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ABSTRACT
Botswana's pattern of economic growth during its first
two decades of Independence has been hailed by many
economists as representing a model for successful
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. From the 1970s the
development of the diamond industry provided the main
impetus to this economic growth, and allowed the
government to make rapid improvements in the provision of
rural health care, primary education, and water supplies.
However, despite these improvements to the rural
infrastructure little has been achieved in stimulating or
even maintaining rural incomes and levels of employment.
The nutritional status and economic well-being of a
substantial proportion of the rural population remains
precarious, especially during periods of drought. This
thesis argues that the present structure of economic
development serves to preserve and intensify these
existing patterns of inequality rather than allay them.
The first two sections of the thesis are concerned with
the political economy of the country, and the nature and
spatial distribution of rural poverty. I argue that the
key to an understanding of this rural poverty lies in the
changing socio-economic role of livestock over the last
fifty years, and the emergence of new class structures
based on the ownership of cattle. A growing exclusivity
in the control of water sources and grazing, encouraged
during the colonial period amongst the tribal elite, led
to a growing inequality in income and assets and the
breakdown of traditional redistributive mechanisms in the
rural economy. It was this privileged and educated tribal
elite, now largely divested of its tribal and kinship
obligations, that gained political power on Independence,
and which now forms collectively the largest group of
livestock owners in the country. With access to lucrative
overseas markets, what had emerged as a growing
Abstract x
contradiction between the private ownership of herds and
the continued communal tenure of grazing land, is now
being resolved by sweeping changes to the structure of
land tenure. Whereas water borehole syndicates in the
past had had (theoretically at least) an open membership
and did. not preclude the grazing of smaller herds, the
new land tenure policies now promise an exclusive control
over water and grazing on fenced ranches. The existence
of these ranches now threaten the very subsistence base
of many marginal groups.
An assessment of the government's commitment to tackling
the problems of rural poverty can, be derived from a study
of its own welfare programmes. The third section of the
thesis is concerned with the nature and effectiveness of
the food aid and labour based relief programmes over the
period 1982-88. Whilst these programmes have averted
widespread starvation, they have done little to protect
or restore the productive assets of the poor. Rather they
have served to mask the structural nature of rural
poverty and inequality and left the process of
privatisation of the commons to continue unchallen ged. In
some cases they have also failed to achieve the more
modest objective of alleviating malnutrition: an analysis
of relief food distribution for the period reveals
serious shortfalls to those marginal groups most at risk.
The final chapter summarises the main findings of the
thesis and concludes that the fundamental issue of
unequal access to productive assets such as cattle,
grazing and water remains unresolved, reflecting the low
priority afforded by the political elite to the plight of
the poor. Without seeking to be prescriptive, it argues
for a radical departure from the present pattern of
economic development to one based upon a more equal
access to productive assets.
Map of Botswana	 xi
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
From the early 1980s, an increasing amount of literature
in the field of development economics began to focus
attention on the worsening food situation in sub-Saharan
Africa. Although there had been a small increase in per
capita cereal production over 1979-84 in developing
countries as a whole (of around 2%), the sub- Saharan
region fared considerably worse, and production of
cereals actually fell over the same period. Per capita
cereal production was, on average, some 20% lower in 1985
than it was in 1979, self-sufficiency had declined from
85% to 75% during the same period, and food aid as a
percentage of total imports had increased from 25% to 39%
(Maxwell 1986, p.12).
The problem has been compounded by the fact that many of
the national economies of the region have also suffered
a declining share in world trade, have faced dwindling
foreign exchange earnings, and a decrease in public
revenues available for investment in rural development.
For the region as a whole, the debt/service ratio as a
measure of the proportion of export earnings required to
meet debt repayments, rose from 4.6% to 20.3% during the
period 1974 to 1983 (Sin ger 1987, p.41). In addition,
drought, pestilence and civil war have continued to
devastate large areas of the region, leaving many rural
subsistence economies shattered, and producing declining
levels of income and nutritional standards for the great
mass of the rural population.
The present study focuses on the situation of the rural
poor in Botswana, and was conceived and researched during
a two and a half year period spent in the country
attached to the Ministry of Local Government and Lands,
as a Food Management and Logistics Advisor to the Food
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Resources Department (FRD). Botswana provides an
interesting area of study for development economists on
several counts. Geographically, it is situated in perhaps
the most politically sensitive area of Southern Africa,
and yet remains one of the few multi-party democracies in
the region, having recently celebrated (in 1986) its
first twenty years of Independence and internal
stability. 1 Firmly committed to a market economy
structure, it has sustained the high rates of economic
growth that were first established in the mid-1970s with
the development of the mineral industry. World Bank
statistics indicate Botswana's economy had the highest
rate of growth in Africa during 1.970-78, at an average of
16.1% per annum, and in 1983 it surpassed South Africa to
become the world's third largest producer of diamonds
(Picard 1987, p.232). Despite the fact that the country
has only recently begun to recover from what has perhaps
been its most severe drought this century, with per
capita cereal production in 1986 falling to just under
56% of 1970-80 levels, 2 it has emerged with more than
adequate foreign currency reserves, and no pressing
balance of payments problems.
The country's impressive growth rate since the mid-1970s,
fuelled by rising mineral revenues, has enabled the
government to achieve an enviable record in the provision
of primary education and health care in the rural areas,
and it is largely because of this that Botswana continues
to be seen almost as a "text-book" example of successful
development in the Third World. As one observer has
1 Sandford (1983, p.280) ascribed Botawana's 'openness' to outside research as largely the result of the 'hitherto
considerable political cohesion of the country's important interest groups which makes politically inconvenient
research findings less of a threat.'
2 Calculated from per capita production tables in World Bank (1987), p.63.
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argued:
• . stringent efforts have been made to see to
it that everyone, however poor and wherever he
lives, can have his health looked after, see
his children going to school, drink clean water
and in extremity, obtain relief from actual
starvation" (Egner 1979, p.14).
However, the maintenance of adequate levels of nutrition
is a necessary but only partial approach to human
resource development. Many of the benefits of Botswana's
economic growth have hardly touched the mass of the rural
population of subsistence arable farmers, because both
their output and resulting overall levels of income
remain largely unaffected by existing patterns of
mineral-led growth. For the majority of the population
engaged in dryland farming, incomes derived from cereal
production still remain dependent on the vagaries of the
weather and overall rainfall patterns, and Botswana has
one of the least promising climates for traditional
rainfed agriculture in the whole of the sub-Saharan
region.
For the broad mass of the rural poor, relief from actual
starvation during periods of drought has been maintained
largely through the aegis of the international donor
community. Botswana has been a recipient of food aid from
the mid-1960s, which has been channelled through the
country's network of health facilities, primary schools
and remote area settlements. These major food'
distribution programmes are financed by the World Food
Programme 4 and supplemented with donations from the EEC,
According to a study by Bush, 70,250 households out of a total of 82,000 in Botawana produced no crop at all
in 1983, and between 1981-3, the hiring of rural labour fell by 36%. Bush (1985), pp.59-63.
The total value of VFP food aid to Botswana during the period 1963 to 1987 was $133 aillion (WFP 1987e, p.1)
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USAID and other bilateral donors. They run even in non-
drought years, albeit in a scaled-down form.
Even with these institutional provisions for rural
household food security, the persistent level of
malnutrition in just over 25% of children under five
years of age, even in non-drought years, implies that
despite the country's impressive growth rate, rapid
improvements to the rural infrastructure, and
considerable flows of food aid, a sizeable proportion of
rural households experience chronic food deficits which
are related to low incomes and lack of assets (RoB, MFDP
1985, p.5). By 1987, nearly two-thirds of the total
population of • the country were receiving supplementary
food aid of one kind or another.(RoB, FRD, 1987).
The central argument of this study is that rural poverty
is on the increase in Botswana, and that the primary
motive force behind this process is not - as commonly
assumed - recurrent periods of drought (which have served
only to hasten the process), but rather the pattern of
economic development itself. This pattern was already
well established during the Protectorate when the tribal
elite was actively encouraged to develop its own
livestock water sources, not for the tribe as a whole,
but increasingly for syndicate or private use. With the
growth of external markets for Protectorate beef and the
development of a commercial livestock sector, the period
saw a changing socio-economic role in the holding of'
livestock and a growing exclusivity in the control of
grazing and water sources. These developments were
accompanied by an increasing polarisation in the
distribution of cattle ownership and the breakdown of
many traditional redistributive mechanisms. It was the
social and economic differentiation that evolved between
the predominantly subsistence traditional sector on the
one hand, and the emergent commercial sector on the
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other, that provided the backdrop against which future
land tenure policy was formulated after Independence.
Although motivated ostensibly by similar concerns over
population growth and ecological deterioration as in
other pastoral societies elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa,
Botswana has taken a distinctly different path with
regard to land tenure, and this reflects the fact that,
unlike most other pastoralist societies in the region,
Botswana's herd owners form a sizable and politically
dominant minority. Ownership of cattle remains the key to
rural wealth, and figures on cattle distribution may be
used as a proxy for wider' patterns of social
differentiation (Hinderinck & Sterkenburg 1987, p.79).
This is reflected in the degree of state involvement in
the commercialisation process, and there exists a high
correlation between status within the civil service and
the ownership of cattle (Picard 1987, p.147). According
to Picard, the total number of this political elite,
including cabinet members, parliamentarians, district
councillors and other specialised political actors, is
probably less than 250. With less than 7,000 employees in
the formal private sector enjoying significant salaries,
and 18,000 employees in the central and unified local
government service, no single group can rival the
government apparatus in terms of size, economic status
and political influence.
New land tenure legislation was introduced in Botswana in
1975 in the shape of the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy. The
TGLP is already having a profound effect on some marginal
groups such as the Basarwa, as more and more communal land
and water resources are being enclosed and effectively
privatised. The Policy has not simply left the mass of
the rural population at the level of subsistence at which
it has, historically, always struggled to survive. The
wealthier stockholders have been able to enlarge their
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herds and gain control over scarce water resources at the
expense of the rural poor, whose subsistence base itself
is now increasingly coming under threat.
Some of the more disturbing effects that emerged with the
development of commercial ranching under the TGLP land
tenure changes can be seen at first hand in the evolving
social relationships between the main Tswana groups and
the Basarwa hunter-gatherers, particularly in the more
remote areas of the country. What had developed over
centuries as a symbiotic, semi-feudal relationship is now
rapidly giving way to an impersonal cash nexus as more
and more communally held land is commercialised and the
hunter-gatherers are moved on, often with little or no
compensation. In a SAREC report of 1979, Dahl & Hjort
(1979, p.32) suggest that the acquisition of individual
land rights to grazing can rapidly transform a pastoral
society to a class society, with proletarianised herdsmen
working for local capitalist ranches. My own research for
the present study indicates that wage levels, working
conditions and nutritional status on the freehold ranches
are amongst the worst in the country. Other independent
studies also suggest that the current poverty of the
Basarwa is due more to the changes in access to their
resource base with the commercial expansion of livestock,
than to the harsh ecological conditions of their
environment (Hitchcock (1978), Russell (1979), Stephen
(1982), and Picard (1987). Guenther's study of
proletarianised Basarwa on the freehold farms of Ghanzi
paints a particularly disturbing picture, and one that is
likely to become more common in the future with the
expansion of leasehold ranches.
The exclusive rights to grazing and water resources that
the TGLP bestows has allowed many of the larger
stockholders to gain access to the lucrative overseas
markets in the EEC, and obtain a price for their beef
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substantially higher than exists in alternative local or
regional markets. The bureaucracy has therefore a vested
interest in using the state apparatus as an instrument of
power in the process of commercialisation, and this is
reflected in the amount of government funds accruing to
livestock owners in the form of subsidies.
A wide literature exists on the concept of the post-
colonial state and the issue of whether new elites have
been more interested in appropriating the colonial
heritage than in the fundamental restructuring of society
and political economy (Meillassoux 1970, pp.97-110;
Arrighi & Saul 1973, pp.11-43; Leys 1975; Ake 1981; Hart,
1982). In Botswana, it was the tribal Chiefs who gained
most from the process of commercialisation during the
Protectorate. Cliff & Moorsom (1979, p.37) point out that
as they received a commission for the collection of taxes
from the colonial administration, the Tswana nobility was
able to maintain its preferential position throughout the
colonial period. They used their control over native
treasuries and labour to increase their personal wealth
on the hoof, until the increasing scope for commercial-
isation in the 1950s and 1960s enabled them to transform
this wealth into capital. After Independence, the Chiefs
were able to assume the political control over the
industry that was denied them during the period of the
Protectorate. Parson (1974, p.239-24O) argues that a
clear continuity exists between the present generation of
political and administrative elites and the pre-colonial
tribal rulers.5
The Chiefs' early economic gains during the colonial
period often allowed their families and relatives
privileged access not only to material resources, but to
Fora description of the roleof the iefs in public service see Jones (1983), pp.133-9. A reviewof Botswana's
political parties Is provided by Polleaus, (1983), pp.39?-430.
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a level of education in South Africa or Rhodesia
unobtainable at that time in the Protectorate. This is
not to say that all the Tswana Chiefs actively
collaborated with the British administration but does
suggest that they were in the best position to benefit
financially from the increasing commercialisation
process. Crowder's paper on Tshekedi Khama illustrates
the Bangwato Chief's sustained opposition to British rule
throughout his period as Regent of the largest Tswana
state. (Crowder 1985)
After Independence, this level of education enabled them
to reach dominant positions within the new state
apparatus, and government bureaucrats now form the major
component of the dominant economic elite, with civil
service salaries providing the basis for the wealth of
private investment funds flowing into the livestock
industry. In her study of rural poverty, Brown (1983,
p.126) points out that in Botswana there is a clear
connection between ownership of assets and the level of
attainment in education. Whilst writing on a more general
level, Foster (1980, pp.201-236) maintains that there is
a substantial chance that secondary and tertiary levels
of schooling in Africa may have done as much to enhance
current inequalities as it has done to remove them.6
The role of the state in the colonial and post—colonial
development process, particularly in the field of rural
development and agricultural commodity production, has a
particular significance for Africa as a whole and also
has a wide literature (Cliffe, Coleman & Doornbos 1977;
Ake 1981; Bates 1981, pp.147-157; Dumont & Mottin, 1983).
6 As we will see in Chapter Three, the preiiui attached to higher levels of educational achieeeent in Botswana
(especially after its neglect during the Protectorate) has done little to break down existing lewis of inequality.
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Picard (1981) argues that in Botswana, the District
Councils have not shifted their role orientation since
Independence towards development tasks because the
country's political elites see political mediation and
social control as having a higher priority. During
periods of drought however, it is the District Councils
that assume an executive role in both human and livestock
relief operations, using staff seconded from council
duties. This is precisely when the government's true
development priorities surface as there is a
disproportionate amount of time and manpower spent on the
livestock element of the programme while management of
the relief food distribution remains poor and chronically
short of adequately trained personnel. This is reflected
particularly in the design, management and execution of
Labour Based Relief projects.
Since the mid-1970s, the larger stockholders have been
able to consolidate their position of economic power by
political means under the guise of land reform. Picard
(1980, pp.313-356) maintains that the TGLP, whilst aimed
at tackling the problems of range conservation and a
rapidly diminishing resource base for the smaller
subsistence farmers, bore little political commitment to
either. The Policy was more concerned with the creation
of the legal and institutional framework necessary to
advance the essentially commercial interests of the
political elite itself.
Hinderinck & Sterkenburg's study (1987, p.184) of
agricultural commercialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa
comes to a similar conclusion: that Botswana's
development strategy since Independence reflects the
rather narrow objectives of meeting growth targets and
attaches second place to redistribution and social
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justice goals. Hoim and Morgan (1985, p.463) noted that
"The Government of Botswana is openly committed
to an approach of development that accepts a
certain degree of inequality as necessary for
capital mobilisation.
As we will see in Chapter Four, the degree of inequality
that does exist (in income levels, and access to
productive assets such as cattle), is already high and
increasing.
Though the commercialisation of agriculture, together
with an improved physical and institutional
infrastructure may be considered a necessary condition
for rural development, it can also widen income
disparities, polarise still further the ownership of
productive assets, and promote the exploitation of
labour. 1 That a rapid growth of national income in
developing countries is perfectly consistent with the
stagnation, or even decline, in the living conditions of
the lowest income groups has been well documented by
Fishlow (1972, p.391-4O2), Hodd (1976, pp.221-8), Cliffe
et al (1988) and others.
This growing inequality of access to productive assets,
and the reluctance of the Botswana government elite to
adequately address the fundamental problems of declining
rural incomes and unemployment levels, is a recurrent
theme throughout this study. In essence, it sets out to
show in an inductive fashion that in a market orientated
economy with increasing levels of social and economic
differentiation, there are likely to be inherent
contradictions between unconstrained economic growth on
the one hand, and equity on the other. Such a process can
Vage rates on the couercial fans of the Tuli Block, for exaaple are substantially below •iniiu. rates
established by the Governient for its own unskilled workers, and the rates of .alnutritlon uongst the children
living on the fans is aiongst the highest in the country.
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culminate in a growing immiseration for the poor, chronic
malnutrition and even death by starvation, brings into
question whether Botswana really is a "text-book" example
of successful "development".
The study itself is divided into three distinct but
interrelated sections: the first traces the historical
roots of rural poverty and class formation in Botswana
during the Protectorate, and the political significance
of its growing economic ties with South Africa. As part
of the price of British "protection" from the Boer
settlers, colonial rule alienated the indigenous
population from some of the best arable land in the
country. 8 The increasing monetisation of the economy due
to the imposition of taxes, which were collected by the
Chiefs on a commission basis, 9 brought about a breakdown
in the traditional redistributive mechanisms in tribal
society (particularly in relation to the exchange of
labour and livestock use), and the emergence of new class
structures and property relations. This led to a
corresponding disparity in the distribution of wealth and
productive resources. Evidence of profound economic and
societal change influenced by the influx of European
settlers and external markets appeared even before the
formal declaration of the Protectorate in 1885. Parsons
relates that property rights to cattle in Botswana were
first established by Chief Khama I of the Bangwato tribe
after 1875 (Parsons 1977, p.119). The Chief's followers -
who already controlled large herds due to their position
in the political hierarchy - stood to gain most from this
8 The Tuli Block area (see Map 1), along the border with South Africa was given to the British South African
Coapany (BSAC) for the building of the Mafeking-Bulawayo railway through the Protectorate. It was subsequently
sold by the BSAC on a freehold basis to white settlers and today foras the uain irrigated area of arable land.
Parson (1975) notes that the Bangwato chief Khaaa's share of the Hut Tar in 1916 uounted to £1700 per annua,
a not inconsiderable sui in those days.
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development, as it at once freed them from mafisa 10
obligations and allowed them to trade openly with the
established European trading stations. This represented
an important watershed in the economic and political
development of the Tswana peoples and was to have far
reaching consequences for the future of traditional
society.
Agricultural commercialisation is not in itself a new
phenomenon in the sub-Saharan region and had existed in
small pockets for centuries before the colonial period:
surpluses were produced and exchanged both within and
between small communities, which were sometimes
integrated into wider economic networks and political
units. Though as a result, some element of social
differentiation must have occurred, the limited means of
production and capacity would have allowed little more
than personal services to be conspicuously consumed.
Moreover, differentiation in socio-economic position
implied differences in obligations as well as in assets,
and numerous levelling mechanisms existed to prevent the
occurrence of extreme inequalities (Hinderink &
Sterkenburg 1987, p.25). The distinction therefore
between the forms of commercialisation existing in pre-
colonial society and those established during the
Protectorate is a crucial one, and not simply of scale.
In the former, economic life was not dominated by
impersonal forces of supply and demand, and market prices
did not serve to allocate resources, incomes and outputs.
The labour input for such production was primarily
provided by the family and wage labour in farming was
virtually unknown (Fallers 1964; Feldmann 1975). By
contrast, a process of capitalist commercialisation in
agriculture implies an increasing monetisation in the
10 Mafisa involved the use and distribution of the larger herds beyond the iuediate family and was an iiportaxit
levelling aechanisa,
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economy, a system of deliberate production for the
market, and relates specifically to the social attitudes,
motivations and behaviourial patterns of the agricultural
producers themselves.
Schapera (1943, 1947, 1970) is perhaps the most important
and influential personal witness of the impact of these
structural changes on Tswana society, particularly during
the 1930s and 1940s. He writes:
"The economic reciprocity which entered so
strongly into the relations between Chief and
subjects, and which formed one of the vital
features of the native economic system, has
broken down completely. The Chief no longer
plays the part of tribal banker: his function
as the holder and distributor of all the
surplus wealth has been obliterated by the new
economic forces. . . instead of working for the
Chief, (the people) now worked for themselves:
the accumulation of wealth became a motive in
the life of every native." (Schapera 1943,
p.'50)
The late South African novelist Bessie Head has also
produced an interesting documentary cameo of traditional
society in its transitional stage, based on personal
interviews conducted in her adopted village of Serowe
(Head, 1981).
With production orientated towards external demands for
labour and livestock, Botswana became a reserve on the
periphery of the South African economy. This position was
maintained and reinforced by European trading interests
within Botswana itself and in South Africa. Parson (1975,
pp.383-408) gives an interesting account of how these
interests were directed against any indigenous attempt to
make the state self-reliant. According to Pim, in a
report commissioned in 1932 by the British Secretary of
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State for Dominion Affairs on the Protectorate,
"The main factor in destroying the old
subsistence economy has been. • .the introduction
of a money economy, and more especially of
taxation levied in money...to pay taxes the
Native has to raise money and he could do this
only by selling his possessions to European
traders or by going outside his Reserve to earn
money in European service (HMSO, 1933, pp.23-.
24).
Migrant labour is acknowledged by almost all writers on
Southern Africa as having had a profound effect on
traditional society and the integrity of the family, and
some have argued that such migration is one consequence
of the historical development of capitalism and the
geographical concentration of the means of production in
particular regions (Arrighi 1970, pp.l97-234; Legassick
& Wolpe 1976, pp.87-107). In Botswana, Schapera studied
the impact of migrant labour over a period of many years
and noted that one of the effects was the emergence of
the female headed household in the 1930s (Schapera 1970).
A more recent study by the FAQ in 1974 and commissioned
by the Government of Botswana found that female headed
households are less likely to own productive assets such
as livestock, and are consequently disadvantaged when it
comes to agricultural activities. They therefore figure
amongst the poorest of all social groups (FAO, 1974, WFP
1985d, WFP 1985e, Cliffe et al, 1988). Brown (1983) in a
study of the particular effects of male labour migration
on women, argues that womens' earlier access to income
and wealth was secure as they were productive members of
a kin group headed by men. As land and cattle became
privatised, women have been unable to maintain access to
these resources (Dahi, 1987). Studies made in Botswana by
two UN agencies (UNDP et al, 1985; UNICEF, 1986) both
note the particular vulnerability of female headed
households during recurrent periods of drought.
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The pattern of development established during the
Protectorate, because it was directed at the growth of an
economic surplus in the commercial livestock sector (in
order to maximise one of the few sources of taxable
revenue), also had the effect of vesting an increasing
amount of wealth and power in a small, privileged elite.
In this process, the power, aspirations and perceptions
of the elite were changed and, upon Independence, its
interests were brought into conflict with those of the
majority (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.243).
The second section of the study examines the increasingly
dualistic structure of economic growth since
Independence, • the progressive divergence between
subsistence and commercial livestock production, current
trends in rural employment and incomes, and the nature
and spatial distribution of rural poverty in Botswana.
Much useful background information on the natural
climatic constraints acting upon traditional dryland crop
production is provided by the occasional publications of
the National Institute of Development Research and
Documentation, University of Botswana, (NIR, 1983). Data
on rainfall patterns during the 1982-87 drought, and
their deviation from the long-term mean, have been
published by the Department of Meteorological Services in
Gaborone (RoB, 1987). This section also looks at the
crucial issue of the land tenure changes (the Tribal
Grazing Lands Policy) currently being pursued by the
Botswana Government and now characterised by the
enclosure of some hitherto communal grazing areas and the
alienation of smaller herd owners from both land and
water resources. The ideological rationale behind the
TGLP is examined and an assessment made of its socio-
economic impact on hunter-gatherer and other marginal
groups.
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Most studies of the severity and distribution of rural
poverty in modern Botswana are based on the Rural Income
Distribution Survey (RIDS) conducted in 1974, and based
on a sample of 950 randomly selected rural households in
some twenty areas, surveyed once a month throughout the
year (RoB, Central Statistics Office, 1975). Watanabe &
Mueller (1984, pp.115-127) used RIDS data to compile a
profile of rural poverty in Botswana by deriving a
"poverty income ratio", based on the Government's own
"poverty datum line" which varied with individual
household size, age and sex. The data revealed a high
level of income inequality and argued that the basic
problem of rural poverty in Botswana was the
maldistributionof productive assets between the various
income groups.
The RIDS is, at the time of writing, the latest national
survey of rural income structures in Botswana that has
been published, although another similar study is due to
be published in the near future. Though this might
indicate that any judgment on present poverty trends may
be premature, evidence from regional studies conducted
since 1974, together with known data on malnutrition
rates, cattle mortality rates amongst smaller herds, and
the general severity of the 1982-88 drought, all indicate
the strong likelihood that both the extent and severity
of rural poverty have increased in recent years, and that
the dominant trend is towards a greater polarisation of
assets and income. A study by various UN agencies in 1985
and commissioned by the Government's own Interministerial
Drought Committee would seem to confirm this trend, even
without the impact of drought (UNDP et al, 1985).
Colcough & McCarthy's 1980 study of the political economy
of Botswana remains perhaps the best general analysis of
the country's pattern of development and the interaction
between its national bourgeoisie and political elite.
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More recent papers edited by Harvey (1981) and Oommen et
al (1983) have focused on the growth of livestock and
mineral extraction industries since Independence, and the
increasing significance of the SACU revenues to the
Botswana Government. A more in-depth study of the
development of the livestock industry, and the means by
which the political elite were able to expand and control
this important sector in their own interests after
Independence, is provided by Hubbard (1983,1986). Most
studies on Botswana have recognised the crucial
relationship between cattle ownership, income, and social
differentiation, and noted that access to the lucrative
beef export markets is dominatedby the larger breeders
(Cliffe & Moorsom 1979; Colcough & McCarthy 1980;
Sandford (1983); Hubbard, 1983, 1986; World Bank, 1985).
Though livestock rearing remains an important activity in
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, its commercialisation
in the sense of directly producing for the market is
still relatively a rare phenomenon. Livestock is still
usually seen by most pastoralist and transhumant
societies in the traditional sense, as a means of
accumulating wealth and social prestige (Konczacki, 1978;
USAID, 1986). In Botswana, though marginal stockholders
still see livestock primarily as a means of financial
security during periods of drought and crop failure, the
commercialisation of livestock has been a dominant
feature of the post-Independence economy.
The evidence for a rapid and growing commercialisation in
Botswana is clear. Between the end of the drought in 1965
and 1978, the national herd grew from one million to
nearly three million head. With the national herd
standing at around 300,000 in 1900, this implies a ten
fold increase up to 1978 (Colcough & Fallon, 1983). The
growing commercialisation in livestock can also be showed
by the national offtake rate (the proportion of the
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national herd slaughtered each year), which was 3% in
1930, 6% in 1950, 10% in 1960 (Konczacki, 1978) rising to
13% by the mid-1970s (McDonald, 1978). A USAID (1986,
pp.23,115) evaluation study estimated the offtake rate in
the commercial sector itself at 15.6% in 1983, which
compares with only 4-8% in Kenya after the World Bank
Livestock Development Programme (Phase II), a programme
which was aimed primarily at the commercialisation of
livestock and had started in the mid-1970s.
The rapid progress of the commercialisation process after
the 1930s was due to a combination of factors, including
the introduction of new borehole drilling technology, the
formation of boorehole syndicates (particularly by the
tribal elite) and the incorporation of new grazing land
that followed in its wake. It was to have important
repercussions on the structure and direction of land
tenure policies after Independence.
Customary law with regards to water distinguished between
naturally occurring sources such as rivers, ponds and
pans, and those derived from individual or group effort,
such as hand-dug wells. Whilst the former was seen as
being owned communally, the latter was often subject to
more restricted use. (USAID 1986, p.101). However, as
these hand-dug wells were generally low yielding and even
ephemeral in nature, exclusive individual or group
control did not confer a significant advantage over non-
owners of similar water sources; nor did it necessarily
allow for larger herds. During the 1930s, however, the
introduction of deep borehole drilling technology not
only extended the ecological zone suitable for grazing
all year round, but in the process brought on major
changes in land use patterns, size and distribution of
herds. It also brought about the de facto ownership of
grazing land, as water use was now restricted to the
owner of the borehole. Their introduction not only
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increased the potential for the commercial development of
livestock but at the same time, the potential for a
growing inequality and social differentiation.
The boreholes were expensive to drill and their use was
therefore generally restricted to the tribal elite and
other large stock owners, although district council funds
were also used to site new boreholes to relieve existing
areas of high grazing density. Hitchcock's detailed study
for the MFDP in 1978 indicates that many district council
owned boreholes drilled by the Protectorate
administration in the western sandveld (to relieve
grazing pressure in the eastern hardveld) had been sold
off to private, individuals by the time the TGLP was
introduced in the mid-1970s. This is confirmed by a USAID
study (1986, p.107). Colcough & Fallon's study for the
ILO in 1983 notes that the larger cattle owners' position
was also strengthened by the government's policy bias in
respect of land allocation and borehole drilling rights,
which was seen by the colonial administration as the
first example of indigenous water resource development
and actively encouraged. However, a study of the
development of borehole syndicates in Kgatleng District
noted that, far from being a local initiative for and on
behalf of the tribe, this development soon led to a
growing exclusivity in the control of water sources and
paved the way forward to a future privatisation of the
commons. (Peters 1983).
With these changes in the forces of production has
developed a process of social transformation and the
emergence of new values of economic individualism. The
production advantages that ownership of the boreholes
bestowed, together with the growing market orientation of
the larger stockholders, further entrenched the already
skewed distribution of cattle that had developed from the
fragmentation of the tribal herds,
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The skewed distribution of livestock also contributed to
the emergence of a growing duality in the sector, as
smaliholders continued to pursue a subsistence level
mixed farming strategy, whilst the larger stockholders
produced solely for the market. The rapid increase in
public sector employment that accompanied the growth in
the mineral extraction industries, and the growth of non-
agricultural economic activities, added to this duality
as it allowed an increase in the amount of private
investment in cattle. The commercial banks played a
leading role in this investment, and a 1982 study by
Makgetla notes the failure of the banks to direct
investible funds into alternative development projects,
due largely to the lack of acceptable collateral of most
loan applicants without livestock (Makgetla 1982, pp.69-
86)
Colcough & McCarthy's 1980 study showed that the incomes
policy pursued by the Government since the mid-1970s had
exacerbated rural deprivation as it had allowed public
sector salaries to rise without establishing a minimum
wage in agriculture and in herding. With the collapse of
rural employment opportunities in agriculture during
periods of drought, wage levels tended to fall and many
smaller herd owners could no longer afford to maintain
their stock. When this happened, the cattle were often
sold off to the larger stockholders before they died of
hunger. This had a dual effect: first, the larger
stockholders could buy up emaciated stock at low prices,
and secondly, the smaller stockholder was now even more
dependent on deriving an income from wage labour. This
process not only reinforced a downward spiral in wage
levels, but enhanced still further the capacity of the
larger stockholder to command the use of that wage
labour. Furthermore, the system of taxation after this
date was regressive, allowing the formation of new
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echelons of bureaucrats amongst the urban elite (Colcough
& McCarthy, 1980).
Traditional societies, which are characterised by their
subordination of individual to communal interests and the
prevalence of personal over contractual relationships,
have been seen as inherently inefficient and hindering,
rather than promoting, economic and social progress.
Similarly, customary land tenure, the communal ownership
of other productive assets, and the importance given to
social and cultural considerations in economic decision
making, have often been criticised as being incompatible
with long term development needs, and in sub-Saharan
Africa, detrimental to the long term ecology of the
region. Such arguments, based on a rather uncritical
acceptance of the "Tragedy of the Commons" paradigm first
popularised by Hardin (1968) would at first sight appear
to be particularly applicable to Botswana: overgrazing,
range degradation and consequent herd loss are
encountered throughout the communal grazing areas of the
eastern hardveld (USAID 1986, p.120). Cattle left to roam
unguarded during the day tend to use the same trek routes
and these low-lying areas become natural run-offs when
the rains come, causing severe soil erosion due to the
lack of vegetation, especially around the larger
villages. As a result, livestock development policies
such as the TGLP (which sought to introduce a greater
exclusivity to land use), have been seen throughout the
sub-Saharan region in recent years as an essential
element of the development process, by government and
donor community alike."
The TGLP has since been criticised on several counts.
First, the rationale for the TGLP is based on the premise
See USAID (1986), for a coiparative evaluation of the various Vorld Bank and AID financed livestock developuent
projects,
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that traditional pastoralism on communally held land is
inherently inefficient and ecologically unsound. This has
been challenged by several observers (Hitchcock (1978),
Dahl & Hjort (1979), Sandford (1983) and others, who all
argue that the "Tragedy" paradigm was based more on a
priori assumptions about human nature than on empirical
evidence from pastoralist societies. Mazonde (1987) notes
that in Botswana overstocking and range degradation are
not limited to the communal areas, but occurs throughout
the freehold farm blocks. Sandford (1983) argues that it
is extremely difficult to ascertain on any scientific
basis the level of overgrazing at which permanent and
irreversible damage is done to the range, and in most
cases "overgrazing" may only be a cyclical phenomenon
occurring with periods of drought, when the stock
carrying capacity of the range is diminished. Where
serious and permanent range degradation has occurred it
has usually been associated with areas around deep
boreholes. (Oxby (1975); Sandford (1983); Livingstone
(1986). The inference that may be drawn from this is that
provided adequate measures for de-stocking are carried
out during the early periods of drought, and provided
that new water sources are smaller and more evenly spaced
(to reduce stock densities), communal pastoralism remains
an ecologically sound economic activity.
Secondly, the size of herd required under the TGLP makes
it unlikely to be of benefit to anyone but the very
wealthiest of stockholders. The amalgamation of several
smaliholders is not generally feasible, as the real
economic benefits of having a TGLP ranch lie in the
exclusivity of access to grazing land and water that it
confers. Hitchcock's field study confirms this, as he
notes that the main motive for stockholders applying for
a TGIJP ranch was to evict people off the land (Hitchcock,
1978). For the same reason, the assignment of individual
smaliholders to discrete areas of land within a ranch is
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not feasible either: private grazing lands require
individual water supplies which cannot be capitalised
upon by the modest offtake of a smaliholding.
A major proportion of the financial costs of the TGLP was
provided by World Bank loans administered under the aegis
of the Second Livestock Development Project, which began
in 1977. The model ranch envisaged by the TGLP supports
a herd of at least 500 head, the minimum considered
necessary to generate an offtake that would finance
private water development and other ranch costs. The TGLP
was based essentially on the argument that the benefits
that would accrue in terms of economies of scale,
increased output and income would offset the loss of
welfare incurred by the displacement of the smaller
stockholders already using the land. Konczacki (1978,
p.145-6) saw the planned privatisation of communal land
and water resources in Botswana under the TGLP as
"a major step forward in the right
direction...the land boards can play a crucial
role in closing the gap between the rich and
the poor".
Similar arguments were put forward by the Chambers &
Feldman consultancy in 1973, which first formulated the
framework for the new TGLP (Chambers & Feldman, 1973).
However, the "trickle-down" argument for the TGLP cannot
be sustained as the taxation of livestock in Botswana is
almost completely offset by the extensive range of
government subsidies available to stockholders, and the
very low rents (at P0.04 per hectare per annum) paid for
the ranches (World Bank, 1985). Other studies of the
social effects of the TGLP have been equally scathing.
Masalila (then the Permanent Under Secretary of the MLGL
- the Ministry charged with the implementation of the
TGLP) was particularly critical of the implementation of
the policy (Masalila, 1983), whilst studies by Weimer,
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Colcough & McCarthy, Hubbard, and Picard have expressed
serious concern over the likely effects of the Policy on
the poor, particularly marginal groups such as the
Basarwa (Weimer 1977, p.46; Colcough & McCarthy 1980;
Stephen 1982; Hubbard 1983, 1986; Picard 1980, 1987).
The USAID evaluation of land tenure and livestock
development in Sub-Saharan Africa saw Botswana's TGLP as
an important milestone in land tenure policy:
"The Tribal Land Act (of 1968) was a critical
instrument in reforging institutional
arrangements and channels away from rural based
traditional centres of power towards modern-
sector elites, possessing more cosmopolitan
economic outlooks and less tied to constraints
of reciprocity and social obligation,
characteristic of leadership roles in customary
society" (USAID 1986, p.104).
Lease and contract methods of assigning exclusive grazing
areas to individuals can be viewed as diminishing the
rights and freedom to land use that had previously been
held on a communal basis. Far from relieving the
overgrazed commons by the removal of large private herds
to commercial ranches, the TGLP has increased communal
range deterioration as the herds are invariably returned
during periods of drought, when the grazing in leasehold
ranches is exhausted. The USAID study notes that this is
a common recurrence in all World Bank/USAID funded
livestock projects in the Sub-Saharan region (USAID 1986,
p.44). Because drought tends to affect smaller herds much
quicker than larger ones, it merely speeds up a pre-
existing process of concentration in livestock, 12 of which
the TGLP is only the latest development. The larger
stockholders not only benefit most from the range of
subsidies available, but are often able to increase their
12 The high iortality of sialler herds, even when grazed in si.ilar areas to larger herds, is often due to the
increased deiand for iilk froi the herder's own faaily competing with that of calves.
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herds during drought by buying up weak and emaciated
cattle from the smaller herders (World Bank, 1985).
The third and final section of the study is an analysis
of both short and long-term strategies for household food
security in Botswana, with its main focus of attention on
the 1982-88 drought relief programme. In particular, an
assessment is made of the effectiveness of the response
to the drought from both the Botswana government and the
donor community. For the government, the nature and
efficacy of its response to both the drought and its
other poverty-orientated programmes is a valuable
indicator of its commitment to social justice, of which
the alleviation f rural poverty and deprivation is the
most essential element. This section makes a qualitative
analysis of the way the current drought relief programme
was managed, discusses the nutritional requirements and
supplementary feeding programmes of Vulnerable Groups and
primary school children, and the particular effects of
drought on marginal groups such as destitutes and the
Remote Area Dwellers. It then goes on to provide a
regional assessment of the management and effectiveness
of the relief programme in providing an adequate level of
nutrition for these groups, during the period 1985-88.
This assessment is based essentially on unpuplished
figures supplied to me by the Secretary of the
Interministerial Drought Committee (MFDP), based on data
collected from individual health facilities throughout
the country . Other data is drawn from internal reports
and memoranda provided by the various Ministries,
Government departments, district health teams and UN
agencies involved in the programme's implementation.
For an analysis of the donor community's role in the
drought relief programme, I also provide an in-depth
evaluation of how effectively its food aid was
distributed and utilised during the 1986-88 drought
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years. Beneficiary level and stock utilisation reports
prepared by FRD for submission to the aid donors on a
quarterly basis were felt inadequate for this purpose,
for a variety of reasons. Firstly, figures for the number
of malnourished and severely malnourished children were
often subsumed in the "under five years" beneficiary
category or only quoted in aggregate terms. This meant
that it was not possible to obtain any indication of
general trends or identify areas of high levels of
malnutrition. Secondly, data for food actually
distributed was again presented in aggregate terms with
no regional or district analysis. Moreover, as the aid
programme was being served by a multiplicity of donors,
each of which had to present periodic food utilisation
reports to their respective agencies or governments, this
meant that there existed no comprehensive analysis of
whether food aid distribution was adequate, even on an
aggregate basis. Thirdly, the quarterly reports submitted
by FRD HQ to the various donors were often inaccurate,
particularly where it came to reporting stock losses.'3
Reports were typically submitted a full year behind
schedule, and it was for these reasons that WFP
unilaterally withdrew from the Remote Area Dweller's
programme at the end of 1986.
For the purposes of this study therefore, the assessment
of the distributive performance of the aid programme is
based on unpublished data from the stock analysis ledgers
and beneficiary level reports of the individual FRD
depots. This data was collected and recorded on a daily
basis as the deliveries to individual centres were made,
and then summarised in monthly regional reports in a
specific format designed jointly by myself and the other
Food Management Advisers. This new report format was
13 Perona1 observation in coiparing FRO Quarterly Reports with Etock conderination and write-off authorisation.
in individual FRO depots.
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computerised in early 1986 and further enhanced to
compare calculated food requirements (based on latest
beneficiary figures and ration levels) with actual
distribution. It thus provided not only an assessment of
each depot's monthly distributive performance, but a
useful tool of analysis for logistic and planning
purposes. Once the food requirements were known it became
a simple matter to calculate the stock availability in
months in order to facilitate the timely arrival of donor
shipments or the government's own food purchases for the
programme.
In this section we also examine some of the possible
disincentive effects the food aid might have had on
cereal production and government policy,' 4 and point to
alternative food aid strategies that might be used to
enhance its overall impact on the country's development.
In this regard, the ILO has recently prepared detailed
proposals for expanding the country's Labour Based Relief
Programme (which is primarily intended to provide short-
term employment opportunities during periods of drought)
into a fully fledged public works programme (ILO 1987).
The dilemmas of making aid a more efficient instrument of
development are well illustrated by the experience of
sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest, most heavily aided and
least successful region of the Third World (World Bank
1981). Within a growing literature on the various issues
of aid (Hayter & Watson 1985; Clay & Singer 1985; Wood
1986; Maxwell 1986; WFP 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; Mosley 1987;
Singer et al 1987), Botswana's own experience provides a
particularly useful area of study, not only because it
has been a major recipient of aid since Independence, but
14 Food aid, for exaisple, iay even help to consolidate existing power structures by acting as a palliative to
the host governient' s own developsent policies, relieving what otherwise would be strong political pressures for
ref ora,
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because this aid has been seen as a stimulant to growth
and an "outstanding success" in development terms (Mosley
1987, p.235).
Our main concern in this section is food aid. A recent
Oxford Food Studies Group paper by Hay (1988, pp.1113-
1125) notes that Botswana is generally acknowledged to
have been one of the more successful countries in
avoiding widespread famine deaths during the African
drought of the 1980s, which he attributes, amongst other
things, to its "competent civil service" and "good
relationships with the donor community". Morgan, a former
Secretary of the Interministerial Drought Committee
(IMDC) at the Ministry of Finance & Development Planning,
highlights the success of the country's investment in
primary health care infrastructure, through which the
bulk of its food aid provision flows. Like Hay, he also
notes Botswana's capacity to elicit an adequate level of
response from the donor community (Hoim & Morgan 1985).
Later chapters will question whether in fact such
optimism is justified.
The actual management of the drought relief programme
however, has drawn less praise. A critical evaluation of
the management of Botswana's 1979-80 programme was
provided by the influential Gooch & Macdonald consultancy
report, commissioned by the MFDP and published in June
1981. This report included one element of analysis that
has been a serious omission in past and subsequent
evaluations: an attempt to quantify, on a district and
regional basis, the actual distributive performance of
the programme. A more recent, and equally critical report
of the management of the programme was prepared in 1984
by an expatriate official who had worked at the Food
Resources Department (Borton, 1984). This study attempts
to build on these efforts by presenting an enhanced level
of analysis for 1986-88, which I feel is essential
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because of the important contribution aid provides during
periods of drought to net food flows at the village
level.
The food aid programme in Botswana, though successful on
an aggregate level in averting famine, has only focused
on the symptoms of rural deprivation and has not been
directed at the causes, one of which has been, for some
sections of the rural population, the very land
allocation and commercialisation policies pursued by the
Botswana government. Those marginal groups living in the
remoter areas of the country, for example, have been
particularly affected by the TGLP and yet are least
likely to benefit from the relief aid programme, despite
the fact that field studies estimate that a considerable
proportion of the "Remote Area Dwellers" now depend on
such programmes for more than 80% of their subsistence
needs (Hoim & Morgan 1985, p.467; Guibrandsen, Karlsen,
& Lexow, 1986, p.1). The lack of any data on the absolute
number of RADs now threatened by these land tenure
changes (or are likely to be so threatened in the future)
is itself illustrative of the low priority afforded to
this issue by the Botswana government.
Finally, the section focuses on both the immediate post-
drought recovery plans and longer term development
strategies currently being pursued by the Government of
Botswana and set out in the 1985 "National Food Strategy"
prepared by the MFDP. It argues that the policy strategy
as set out in the NFS, is likely to enhance, not
diminish, rural inequalities and deprivation in what is
now increasingly a class divided society.
The contradiction between rapid economic growth on the
one hand, and burgeoning levels of rural poverty and
deprivation on the other, is not a problem unique to
Botswana. In the past, the aboriginal populations of the
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USA, New Zealand and Australia have been decimated and
deprived of their only means of subsistence, or obliged
to live a precarious existence outside mainstream
society; the fate of similarly marginalised groups such
as the Basarwa may lie along the same path.
In Botswana's case, as in the others, the only lasting
solution for the poor will be a political one, but
exactly what shape and form this solution may take (if at
all) is obviously well beyond the scope of this study.
What is required for Botswana is not a form of utopian
socialism that advocates a return to the old means of
production and exchange, in an attempt to rekindle the
kinship values and moral bonds that once characterised
traditional society. The challenge for the future surely
lies in exploiting Botswana's international comparative
advantage in livestock production, perhaps allied with
the communal ownership of productive assets. When
combined with effective range and water resource
management, this form of pastoralism may not only
preserve the delicate ecological balance of the
Kgalagadi, but also stimulate a revival of economic
reciprocity and promote a form of economic development
that will benefit all Batswana.
SECTION A
THE EVOLUTION OF THE RURAL ECONOMY
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I
THE STRUCTURE OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
a) Geography, Climate and People.
Botswana is some 581,730 square kilometres in area,
slightly smaller than Texas and a little larger than
France. The country is entirely landlocked, being
bordered by the Republic of South Africa to the south -
east and south, Namibia to the west, the Caprivi Strip to
the north, arid by Zimbabwe to the north-east.
Essentially a shallow, sand filled basin with an average
elevation of some 1000 metres, two-thirds of the
country's surface is covered by the Kgalagadi Desert,' and
has a predominantly semi-arid climate. Older rocks lying
beneath the surface emerge in a broad belt along the
eastern border and as scattered outcrops in the west and
extreme north-west. Some of these rocks are of an immense
age, and probably the oldest known rocks in the world.
The Kgalagadi consists of extensive deposits of wind-
blown sand, forming wide flat plains and in some areas,
dunes of varying shape and size, now largely stabilised
with vegetation. Rainfall infiltrates rapidly but the
percolation is not deep, due to the fine spherical nature
of the sand.
Through the northern reaches of the Kgalagadi flows the
Okavango River, winding its way from Angola, and
eventually spreading out first into a massive delta, and
then into a large shallow swamp, which is the dominant
1 The closest English pronunciation would be mKhalahadi', though outside Botswana it is norsaily spelt and
pronounced as 'Kalahari,'
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feature of the region. The Okavango Delta represents the
only extensive area of surface water in Botswana and
transforms the arid sands of the desert into a tropical
paradise of lush vegetation, attracting species of
animals and birds of a bewildering variety and number. By
contrast, much of the rest of the country is covered by
tree savanna which grows on low, rolling dunes and is
interspersed with bush savanna. Botswana has for the most
part a sub-tropical climate but there are local
variations depending on location and environment.
Temperatures can fall as low as -7 degrees centigrade at
night during the winter, rising to as high as 40 degrees
at midday heat in the summer months. Being completely
landlocked and separated from the coast by high plateaux
and mountain ranges, the effective rainfall over much of
Botswana is erratic, unevenly distributed, and
essentially low, being in the region of 250-650mm. More
than 90% of the rain falls in the summer months between
November and April.
While large regions of western and central Botswana are
virtually unoccupied, some 80% of the population is
concentrated in the eastern 400-600mm. rainfall zone,
where soils are of the ferruginous tropical type with
good potential for arable crops. Such is the importance
of an adequate rainfall to Botswana and its people that
the national currency is expressed in units of it.
The harshness of the climate and its general
unsuitability for arable crop production has meant that
historically, farming in Botswana has always been
subsistence in nature with little opportunity for
producing an agricultural surplus. This has meant that
cattle, which are more drought resistant than crops, have
2 The unit of currency in Botswana, the Pula, literally aeans rainN.
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played an important role both culturally and economically
as an insuraiace against crop failure.
The populatin of Botswana is just over 1 million with an
average density of 1.8 persons per square kilometre,
making it the most sparsely populated nation in the world
after Mongolia.
The main ethnic group3 in Botswana are the Tswana who
arrived in the 17th. and 18th. centuries from the area
now stretching from the Northern Cape eastwards through
to the south—western Transvaal. Some 75% of the Tswana
still live in this area of South Africa. The Bangwato of
Central District, based in Serowe, are the largest Tswana
group and fox-rn around 40% of the total population. Their
tribal leaders, the Khamas, have been amongst the most
prominent figures in the history of the country.
The Kalanga people, probably the second largest tribe
after the niain Tswana tribal groups, occupy the area
around Francjstown and north eastwards into Zimbabwe.
Like the Tswana, the tribe was divided by national
boundaries iiposed by the colonial powers in the late
19th. century. The Kalanga are in fact not one ethnic
group but a ixture of groups who have over the centuries
come to settle in the mainly Bangwato tribal areas of
what it now Botswana. They are essentially
agriculturalists, though livestock still plays important
social and religious functions within their society.
The Yei, Mbukiishu and Subiya peoples are central African
in origin a.id have no immediate historic relationships
with the other ethnic groups in Botswana. They are river
peoples who settled along the area between the Okavango
For a lore thorough	 cription of Botswana's ethnic iinorities, see Silberbauer, G. 8., (1965) aid Caiipbell,
(1980),
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Delta and the Chobe River around the middle of the 18th.
century. They too had their tribal integrity destroyed
when the colonial authorities created the Caprivi Strip
in 1929.
The Herero are mainly settled around Lake Ngami and are
related to the Ovambo peoples of Namibia. Most Herero now
settled in these areas are descendants from those who
fled from Namibia in 1905 where a war of extermination
was being carried out against them by German farmers
eager for their land.
The Kgalagadi is a general name given by the Tswana to
those peoples living in an around the Kgalagadi desert,
though they are now to be found living in all areas of
Botswana. In the nineteenth century they were virtually
enslaved by certain Tswana tribes and survived in the
desert mainly by hunting and trapping. Today, some of
them have prospered and own many cattle but the majority
still subsist with a few goats and small fields of
sorghum, melons and beans.
The Basarwa, or San peoples are the original inhabitants
of Botswana and existed long before the arrival of the
black tribes from central and southern Africa. There are
about 50,000 Basarwa living throughout Botswana, Namibia
and overlapping into Angola and Zimbabwe. Over the years,
the steady encroachment of Tswana livestock along the
fringes of the desert has destroyed many traditional
hunting grounds, and cattle cordon fences (directed at
the prevention of the spread of Foot & Mouth disease)
have hindered migratory movements of wildlife essential
for their own semi-nomadic lifestyles. Probably fewer
than 3,000 Basarwa still exist by traditional hunting and
gathering and the effects of drought on veld food has
greatly accelerated their absorption into established
villages and settlements where many, however, remain
The Structure of Traditional Society 	 35
totally destitute. 4 About 15,600 non-citizens are living
in the country, some of which are from neighbouring
countries, whilst others are expatriates on government
and private contracts.
The social organisation of the Batswana remains focused
on village settlement except for the Kalanga and Basarwa.
The tradition was stronger several decades ago when the
tribal capital was the centre of the political and social
life of the tribe and was where the tribe lived for the
winter months from May to October for a period of intense
socialising and ceremonies. Another interesting feature
of settlement in Botswana is the strength of relationship
between the urban areas where 17% of the people live and
the rural areas. The capital city of Gaborone isa recent
development, having been built since Independence, 5 and
urban dwellers maintain strong links with the rural areas
with frequent visits to their cattle posts.
Though composed of several different ethnic groups, each
with their own language, history and culture, Botswana
has since Independence made positive steps towards
creating a national sense of identity. Though tribal
differences do occur these are generally of a minor
nature and the overwhelming majority of individuals see
themselves first and foremost as "Batswana". This is in
marked contrast to some of its neighbours, where ethnic
or tribal divisions still remains a serious impediment to
political progress.
Hitchcock (1978) ..aintains that the San have clearly defined territorial boundaries which are recognised by
other hunter-gatherer groups and that being classified as purely noiadic in the past has led to thea being denied
noraal rights of tenure. This process is likely to continue with the introduction of leasehold ranches. See also
Stephen (1982).
Prior to Independence, the capital of the Protectorate las Nafeking, i.e. in South Africa.
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b) The Structure of the Traditional Rural Economy.
This section traces the social and political origins of
the traditional rural economy and examines its main
distinguishing features in the period prior to the
formation of the Bechuanalarid Protectorate in 1885. It
provides the starting point for a comparison with the
modern Botswana economy presented in subsequent sections,
thereby helping to illustrate the dynamics of social and
political change that has accompanied economic growth.
The precursor of the traditional Tswana society was the
"classless" society of the Basarwa hunter-gatherers,
where no formal property rights to either land or capital
were recognised, and for whom no structure of formal
government existed:
"all their institutions, manners and customs
serve to regulate the relations between the
members of the band, and thus to maintain law
and order." (Schapera, 1930)
In traditional Tswana society too, the right to own and
use productive assets was not held by a particular group
or class but traditionally vested in the tribe. The
Batswana are predominantly a pastoral society, with
cattle playing an important cultural and economic role in
their lives. Unlike the tradition of most African tribes,
they have always lived in large groups within established
villages, split into a number of wards, and each headed
by a Chief who held ultimate authority and responsibility
for his people. In the past this was probably for reasons
of defence and also as a natural concentration around a
reliable water resource. Most households also keep a
second dwelling some distance away from the village where
they grow their crops, and which they call the "lands".
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The Chief was trustee of this property and used it on the
behest of the tribal members. His rule was patrimonial
and his people termed his "children". Control of the
tribal property included the allocation of land and, up
to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the tribal
herds, Blocks of land for homesteads, arable fields and
grazing areas were allocated by the paramount Chief of
the tribe on the basis of village wards, and was selected
on its suitability for each particular activity. Areas
consisting of more favourable soils were reserved for
crops, whilst more distant areas possessing a viable
water source were set aside for grazing (USAID 1986,
p.98).
Though evidence is fragmentary, descriptions of Bangwato
tribal society (the main tribal group in Botswana) by
various European travellers and missionaries in the early
nineteenth century suggest that the social relations of
production of traditional society were "feudal" in
nature, but with the important distinction that it was
cattle and not land that formed the contractual basis of
political affiliation; in an arid climate such as
Botswana, it was the former rather than the latter that
was capable of sustaining a surplus (Parsons 1977).
Peters (1983, pp.46-114) describes the pre-colonial
Tswana polity as a system of hierarchical domination, in
which the tribal elite enjoyed a privileged appropriation
of agricultural products and labour. But it was also
characterised by a communal form of holding and access to
basic resources such as land and water. The "free"
commoner, while he was obliged to surrender a measure of
his labour and agricultural output to the Chief, appears
to have had a large measure of autonomy in respect of his
own crop production. (Peters 1983, p.124.)
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However, rights of free access to productive assets
depended on kinship ties and full membership of the
tribe, and the ability of tied servants to control their
own production was clearly limited by the chiefly elite
because of the need to provide labour at ploughing time.
Subjugated groups such as the BaKgalagadi and Basarwa would
have enjoyed few rights, and an early account by
Mackenzie (1871) illustrates this:
"...when one Bechuana tribe attacks another,
the Bushmen and BaKalahari belonging to both
are placed in the same category with cattle and
sheep...they are to be "lifted" or killed as
opportunity offers"
Traditionally, as the summer and rainy season approached,
the chief would decide on the date when the people would
begin ploughing. On this date there was a general move to
the lands with only old people and children left in the
villages. At other times during the year, males would be
absent at their cattle posts, where larger herd owners
would often keep a third dwelling.
Pre-colonial society was largely self-sufficient in
cereal production (FAO 1974, p.17; Colcough & McCarthy
1980, p.8; Schapera, 1971, p.105), with people living on
a diet of sorghum porridge and milk, the meat of wild
animals and cattle, vegetables and fruit. Clothing was
made mainly from animal skins decorated with bead work,
embellished with iron, copper or bone ornaments.
Archaeological evidence shows that from a very early
date, many household implements were either made at home,
or locally in the village, and included baskets, clay
pots, iron bladed hoes, spears, axes and knives, skin
bags, wooden bowls and pails, spoons, cups and bottles.
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The high rate of population growth in recent years 6 has
reversed this cereal self-sufficiency in all but years of
exceptional rainfall, while the domestic production of
household implements and clothing has practically
disappeared, largely as a result of the country's
membership of the South African Customs Union, which
allows for the free movement of manufactured goods
between member states. 7 Botswana's climatic conditions and
lack of surface water make it extremely difficult to
compete with its neighbour in all but the most
rudimentary of manufacturing processes.
The traditional social structure' in Botswana, based on
strong kinship and family bonds, often required and even
demanded a considerable individual and community effort
in coping with food production in a harsh environment
(Campbell 1980, Chapter 2; FAO 1974, p.16; Toulmin 1983,
p.81-84) Daily life was one of continuous struggle for
existence against the vagaries of the climate. In the
past, the tribal authorities would organise "age
regiments" not only for use as armies in times of war but
as a mobilising force for joint enterprises and
agricultural effort.
The means of extracting a productive surplus in arable
agriculture remains essentially the same for the rural
economy today as in the past, in all but the few
irrigated freehold farm areas now under cash crops and
using hired labour. But it is in the way that this
surplus was extracted and used that enables us to
distinguish between the two different economic epochs,
and attach a historical specificity to them both. The
6 Rstiaated at 3.7% in 1986 (RoB, Health Education Unit). Increases in the rate of population growth can be
attributed to a nuiber of factors, including iaproveients to the infant tortality rate as well as other social
factors such as uigrant labour.
Soie of the advantages and disadvantages of ieibership of the SACU are discussed in subsequent chapters,
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essential difference was that production in traditional
society was subsistence in nature and a function of the
family group or tribe, whereas production after the
establishment of the Protectorate became increasingly
individualistic in nature, used hired labour, and was
directed primarily at the market. In the pre-colonial
tribal polity, peoples' relationships with the land,
water and other productive resources were mediated by
their reciprocal relationships with other people and
their position within the tribe; with the development of
a capitalist means of production in livestock these
relationships were increasingly mediated through
impersonal property rights. (Peters 1983) The Tswana have
never recognised individual ownership of land in tribal
areas, only rights of usage. Thus a tribal member could
lay claim to a piece of land if he or his family could
prove they had farmed it in the past, but that same
villager could not sell or exchange the land. If it was
deserted or not used for any length of time, another
villager could approach the Chief and ask for it to be
reallocated, and the land would then change hands if no
objections were raised.
Communal tenure entitled every household to hold usufruct
rights to an area of land sufficiently large enough to
meet the family's subsistence needs, whilst the land
itself remained the property of the tribe. That this
communal tenure of land was inviolable and formed the
basis of tribal society was illustrated by the reaction
of the Tswana Chiefs to the encroachment of the Boers
after 1870. In his appeal to the British government
asking for the formation of a Protectorate in 1885, Khama
III of the main Bangwato tribe wrote:
"I am not baffled in the government of my town,
nor in deciding cases among my own people
according to our custom...I refer further to
our law which declares that the lands of the
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Bangwato are not saleable. I say this law is
also good; let it be upheld and continue to be
law among black people and white people" (Head
1981, p. 9).
In Tswana society, male primogeniture laid the foundation
for the Chief's position and inheritance, yet tribal
society exhibited (for members of the tribe at least) a
high degree of popular participation in the process of
government. The traditional court or kgotla still survives
today as the focal point for the village and bears
witness to this particularly open form of tribal
government. Though the customary authority of the tribal
Chiefs has now waned, it is still through the medium of
the kgotla that modern politicians are obliged to address
the people, and face possible criticism of their
policies.
The Chief's position within the tribe was one of prestige
and power, described by Schapera as
"...the symbol of tribal unity, the central
figure around whom tribal life revolves. He is
at once ruler, judge, maker and guardian of the
law, repository of wealth, dispenser of gifts,
leader in war, priest and magician of the
people." (Schapera 1970).
The Chief ruled, however, on the sufferance of the tribe,
according to the Tswana saying "Kgosi kekgosi kamorafe",
meaning "A Chief is a Chief only because of the Tribe" -
the implication being that the Chief had to do what was
best for the tribe, otherwise he would be deserted by its
members and revert back to the status of a commoner. Thus
his position was also one of obligation. He was the
holder of tribal property and had to be available at all
times to run its affairs and settle its disputes.
The allocation for grazing land was also made on the
basis of wards, with a modisa or overseer appointed to
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ensure against outside herders using the grazing block.
He was also responsible for the spacing of cattle posts,
thus ensuring that soil erosion did not occur around
major villages and perennial water sources due to
overgrazing (USAID 1986, pp.99-100).
The ability to distribute seasonal grazing pressure by
moving among a variety of water points in the communal
grazing block was a central feature of Tswana herding
strategy (Toulmin 1983, p.81-84). During the dry season,
cattleposts were situated near perennial wells. With the
coming of the rainy season in October or November, cattle
would be trekked to more favourable grazing areas near
ephemeral or seasonal water sources, such as pans and
shallow wells or dams.
Thus two regulatory mechanisms existed to conserve the
quality of communal grazing land: the natural one of
water deficiency, and the human one in the form of the
supervisory modisa. By 1943 however, this institutional
arrangement had already broken down, and cattle could be
grazed at will in any area recognised as pasture, without
tribal authority (Schapera, 1943, p.223). This is
illustrative of the decline in economic cooperation and
reciprocity that has accompanied the commercialisation of
the industry. Recent years have seen fundamental changes
to the structure of land tenure in Botswana, and the
formation of large-scale leasehold ranches on tribal land
that have granted exclusive grazing and watering rights
to their holders, reflecting the growing commercial-
isation of livestock since Independence. This in turn has
led to a growing inequality in the ownership and control
of the country's productive assets, and it is this
development, and the social, economic and political
implications that stem from it, that forms the basis of
this and subsequent sections of the study.
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c) Redistributive Mechanisms in the Rural Economy.
Perhaps the most notable feature of traditional Tswana
society was that it had certain inherent safeguards for
the community and the individual in coping with life in
an unpredictable climate, particularly when faced with a
crisis such as recurrent drought or crop failure. One
such example was the practise, after a good harvest, of
storing a proportion of the crop in tribal granaries for
future redistribution to the tribe in times of drought
(Colciough & McCarthy 1980, p.110). Peters (1983, p.84)
notes that an essential feature of' the pre-colonial
polity was that little distinction existed between the
Chiefs' private and tribal "purses' t , and that a
proportion at least of the agricultural tribute was
redistributed or consumed at the large tribal harvest
ceremonies. This practice seems to have declined in the
colonial period and the tribal granaries fallen into
disuse, with storage facilities that were built during
the Protectorate hopelessly inadequate and unable to cope
with the requirements of the prolonged droughts of more
recent years.8
When drought did occur, the effects were felt and shared
by all, according to contemporary witnesses. The explorer
and missionary David Livingstone wrote of one Tswana
tribe in 1849:
"As long as the Bakwena have anything at all it
will be freely shared." (Vierich & Sheppard
1980, p.58).
The holding of cattle, traditionally the main source of
individual social status and economic security in
Botswana, has always played an important cohesive role in
8 See Gooch & acDonald (1981), This reflects both a declining self-sufficiency in cereal grains during the
protectorate as well as an increasing reliance on South African grain imports.
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the tribal community by the protection it offered against
the ravages of drought. The natural growth of herds in
years of good rainfall and grazing helped to sustain
people through the years of inadequate rainfall and crop
failure, when meat and milk were substituted for cereal
grains.
The Chiefs utilised their sizeable herds to enhance their
personal relationships with followers and, along with the
allocation of cropland, ensure the survival of both the
tribe and the individual household. While the chief grew
rich during periods of plenty, in bad times he was
obliged to share at least some of his accumulated wealth
in order to retain his followers. This distributive
mechanism was the mauisa system, whereby a section of the
herd was loaned out or managed by others both to minimise
risk through disease or the effects of drought and to
provide a means of subsistence for all the tribe (FAO
1974; Colcough & McCarthy 1980; UNDP et al 1985).
Parsons notes that property rights to cattle were first
established amongst the Bangwato tribe in 1875 by royal
declaration from Chief Khama I, and it is likely that
other tribes had also followed this course by the turn of
the century. The reasons for this are not clear, but the
most likely cause was the growing economic individualism
that developed with an increased contact with European
settlers and traders. It was the larger stock owners who
stood to gain most from this development as it
effectively freed them from formal mafisa obligations and
allowed them to trade openly for cash with the
established European trading points (Parsons 1977,
p.119).
However, there is little evidence to suggest that mafisa
obligations were widely disregarded whilst the larger
stockholders were still tied to the communal grazing
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areas, where social pressures could usually be relied
upon to maintain a certain level of social homogeneity.
With individuals restricted to their own grazing areas,
which they had to share with others of the same ward,
this would also have had a significant limiting effect on
overstocking and range deterioration, as the quality of
grazing of each depended on the cooperation of the
others.
The size of individual cattle herds fluctuated with the
availability of water in the communal grazing areas, and
this in itself was a limiting factor on the process of
individual accumulation and commercialisation. In wet
summer months cattle were trekked out to the rivers and
pans in the western sandveld, retreating in the dry
winter and spring to the perennial rivers of the eastern
hardveld. In this way the delicate ecological balance of
the Kgalagadi Desert was preserved. It is likely
therefore that such widespread changes in traditional
mafisa relationships first evolved with the development and
use of deep boreholes in the western sandveld in the
1930s, which allowed the larger stockholders to
effectively escape the rural economy altogether. (Peters
1983)
Payment for rnauisa services was usually in kind, with the
manager of the herd utilising the flesh of dead animals
and the milk of the living to supplement his basic diet.
Managers of mafisa cattle might also perhaps receive a
calf or two each year as payment for their services. In
this way people with few cattle of their own could build
up their own herds, have a supply of manure for their
fields, access to draught power at ploughing time, and
even during periods of drought and crop failure, still
maintain a certain level of nutrition. The mafisa system
thus had a significant levelling effect, with the
benefits of holding large herds being spread over a much
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larger group of people than the owner's immediate
household.
The solidarity of the tribal community and the continuity
of the rural economy was maintained through the existence
of mutual obligations, not only in relation to livestock
and agriculture, but also to the provision of labour,
goods and services. The inajako system was one such labour
arrangement whereby poorer households attached themselves
to others, and embraced a whole range of informal
arrangements and activities. The main feature of majako
was that it involved an exchange of labour. One man might
help another plough his fields and then receive help with
his own fields •in return. Another, more common type of
majako would occur during harvest time, when women would
help each other in return for a share of the harvest.
Majako could also include the curing of skins, the making
of baskets and karosses, and general domestic duties.
This type of work could provide up to six month's
employment during the year (Parsons 1977).
Payment was not in cash but in meat and milk, or a share
of the crop after the harvest. Where these arrangements
were established on a regular basis, they often evolved
into a symbiotic patron-client relationship, with mutual
obligations on each side. This was particularly true of
the relationships between the Tswana and the Basarwa (and
to a certain extent, the BaKgalagadi).
These reciprocal relationships, involving an exchange of
labour, characterised the essentially cooperative nature
of traditional Tswana society. With the introduction of
new social values during the Protectorate, this pattern
of cooperation would start to break down and be replaced
by a wholly new form of economic individualism - the
harbinger of a process of social disintegration that we
now examine in the following chapter.
4-
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II
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RURAL ECONOMY
a) The Formation and Administration of the Protectorate.
To the colonial powers of the mid-nineteenth century, the
tract of land inhabited by the Tswana was not considered
to have any intrinsic value, save in its geopolitical
position and terrain. For Britain, its value lay in the
fact that access to other colonial possessions in the
north led through its territory. The trek route to the
North ran from Kuruman in the south through the village
of Shoshong (about 40km. west of Mahalapye and then the
tribal capital of the Ngwato under the Chieftainship of
Khama III) and the high flat plains of the country were
ideally suited for ox-drawn wagons. This meant that the
area was primarily of strategic rather than economic
importance.
It was not long however before it had attracted other
interested parties who realised that the area was well
suited for pastoral farming. As early as the 1830s, the
expansive tendencies of the Voortrekkers, descendants of
the colonial trekboer community of semi-nomadic pastoral
farmers, had already brought them into contact and
conflict with the Tswana societies. By 1835, over 20,000
Voortrekkers had crossed the Vaal River and settled in
the Tswana areas of the Transvaal. By 1850 they were well
established and already looking westwards. In 1852 at the
Sand River Convention, the British decided to give the
Voortrekkers full independence of their de facto
possessions north of the Vaal River. However, the
Transvaal Voortrekkers were careful never to define their
western borders and thus the existing conflict with the
Tswana did not diminish, but increased. The system of
I
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territorial acquisition of the Voortrekkers at the time
simply required an individual to ride beyond the existing
farms and then chose 3000 morgen for himself. 9 Its limits
were advertised by the local administration and, if no
objections were raised within three months, it became
his. No account was taken of the existing indigenous
inhabitants who now faced the choice of either moving
elsewhere, or effectively becoming farmhands of their new
masters.
By 1870, many Tswana tribes were in disarray, due to
having lost much of their land to the Voortrekkers
(Parson 1984). Inter-tribal conflicts were often
engendered by the Voortrekkers themselves, who set
themselves up as mercenaries serving any Chief who
promised them land. In the same year, Chief Kgamanyane of
the Bakgatla tribe was flogged by the Voortrekkers for
failing to supply farm labour (Parson 1984, p.221) which
resulted in many Bakgatla migrating from the Transvaal to
Bakwena land, thus further exacerbating existing tribal
land rivalry. The Chiefs finally appealed to the British
for protection against further encroachment by the
settlers, and for a short time their expansion was
checked, though the Tswana regained very little of their
land.
Another factor that influenced Voortrekker interest in
the area was the discovery in 1870 of gold in the Tati
River area around present-day Francistown, and diamonds
along the Vaal River, close to the country's southern
border. The Tswana Chiefs, feeling themselves deserted by
the British, tried to co-exist with the Voortrekkers by
signing a series of agreements and forming what alliances
they could. This resulted in the establishment of two new
Boer republics at Goshen and Stellaland just south of the
present Botswana border, with the Rolong, Thlaping and
Around 2400 hectares. See Parson, (1984), p.215.
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Korana tribes losing almost all of their land. Thus the
Voortrekkers had finally severed the interior from the
Cape, and for the first time posed a serious obstacle
between the British and their northern possessions. The
annexation of South West Africa by the Germans in 1884
added to the problem of access to the interior and made
it imperative that the British take action at last. The
outcome was the declaration in 1885 of a British Crown
Colony for Southern Bechuanaland (absorbed into the Cape
Colony in 1895 and now part of the Cape Province of the
Republic of South Africa), and a Protectorate for
Northern Bechuanaland (now Botswana).
The impetus towards the formation of a Protectorate
against the Voortrekkers, initially sought for by the
Tswana Chiefs and finally recognised as politically
expedient by the British, was now paralleled by other,
imperialist interests: the British South Africa Company,
led by Cecil Rhodes. The Company was charted in 1889,
but the economic interest of its concessionaires in the
region was first established in 1870, when large gold
deposits were thought to exist in the Tati area. With the
discovery of diamonds in the same year at Kiniberley, and
the later gold discoveries at the Witwatersrand, British
imperial interests sought an expansion of colonial
influence and settlement northwards, in to what would
later become Northern and Southern Rhodesia.
This colonisation, Rhodes envisaged, would be undertaken
by a monopoly chartered company under the protection of
the British Crown, and would provide both the necessary
administrative and political framework for running the
country, whilst carrying out its normal business
activities. In 1889, the Company was granted a Royal
Charter to obtain from the Chiefs "powers of government
and administration" within not only the Protectorate but
in lands occupied by the Ndebele tribe. Within a period
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of four years, the Ndebele land had passed into the hands
of Rhodes and their Chief Lobengula had fled into exile.
In 1892, Rhodes made a formal offer on behalf of the
Company to administer the Protectorate in return for
£50,000 a year and finally received assurances from the
British government that it would be given authority to do
so in due course (Parson 1984). In 1895, the Chiefs
Khama, Sebele and Bathoen travelled to England to appeal
to the British government against this decision.
Meanwhile, back in the Protectorate itself, the lands of
Chiefs Montshiwa and Ikaneng were ceded to the Company,
and the lands of Chief Lentswe hung in the balance.
The Chiefs' visit to England, however, proved a success
due to their warm reception at public meetings aided by
the London Missionary Society. Chief Khama of the
Bangwato made a memorable speech at Leicester, in which
he expressed their common fears over Rhodes' proposal:
"We think that the Chartered Company will take
our lands, that they might enslave us to work
in their mines. We black people live on the
lands, we live on the farms. We get our food
from the land, and we are afraid that if the
British South African Company begin in our
country we will not get these things and that
it will be a great loss to us." (Head, 1981,
p.47)
Khama's fears at Leicester were to prove sadly prophetic,
but not quite in the same sense in which they had been
spoken. Whilst the Tswana people would escape the
clutches of the Company, the protection of the British
would prove to be both costly and disruptive to the
fabric of traditional society. In the years to follow,
some of the best farming land would be taken from them,
and the Tswana would be set to work in the mines of South
Africa in their thousands, not as slaves but as "free"
migrant labourers. The final chapter leading to direct
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British administration was the abortive Jameson raid into
the Transvaal to support an uprising in favour of the
Company. It failed miserably and the Company effectively
lost all future political control over the Protectorate.
Historically, the main Tswana tribes had always settled
in their own traditional areas and these were officially
demarcated as "reserves" by the colonial administration
in 1899. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
"tribal reserves" comprised about 40% of the total land
area of the country, with about 3% of the total held as
freehold farms owned almost entirely by Europeans. The
rest of the country remained largely unoccupied and
undeveloped. In other areas, European settlement was
largely concentrated in the larger villages in the
eastern parts of the country, and particularly along the
newly built railway line, where small trading stations
were established and which were later to play an
important role in both the livestock industry and in the
development of the country's economic ties with South
Africa.
Authority in the colonial administration was delegated
through European District Commissioners in the
Protectorate who were vested with the power to impose
taxation, define tribal boundaries, appropriate lands to
the Crown, and issue land rights. Thus, when in 1896-7
the railway link from Mafeking to Bulawayo was completed
by the British South African Company, it received in
return large tracts of freehold lands around Lobatse,
Gaborone, the Tati River, and in the Tuli Block
stretching along the Limpopo River and forming the border
with South Africa.
Authorised concessions to European settlers were made by
the Concessions Commission of 1893 and by 1898 the first
white farmers settled in farms around Ghanzi, followed by
others around Lobatse in 1903., Gaborone in 1906, and in
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the Tuli and Tati areas from 1912. The Tuli Block
concessions today form one of the few areas of cultivable
land in Botswana where irrigated agriculture is
economically feasible, from the perennial Limpopo River
forming the border with South Africa.
Though the tribal administration survived, together with
much of the traditional authority of the village Chief,
in reality de facto political power lay with the colonial
administration, itself heavily influenced by the European
Advisory Council, an amalgamation of cattle breeding and
trading interests with strong economic links with South
Africa. Though the Native Advisory Council was formed in
1919, and after 1928 began taking on more of an
appearance of a consultative committee, the Resident
Commissioner was not bound to accept any of its advice on
legislative measures. The de jure removal of the Chiefs'
former political independence was to be finally
established in the 1930s when it was declared that
"His Majesty has unfettered and unlimited power
to legislate for the government and
administration of justice among the Native
tribes in the Bechuanaland Protectorate."
(Robertson 1984, p.22).
Throughout the period of the Protectorate, the colonial
authorities remained remarkably ambivalent about its
future political status as a Tswana state. This was
reflected both in the growing political links with South
Africa, and the virtual neglect of public services and
infrastructure.
The administration's political ambivalence had first been
made clear by the relationship that existed between the
colonial Government and Rhodes in the early 1890s, when
it was initially intended to hand over the administration
of the country to the British South African Company. The
South Africa Act of 1910 (which established the Union by
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joining the two defeated Boer Republics of the Transvaal
and Orange Free State to the former British colonies of
Natal and the Cape) together with the customs agreement
of the same year, drew the Protectorate closer
economically with South Africa. The Act planned for the
eventual inclusion of the High Commission Territories
(Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland) within South
Africa itself (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.114).
During the 1930s the colonial Administration came under
renewed pressure to join the Union when South Africa
imposed a trade embargo on Protectorate beef, in flagrant
violation of the 1910 Customs Agreement. Later, when
apartheid was officially instituted in South Africa after
the Second World War, the planned integration of the High
Commission Territories was seen as instrumental in
forming the nucleus of the new Bantustan policy.' 0 The
future political status of the Protectorate remained
uncertain until as late as 1961, when the colonial
Administration agreed to the formation of a Joint
Legislative Council, which effectively paved the way
forward to Independence. As such councils had existed in
Kenya si.nce 1944, Tanganyika and Uganda (1945), Northern
Rhodesia (1948) and Nyasaland (1949), the long delay in
establishing a similar administrative body in
Bechuanaland is indicative of the attitude prevailing
during the whole of the colonial period regarding the
Protectorate's independent status (Colcough & McCarthy
1980, p.27').
From the earliest days of the Protectorate, the main aim
of the new administration was to hold the area at the
minimum of cost, and this established a pattern of
expenditure which did little to develop either the
10 Such a plan, if it had been imp1eented, would have resulted in the total amount of land being given to the
indigenous black population increasing frois a riere 14% to over 40% of the total area of the new enlarged South
Africa, It can be seen therefore as an atteipt to gain international recognition for the new policy of apartheid.
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country or its people. The High Commissioner of the
Bechuanaland Protectorate, based at Mafeking in South
Africa, stated in 1885 that it was his government's
intention to do
"as little in the way of administration or
settlement as possible."1'
The emphasis was laid less on development than on the
maintenance of law and order. In 1913/4, of the 160
Batswana employed by the administration, 147 were
policemen, and the department included 85% of all
established posts in the government at that time. By
1932, the administration was employing 287 people in the
police force, whilst the medical, veterinary and
agricultural departments combined accounted for only 81
employees. In the same year, the education department had
a staff complement of three (Colcough & McCarthy 1980,
p.28,30).
Though about 8000 Tswana children were enroled in primary
school, no money was provided by the colonial
administration out of general revenues for their
education, and any progress at all was due to tribal
initiative or left to the various Christian Missions. On
the other hand, several thousand Pounds were being spent
during the same year on subsidising the education of the
children of the European population, at that time less
than 200 in number (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.31). If
South Africa had not ceased to accept non-European
foreign pupils to its schools and universities in 1954
and 1958 respectively, thereby effectively forcing the
Administration to make its own provision, progress
towards establishing ' Ten a basic level of education in
Bechuanaland would have been even more retarded. Even so,
as late as 1964, only 39 students were enroled in the
From the 'Blue Book', C,4588, p,lB6 quoted in Stevens, E. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, London 1967., p.124,
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fifth year of secondary school and studying for the
Cambridge Overseas School Certificate (Colcough &
McCarthy, 1980).
Discrimination in favour of the white minority population
in the provision of education was reinforced by a similar
recruitment policy in public service. In 1948 a dual
salary scale was adopted for government employees in the
colonial administration whereby African employees were
paid two-thirds of the expatriate rate for posts that up
to that date had been reserved for Europeans. This was
justified by the claim that expatriate workers needed
more money as an inducement to come and work in the
Protectorate, whereas this was not necessary for
Africans. In actual fact most of the expatriate employees
were locally recruited whites from Mafeking in South
Africa. The adoption of this dual salary scale meant that
rates of pay more closely approximated those in South
Africa where growing differentials in black and white
salaries was well established.
In 1961, with Independence in sight, this ruling was
changed, and no further inducements were payable to
anyone recruited in Southern Africa, regardless of race
or colour.'2 However, as it was then inevitable that the
most senior posts would continue to be held by whites
from South Africa, the salaries would have to correspond
to those prevalent in the Union. Accordingly, the senior
posts were upgraded with much smaller rises for junior
posts which were to be held by Africans. In 1964, only 24
out of 184 administrative posts in the Protectorate were
held by Batswana (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.209). A
similar picture existed in the provision of health care.
By the early 1930s, the patient/bed ratio for Europeans
was 1:250, whilst that of the Tswana was about 1:2800.
It is perhaps significant that in this year South Africa was expelled froi the Comionwealth, and the political
future of the BLS countries finally settled..
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Hospitals remained largely the function of the Missions
throughout the period of the Protectorate.
The administration spent considerably more of its time,
effort and revenue on livestock development as it was one
of the few taxable sources of Tswana income, particularly
from the 1950s when new export markets were finally
opened.'3 The development of cordon fences for the control
of Foot & Mouth disease date from this period.
The lack of provision of a basic education and access to
even a rudimentary level of health care for the broad
mass of the population, can be seen as evidence not only
of serious neglect of the indigenous population on the
part of the colonial Administration, but also of active
discrimination in favour of the European settlers.
Provision for such basic human needs should have formed
the primary goals of the country's development strategy
during the colonial period. Instead, education for the
Tswana became the privilege of the elite, for those
wealthy enough to be sent to expensive private schools
and colleges outside the country. They were thus able to
command both the positions and salaries of high
government service after Independence, and channel these
newly available investment funds into livestock.
Botswana's traditional rural economy, characterised by
its informal nature and largely cashless economic
transactions, its sharing of labour and cattle at times
of ploughing and harvesting, and of grain and meat during
periods of drought, has been in decline for over a
hundred years. With the formation of the Protectorate we
saw the first signs of the process of commercialisation
in livestock that would eventually lead to the breakdown
13 This situation was to be reversed after Independence when the Tswana cattle owners theiselves gained political
power.
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of tribal society, and mark the emergence of Botswana as
an economic appendage of South Africa. It is during this
period too that we can start to trace the first evidence
of growing inequalities within Tswana society, a
corresponding polarisation in cattle ownership, and the
origin of a new class of entrepreneurs that will later
throw off the shackles of traditional society and emerge
as the political elite of the newly Independent Botswana.
Following on from our analysis of the political impact of
the colonial administration on Tswana society, the next
part of this section examines the dynamics of the social
and economic change that emerged during the Protectorate.
It illustrates how this pattern became firmly entrenched
by the new political institutions which evolved during
the period. We will examine the role of European trading
interests in the evolution of the domestic economy, the
active discrimination practised against Tswana in most
economic spheres, and how the Protectorate became bound
during the first quarter of this century to the
peripheral role of labour and cattle reserve for two
major markets: the Witswatersrand in South Africa, and
the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia. These developments
had a mutually reinforcing effect on the traditional
rural economy, which would after Independence lead to the
emergence of a nascent contradiction between the private
ownership of cattle and the communal ownership of land.
This contradiction is now being "resolved" by the
fundamental restructuring of the land tenure system.
First however, we will start our analysis with an
assessment of the social and economic impact of taxation
and the migrant labour system.
b) Taxation and the Migrant Labour System.
Even before the declaration of the Protectorate, the
first steps towards the integration of Tswana society
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into the cash economy were already established, by
contact with the early white settlers. Chief Khama III of
the Bangwato maintained a thriving trade in ivory and
skins in exchange for rifles with English and Dutch
traders from his tribal settlement in Shoshong (40 km.
west of Mahalapye). Migrant wage labour of Batswana to
the Cape Colony is recorded as early as 1844, although
this form of activity was rare until after the formation
of the Protectorate (Duggan 1977, p.42).
With the formation of the Protectorate however, the cash
economy was formally introduced for the majority of the
indigenous population. Britain's continued prevarication
over the political future of the Protectorate was
reflected in the colonial administration's marked
reluctance to incur any expenditure that could not be met
from local taxation. It was through the medium of new tax
legislation that money was to grow in significance as a
means of exchange.
With relatively little investment made in developing the
social infrastructure, and even modest levels of public
expenditure financed by tax revenues, the burden of the
new tax legislation fell predominantly on the indigenous
black population. Though direct budgetary grants from
Britain were received until 1911 (when a balanced budget
was achieved), after this date no further grants were
made until the 1930s, when they were resumed to
compensate for the tax revenue loss arising out of the
closure of the South African cattle markets. During the
whole of the colonial period, approximately 75% of all
expenditures went on administrative costs (Parson 1984,
p.22).
The Hut Tax of 1899 and the further surcharge in 1919
were extensions to the normal tribal levies but with the
important distinction that they were paid in cash which
essentially "forced upon the , people the necessity of
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finding a regular sum of money each year (Schapera 1971,
p.7)
The proceeds from the 1919 surcharge on the basic Hut Tax
were paid into a fund for financing Tswana education,
medical development and the eradication of cattle
diseases, the latter being particularly important to the
colonial administration as it was the main source of tax
revenue. Both taxes were amalgamated into the "African
Tax" in 1932 and became payable by every adult male over
the age of eighteen. Collected by the Tribal authorities
after 1938, they were essentially a regressive poll tax,
falling harder on the poorer families who were often
least able to take advantage of the new provisions.14
Though at that time the District Commissioners had the
power to waive the tax for people too poor to pay
"without being deprived of their means of subsistence",
Schapera mentions in 1935 that amongst the Bakgatla tribe,
only 49 persons out of a total of 3645 were thus exempted
(Schapera 1971, p.11).
The need for cash stimulated the growth of migratory
labour to the South African mines. In other colonies in
Southern Africa, taxation was often used as a means of
dragging the indigenous population into the wage economy.
In 1894, Rhodes as Prime Minister of the Cape Parliament
had argued for a lOs. tax per head on all African males:
"You will remove them (the Africans) from that
life of sloth and laziness, you will teach them
the dignity of labour and make them contribute
to the prosperity of the State, and give them
some return for our wise and good government"
(Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.259).
14 Poorer families were less likely to send their children to school if they were required to look after cattle
or perform domestic work. They were also less likely to live within walking distance of a health facility or
veterinary office.
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In Bechuanaland, however, the encouragement of migrant
labour was more directed towards generating revenue for
the administration as the white settler community was too
small to be troubled by a shortage of labour. Thus those
without access to domestic wage employment or cattle were
obliged to work abroad to raise cash to pay the wages.
The basis for this migratory labour system was in its
price: migrants were cheaper than indigenous labourers,
as being without their families fewer social services
such as education and health care were required.
According to the Mine Natives' Wages Commission Report of
1944,
"It is clearly to the advantage of the mines
that Native Labourers should be encouraged to
return to their homes after the completion of
the ordinary period of service. The maintenance
of the system under which the mines are able to
obtain unskilled labour at a rate less than
that ordinarily paid in industry depends upon
this, for otherwise the subsidiary means of
subsistence would disappear and the labourer
would tend to become a permanent resident upon
the Witwatersrand, with increased requirements"
(Schapera 1971, p.204).
Oliver & Atmore (1967) laid particular attention to the
needs of government revenue and the ways in which
colonial administrations attempted to maintain law and
order at a minimum expense to the European tax-payer.
There was a marked increase in migrant labour to the
South African gold mines during the 1930 g . The proportion
of the total male population working in the mines stood
at 6% in 1936 and rose to 10% in 1940 (Massey 1981, Fig.
3.1). The war years saw a further strengthening of
economic ties with South Africa, and migrant labour
steadily increased so that, by 1943, nearly half of all
males aged fifteen to forty-four were working away from
the Protectorate (Schapera, 1947, pp.32,39,ll5). This
The Transformation of the Rural Economy	 61
trend continued in the intervening years up to
Independence, and was a predominant feature of the
economy until the late 1970s. The likely magnitude of
Batswana working in South Africa is now much higher than
official statistics show. Many people find work
illegally, and whilst there is no data available for the
number of migrant farm workers, the FAO estimated in 1974
that a combined figure of 20-30,000 Batswana find
employment each year on farms and in factories (FAO 1974,
p.20). The Colcough & McCarthy study estimated is that as
many as 70,000 Batswana were working in South Africa in
1977, and that as many as one third of migrants do not
pass through registered recruitment agencies (Colcough &
McCarthy 1980, p.254).
Remittances from Batswana working in the South Africa
mines became very significant to rural incomes after
1973-5, when wages had almost trebled in money terms (due
in some measure to disapprobation from foreign companies
working in South Africa). It has been estimated that in
1979 migrant workers contributed money and goods to
around 60,000 family members still resident in Botswana
(Borton, 1984, p.19). Up to that period wages had been
lagging behind other sectors, but rose soon after due to
general disapprobation about levels of wages from foreign
and international companies operating in South Africa.
Table 1.1 overleaf shows the changing structure of
migrant labour to the South African mines over the period
1973-83. Employment opportunities in South Africa are now
declining due to the closure of marginal mines, increased
mechanisation and a greater demand for jobs from the
indigenous (South African) black population. The migrant
labour system has had long term social and economic costs
for the Batswana in terms of household security and
integrity, despite its immediate short term financial
benefits. For the predominantly female headed households
back in Botswana, the responsibility for ploughing and
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harvesting was now added to the burden of' looking after
the young, the very old and the sick. Brown's study of
the impact of male migration concludes that it has
brought about a feminisation of poverty which represents
a major change in the social and economic structure of
rural Botswana (Brown, 1983, pp.3'75,387). The tax
legislation was also socially divisive. When the Hut Tax
was introduced in 1899 for example, the Chiefs were
allowed to retain 10% commission on the amounts they had
collected (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.19, 23). This had
the effect of concentrating wealth in relatively few
hands, and consequently led to the creation of the
personal fortunes held by some of the wealthiest families
in Botswana today (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.23; Brown
1983, p.382).
TABLE 1.1 : BA1WANA E21PWYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAN MINES, 1974-1983.
	
1974	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983
}Ouiiber of Employees 	 -	 24076	 25456	 25297	 20804	 20307	 20441	 17534	 18580	 17887
Earning of Deferred Pay
	
4102	 6972	 9964	 10695	 9706	 9120	 14415	 14542	 14434	 16355
Re]ittances (P'OOO)
	
640	 1098	 1834	 2571	 2895	 4333	 4724	 5729	 6036	 7660
Source: CSO, Statistical Bulletin, March 1983,
The introduction of taxes and the corresponding need for
cash came at a time of transition in the rural economy
when private ownership of cattle was apparently universal
in the main Tswana states (Parsons 1977, p.119; Schapera,
1943, pp.30-31). Here are the first signs of an
ideological shift in Tswana society with regards to
ownership of productive assets: the holding of cattle was
no longer the sole prerogative of the Chief and the
embodiment of prestige and social status, to be held for
and on behalf of the tribe. It was now a commodity to be
bought and sold and henceforth the Chiefs would use their
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cash income from taxation to build up their own private
herds for commercial purposes. This would in turn lead to
the emergence, for the first time, of rural class
formation based on the private ownership of cattle.
The annual obligation to pay the Hut Tax forced some
owners to sell cattle to raise sufficient cash. In the
early years of the century this Tax was roughly
equivalent to 20% of the value of a good ox, and Schapera
estimated that among the Bakgatla tribe in the 1930s, some
16% owned no cattle at all (Parsons 1977, p.118). The
percentage of the rural population not owning cattle was
to rise dramatically after Independence.
c) The Emergence of a Reserve Economy.
The evolution of Botswana's rural economy into a
"reserve" of labour and livestock, and its mode of
incorporation into the wider capitalist economy, differed
from those pertaining in other African colonies, for a
variety of climatic, political and strategic reasons. In
Southern Rhodesia for example, a Land Apportionment Act
of 1930 had given half of the country to the 5% of the
population who were white settlers, and a similar
alienation of land occurred in Northern Rhodesia.
(Hinderinck & Sterkenburg, 1987, p.43). The black African
population was generally dispossessed of its lands and
pushed back in reserves to rely on subsistence farming,
where the intensity of production led to soil erosion and
the consequent growth of the migrant labour system as
farmers could no longer meet subsistence needs.
By contrast, Botswana was not suitable as a white settler
type economy. Though some areas (such as the Ghanzi, Tuli
and Tati Blocks) were sold off around the turn of the
century, the country's very small population, poor
climate and soils, and little surface water, did not lend
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itself easily to a capitalist transformation of
agriculture during the colonial period. What the country
did offer, however, was a comparative advantage in
livestock production, both domestically and on an
international level. Despite the risk of periodic
drought, the extensive tracts of land held under communal
tenure made the financial costs of raising livestock very
low (Hubbard 1986). The social and ecological costs of
commercialisation however were much higher, as we hope to
show in subsequent chapters.
Hubbard (1983, 1986) identifies three distinct phases of
development in the livestock industry in Botswana. In the
first phase, the economy was characterised by the
dominance of primary exports, its small domestic market,
and direct political control by a colonial government
serving the interests of large scale capital in South
Africa. This period of development was that of a
"reserve" 5 economy on the periphery of South Africa,
dominated by European and South African trading interests
acting as intermediaries between Batswana breeders and
the South African meat markets. The concession of
freehold farm blocks to white settlers in the 1900s
allowed them to combine trading with ranching, and with
the provision of finance from Johannesburg, many border
farms were used as holding , growing out or fattening
grounds for the export of cattle to South Africa.' 6 The
Imperial Cold Storage Company (ICS) was the key
institution of' the reserve trading system in the
15 The term reserve" economy is used here in the sense that it is one which exhibited extreme peripheral"
characteristics, lacked forward or backward linkages to the rest of the econoly, and existed to be drawn upon at
will by the ietropolitan centre. The shape and form that the industry took at the periphery was dictated by
external interests, and its products were exported in the crudest of forms, Its revenues were subject to the
vagaries of the world market and uncontrolled by the government, whilst marketing was dominated by the reserve
trading system,
16 Bee Hubbard (1983. As we will see in later sections, the practice of buying and fattening is still carried
out by the Tuli Block freehold farmers, who buy cheap emaciated cattle during periods of drought.
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Protectorate, the actual instrument of external capital
operating in the periphery. The system involved the
selling of manufactured goods from the "centre" (from
Britain and, increasingly, from South Africa), to the
"periphery" of Botswana, in return for the export of
livestock and labour. It soon established itself as the
dominant form of exchange in the Protectorate. It bought
labour and cattle only when needed and in the most
convenient form, i.e. migrant labour or livestock on the
hoof. Specialised intermediaries, dealers and speculators
were established within the Protectorate to buy livestock
and were linked to commission agents at the main markets
in Johannesburg and Northern Rhodesia, where purchase
credit schemes were run by auctioneers and their agents.
A two tier system of payment was made to the cattle
sellers. The first down payment was the "floor price"
equivalent to the South African Meat Board support price,
with the subsequent payment being the balance obtained on
the final sale overseas (Hubbard 1983). Normally, this
bonus was paid on an annual basis, was usually 10 to 30%
of the floor price and was usually retained as commission
by the traders and speculators.
The reserve trading system, and the conflict of interests
between the indigenous Batswana as primary producers, and
the white traders as speculators and intermediaries,
impeded the stabilisation and growth the industry
required if it was to escape from its peripheral status.
This conflict of interest was made manifest by the power
and influence of the European Advisory Council, and was
reflected in the active discrimination against non-
whites. Access to credit and trading licences was denied
Batswana and Asians, and therefore the trade was
dominated from the outset by white settlers, particularly
store owners and farmers. Export licences were fixed at
£100, and ostensibly designed to regulate trade and
exclude fraudulent dealing, but also served to ensure
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that only the largest (i.e. mainly white) dealers
exported cattle.
Even general traders were discriminated against, with the
Credit Sales to Natives Proclamation of 1923 effectively
barring Tswana traders from engaging in the market
economy (Parsons 1975, pp.383-408). Even as late as 1949,
there existed only ten stores owned by Batswana in the
whole of the country, compared with 155 owned by
Europeans (Best 1970, pp.598-612). This pattern of
ownership is still visible today in many rural villages
outside Gaborone .
Botswana's peripheral status was reinforced by the
country's membership of the Southern Africa Customs Union
(SACU) from 1910, which allowed for the importation of
cereals and manufactured goods from South Africa, often
at subsidised prices. Though imports of cereals would
have been of some benefit during periods of drought (when
domestic production fell and prices rose), domestic
production would have suffered during periods of normal
and above normal rainfall. This tended therefore to
divert long term investment away from cereal production
and into livestock, reinforcing Botswana's peripheral
status.
By 1920-1 94% of the Protectorate's exports of cattle
went to South Africa. (BNA 2.274/1. in Hubbard 1983,
p.114). After 1923, however, the market in South Africa
for Protectorate cattle collapsed, and unrestricted
cattle imports came to an end as an era of protectionism
was established, despite the existence of the Customs
Union agreement. Restrictions on imports to South Africa
were to take several forms. Weight restrictions were
imposed after 1923 and exports declined from 34,000 in
1925 to 25,000 in 1932, most of the losses falling on the
17 Personal observation,
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shoulders of' the Batswana producers, as cattle grazed on
communal land were generally leaner and therefore less
heavy generally than their counterparts raised or
fattened on the freehold farms. (Colcough & McCarthy 1980
p.16)
The imposition of weight restrictions served the interest
of ICS as it could then obtain lower prices for cattle in
the Protectorate, (due to the lack of alternative
markets) which it did so to supply its overseas
contracts, railing them out to be processed at Durban.
With a complete embargo on Protectorate cattle to South
Africa between 1933-5, producer prices remained very low
(Hubbard 1983). Border freehold farms took advantage of
this situation by buying cattle for fattening for the
Johannesburg market, and smuggling became a vigorous
business ' T initiated and financed by South African cattle
speculators and farmers." (Colcough & McCarthy 1980,
p.144). Though an abattoir at Lobatse had been
commissioned in 1934, between 1935-37 it had processed
only 21,000 head due to the closure of the South African
markets. Smuggling during the same period had been
50-100,000 head per annum. (BNA S.274/6, in Hubbard 1983,
p.152)
The second, expansionary, phase in the livestock industry
came after the second world war. This period saw a break
away from peripheral status, through the establishment of
a successful meat processing plant at Lobatse and the
forward integration into Botswana's main external
markets. Whereas the industry had previously been drawn
upon only during expansions of the South African market
and been neglected during periods of contraction, it was
now transformed into one of dynamic growth by the
establishment of a viable abattoir at Lobatse. For the
first time in its history, it took on the robust form and
characteristics of a growth industry, and was supported
by a new colonial policy of expansion and stabilisation.
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As part of this new policy, the colonial administration
was provided with increased funds with which to develop
the economy and make up for the long years of neglect and
parsimony. A colonial Development and Welfare grant of
£400,000 was made available specifically for boreholes
which enabled virgin desert to be opened up for livestock
permanently for the first time (Roe 1980, p.22; Peters
1983). With drilling going on at an unprecedented rate,
together with the absence of a serious drought in the
1950s, this led to the national herd increasing by an
unprecedented 34% between 1949 and 1959 (Hubbard 1983,
p.188), and laid the foundation for the de facto control
of much of the western sandveld that was later to be
declared de ,jure leasehold under the TGLP after
Independence.
After 1960 the livestock industry expanded to gain
preferential access to the lucrative British market, and
also regained access (by quota) to the relatively high
priced South African market. With the gradual move
towards decolonisation, there was an increasing
prominence of the Batswana tribal aristocracy in the
affairs of the beef export industry. Seretse Khama of the
Bangwato (later to become the first President of
Botswana) became the single most influential local board
member of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Abattoirs (BPA)
Ltd. (Hubbard, p.212). As the BPA was 50% owned by the
Livestock Breeders Trust, it thus allowed Tswana breeding
interests to establish control over the industry for the
first time.
Nationalisation and fair prices for producers became the
election platform for Khama and the Botswana Democratic
Party as Independence drew near, with the moderate BDP
favoured by the colonial government over more radical
parties (Hubbard 1983, p.226; Parson 1984). With control
of the industry now in the hands of the larger cattle
owners, plus their likely control of the future post-
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colonial state, the interests of the industry could be
articulated forcefully and defended by the state in
international markets to a degree impossible under the
colonial administration. As the livestock industry
flourished in the run up to Independence, the rest of the
economy stagnated. Although total wage employment grew
from 7,000 to 10,000 between 1950 and 1960, it only
represented about 2% of the population on both dates,
whilst roughly three times this figure were working in
the mines of South Africa over the same period (Colcough
McCarthy 1980, p.31). The small number of jobs that were
created are likely to have been insufficient to
compensate for the decline in traditional sources of
employment arising from the introduction of a cash
economy open to imports from abroad (particularly from
South Africa), and on Independence in 1966, some 100,000
Batswana (around 20% of the population at that time) were
dependent on famine relief programmes, due to the very
prolonged period of drought from 1961 (Colcough &
McCarthy 1980, p.32).
Sir Seretse Khama, (grandson of Khama III of the
Bangwato) described this situation on attaining
Independence in 1966, when the country was one of the
poorest in the world:
"The basic physical and social infrastructure
was sadly deficient, if not almost totally
lacking. Roads and telecommunications, water
and power supplies were totally inadequate to
provide a base for industrial development. Most
important of all the colonial Government failed
to recognise the need to educate and train our
people so they could run their own country. Not
one single secondary school was completed
during the whole seventy years of British rule.
Nor did we inherit any properly equipped
institutions for vocational training even at
the lowest level of artisan skills. The
administration had at its disposal only the
most rudimentary information on our national
resources. The country was largely unmapped"
(Khama 1970).
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The third phase of development of the livestock sector in
Botswana began wiii the accession to political power of
the Tswana cattle aristocracy, the nationalisation of the
BPA meat processing plant, and the expansion of the beef
export market. The period was marked by a growing
commercialisation of livestock production which was
fueled by the rapid growth in the level of revenues
generated by the mineral extraction sector. These
revenues have enabled the Government to rapidly expand
the size of the public sector, whilst incomes and
employment levels in the traditional rural economy have
stagnated. Livestock has now become the primary
repository of private domestic investment, with the
government elite its primary investors. This investment
in turn has called forward fundamental land tenure
changes that now threaten the very subsistence base of
many marginal groups, the discussion of which is covered
in Chapter Four.
Section B now examines the dualistic structure of
economic growth since Independence, how this growth has
increased social differentiation in the rural economy,
and been accompanied by a growing inequality in the
ownership of livestock, incomes and assets. This pattern
of economic growth has had important repercussions on the
rural poor and culminated, in the late 1970s, in
fundamental changes in the structure of land tenure which
now threatens the continued existence of marginal groups
such as the Basarwa.
SECTION B
ECONOMIC GROWTH, POVERTY AND DROUGHT




THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Botswana, although starting from a very low base, had one
of the world's fastest growing economies in the first two
decades after Independence (World Bank 1985, p.4), and is
now the third largest diamond producer in the world, with
an output greater than both South Africa and Namibia
combined (UNDP et al, 1985, p.l2). Exports earnings from
diamonds rose from US$91.2 million in 1978 to US$601.6
million by 1984 (RoB, CSO, 1985). Table 2.1 below shows
the structure of this growth between 1966 to 1986,
together with the per capita GNP for the same period:













1966	 1970	 1974	 1978	 1980	 1982	 1984	 1985
100	 150	 370	 500	 790	 880	 950	 810
18.53	 27.14	 61.58	 81.23	 100	 105.10	 160.63	 174.21
35.89	 44.78	 118.49	 104.20	 100	 86,19	 61.10	 57.62
5.46	 20.87	 45.21	 82.49	 100	 110.20	 218.19	 22606
24.66	 27.05	 59.59	 110.96	 100	 156.85	 150.68	 157.53
21.84	 23.28	 51.67	 68.00	 100	 107.22	 128.33	 142.06
Source: World Bank, (198?) World Tables 1987, 4th. edition. Original data in 1980 US Dollars.
Notes: 1) Per capita GNP at current US $. 2) DP at Factor Cost. 3) Agriculture sector includes livestock, except
for cattle processed through the Botswana Meat Coasission, where it is shown under the Industry sector. 4) Industry
sector includes Manufactures, which is shown separately for coaparison purposes.
Substantial revenues accruing to the Botswana government
from its rapid mineral-led growth of the 1970s has
allowed it to build up an enviable record in the
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provision of primary education and health care in the
rural areas. The physical infrastructure and basic levels
of essential services at village level are of a high
standard (compared to many other countries in the
region), with even the more remote villages and
settlements having their drinking water reticulated from
boreholes. Approximately 45% of the population has had
access to safe drinking water from as far back as 1977,
compared to an average of only 25% for the sub-Saharan
region as a whole (World Bank 1981). The infant mortality
rate, at 80 per 1000 live births per year, is bettered in
Africa only by Zimbabwe; life expectancy at birth is 57
years and the adult literacy rate is 61%, both relatively
hi gh in comparison with other African countries (UNICEF
1983)
However, with the combined unemployment and under-
employment rate in the rural areas estimated in 1985 to
be as high as 40%, and as many as 50% of rural households
living in absolute poverty,(World Bank 1985, p.5), it is
clear that economic growth itself is an ambiguous
indicator of progress. Moreover, economic growth has been
largely confined to the mining and livestock sectors and
the contribution of arable agriculture to GDP has
declined both in relative and absolute terms. As
livestock itself (which has shown significant growth
during the period) is subsumed under agriculture in
Botswana's National Accounts, the Table 2.1 above
therefore masks a marked fall in arable production
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, due largely to the
ravages of drought and both public and private investment
preferences, which reflect the higher returns obtained
from livestock. This is significant because most of
Botswana's 80,000 rural households are subsistence
farmers, of whom many do not own or have access to
cattle, and are therefore completely reliant on the
vagaries of the weather for much of their income. With
beef export prices increasing much faster than the size
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of the national herd (213% against 44% durin g 1970-80),
increases in the value of cattle stocks usually account
for around 80% of the agricultural sector's total
investment (Hubbard, 1983, p.265).
We can not therefore make a realistic assessment of the
country's present pattern of economic growth without
first analysing its various components in order to judge
whether any real and positive income effects have
occurred. Equally important are the ways in which
increases in income are generated: from terms of trade
gains, from the sale of non-renewable assets such as
minerals, or from labour intensive activities such as
arable agriculture. These have different investment and
employment opportunities, and have different levels of
dependence on foreign interests and vulnerability to
external events.
In this chapter we will briefly examine the impact of
growth in the mining and manufacturing sectors on
employment levels, government revenues and expenditure
patterns, and how this rapid growth has allowed for an
equally rapid expansion in public sector employment and
salaries. As a corollary to this we explore the legacy of
the low level of provision for education under the
colonial administration, and the current relationship
between livestock ownership, level of education and
access to civil service employment. The latter has become
particularly significant as the main source of private
investment for the livestock industry.
We then look at the livestock industry itself, the degree
to which the industry is controlled by and on behalf of
the political elite, and assess the social and
environmental effects of the overgrazing that has arisen
as a consequence of expanding overseas markets.
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a) Growth in the Mining and Manufacturin g Sectors.
Although the mining sector has in recent years accounted
for more than two-thirds of export earnings, and almost
one-third of government revenue, (World Bank 1985, p.S),
its direct contribution to solving the chronic
unemployment problem has been very limited. The sector is
not only inherently capital intensive in nature but also
has few direct linkages with other sectors: the diamond
industry accounted for 85% of the mining sector's
production in 1982, yet only employed 3772 workers (less
than 1% of the total workforce), including 366
expatriates (World Bank 1985, p.39). For the mining
sector as a whole, GDP at constant prices increased four-
fold during the period 1976-81, whilst its labour force
grew from 5450 to 7350, an increase of only one-third
(World Bank 1985, footnote, p.18).
The diamond industry's contribution to GNP also remains
highly dependent on world market prices, as determined by
th.e De Beers' Central Selling Organisation (CSO), which
markets some 85% of the world's total diamond output
(Nchindo 1983). The weakness of mineral-led growth to
exogenous influences was shown in 1981, when a sudden
slump in the international diamond market led to a sharp
fall in the growth of real GDP in 1981-2 - to 4.1% from
the previous year's 11.2% (World Bank 1985, p.4).
Situated at Selebe-Phikwe, the copper-nickel industry has
had a far greater impact on job creation than the diamond
industry, employing some 8000 workers at the mine.
However, this industry has been suffering from
chronically depressed prices in recent years, and is also
faced with the problem of diminishing reserves. Though
production rose by 20% between 1980 and 1983, its market
value fell by some 18% (World Bank, 1985, p.5).
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Though foreign currency reserves generated by the mining
sector have been substantial, the country's mineral
resources are finite and the annual income derived from
their sale determined exogenously (copper-nickel matte
reserves at Selebe-Phikwe for example are nearing
exhaustion). There is also the danger that the mining
revenues, if not managed properly, could brin g about a
situation of "growth without development", one without a
broad development base and which could not be sustained
in either the long term (because of finite resources), or
relied upon even for that matter in the medium term,' as
revenues are determined by the vagaries of the world
market and the continued cooperation of the multinational
companies that exploit these resources. For example, the
Selebe-Phikwe mining complex is jointly controlled by the
South African company AAC, and the USA based Amax
company. As De Beers has a 50% share in Botswana's
diamond industry, and both it and AAC are interrelated
companies under the control of Sir Harry Oppenheimer,
Botswana's mining industry is dominated not only by South
African capital but by one particular corporate group
(Colcough & Mccarthy, p.15'?). This illustrates the extent
to which the past growth of Botswana's mineral industry
has been determined exogenously.
The manufacturing sector contributed only about 6% to GDP
in 1986 (World Bank 1987, p.61), and is characterised by
the relatively large number of' small enterprises: less
than 6% of all firms have more than 200 employees.
Despite being overshadowed by the contribution to GDP of
the mineral industries, it employed over 8000 people by
1983 (World Bank 1985, p.10).
However, the profile of the formal manufacturing sectors
show that the industrial base remains narrow, and in 1980
was 91% forei gn owned (RoB 1980, p.203).
1 Per capita GNP is now falling (see Table 2.1 above(
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Foreign ownership extends even to the larger traders and
dealers: with the exception of the Co-operative Society
building, all commercial premises in the main Gaborone
Shopping Mall are owned by foreigners (Botswana Daily News,
Feb. 18, 1987). One sixth of the total employment in the
manufacturing sector is at the Botswana Meat Commission,
(itself sustained by access to preferential markets such
as the EEC), a maize mill at Lobatse (owned by a South
African subsidiary), and a tannery in Francistown.
Despite Botswana's membership of the SACU, which
theoretically gives it access to the large South African
market, in practice the lack of skilled manpower and the
shortage of' local entrepreneurs limits the value of this
potential export outlet. The consequent need for in-
service trainin g and expatriate managers has raised unit
costs in many manufacturing firms, thus making them less
likely to be competitive with South African goods. This
lack of skilled manpower can be seen as one consequence
of the previous colonial administration's education
policy.
Restrictions on free trade within the customs region by
South Africa in the past make the future expansion of
manufacturing industry in Botswana seem limited. There is
also an apparent political threat from South Africa to
restrict imports for foreign firms if they move
production to Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland (Selwyn
1975, p.119). Whilst most of Botswana's exports go to
Europe and America, 87% of its imports originate in the
Customs Union Area. Botswana thus remains very dependent
on South Africa for its key requirements including
foodstuffs, oil construction and building materials
(Borton 1984, p.7).
The mineral sector's capacity to "transform" the rest of
the economy therefore remains curtailed by the country's
peripheral status with South Africa, and by its weak
The Pattern of Economic Growth Since Independence	 77
linkages with the rest of the economy, and has not led to
the evolution of a more diversified pattern of economic
growth.
For the purposes of our study, a more critical question
than how Botswana's economic growth has been generated
is: In what ways have the gains from growth been
distributed? In countries where most of the income
accrues to a small minority of the population; further
increases in total national iicome may be irrelevant to
the welfare f most of the people, unless there exists
appropriate redistributive measures, and may in fact have
a negative impact on the incomes •of the rural poor.
We have already noted that though substantial revenues
have been channelled into the rural areas and significant
improvements made to provision of primary education and
health care of the rural population, employment gains in
the mining industries have been minimal. Future
employment gains in manufacturing are also likely to be
limited. For those employees already within the mining
industry however, salaries far in excess of those
existing in agriculture have allowed for an increase in
personal herd size and encouraged a growing social
differentiation •2
Moreover, the overall pattern of government expenditure
since Independence would still suggest a marked urban
bias, even in the provision of basic health care. Though
financial constraints were lifted shortly after
Independence as the mineral revenues came on flow, the
emphasis up to 1973 was still on curative medicine with
86% of capital expenditure going on the main hospitals
and training Institute at Gaborone. Only 10% of capital
expenditure was spent on health centres and clinics (Gish
2 Miniaum wage legislation was established duriog 1973 for, all sanual unskilled grades except for agricultural
workers.
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& Walker 1977). Less than 10% of government capital
expenditure during the period 1971-1974 was spent in the
rural areas and only 1% on agriculture (Colcough &
McCarthy 1980, p.92).
The announcement of a new economic strategy in 1973 by
the then vice-president, Quett Masire, promised to
reverse this trend, as it put the emphasis:
"not only on economic growth and its impressive
physical manifestations, but also on the
quality of the lives of all Batswana and the
equitable distribution of the benefits of
development", which would be accomplished by
"raising rural incomes, by providing better
services i rural areas, by developing a rural
infrastructure, and by creating wider
opportunities for self-advancement through
education" (Masire, 1973, paras.2 & 4). (my
italics)
With the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP),
which arose out of this new strategy in 1974, an approach
was taken with the emphasis more on rural clinics and
health posts. Costing about P31 million, some studies
have suggested that it was initiated primarily because of
nervousness about the outcome of the forthcoming election
and the need for the BDP to preserve its rural power base
(Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.43; Picard 1987).
Accompanied by substantial increases in government wage
levels targeted at the urban electorate, it also provided
an attractive image of "rural development" for the
international donor community. Whatever the primary
motives for this new initiative, it did alter
substantially the trend in government expenditure
patterns, even though a level of urban bias remained, as
Table 2.2 overleaf illustrates. The ARDP was jointly
funded by the Government and the two Scandinavian aid
agencies NORAD and SIDA. Although the rural water
situation was very much improved under the ARDP by the
installation of new village boreholes, water consumption
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per capita in urban areas in 1980 was about 10-15 times
the per capita rural rate (Colcough & McCarthy 1980,
p.237)
TABLE 2.2: GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS (196617-197617)
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DISBURSEMENT)
YEAR
	
66-6?	 67-68	 68-69	 69-70	 70-71	 71-12	 72-13	 73-74	 14-75	 75-76	 16-77
RURAL
	
26%	 39%	 25%	 20%	 16%	 8%	 5%	 10%	 33%	 32%	 21%
URBAN
	
49%	 45%	 64%	 45%	 63%	 74%	 85%	 701	 31%	 42%	 33%
ROADS, ETC
	
25%	 16%	 11%	 35%	 21%	 18%	 10%	 20%	 30%	 26%	 40%
Source: RoB, Annual Stateients of Accounts (196? -197?),
The government's continued concentration on the
comparatively straightforward construction of physical
infrastructure, rather than the much more complicated
process of stimulating rural production and employment,
has left a growing proportion of the community reliant on
government financial assistance, particularly during
periods of drought. In 1975 for example, it was estimated
that only 8% of the rural population were involved in
cash employment (not counting self employment in
agriculture), and even this figure included some work
which was seasonal.
One consequence of this urban bias in expenditure and
investment has been a surge in labour migration, now not
just to the mines of South Africa, but to Palapye,
Selebe-Phikwe, Orapa and - Jwaneng. Botswana's urban
population has grown from 4% of the total in 1964 to 15%
in 1975, an increase of about 14% per year, and was
described as having the fastest rate of urbanisation in
Sub-Saharan Africa in 1973 (Todaro 1973, p.44). Between
1964 and 1975, some 10% of the rural population moved to
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the towns, because of the greater opportunity for
employment (Colcough & McCarthy, 1980, p.180). Although
no later data is available, the physical expansion of the
capital Gaborone strongly suggests that this trend has
continued or even increased.
Thus Botswana's mineral-led growth, whilst improving the
rural infrastructure, has done relatively little for
rural incomes. A form of economic dualism has emerged,
with a modern and highly capital intensive sector co-
existing alongside a stagnant rural sector, characterised
by chronic unemployment and declining incomes. As Egner
notes:
"The poor have been largely unaffected by
either rises or falls in GDP. These affect
mainly those who benefit from Government salary
increases, mining incomes and the possession of
cattle" (Egner & Klausen, n.d., p.35).
Instead, it has stimulated a more rapid development and
commercial transformation in the livestock sector. With
wage levels in the formal sector more "drought-proof"
than those in agriculture, the trend during periods of
drought has been for the larger stockholders to increase
their ownership and control over productive assets,
whilst the poor lose what little they already have.
b) Growth in the Public Sector.
Economic dependency on South Africa, and the uncertainty
over its future political status, left the Protectorate
with a stagnant rural economy as it approached
Independence, with no incumbency felt on the part of the
administration to develop either the social
infrastructure of the country, or the skills of its
people. This attitude of the colonial authorities, and
its consequential neglect of the Protectorate, left the
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country little prepared for self-rule in 1966.
The majority of administrative grades within the
administration were held by expatriate officers, and as
late as 1964, when Independence was in sight, some 75% of
the occupied senior and middle management grades were
still held by expatriates, as were 20% of the clerical
and secretarial posts (Luke 1966, pp.17,141). Only those
few Tswana officers fortunate enough to have been sent
abroad for their education were able to gain access to
the colonial civil service. This reflected the similar
policy of racial discrimination shown against the Tswana
population in commerce, but with the important
distinction that its effects did not disappear on
Independence; rather it sowed the seeds for a more
serious form of discrimination and social differentiation
amongst the Tswana themselves that has now become largely
self-justificatory. If ownership of livestock durin g the
Protectorate bestowed wealth and a privileged access to
education, in the period since Independence, a high level
of attainment in education has conferred senior positions
within the civil service and legitimised a political form
of control of the livestock industry itself.
The shortage of skilled manpower, particularly in the
managerial and technical fields, and which is evident in
both the private and public sectors, remains a serious
constraint to Botswana's future development in the short
to medium term, and can be seen in retrospect as one
consequence of the low priority given to education and
technical training afforded by the previous colonial
administration. 3 In 1963 there were only 45 Batswana in
institutions of higher education, (GB, Colonial Office,
1963, Bechuanaland Protectorate Report, p.60) and by 1967
some 38% of primary school teachers were still untrained
As we will see in later sections, this has had a direct bearing on its ability to effectively mnage and control
the current Drought Relief Programe,
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(RoB, NDP1976-81, 1977, Table 6.6., p.109, and fig. 6.4,
p.11l)
The growth of domestic revenue was the most dramatic
feature of Botswana's economy in the first decade after
Independence, rising from P6.2 million in 1966-7 to P85.4
in 1976-7, at an average annual growth rate in real terms
of 30%. The creation of a new ran ge of bureaucratic arid
parastatal institutions to manage these rapid
developments led to a corresponding demand for
administrative and managerial skills and a growth in
employment within Government service from 13,550 in 1972
to 21,675 by 1976. By 1980, 36.9% of all recorded
employment was in the public sector (Parson 1984, p.42).
With the hiring standards of the colonial period
maintained by the new government after Independence, this
meant a continuing emphasis on paper qualifications
rather than practical skills adapted to the needs and
requirements of rural Tswana society. Apart from
attaching a high premium to formal education, it also
meant that the demand for skilled labour could not fully
be met from the indigenous population. The government
therefore relied on expatriate manpower. One consequence
of this policy was that by 1977 there was twice as many
expatriate public officials in Botswana Government
service than the total number of all officials in the
Colonial administration in 1964 (Parson 1984, p.42). As
late as 1981, 30% of the top administrative, 55% of the
professional and 35% of the senior technical positions
were filled by non-citizens. (Parson 1984, pp.24-6; FAO
1974, pp.20-21). Botswana probably now has the world
record in expatriate technical assistance workers per
capita of population, most of whom are financed by the
international donor community as part of their aid
programmes (Isaksen (n.d.), p.12).
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One of the major developmental thrusts since Independence
therefore has been directed towards the expansion of the
education services, and the training of staff for more
specialised posts in the public sector has attracted
considerable amounts of multilateral and bilateral aid
from a variety of donors. The Mid-term Review of NDP5
(1983) envisaged a growth rate in the supply of educated
manpower of around 7.4% between 1981-89 (World Bank,
1985, p.52). These developments also meant pressure on
the government from the articulate urban middle classes
for an increased level of spending on higher education,
as the shortage of skilled labour and a rapidly expanding
public sector meant that a strong relationship existed
between the amount of schooling an individual held, his
rank in the political hierarchy, and his expected level
of earnings.
The strong linkage between livestock ownership, education
and political status in the post-Independence state is
illustrated by the example of Ngamiland, in the remote
north west of the country. Endemic with tsetse flies, and
most vulnerable to livestock disease, the extension of
disease control cordon fences and veterinary services
geared up to overseas markets had for many years
effectively cut off the area from access to overseas
markets via the BMC abattoir in Lobatse. According to one
source, livestock owners in Ngamiland were therefore
exposed to the process of commercialisation at a much
later stage. Because of the generally lower level of cash
income and capital accumulation, the distribution of
cattle in Ngamiland is less skewed, and significantly,
proportionally fewer higher level civil servants from the
District figure amongst the national elite (Hinderinck &
Sterkenburg 1987, p.2O3). With a lower level of capital
accumulation and social differentiation, stockholders in
Ngamiland were less likely to have been able to afford to
send their sons abroad for their education.
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The pressure for an increased provision of secondary and
tertiary levels ri education has in turn led to the
emergence of a growing duality in the quality of
provision of primary education. Rural primary schools are
relatively neglected in terms of quality of staff and
equipment when compared to urban schools, and the pass
rate in the rural primary schools' examination to enter
secondary education is typically only half that of urban
schools (Colcough & McCarthy, 1980, p.215).
That the institutional relationships which link the
school system with the labour market is the most
important constraint on achieving real educational
reform, is shown by the project carried out by the South
African refugee Patrick Van Rensburg at Swaneng Hill
school in Serowe. Van Rensburg started the "Brigade"
movement in Botswana in the early 1960s and which
mirrored the traditional "age regiments" raised by the
tribal authorities. 4 The aims of the Swaneng Hill School
experiment were to inculcate a commitment to social
justice among the educated minority, and to equip them
with the necessary skills and knowledge for self-
development. But it went beyond this: it also aimed to
make a secondary education more accessible to poorer
families by requiring students to contribute in labour
rather than by monetary means, and to make the school the
focal point in the community. The school itself is
situated on a hillside overlooking the Khamas' village of
Serowe, and was built by the staff and students
themselves. Though it flourished in this form for a few
years, (and remains academically one of the finest
schools in the country) the project itself was a failure
as it did not take into consideration the prevailing
spirit of individualism that had been ushered in at
Independence. As other state schools operated on a fee
The 'age regiments' originated as a tribal mechanism for community effort.
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only basis and did not require contributions of' unpaid
labour from their students, this caused an increasing
resentment amongst the wealthier students at Swaneng able
to meet their fees in cash (Colcough & McCarthy, 1980,
pp.2 16-221)
Thus the expansion of the school system in Botswana,
though making rapid progress in the provision of primary
education, has done little to break down existing
patterns of inequality within the community. The search
for jobs remains highly competitive and the length of
stay in school can be seen as playing a legitimising role
in the selection of' which people are to get the jobs with
the highest rewards. These rewards are being increasingly
channelled into the livestock sector, especially during
periods of drought when the value of alternative
investment strategies pale in comparison with the
prospect of buying cheap emaciated cattle from the
smaller traditional farmers. The very unequal gains to be
made from holding livestock (because of existing
economies of scale, and whether or not herds are kept on
communal land) provides a key element to the analysis of
poverty in Botswana. We will therefore examine more
closely the dynamics of growth in the industry in the
following section.
c) The Dynamics of Cattle Accumulation.
In Botswana, harsh ecological conditions and consequently
a very limited supporting capacity of land is reflected
in an exceptionally low average of population density
which is ideally suited to pastoralism. The holding of
livestock has traditionally been seen as a form of
insurance against drought as it produces milk and meat
for when cereal crops fail, benefits from a natural
increase over time, and provides for draught power for
arable farming during periods of adequate rainfall.
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In many pastoral societies, the accumulation of cattle
instead of increasing the herd offtake when prices are
favourable, may suggest a backward sloping supply curve.
This can be explained by the fact that medium sized
commercially orientated producers tend to hold on to
their stock if' they think that the price rises are
permanent, whilst the smaller traditional farmers attempt
to maintain even the most tenuous links with livestock as
an insurance against drought. For the larger stock owner
this behaviour may increase sales volume in the long
term, and for the poorer farmer may help achieve a cash
and drought viable herd size (Konczaki 1978, p.59).
Thus the reluctance of some stock holders to sell cattle,
both in periods of good grazing (when cattle can be
fattened and realise a good price at the abattoir), and
in periods of drought (when cattle are lean and weak and
fetch a very low price) can be seen to be an inadequate
indicator of their commercial orientation. Offtake rates
in Botswana suggest a highly developed commercialism
among the medium to large livestock owners able to take
advantage of overseas markets, and although it accounts
for only 15-20% of total merchandise exports, the
livestock sub-sector represents some 80% of the
agricultural sector's value added. Botswana has an
international comparative advantage, not just regional,
in the production of livestock. (von Massow 1982)
Historically, the size of the national herd has always
fluctuated with water availability and grazing. Drought
often decimated herds but there was a fairly fast
recovery with the onset of new rains and fresh grazing
(Oxby 1975; Sandford 1983; Livingstone 1986). From the
1930s, an accelerated growth in the drilling of deep
water boreholes and vaccination against disease
(especially Rinderpest, which destroyed many herds in
1896-7) greatly increased the size of the national herd.
With this increase, the communal grazing of large herds
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around traditional village sites became difficult due to
competition from other herders, and for the larger stock
owners a herd size of around 60-100 head made the use of
a private borehole in or around the fringes of the
Kgalagadi desert a commercially viable proposition
(Hubbard 1983). Thus waterpoint creation became a major
focus of both public and private investment between the
1930s and 1950s as the authorities strove to expand the
virtually sole export industry and (with migrant labour
remittances) the main source of tax revenue.
Peters' study of borehole syndicates in Kgatleng showed
that they played a crucial role in the transformation of
the commons. (Peters 1983). Because of the hi gh initial
cost of water development, boreholes were , usually
financed by syndicates of the wealthy tribal elite and
the larger herdowners, which shifted responsibility for
regulating grazing land from a parsimonious colonial
administration back to the tribal aristocracy. The
ideology of the syndicates was that of a form of
collectivity working for the "common good", culturally
expressed as collective help, mutual support and
stewardship of the commons. The colonial administration
thereafter concentrated on the provision of such water
points further westward into the Kgalagadi and relied on
syndicates for their regulation. The Resident
Commissioner in 1934, Colonel Rey, made strenuous
attempts to secure a grant for water development in
Kgatleng as he saw the syndicates as representing the
"first and only Native cooperative water scheme" (Peters
1983, p.240). As Peters remarks:
"Borehole syndicates could be seen then as both
business like and potentially profitable, and,
in the provision of water "for the tribe", as
a fulfillment of the colonial trust. They
represented a happy merging of economic
imperative and moral responsibility akin to a
missionary linking of Christianity and
Commerce." (Peters 1983, p.242).
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From the early 1950s, Chief Molefi of the BaKgatla
acceded to private, rather than syndicate, boreholes. Up
to that time there had been a tribal understanding that
boreholes were to be drilled only for the benefit of
groups, not individuals. The colonial administration
appeared to demonstrate a naive understanding of the
process of privatisation and hoped that the cattle owning
elite would follow their good intentions and fulfill
their obligations to poorer members of the tribe. The
District Commissioner Clark wrote in 1956 that
"the chief, however, would doubtless consider
the position of people outside the syndicates,
since without safeguards all water and winter
grazing would pass into the hands of the richer
elements of the tribe". (Peters 1983, p.245).
By the late 1950s however, the colonial administration
started to have serious misgivings over the role of the
syndicates in development. In 1958 District Commissioner
Clark commented that, since all the district's boreholes
were operated by syndicates and none by the tribe, "the
richer Bakgatla exercise a proprietary right over the
best grazing areas as they own the water". Another
District Commisioner noted in 1961 that the Kgatleng
syndicates system had "degenerated into a money-making
concern which ruined the veld". (Peters 1983 p.243).
For the larger herdowners, the new technology offered the
opportunity to escape the resource limitations of the
communal grazing areas. Under the colonial administration
the money economy facilitated the translation of the
"rewards of office" for the tribal elite into forms which
allowed a greater privatisation of its income, whilst
protecting it from the traditional claims to its
redistribution. Peters (1983, p.153) remarks that it was
during this period that the tendency emerged for the
largest herdowners (>200 head) not to loan stock as mafisa.
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The role of the borehole syndicates can thus be seen as
one which facilitated a process of greater exclusivity
of control over grazing and water sources, even though
its original social organisation presented a hurdle to
full privatisation.	 Now however,	 syndicates	 are
characterised more by their exclusivity than
collectivity. The exclusion of bahiri (sharers of grazing
and purchasers of water from the boreholes) is now very
common, and by 1980 there were very few bahiri in Kgatleng.
(Peters p.283-285). This process during the Protectorate
has been described as a "cycle of capital accumulation":
the privileged access of the wealthy to the new boreholes
helped prevent herd loss; rising prices after 1945
increased their wealth and facilitated investment in
business & trading; allowed for the education 'of their
children and access to high status, high income
employment after Independence; and thus allowed further
investment in livestock throu gh syndicates and eventually
through private boreholes.(Peters 1983). Seen in this
light, a major element of the colonial legacy was the
formation of a new cattle aristocracy which would, after
Independence, gain virtual monopoly rights over access to
grazing and water in many areas of the western sandveld.
Because of the economies of scale in beef production in
a semi-arid environment, the wealthier herdowners have
been able to accumulate enough stock to effectively
propel themselves out of the traditional rural economy
altogether, to become independent breeders. Now freed
from the reciprocal obligations and r estrictions that
characterised traditional society, the wealth of the
cattle aristocracy has enabled it to overcome all
cultural, racial and political barriers to the future
expansion of their industry. According to one Botswana
newspaper report in 1987,
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"Mr. Basimanyana Masire, brother of President
Quett Masire, was criticised for his meeting in
Botswana with South African Foreign Minister
Pik Botha in July 1987. Describing himself as
a "big capitalist farmer", (Mr. Masire) said
his heifers alone are worth P8 million and that
it was this volume of trade that did not allow
himself to confine himself to Botswana"
(Botswana Guardian, 7 August 1987).
As we noted in the previous section of this chapter, many
prominent members of the ruling BDP are themselves owners
of sizeable herds. The Permanent Secretary to the
President and former Governor of the Bank of Botswana
said in 1982:
"Of course, many other people worry about the
skewed distribution of cattle ownership. This
is not a bad thing since in Botswana cattle
ranching has to be large scale to be viable
because of the semi-arid conditions of this
country" (Mogae 1983, p.23).
This statement may be seen as a deliberate obscuration of
what it is in fact a delicate political issue and has
commonly been used in Botswana to justify fundamental
land tenure changes in favour of the wealthy.5
The introduction of the new high-yielding borehole
technology effectively granted exclusive use of grazing
for a wide area around the borehole site. Because of
their relatively high cost (over P50,000 in 1987), the
drilling of the new boreholes after Independence has been
limited to the larger herders with adequate collateral,
and was facilitated by the provision of cheap credit
(Livingstone & Srivastava 1980; Roe 1980).
The wealthier stockholders have thus been more able to
preserve their cattle through a drought than have the
The ideological basis to the current land tenure changes is discussed in the next chapter, together with a
discussion of its impact on the rural poor.
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poorer stock owners. 6 Parsons notes the very unequal gains
to be made in Botswana by different types of livestock
owner, and the correlation between their access to scarce
resources, economic gains and political power. In
practice, this has meant that smaller herders have had to
sell off their breeding stock sooner in a drought
situation, because of the hi gh mortality of smaller herds
(IMDC, 1987). This has often worked to the advantage of
the wealthier owners who have taken advantage of buying
weak and emaciated stock for fattening, and eventual
export through the BMC. Competition between calves and
people for milk in the poorer families often makes calves
more vunerab1e to drought and disease, and the older
animals less able to plough. Partibularly during drought,
the wealthier stockholders can increase their assets and
control over natural resources such as grazing and water,
at the expense of' the smaller and marginal farmers. This
was the area where the mai'isa system of lending cattle for
milk and ploughing purposes probably had its most
profound levelling effect: by distributing the use of the
larger herds, it served to preserve the existing small
herds, thereby preventing the loss of the last means of
subsistence open to the poor.
When, after Independence, the nationalised Botswana Meat
Commission was established, legislation gave it autonomy
from parliamentary control (Hubbard, 1983); policy
decisions for the BMC were vested in the President
through his power to hire and fire commissioners, veto
any change of policy and issue directives. As Hubbard
succinctly points out,
"The legislatior iut ultimate control of the
industry into thb hands of the largest
breeders, since the President and most Cabinet
6 A large herd is more drought resistant than a small one, This was also the finding of WFP in its support of the
Turkana Rehabilitation Project (Kenya}.(WFP/FAO et al, 1988a, p.4?.
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Ministers were important breeders t' (Hubbard
1983, p.227).
This suggests that certain elements of state policy are
exercised in favour of the national bourgeoisie, as the
leading members of the political elite form the vanguard
of the this group. However, as the ruling party is a
democratically elected one, 7 this open exercise of state
power in favour of its national bourgeoisie has had to be
carefully managed and held under control to provide at
least a semblance of impartiality. The BMC functions
therefore in the form of a co-operative, of benefit not
only to the long established breeders but to both the up
and coming medium sized stockholders, (whose rising
incomes from government salaries have enabled them to
invest in cattle), and the more marginal stockholders who
make up a substantial proportion of the electorate. The
BMC passes on to all breeders, irrespective of size, the
enhanced profit margins enjoyed by the industry's
continuing access to preferential markets, generous
subsidies, and enhanced veterinary facilities. The BMC
Lobatse plant remains the largest abattoir in the
southern hemisphere, with an annual throughput of 220,000
head of cattle in normal years (Borton 1984, p.11).
However, it is the larger, wealthier breeders who are
most able to take advantage of access to the BMC and
enjoy the full range of subsidies available. (Sandford
1983, p.215; World Bank 1985). Since its inception, the
most strongly represented group on the board of the
Botswana Meat Commission has been the largest and mainly
freehold cattle suppliers (Colcough & McCarthy 1980;
Hubbard 1983; World Bank 1985). The BMC has a near
monopsonistic position within the country, handling some
50-70% of all cattle slaughtered. Of the slaughtered
The term is used here in a deliberately narrow sense to mean the simple process of voting in a multi-party
state,
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cattle actually marketed, 97% pass through BMC and of
this some 95% is exported (RoB, MoA, 1980, Table 9.14).
Perhaps the main impetus behind the rise in private
investment in livestock lies in the fact that beef
production has become increasingly lucrative over recent
years, due to preferential overseas markets (particularly
to the EEC, an arrangement made for the ACP states under
the Lome Convention agreement, and signed in 1976.) The
higher producer prices obtained from beef exports through
the BMC, combined with the salaries from newly created
civil service posts, provided the wherewithal for
increased borehole drilling and the purchase of breeding
stock after Independence. The rapid expansion and
commercialisation of the industry has resulted in a
rapidly growing national herd and the attendant problems
of overgrazing and increased drought risk:
"In 1982, the average price obtained by BMC was
US$315 per 100kg. of boneless beef compared to
a world market price of US$239 recorded by the
Commodities Division of' the World Bank. This
may have contributed to the overstocking of
cattle and consequent poor herd management
methods, and to the relative neglect of other
potentially competing activities, particularly
crop farming" (World Bank 1985, p.44).
This distortion in livestock producer prices has meant
that livestock production has become relatively more
attractive when compared with arable farming, with all
its attendant risks and uncertainties:
"An average family needing 1500kg of cereals a
year, would throughout the entire period, have
to work about 120 days on about 6 ha. of an
adequately moist field. The same amount of
cereals could have been bought from an offtake
of: a herd of 30-35 around 1940, a herd of 15
in 1966 a herd of 10 in 1980, with labour
requirements in adult equivalents of 120 days,
45 days and 30 days" (Opschoor 1983, p.161).
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The EEC maintains a system of variable levies designed to
raise the price of foreign imports (based on a notion of
a "world price") to the EEC level. An exporter like
Botswana, if subject to such levies, would therefore only
receive the world price and not the higher EEC price.
With the Lome I agreement of 1975 the ACP states received
a import quota to the EEC market of 23,000 tonnes, of
which Botswana was awarded 17,360 tonnes. After prolonged
diplomatic negotiation, Botswana was awarded a rebate of
90% of the variable levy, in common with the other ACP
states. With the 1979 borne II agreement, a 30,000 ACP
quota was declared exempt from the levies, with
Botswana's share a sizeable 27,000 tonnes. This figure
was also exempt from the Common External Tariff of 20%.
The borne Convention was renewed in 1984 and negotiations
started for a fourth renewal at the end of 1988..
The preferential access to the EEC market can be seen as
a form of economic aid in the shape of a transfer of
resources from Europe to the ACP states. The eventual use
of this rebate of the variable levies, however, was not
stipulated at borne and for Botswana between 1977-81, was
paid back into the BMC general revenue and passed on as
bonuses to producers. This aid was therefore effectively
targeted at that section of the community least in need
of it. Between these years it was P11 million, or twice
the average development budget of' the Ministry of
Agriculture during the same period (Mmusi Commission
1982, Table 5.3.1.).
A cost/benefit analysis of EEC beef policy to Botswana
was made by Hubbard (1983). For those livestock owners
that do have regular access to BMC and the EEC market,
the financial benefits are substantial when compared with
other markets, as Table 2.3 below indicates. Benefits
appear to have peaked around 1976-77, but declined
thereafter with a reduction in sales to the EEC in 1978
and 1980 due to Foot & Mouth disease (especially in
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Ngamiland, which was effectively closed to the BMC during
this period). The EEC's periodic restrictions on cattle
from both Ngamiland and North Central districts (which
taken together form one third of total offtake, has
reduced the overall levels of benefit, or rather narrowed
the financial benefit to a smaller number of farmers.
TABLE 2.3: BEEF PRICES: BOTSWANA, SCLJTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD 1960-81
YEAR WORLD INI)EX SOUTH AFRICA	 BOTSWANA (BMC BOTEWANA






































































































Notes: 1) Prices received for local sales not available for many
years but included here to indicate trend. In 1979, the BMC floor
price was some 2.7 times that of the local price. (Hubbard, p.247)
Sources: World index price: FAO Trade Yearbook (various years). SA
prices: South Africa Statistics 1978 and Agrekon, October 1981.
Botswaria: (BNC): BPA and BMC Annual Report & Accounts. Cited
Hubbard (1983), p.305. Botswana local prices: MoA Botswana: A
Handbook of Livestock Statistics, 1978 and 1980.
The growing surplus of beef in the EEC throughout the
1980s, resulting from subsidised production under the
Common Agricultural Policy, has led to the dumping of
surpluses on normal alternative markets for the ACP
countries. This dumping of beef on to external markets
since 1980 by the EEC has reduced both prices and markets
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for Botswana outside the EEC and South Africa. So far, a
tangible cost has not incurred, but it means that
Botswana beef has become more dependent on its
preferential access to the EEC and South African markets.
In one sense, membership of the SACU insulates Botswana
beef against the world market. Despite the fact that the
South African market fluctuates and sometimes falls below
world prices, it does have the advantage that its
fluctuations are usually out of phase with world price
fluctuations. At these times, the quota allocated by
South Africa to Botswana has been raised so that she can
increase sales, even of cattle from the northern areas
(such as Ngamiland) which are normally closed to the EEC
market due to stringent Foot & Mouth regulations.
On the debit side, the opportunity costs of channelling
scarce development funds into an industry which is
already highly subsidised, already the focus of heavy
domestic investment and does not require additional
revenue	 in	 order	 to maintain	 investment,	 are
considerable. But it is the social costs of
commercialisation that we are more concerned with here,
and how these are reflected in growing inequalities in
income and control of assets. It is during an extended
drought, when the size of a drought-viable herd is
rising, that the real winners and losers in the industry
become evident.
There appears to be a close interaction between BMC's
monopsonistic position and its control by well-placed
cattle owning interests. The latter have a vested
interest in restricting exports through the BMC to match
the existing quota to the EEC, so that prices are not
"diluted" by other export prices to less lucrative
markets, which would give a much lower average price to
producers. This provides a possible explanation to the
opposition to a northern abattoir until 1979, when
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Lobatse proved incapable of coping with the drought-
induced offerings, and it was realised that EEC would not
accept Ngamiland beef in any circumstances. Until this
time, northern producers, particularly in Ngamiland, who
perhaps had inadequate finance or knowledge of' how to
organise direct sales to BMC, 8 had little option but to
sell to middlemen such as traders at much lower net
prices than would have been received at Lobatse. (Hubbard
1981, p.51). As of January 1983 an agreement was reached
to accept "diluted" Ngamiland prices, and representatives
of marketin g co-operative interests on the BMC board.
This, it should be stressed, was not a victory for the
smaller farmer but rather a politically expedient move on
the part of the government faced with a severe drought
and the prospects of thousands of unsold cattle dying of
starvation in the northern areas:
"The winners in the system are those who secure
direct access to BMC and its higher prices. Of
these, the ones who stand to gain most are
those who also buy cattle for speculation and
fattening so they benefit both from lower up-
country prices and from higher BMC prices. The
losers are those predominantly small herders,
with insufficient means or knowledge, or are
too remote to organise direct sale to BMC, and
who therefore sell at a much lower price or not
at all" (Hubbard 1981, p.58).
Reinforcing the high profit margins obtained for beef is
the artificially low cost of production, maintained
through an extensive range of government subsidies. These
tend to favour the larger freehold farmer as they are
aimed at improving the (private) on-farm infrastructure,
such as the construction of dams, boreholes, and fences.
8 Access to the BMC is on a quota basis and requires sose forward planning, It also involves considerable expense
to transport cattle from the north to Lobatse. The rsuch slower rate of conercialisation in Nganiland has already
been noted in the previous section of this chapter, where it was suggested that this was reflected in the ssall
nuaber of Rgaailand breeders in the political elite. The sane arguisent could be applied to the esbership of the
BMC board.
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Because of their very nature, many of these subsidies can
not be applied to the type of communal grazing carried
out by the majority of Batswana farmers. Moreover, any
subsidy is irrelevant to those who have lost their cattle
due to drought, or never owned any in the first place.
A Presidential Commission set up in 1982 noted "it can be
said with certainty that there is a very substantial net
subsidy to the cattle industry (Mmusi Commission 1982, p.
A26). This confirmed an earlier Ministry of Agriculture
estimate that subsidies make up 55% of the production
cost per livestock unit on Botswana (World Bank 1981,
p.21). The distortion in livestock producer prices is
reinforced by an ineffective taxation system. In the
absence of cattle ownership records, tax avoidance is
common and again works in favour of the larger
stockholder (World Bank 1985, p.45-6).
Taxes during the colonial period on cattle revenues
constituted at least 20% of government revenue from
domestic sources; the rest was derived from the 1910
Customs agreement with South Africa. By contrast, the
industry now only provides between 5% and 10% of
government revenue. During the Protectorate, revenues
from the industry were usually double those of recurrent
expenditures, but now state expenditures on the industry
exceed tax revenues (Hubbard 1983, p.270). The industry
now contributes a declining proportion of public revenue
while attracting an increasing amount of public expendi-
ture as infrastructural support for private investment.
The more visible of these include veterinary and disease
control cordon fences and requisites, stock route
maintenance, breeding and management research, bull
purchase subsidies, artificial insemination subsidies,
and water point subsidies. The industry has also
attracted World Bank loans for implementation of the new
land tenure changes, which have been heralded as a major
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breakthrough in land use planning. 9 Though the BMC does
pay tax to government, this hardly offsets the wide range
of available subsidies (Hudson 1981, p.68). With the key
exogenous factor in private cattle accumulation being the
availability of investible funds, access to the EEC
market has removed the only obstacle to accumulation.
This explains the rapid growth in the national herd size
and the consequent ecological damage, the economic cost
of which falls most heavily on the marginal farmers who
have not benefited from land tenure reform and are still
tied to the overgrazed communal areas.
The World Bank noted in 1983 that the range carrying
capacity will probably limit the' size of the national
herd to around 3.25 million head (World Bank 1983).
However, this figure may be optimistic as serious range
degradation had already occurred in many areas
(particularly around large boreholes) and was the
rationale for the Government's announcement of the Tribal
Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) in 1975. The public and
private investment in establishing boreholes for
livestock and then using highly subsidised and imported
fodder has effectively pushed the range carrying capacity
beyond its natural limits and risks permanent degradation
of the range (UNDP et al 1985, p.25). Prior to the
sinking of the boreholes, the shortage of water preceded
the degradation of the range, and effectively limited
overgrazing.
Desertification of the grasslands, once triggered, can
become a self-reinforcing process. Reduction in plant
cover due to over grazing, leads to soil erosion, loss of
fertility and water holding abilities. Fewer new plants
are produced and if these are in turn destroyed by
excessive numbers of cattle, the process is accelerated.
If' the accumulation of livestock is continued and the
See the next chapter on the Tribal Grazing hands Policy '(TGLP)
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state of affairs gets progressively worse, there is no
built in mechanism in the existing socio-economic
structure to cope with the problem. With private
ownership of cattle and communal ownership of land no
communal basis for action exists.
Less well recognised is the possible environmental
effects caused by the use of pesticides in Botswana,
particularly for tsetse eradication, and usually at the
request of influential beef exporters. Dieldrin, a
powerful pesticide chemically related to DDT is currently
being supplied to the country by Royal Dutch Shell in
South Africa and is used for ground spraying. Dieldrin
has been proscribed by most western governments and is
banned for agricultural use in South Africa itself
(United Nations, 1986). Aerial spraying using the
chemical endosulfan has been used over 29,000 square
kilometres of the Okavango Delta in Ngamiland, and may
damage the delicate ecosystem of the region (Botswana Daily
News, July 2, 1987). This chemical is known to have deadly
effects on fish stocks (United Nations, 1986). According
to the Chief Tsetsefly Control Officer, Mr. Charles
Wiggett, speaking at the Southern African Regional
Commission for the Conservation and Utilisation of Soil,
"they (the tsetse eradication team) had not
looked into the long term effects of the
chemicals they were using but would continue to
monitor its effect on the environment after
covering the whole area" (Botswana Daily News,
July 2, 1987). (My emphasis).
These efforts to increase the grazing area available for
livestock without a corresponding effort to improve the
system of range management, can be seen as a prime
example of the "technical-fix" approach to development.
Its application to the Okavango Delta may have serious
effects on the wildlife in the area which currently
attracts some 50,000 tourists per year.
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In his study of the beef industry in Botswana, Hubbard
draws parallels with other beef producing countries where
soils and climate are inferior for both arable and
livestock production, and where the exporters typically
have low populations. Examples of this type are the
Central American states, the latifundia and humid forest
zones of the small South American states, and the
waterless savannah of some African states.
Whereas in earlier, fully colonised temperate zones,
rising domestic demand for beef (due to the general rise
in incomes) had led to the decline of beef exports, and
consequently to the growth of imports, it is rising
population growth in the "new exporter" countries that
has tended to outstrip increases in cattle production.
Hubbard suggests that this trend is now causing social
conflict in exporting countries of Central and South
America, Argentina and Kenya, and is likely to do so in
the near future in Mexico, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama,
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Guyana, all of which will be net
importers by 1990 (Valdes & Nores 1978, p.17). Botswana's
similarity with other beef producers may not be
immediately clear. For example, the trend towards an
increase in social conflict, due to rising population,
has not become a serious issue as the population stood at
only 1.04 million in 1984. As commercial pressures for
exclusive use of large tracts of grazing continue,
however, this may change in the near future. There is
already the basis for a growing social conflict in
Botswana associated with the livestock industry, which
has yet to be articulated.'° Just as expansion of beef
10 The absence of any widespread, overt grievance over the present land tenure changes does not mean that the
basis for social conflict do not exist. Lukes (1974 p.24) remarks that 'the most insidious form of power,. prevents
people from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it,
or because they see it as natural and unchangable...". The fact that lany larger herdowners who benefit from the
TGLP are from the tribal aristocracy lends a certain legitiiacy to their actions.
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production has led to the displacement of populations in
Brazil and Paraguay which has been well documented
(Shane, 1980, p.28), a similar trend is occurring too in
Botswana as marginal groups are expropriated of their
lands and-subsistence base to make way for private cattle
ranches. With a population growth rate that stood at 3.7%
in 1984, and a projected population size of 2.6 million
in the year 2011, pressure on land use and grazing is
likely to rise.(RoB, MoH 1987, p.l).
The commercialisation of the livestock industry in
Botswana, therefore, has been a process which has been
instituted by, and on behalf of, the wealthier
stockholders, many of' whom hold high government office.
Though livestockwas superseded as the leading. sector of
the economy by minerals (and by the government itself
through its vastly increased SACU revenues) after 1970,
both these new sources of revenue have been channelled
back into livestock via the medium of public sector
salaries and subsidies. The present expansion of this
sector is threatening not only serious ecological damage
to the veld, but to the subsistence base of many marginal
groups. Because of the labour extensive nature of
pastoralism, the capitalist transformation of cattle
production is destroying rural employment, not creating
it. This has obvious implications for the rural poor, who
possess no alternative avenues for employment. In the
next chapter we will examine the structure of rural
poverty, and the impact of the land tenure changes that
the commercialisation of livestock has brou ght into
being.
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IV
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN RURAL BOTSWANA
In this chapter we examine the nature of rural poverty in
Botswana, and the impact on the poor of the pattern of
economic growth since Independence. We will seek to
establish the basis of a causal relationship between
these developments and both the incidence and extent of
rural poverty in Botswana. We will argue in particular
that the pattern of economic growth established during
the colonial period and built upon after Independence has
destroyed the fabric of traditional society and ushered
in a new era of economic individualism. This has in turn
brought about a breakdown in the redistributive
mechanisms of tribal society, and a growing polarisation
in the ownership of productive assets such as livestock,
land and water. This ongoing process has led directly and
indirectly to a growing immiseration of an increasingly
significant proportion of the population who are now
dependent on aid relief for the greater part of their
subsistence needs.
Two main contributory factors to rural poverty in
Botswana may be distinguished. In the first may be
grouped a series of natural, environmental constraints
such as climate, soil quality and surface water
availability, acting upon the subsistence farmer and
preventing him from producing a surplus in all but
exceptional years of heavy rainfall. In the second
factor, there is a complicated matrix of legal, social,
political and economic forces at work which are often
mutually reinforcing and act to keep most households at
or near subsistence level. These include amongst others,
the existing levels of wages and incomes in the rural
areas, the incomes policy of the government, the control
Poverty and Inequality in Rural Botswana 	 104
or ownership of productive assets, and access to
employment and education. Taken together these forces
determine the power of the individual household or group
within society to command a range of goods and services
to meet its subsistence needs (Sen 1981).
Though both may involve a loss of productive assets, the
distinction between these two sets of influences on the
individual household or group is a crucial one. In the
past, redistributive mechanisms had evolved in
traditional society and had the effect of minimisin g or
spreading the worst aspects of natural disasters such as
drought. The mafisa system of lending cattle played an
important role in this regard, and drought involved a
communal loss to the tribe as well as a loss to the
individual household. By contrast, modern drou ghts have
increasingly involved private, not communal loss, and
modern borehole technology has ensured that larger herds
are more "draught-proof" than those of the smaller
stockholders. With the increasing commercialisation of
livestock, and the competitive struggle for control of
assets such as water and land, one man's loss has become
another man's gain. What was once the quintessence of
traditional society, now marks its passing away, and
threatens the immiseration of its people.
a) The Structure of Rural Poverty in Botswana.
We start first by looking at the group of climatic and
environmental factors acting upon the arable sector in
Botswana, and examine some of the constraints limiting
cereal production and food self-sufficiency.
The type of agricultural activity carried out in Botswana
varies according to the system of land tenure under which
it is carried out. There are three main land tenure
systems: state owned lands (47%), tribal lands (49%), and
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freehold farms (4%). State owned land is controlled by
the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL) and may
be leased by State Land Boards to commercial ranchers or
farmers on a leasehold basis. The Pandamatenga region of
Chobe District (see Map 1) falls into this category and
is currently the only sizable area of commercial dryland
farming in the country. Most of the cultivable tribal
lands are owned communally and administered by the Tribal
Land Boards, though some areas suitable for livestock are
now available for grazing on a leasehold basis.' The
freehold areas are largely situated along the eastern and
western borders and comprise around 30,000 sq.km. They
are farmed by 360, mainly expatriate, families. The 150
commercial larger farms (both freehold and leasehold)
account for roughly 2% of the total area planted in the
country, 9% of the total area harvested, 35% of the total
production of the main cereal crops (RoB, Rural
Development Council, 1985, p.3), and hold about 15% of
the livestock (World Bank 1985, p.75).
Communal tenure of the tribal areas theoretically
entitles every household to a piece of land of a size
sufficient to meet his family's subsistence needs.
However, a 1974 survey by FAO found that 13% of the
households sampled held no land and that only 45%
considered their land holding sufficient to meet their
subsistence needs. Sufficiency in land was defined in
terms of having acess to viable plots with reasonable
levels of grazing and water (FAO 1974, p.6). With
population growth estimated at 3.7% in 1985, landlessness
and land shortage are likely to have increased since the
1974 survey (World Bank 1985, p.16).
Although it had only an 8.5% share in GDP in 1982-3, the
agricultural sector remains a major source of livelihood
1 An analysis of the recent land tenure changes under the Tribal Grating Lands Policy is provided later in this
chapter.
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for some 80% of the total population, or around 85,000
households (World Bank 1985, p.75). The overview that
follows therefore serves to paint a picture of the type
of agriculture most rural households have to rely upon in
Botswana for their basic subsistence needs.
In the 1930s Botswana was virtually self-sufficient in
food grain production (UNDP et al, 1985, p.12), and in
the 1940s and 1950s some above average years allowed for
the net export of cereals (FAO 1974, p.24). However, a
rapidly declining mortality rate since the late 1950s,
due largely to improvements in health care and dietZ, has
reversed this cereal self-sufficiency and the country's
present domestic production meets only about 25% of
demand in years of average rainfall, and even less in
drought years. "Normal" rainfall allowed for a near
self-sufficiency of cereals, whilst badtt years resulted
in serious shortfalls, and the consequent need for
increased imports.
The value of output in arable agriculture (and therefore
the level of income for subsistence farmers) is not
accurately reflected in Botswana as it is included with
livestock in the National Accounts. Between 1971-3, the
rise in international price of beef was reflected by a
doubling of the value of meat production at BMC, and in
most years since Independence, stock increases have
represented one fifth of total agricultural output -
hence there is a danger of misrepresenting the amount of
growth that actually took place in the arable sector in
the decade of good rainfall after Independence. In the
event of drought many of the cattle (particularly those
belonging to the smaller herders) actually die, so growth
in agricultural output as reflected in the National
Accounts is really not a good indicator of the welfare of
2 r.proveaents in the nutritional status of children iay have been due to the existence of food aid prograues
in the country since the early 1960s.
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the rural poor. Between 1965 and 1978, 90% of gross
capital investment in agriculture has been in the growth
of the cattle herd (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.64).
There are three main forms of arable agriculture
practised in Botswana: dryland farming, which remains the
dominant category for climatic reasons; irrigated
farming, which is mainly restricted to the freehold areas
along the Limpopo River in the east; and molapo farming,
which refers to the traditional practice of cultivating
on the basis of flood recession along river beds and
channels. Because of the lack of rain and groundwater
supplies, most arable farming carried out in Botswana is
necessarily of the dryland type. 'It is estimated that
only 3% of the country's total land area receives enough
rainfall for this type of farming (FAO 1974, p.17). The
pattern of rainfall up until the end of January
determines, in connection with the individual farmer's
perception of his risk and family needs, the extent of
ploughing and planting. The pattern of rainfall
thereafter determines the yield obtained during the
harvest. Some 70-80,000 households carry out subsistence
dryland farming on an average holding of around 4-5
hectares. The area actually cultivated however is much
smaller, being around 75% of this figure, with only about
25-75% of this latter figure actually harvested,
depending on the rainfall (World Bank, 1985, p.S). The
main staple crops grown are sorghum and maize (80%),
beans (10%) and millet (5%), with the remaining area
including melons, groundnuts, sunflower and vegetables.
Mean yields of maize and sorghum are typically 200-300
kg/hectare, but are considerably less than this is
drought years.
Compared to other African countries, Botswana has one of
the least promising climates for dryland farming, (i.e.
relying solely on rainfall for its water supply), with
some 65% of the total land mass existing within the 400-
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600mm. rainfall zone (compared to no more than 25% in
other countries). Even here, non-irrigated farming is
extremely risky as there is not a single month in which
rainfall exceeds the potential evapotranspiration rate
(Norman 1983). Taken overall, the potential rate of
evaporation at 1800mm. per annum is some four times the
average rainfall level (Khupe 1983).
The crop cycle begins in November or thereafter with the
arrival of the first heavy rains. Families then migrate
to the lands for ploughing. Six to eight oxen are
required for a ploughing team, and if the oxen are weak
from the lack of grazing, the household has to wait until
grazing has improved and they have recovered their
strength. Planting is shared by men and women, whilst
weeding, bird scaring, harvesting and threshing is done
solely by the women. The households return to their
villages in May or June, or sooner if water availability
is low at the lands area. The production of households
without cattle is significantly lower than that of
households with cattle (FAO 1974), and these
disadvantages are cumulative. Though they may be able to
borrow oxen and are therefore able to plough, it is
usually too late to achieve significant yields.
Few dryland farmers, even in years of normal rainfall,
perceive crop production as a way of producing a
marketable surplus. Rather they attempt to meet as much
of their subsistence requirements from it as possible and
this varies directly with the level of rainfall. The
inter-seasonal variability of rainfall also means that
although improved management techniques and technological
inputs are still significant, luck still plays a
disproportionate role in achieving a economic yield: in
a dryland situation, no amount of improved arable
technology can as yet produce a food crop that overcomes
the absence of rainfall. Consequently, farmers have
adopted a risk minimisation strategy and inputs of
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capital and labour are low. Use of fertiliser, whether
chemical or in the form of manure, is limited to less
than 5% of farmers (RoB, Rural Development Council 1985,
p.3 ) . Despite these constraints, in years of above
"normal" rains farmers can still occasionally manage to
produce around 60,000 mt of sorghum and maize per annum.
During 1973/4 and 1975/6 Botswana produced in excess of
100,000 mt from dryland production because of
exceptionally heavy and well distributed rains (World
Bank, 1985, p.49).
However, a realistic view must be that future prospects
for developing this type of agriculture within the
existing land tenure structure are extremely limited, as
irrigation by deep borehole and diesel pump of individual
smaliholdings is generally thought not to be economically
feasible. Any extension of dryland farming with
supplementary irrigation would require a far greater
commitment by the Government to the smaller farmer than
is presently the case, and probably the combination of
existing private holdings into larger farms run perhaps
on a cooperative basis. The Government's present
investment priority, however, is directed more towards
the larger private or state owned farms, and particularly
towards livestock ranches:
"Water development for livestock has and is
taking almost complete precedence over
irrigation for crops" (UNDP et al 1985, p.129).
Probably the only strategy for most rural households in
the short and medium term is to adopt a "mixed" farming
technique whereby in the event of rain failure crop
residues can still be used as fodder for livestock. The
arable/livestock linkage also exists in relation to
growing fodder crops and using kraal manure as
fertiliser. This approach may also have a bearing on
relieving communal grazing lands, which are already at
near saturation point, and allow the small farmer to
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maintain a certain level of income when the rains fail
(Hunter 1983, p.30). However, the mixed farming approach
may already be out of reach for a growing section of the
rural population, owing to the high cattle mortality
during periods of drought and the already skewed
ownership of cattle.
Molapo cultivation is carried out on the basis of flood
recession along river beds and channels, and is done
typically on small plots of around 1 to 3 hectares. This
type of crop production is limited to the northern area
of Ngamiland, and at present only about 300-400
households are currently engaged in this form of
agriculture, due to papyrus blockages around the fringes
of the perennial Okavango swamp. Yields are typically
three times higher than those generally obtained from
dryland farming (RoB, Rural Development Council, 1985,
p.20)
Commercial irrigated agriculture is beyond the reach for
most subsistence farmers because most rivers in the
Botswana are ephemeral in nature and therefore can not be
effectively used for irrigation. Of the perennial rivers
that show some potential are the Chobe, the Okavango
system including the Boteti River, and the Limpopo, which
often becomes merely a series of pools during the dry
season. Borehole extraction is also possible from the
sand rivers which flow sporadically but which store
substantial amounts of water in the sand bed during the
rainy season. These are mainly situated in eastern
Botswana and flow into the Limpopo, e g . the Tati, Shashe,
Motloutse and Lotsane rivers. Boreholes are expensive to
run and maintain and therefore generally restricted to
human or livestock use, or used on an extensive scale for
arable cash crops in the freehold farm areas only. The
topography of Botswana is generally unsuitable for dam
construction on any scale. A possibility exists for small
scale dams in southern areas but these would have a small
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catchment area able to irrigate only 5-10 hectares (Wiles
1983, p.11).
The low level and unpredictable nature of rainfall in
Botswana makes it unlikely that HYV seeds will be adopted
on a large scale, because one of its main requirements
for success is an abundant supply of water. 3 Developing
improved seed varieties which are both drought resistant
and responsive to fertiliser has been largely
disappointing, and for Botswana, any strategy for dryland
farming will necessarily involve modifying the plant to
fit the environment rather than the other way around
(Norman 1983, p.63).
The use of HYV technology and improved techniques on
large scale, highly mechanised and irrigated farms in the
Tuli Block area could increase cereal production levels
and lessen the need for imports. This has not happened
however because the free movement of highly subsidised
South African grain (due to Botswana's membership of the
SACU) makes domestic production uneconomic. 4 Most farms
in the Tuli Block (including state owned farms) therefore
grow vegetables or citrus fruits and have their main
markets in South Africa. The adoption of a policy that
would encourage a switch to cereal crops would have to
set minimum producer prices at a level to provide an
adequate support for the traditional dryland farmer,
which would effectively mean that the irrigated farms
would be highly subsidised and uneconomic when compared
with the cost of importing grain from South Africa.
With the notable exception of countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, the introduction and use of HYV in Sub-
Saharan Africa has not taken place on any serious scale and even in Kenya, agricultural output has been poor in
recent years. See the papers by Thirtle (1988) and Lawrence (1988).
Nost conercial cereal production is therefore grown under rainfed conditions which although it has lower
yields, also has lower input costs. Access to cheap cereal grains froa South Africa tends to benefit the poor in
tijes of drought (when domestic production can fall draiatically) yet is a disadvantage during periods of above
average rainfall when surpluses may be produced. This is one reason for the grain purchasing strategy of the
Botswana Agricultural Karketing Board, which is exaiined in Chapter 7.
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Irrigation on any large scale will not be possible for
some time to come and this leaves us with the fact that
the majority of farmers will still be reliant on rainfed
(i.e. dryland) agriculture for the foreseeable future.
Climatic and environmental factors play an important but
not exclusive role in determining the nature and extent
of rural poverty in Botswana. Several studies have drawn
attentiOn to the fact that though periodic drought is not
a new phenomenon in Botswana, the available evidence
suggests that it did not produce the degree of social
differentiation that can be witnessed today (Schapera
1943, 1947, 1970; FAO 1974; Parson 1974; Parsons 1977;
Cliffe & Moorsom 1979; Picard 1980, 1981, 1987; Brown
1983; Watanabe & Mueller 1984; Cliffe et al 1988).
Rather, they stress the importance of the unequal access
to sources of income and productive assets that so
characterise modern Batswana society, as being the major
contributory factors to rural poverty.
With the arid climate of Botswana making arable
agriculture a risky business in all but exceptional
years, the most productive asset held has always been
livestock. The ownership of cattle, however, is becoming
increasingly skewed, with just 5% of rural households
holding half the national herd by 1974 (RoB, CSO, 1977,
p.111).
In the Rural Income Distribution Survey (RIDS) of 1974,
households with more than 40 head were found to own 64%
of all cattle. More recent agricultural surveys in 1980
and 1981 by the Ministry of Agriculture found even higher
proportions of total cattle numbers in larger herds: 76%
of cattle in herds of over 40 head and 62% in herds of
over 60 head. Colcough & Fallon, writing in 1983, found
income directly correlated with cattle ownership, and
that figures on cattle distribution may be used as a
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proxy for social differentiation (Colcough & Fallon 1983,
p.127-153; RoB, CSO, pp.97-100).
With the drought viable herd size estimated at 20-25
head, 5 the RIDS survey of 1974 found that 80% of rural
households held less than 21 cattle (RoB, CSO 1977,
p.55). The cash viable herd size has been estimated at
between 30 - 40 head so it is clear that only a minority
of cattle owners benefit from the low taxation and high
subsidies going to the industry (Carl Bro International
1982). Moreover, there is a growth in both relative and
absolute terms of the number of households owning no
cattle at all. Table 2.4 below shows the proportion of
TABLE 2 • 4: PR0I1?ION OF 1JRAL }KLJSEHOLDS PAIICIPATING IN ARABLE
AGRICLJLWRE WTflIXTI' NING OR HOLDING CATTLE (1968-76)
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Notes: (1) Estimate of the nunber of households which engaged in
agricultural production in each year, as given by each survey.
Sources: RoB, MoA, The 1968-69 Agricultural Survey, 1970, p.30; The
1970-1 Agricultural Survey, 1971, p.29-30; The 1971-2 Agricultural
Survey, 1973, p.53-4; G.C. Bond, A Report on Livestock Marketing,
1975, p.3; Agricultural Statistics, 1977, 1978, p.19.
Vierich (1919) esti.ated the drought viable herd size at 22 head, Bailey (1983) however puts the size of herd
required for full independence in oxen draught power as 35-40 head.
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rural households without cattle during the period 1968-
76, but still participating in arable agriculture,
according to the various surveys conducted during that
period.
For the poorer households without cattle, anything less
than good rainfall miti gates against participating in
arable agriculture, and these households drop out of the
survey. Therefore such a survey probably underestimates
the total proportion of households without cattle. The
difference between the two columns show that the current
redistributive effect of the mafisa system is low (only
about 2%). Moreover, although about 1O%-20% of the
national herd is held under the mafisa system (FAO, 1974,
p.66) it is predominantly those families who already own
cattle that benefit. The estimated total number of rural
households not owning cattle (whether or not they are
still participating in agricultural activities), is shown
overleaf in Table 2.5 for the period 1970-81, again
according to the various surveys conducted during the
period.
Though the ownership of smallstock such as goats and
sheep is much less skewed, with 75% of farming households
estimated as having some smallstock in 1974-5 (RoB, MoA,
1978, Table 19), the number of smalistock held is
positively correlated with the ownership of cattle
(Konczacki 1978, p.86; FAO 1974, p.68). Smalistock are an
important source of protein for rural households,
especially for those without cattle, as they are more
drought resistant. Where kept in large numbers however,
they are exacerbating the problem of land conservation
around the villages and watering places.
Livestock provides an important food supply. According to
rough estimates the people in the Kgalagadi area consume
36.5 kg. per head per year from domestic animals and the
consumption of milk is at least 200 litres per head,
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presumably because of the shortage of cereals. During
periods of drought all Batswana have historically relied
on meat and milk for the major part of their diet. A
corresponding estimate from FAO for selected East African
countries is 11.8kg of meat per head. (Cole 1971, p.193).
TABLE 2 • 5:	 )1(grION OF 'lUrAL lJRAL W*JSEIIDLDS
N(Yr (MNING CATTLE (1970-1981)
Survey Type	 Year of	 Percentage of
Survey	 households not
owning Cattle
Agricultural survey ( ' l	1970-71	 30%
Rural Income Distributiop Survey(2} 	 1974	 45%
National Migratç,n Stixy' 3	1980	 50%
National Census	 1981	 60%
Sources:
1) RoB, Agricultural Survey, 1970-1.
2) RoB, (jSO, RIDS, 1977.
3) RoB, CSO, The National Migration Study, 1980, cited in World Bank,
(1985), p.42.
4) Republic of Botswana/UNICEF, The Situation of Children and Women
in Botawana, Gaborone 1986, p.43.
The middle and poor peasantry are reliant on urban
incomes for maintaining their herds, but their cash
inputs are seldom sufficient to enable them to increase
their herds to the rich peasant level of more than 40
head (Hubbard 1983, p.89). The real benefactors in the
industry are the freehold farmers, who enjoy considerable
economies of scale. Numbering only about 360 families,
they own about 15% of the national herd and supply 50% of
the cattle entering BMC, but perhaps as much as half of
these are purchased from others and fattened on the
freehold farms (USAID 1976).
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Hubbard suggests that there is a strong probability of
substantially increased accumulation at the top end of
the cattle distribution, especially during periods of
drought, when cattle mortality amongst smaller herds is
proportionately higher than in larger herds. Larger stock
holders were much better able to sustain their herds
through the drought periods of the mid-1960s, and so
generate savings during the rapid rise of cattle prices
during the period 1970-4, when Botswana gained access to
the lucrative EEC markets. They were able to invest in
water and stock, therefore increasing their relative
control of land and proportionate ownership of the
national herd (Hubbard, 1983, p.90). With ownership of
livestock closely correlated to occupational status and
wealth, Cooper attempted a definition of social class in
Botswana in 1983. Table 2.6 overleaf shows these
categories, with some additions by Hubbard in the same
year.
Larger stockholders are also at an advantage when it
comes to gaining access to credit for farm improvements.
A paradoxical situation exists within Botswana's
financial sector: while the commercial banks are laden
with excess liquidity, most small businessmen and farmers
without land as collateral can not get any or enough
finance (Makgetla 1982; World Bank 1985, p.53).
According to the financial advisor to Barclays Bank
(Botswana) Limited,
"...97% of our farming advances are to
commercial farmers and 3% to traditional
farmers. We lend more to the commercial sector
because of the availability of tangible
security. The advances to commercial farmers
are mainly tied into beef cattle production
while a small proportion is for irrigation,










Freehold ranchers 	 Cash Crops iainly	 Very large herds,
TGLP leaseholders 	 exported to BA.	 breeding ranches.
15 to hundreds of
bags. Surplus.
Hired labour,













Poverty and Inequality in Rural Botswana
	
117







'Luipen' peasantry	 25 - 30%
and proletariat.




Source: Adapted froi Cooper, D. 'How Urban Workers in Botswana Kanage their Cattle and Lands: Selebe-Phikwe Case
Studies', NMS Working Paper No.4, June 1980. CBO, Gaborone, with additions suggested by Hubbard, 1983, p.88. Note:
Bags are of 50kg. size.
In a similar way, both the Botswana Development
Corporation (BDC) and the National Development Bank
(NDB), created primarily to serve the rural areas, have
since their inception, come under criticism for failing
to met the needs of the smaller farmer (Botswana Daily News,
February 25, 1986). The BDC in particular remains heavily
committed to large scale irrigated farming, and the whole
of its P5.49 million investment in the agricultural
sector in 1986 was confined to its own farms and ranches
in the Tuli Block and Chobe areas, which together employ
only 286 full time workers. BDC's funding in the
agricultural sector in 1986 was just 9% of the
Corporation's total investment (BDC 1986).
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There are other structural reasons for the growing social
differentiation in Botswana which relate closely to the
nature and function of the State. We have already shown
that the State has been instrumental in the process of
commercialisation in the livestock industry and have
suggested that this was because of the close economic
relationship it has with the national bourgeoisie. This
relationship also extends to the regulation of government
wage and salary scales in favour of the urban elite and
to the detriment of the rural poor. We will now examine
the Government's incomes policy since Independence and
its effects on the distribution of earnings.
In Botswana, inequalities of income and access to
salaried employment can be seen historically as both a
cause and result of an existing maldistribution of
assets. Active racial discrimination in the selection of
government employees by the colonial administration had
created a two-tier system of salary scales, which were
entrenched in line with those existing in South Africa by
the early 1960s. Botswana thus inherited a civil service
salary structure at Independence which was at the time
one of the most unequal in Africa (Colcough & McCarthy
1980, p.184).
In the early years after Independence, the BDP appeared
committed to a policy of reducing the prevailing
inequality in formal sector employment, on the principle
that all employees should be paid a minimum living wage,
and that average rural wages should not lag behind
minimum urban wages (RoB, NDP 1968-73, p.9). This policy
was reaffirmed in the NDP 1970-75:
"no employee...should be required to work for
less than a minimum wage which enables him to
clothe, feed and house himself and his
immediate family sufficiently to maintain good
health. In this respect minimum wages paid by
Government in different areas for different
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work are intended as a guide for the private
sector" (RoB, NDP197O-5, p.13).
Wage Councils were established to take account of what
would be a wage that would provide an acceptable standard
of living for a worker and his family on the basis of
available Poverty Datum Line (PDL) studies. The
commitment to increasing income equality was confirmed in
1970 when a salaries review Commission reduced the
salaries of senior Government posts by 7%. Increases
were made in the lower clerical grades, but less than the
cost of living increase since 1964. The only group to
make a net gain were unskilled labourers (RoB, 1970).
Though Wage Councils established the need for minimum
wage legislation in 1973, it was significant that no
attempt was made to establish a minimum wage in
agriculture. The previous year it had been declared that
"there should be no statutory minimum wage
covering all unskilled workers (RoB, Government
Paper No.2 1972, p.5). (my emphasis)
In the election year of 1974, the government came under
pressure to spend some of its newly found mineral
revenues to pay for rapidly increasing urban housing
costs, and also faced general elections in the same year.
Unskilled manual grades received a 150% rise in wages,
skilled manual and junior clerical grades received from
97% and 42% increases respectively, whilst Permanent
Secretaries received 23%. The ratio of salaries at the
top and at the bottom of the service was therefore
effectively halved (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, pp.186-7).
Since 1974, however, these income differentials have been
eroded somewhat, with higher increases given to the more
senior posts (Ibid., p.188).
In 1977 an official minimum rate was fixed for all formal
sector employment, equivalent to 67% of the government's
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own minimum rates. At the time this represented an
increase of 43% for construction, manufacturing and
transport sectors, and 100% in the trade and catering
sectors, with rates in the mining sectors already above
this minimum level (Ibid., p.270).
These developments, because they affected mainly urban
and middle class salary scales, did not apply to the
informal rural sector in which the majority of the
population subsisted. It thus served to widen the urban-
rural income gap still further, and seemed at variance
with the white paper statement on incomes policy two
years before, in which it was stressed that constraint
would be shown in order to avoid a growing disparity with
rural incomes (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.184).
The Government feared that the mining development might
"give rise to a new group of unskilled
employees in the modern sector of the economy
with a standard of living substantially above
that of the rural sector where the vast
majority of the population must continue to
seek their livelihood (RoB, NDP197O-5).
This policy allowed wage levels in the rural sector to
decline throughout the 1970s and early 1980s relative to
those in the formal and public sectors. The income of
those involved in herding cattle is a case in point.
These herd boys, usually youths from poor families and
with little or no formal education, are about 21,000 in
number. They receive payment for their herding services
in cash and in food. A study in 1984 found that cash
wages of herders in the Southern District ranged from P0
(sic) to P35 per month, and that while some 83% received
food supplements of some kind, the average wage rate was
equivalent to about P25 per month, substantially below
the lowest wage rate existing in the public sector
(Jansen 1984). By comparison, the minimum daily wage for
industrial class employee8 in mid-1987 was around P7.40.
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This increasing divergence in incomes has been
exacerbated by a regressive system of tax legislation
since 1976-7, partly due to political pressure from
increasingly articulate urban classes and the growth in
strength of the civil service unions. According to the
study by Colcough & McCarthy, those individuals earning
over P10,000 p.a. enjoyed a reduction in tax during this
period of around 10%. This tiny group controls a large
proportion of the agricultural capital and are in receipt
of perhaps 20% of the total personal income (Colcough &
McCarthy, 1980, p.201). From this point of time onwards,
income tax was no longer used in pursuit of income
redistribution from the rich to the poor.
The lack of a statutory legal minimum wage in the rural
areas can be explained, at least in part, by the
resistance that would undoubtedly come from the larger
cattle owners who collectively form the main power base
of the ruling BDP (Borton 1984, p.13). A legally enforced
statutory minimum wage would probably also have
deleterious effects on levels of employment levels,
already threatened by the current establishment of TGLP
ranches • 6
One of the major themes of this study, the importance of
which we consider vital in identifying the root causes of
poverty in rural Botswana, is the changing socio-economic
role of livestock. Apart from its traditional role as a
source of social status and prestige, cattle ownership in
Botswana has always had important productive and
ecological linkages within the arable sector in that it
provided draught power for ploughing and kraal manure as
a natural fertiliser. For many rural households livestock
provided the only insurance against drought and crop
failure. Herd size could be increased during years of
high rainfall and good grazing, whilst in lean years,
6 Fenced ranches require less hired labour as the .oveient of the cattle is restricted.
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cattle can be sold for the purchase of imported grain or
slaughtered for meat.
However, with the introduction of a cash economy and the
growth of commercial markets during the Protectorate,
there developed a fundamental change in the socio-
economic role of holding livestock. With the continuation
of this process of commercialisation after Independence,
there emerged an increasing duality within the sector:
whereas formerly the holding of livestock was integrated
with the domestic subsistence economy, modern cattle
raising is now increasingly undertaken outside the
domestic economy as part of a commercial enterprise.
This duality is now characterised on the one hand by a
growing number of subsistence farmers owning few or no
cattle, and on the other, by new capitalist entrepreneurs
with their own boreholes and increasingly, with their own
freehold ranches. This process of commercialisation has
provided a major contributory factor towards the gradual
disintegration of community bonds and obligations
(Raynaut 1977).
With these commercial pressures, the linkages that
traditionally existed between livestock and arable
agriculture are now being severed, along with the
traditional redistributive mechanisms of mafisa and majako.
As we have already seen in the introductory chapter, the
mat'isa system enabled non-owners of cattle to borrow
draught oxen for ploughing, and also provided a source of
milk for rural households. Because of the low level and
variability of rainfall in Botswana, the key management
factor in dryland arable agriculture is the ability of
farmers to undertake timely operations for clearing land,
ploughing, planting, and weeding, in order to make the
maximum use of water available for plant growth. An FAO
study of 1974 found that the timely access to draught
oxen was a critical constraint to the size of land
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actually cultivated and that those farmers with adequate
draft oxen ploughed on average 70% more land than those
without (FAO 1974, p.'?). A World Bank report of 1985
noted that only 38% of all farmers owned enough oxen for
ploughing, and that this scarcity is made worse by the
prevailing high opportunity cost of using them as draught
animals (World Bank 1985, p.79). Hitchcock's study of the
western sandveld in 1978 revealed several cases of
default in mauisa obligations by livestock owners existing
over many years (Hitchcock 1978, pp.318-322).
Majako relationships and obligations (which involved a
mutual exchange of labour and was characteristic of the
pre-colonial cashless society) have also started to break
down or develop into dependency relationships in a
progressively differentiated society (Vierich & Sheppard
1980, Ps43). Foodstuffs traditionally distributed free to
the needy until quite recent times, such as milk and
vegetables, are now commodities to be bought and sold as
part of an ever increasing commercialisation of the
economy (FAO 1974, p.16).
The sweeping land tenure changes introduced in the late
1970s and which form the basis for the future
"rationalisation" of the livestock industry, now threaten
the very subsistence base of rural society. In the next
chapter we examine the ideological foundation of this
Tribal Grazing Lands Policy, and its implications for
those poor and marginalised groups it originally purposed
to benefit.
b) The Tribal Grazing Lands Policy.
The introduction of the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy in
1975 was the first example of land use planning on any
scale in Botswana. It also represented the first attempt
to change the traditional communal land tenure in favour
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of the establishment of commercialised ranches, run by
large livestock owners and having exclusive rights to
grazing and water within the boundaries of the land
allocated to them. For this reason alone it is of great
historical significance to the Batswana, and is in some
respects a process similar to the enclosure of the
Commons in England in the eighteenth century. It is also
significant to the purpose of our study as it reflects
the pattern of investment in livestock since Independence
and the way in which owners of capital have sought ways
of protecting their investment by securing exclusive
access to land, water, and grazing and legal protection
against encroachment by other herders. More than any
other legislation since Independence, it illustrates the
close links that exist between the government, the state
bureaucracy, and the livestock industry.
The introduction of the TGLP was intended as a resolution
of the contradiction that had arisen between the new
forces of production as represented by the modern
livestock industry, and the last vestiges of the
traditional relations of production, as represented by
the communal tenure of grazing land. This process, if
carried to its logical conclusion, may result in the
gradual disappearance of the independent existence of
many minority ethnic groups in Botswana, and the further
impoverishment of' the broad mass of the rural population.
(Cliffe & Moorsom 1979; Colcough & McCarthy 1980; Hubbard
1983, 1986).
The traditional expansion of cattle grazing areas in
Botswana was through the geographical extension of a
fundamentally unchanged system of cattle production.
Before the introduction of deep boreholes in the
Kgalagadi, for example, its use had been limited to
seasonal grazing when rainwater had accumulated in the
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pans. 8 This had enabled the range to recover during the
dry season, when cattle were returned to the eastern
hardveld.
The introduction of deep borehole technology in the
1930s, the formation of borehole syndicates, and the
commercial development of the livestock sector removed
the natural constraint of water availability and allowed
for a rapid increase in the national herd after
Independence. Theoretically, the borehole syndicates
prevented no one from joining but in practise the high
cost of borehole maintenance ensured that they were
dominated by the larger herd owners, often with family
affiliations with the chief and with growing political
aspirations. In Kgatleng, those men who had sufficient
education in the 1940s (i.e. were from families wealthy
enough to send them to school) to train as borehole
mechanics are all today successful business men and
cattle owners. Such jobs conferred great prestige and a
generous income in those days, close ties with the chief
and the cattle owning elite, and represented one of the
few means of gaining access to a cash income, in addition
to the practice of commercial cattle husbandry. (Peters
1983, p.271-2). In 1979-80, nine out of ten councillors
in Kgatleng District were syndicate members; two of them
also owned their own borehole, as did the tenth member.
(Peters 1983, p.314).
In Kgatleng District, where borehole syndicates were
first established, conflict has often arisen over grazing
rights around boreholes drilled near rivers. Around
boreholes sunk near ephemeral or seasonal sources,
grazing by "outside" (i.e. non-syndicate) herds is
usually only temporary, but around the more permanent
water sources other herds may graze for many months
8 Naturally occurring land depressions which collect rainwater.
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(which under tribal law they are perfectly entitled to
do). This has however caused a conflict of interest with
syndicate members who have sought to evict non-members
through the Land Boards. (Peters 1983, p.292-3). Peters
notes that in 1979-80 all five members of the Kgatleng
Land Board had access to syndicate or private boreholes,
and in a number of cases "their opinions clearly
coincided with those generally favoured by syndicate
members and private borehole owners". Peters 1983, p.316.
A water point survey in 1981 found that in Eastern
Botswana 60% of all boreholes were owned by individuals
or syndicates. (Fortmann & Roe 1981, p.68)
During the initial formulation of the TGLP, it was
proposed that • the new land use plans offered the
opportunity for syndicates to incorporate their babiri
(those herd owners who had traditionally grazed in the
area and were buyers of water from the borehole) into the
syndicate. This was firstly resisted by the syndicates
who then proceeded to get rid of as many bahiri as
possible, and borehole syndicates are now increasingly
characterised by the exclusivity of thei' membership. The
badisa (the traditional tribal herd overseers or
guardians) responsible to the Chiefs for the regulation
of the range had now become the private owners of the
land themselves.(Peters 1983, p.285,339).
By the late 1960s, overgrazing (due to the concentration
of large herds around the deep boreholes sunk by the
colonial administration) had already resulted in serious
land degradation and soil erosion in several areas of the
eastern hardveld, where the majority of the population
lived and raised livestock. Partly in response to the
overcrowding in the eastern areas, the wealthier
stockholders moved their herds west. The system of
seasonal movement began to break down and the Kgalagadi
began to be used all the year round, with attendant risk
of overgrazing.
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A team of consultants commissioned by the Botswana
government in 1973, and whose recommendations on the
establishment of commercial farming was to lead directly
to the formation of a new Tribal Grazing Land Policy,
observed that a land rush of sorts was occurring in
Botswana through the allocation of borehole drilling
rights (Masalila 1983, p.153). Whereas before the process
of commercialisation began to develop, aggregate cattle
accumulation did not impinge on the process of
production, (being rather an essential element of arable
agriculture), new and lucrative markets for beef had now
begun to alter the social relations in land.
The consultants went on to note:
"It is true that the present legal,
administrative and economic system has a built
in bias in favour of those who are already
better off while neglecting or impeding others.
Those who are better off are able to establish
themselves with boreholes, exploiting the
communal tenure system to obtain free and
virtually exclusive access to grazing, while
those with smaller herds are confined to
overgrazed areas where each man competes with
his neighbour for a diminishing resource...
agricultural extension is enmeshed in a system
which services a small privileged clientele to
the neglect of those whose need is acute"
(Chambers & Feldman 1973, p.3).
A contradiction had arisen between the existence of
communally held land and privately owned cattle which the
system of syndicates, with their open form of membership,
could not hope to solve. While the tendency to enlarge
herds as an insurance against drought made economic sense
on an individual basis, the totality of these
individually sensible actions was producing a social and
ecological crisis. Such arguments form the basis of the
"Tragedy of the Commons" paradigm popularised by Hardin,
and focuses on the concept that communal grazing lands
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inevitably creates a conflict between private and social
interests:
"Ruin is the destination towards which all men
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all" (Hardin, 1968, pp.1244-5).
The root of the contradiction lay, not in the private
ownership of livestock (which was seen, not in its
historically specific context, but as something wholly
natural and universal), but in the communal ownership of
land. Hence:
"An asset commonly owned is economically
inefficient in that it tends to be over-used,
unlike assets subject to more restrictive
property rights...a good which is free for the
individual becomes a scarce good for the
society. Sooner or later it will be imperative
to regulate the use of common pasture, if that
use is to continue" (Konczacki 1978, p.54-55).
The solution, at least as the team of consultants saw it,
was to regulate the use of the communal grazing lands by
encouraging the process of commercialisation. By zoning
some areas of the country commercial, and leaving others
reserved for communal use, the regulation of grazing land
thus became synonymous with privatisation. It was
envisaged that rangeland improvements would henceforth be
undertaken either by entrepreneurs, or by government
agencies within a national development programme:
"a basic principle of any effective land and
livestock policy inust...be the identification
of individual stockholders of groups of
stockowners with exclusive rights to particular
land surfaces (Chambers & Feldman 1973, p.124).
The weakness of Hardin's argument is that it makes a priori
assumptions about the nature of pastoralists and paints
them as profit maximisers, without regard to other
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pastoralist groups or even that group of which they are
members. Several studies have shown that the ideological
basis of the "Tragedy of the Commons" theory is
unhistorical and not based on empirical evidence from
pastoralist societies. One of the main points of the
theory concerns the apparent reluctance to control
livestock numbers, with the risk of overgrazing and range
degradation. Maximising herd size in good years and
accepting the risk of stock losses in drought years may
be in fact be a economically rational strategy in a
drought prone environment. A larger herd is more drought
resistant than a smaller one and can recover faster with
the onset of the rains. (Oxby 1975, p.7; Livingstone
1986). For the first few years after a period of drought,
cattle populations can increase at the rate of 26% per
annum, though in more normal years the average rate is
around 11%. (Sandford 1983, p.76). While the consensus
appears to be that serious range degradation has occurred
around many deep boreholes, it does not necessarily
follow that a communal form of pastoralism is
ecologically unsound. Sandford (1983, pp.13-14) notes
that it is very difficult to assess the range carrying
capacity and optimum level of stocking so as to avoid
range degradation, and Dahl & Hjort (1979, p.40-41) found
that pastoralists in Botswana generally felt that range
degradation was not due to overgrazing but rather a
cyclical phenomenon that occurred during periods of
drought.9
A second criticism of the "Tragedy" theory is that it
assumes that pastoralist societies have not, and can not,
devise or impose appropriate rules of behaviour on their
individual members. However, complex rules regarding
livestock exist not only in Botswana but all over sub-
Neither in the USA or Australia have syste.s of property rights akin to private ownership led to a control and
stabilisation of livestock numbers at the level at which range scientists believe to be right. (Sandford 1983,
p.1?, 121).
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Saharan Africa in relation to marriage, inheritance and
land use which shows that this is a false assumption.
Past and present societies have successfully regulated
the grazing of the commons (Hubbard 1983; USAID 1986).
One example of such regulation is among the mainly
pastoralist Dassenech of South West Ethiopia, where
livestock populations are kept stable by regular
slaughtering. (Sandford 1983, p.121).
The plight of the Turkana pastoralists of northern Kenya
has been cited as being representative of the "Tragedy of
the Commons" paradigm in an East African context. Having
a similar climate and erratic rainfall patterns to
Botswana, 10 Turkana District has some of the driest and
most drought-prone areas south of the Sahara. As a
consequence, the semi-nomadic pastoralists of Turkana
face many of the same problems as those of the marginal
farmers and cattle herders in and around the Kgalagadi
Desert of Botswana.'t
Like the Batswana, the Turkana peoples have a hi gh rate
of population growth, and this is combined with expanding
livestock herds which could, it has been argued, lead to
the depletion and destruction of the natural resource
base, eventually causing widespread desertification,
poverty and prolonged famine. Such fears have served to
justify the movement and settlement of some Turkana clans
away from their traditional grazing lands, and the
creation of large scale commercial ranches.
However, there seems little evidence that traditional
Turkana land use practices are inherently destructive to
10 About 96% of Turkana is very arid and around 58% of the district baa an average rainfall expectancy of less
than 400ii per annui. (WFP/FAO et al, 1988a, p.18.)
In the drought period of 1979-80, it has been estisated that up to 80% of all stock perished. (WFP/PAO et al,
1988a, p.60). VFP estiaates in 1984 indicated that sole 57% of faiilies in the district had already suffered
destitution to varying degrees, whilst the balance of 43% held stock at a level of high drought susceptibility,
(WFP/FAO et al, 1988a, p.55)
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the environment.(WFP/FAO et al, 1988a, p.43.) Turkana
pastoralism is well adapted to the low ecological
potential of the region, and also exhibits risk-sharing
techniques similar to those that exist in Botswana, such
as herd mobility, split-herd management and mutual
support networks. (WFP/FAO et al, 1988a, p.45) The
mobility of the Turkana herds can be considered
fundamental to the self-sufficiency of the pastoral
system and it is when this mobility is restricted by
settlements that the surrounding area becomes more
susceptible to drought and erosion. Even here, recent
survey work indicates only limited damage in the vicinity
of settlement concentrations. (WFP/FAO et al, 1988a,
p.45)
In Botswana itself, Schapera documents such regulation of
the commons in Tswana societies (Schapera 1943, Ch. XII).
The traditional pastoral system on communal land did have
fairly well demarcated areas for each group of
pastoralists, with livestock from other groups restricted
in access to grazing and water. However, reciprocal
arrangements were made with other groups to share grazing
and water in cases of emergency such as the drying up of
a water supply. This allowed for considerable flexibility
in times of stress or disease. (Sandford 1983, p.116).
Devitt's study of Botswana in 1982 also argues that
communal grazing can exist with some control over range
and livestock numbers, and that it is only by maintaining
traditional forms of land tenure that the interests of
the poorest may still be preserved (Devitt 1982). Where
rainfall is unreliable in both time and space, livestock
need to be able to wander over huge areas of land to
wherever grazing is better at a particular time, and any
restrictions on such movements by fenced ranches can only
harm the smaller herd owner.
Alternative tenure systems have been put forward for
Botswana's communal lands. Reynolds, writing in 1977,
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suggested that tribal grazing land be turned over to a
public company in which each tribesman would have a
single inalienable share (Reynolds 1977, p.12-19). The
company would assess each year the grazing potential and
then auction off the grazing rights. In this way the land
would earn an economic rent which would accrue, through
dividends, to the traditional holders of grazing rights
whether or not they actually owned cattle. Such an
economic rent would have to be very low as land at the
moment is seen as a free good. If land was divided up
individually, holdings would be economically small, a
market in land would develop, and land ownership would
soon become as skewed as 18 cattle ownership at present.
But the communal tenure of land in Botswana has been
criticised not only on ecological grounds. It has been
argued that the private control of resources is
inherently more productive than communal control and for
an example of this we need only look so far as the
freehold farms, which supply most of the export quality
beef to the BMC. However, this argument is rejected by
Hubbard, who found that in 1979-80 most freehold farm
herds exhibited no significant superiority in herd
productivity (in terms of unit cost) compared to communal
herds of comparable size. Only the few largest freehold
farms were clearly more productive, and these clearly had
economies of scale when it came to using advanced
breeding techniques. It is farm size not the system of
land tenure that determines productivity differences and
effective innovation (Hubbard 1982, p.62-74).' 2 This view
is supported in a later study by Mazonde, who observed
that productivity of the fenced Tuli Block freehold farms
was no higher than that at cattle posts on communal
lands. Also, many freehold farmers had still not reduced
the level of overstocking.(Mazonde, 1987, pp.12,338,342).
12 Productivity was •easured in tens of unit cost of production.
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In most pastoralist societies, where capitalist and
traditional systems are compared in terms of the dietary
calories which they produce for human consumption,
results tend to favour the traditional. Commercial
ranches use less labour while traditional system feed
their labour directly through the produce of the pastoral
enterprise, particularly in the supply of milk. (Sandford
1983, p.123; Mazonde 1987). In monetary terms however the
reverse is probably true, though Sandford notes that this
may be because the capitalist enterprises have through
the political process or manipulation of the marketing
system, managed to gain access to higher prices for their
output. (Sandford 1983, p.123). In Botswana's case, this
would certainly apply to the larger herdowners' access to
the EEC market.
The World Bank, which was responsible for the financing
of Botswana's TGLP and similar commercial livestock
projects elsewhere in the sub-Saharan region, has
stressed that
"the key factor determining the efficiency of
an enterprise is not whether it is privately
owned but how it is managed" (World Bank 1983;
Mosley 1987, p.39),
although operationally the World Bank has usually equated
efficiency with privatisation. As we will see later in
this section, TGLP farms have been usually run by
absentee owners and few have adopted significant
managerial innovations (Odell 1981). Sandford (1983,
p.139) considered that most TGLP ranch holders were
"incompetent" farmers 13
The TGLP was heralded not only as a way forward to
increase the productivity and carrying capacity of the
13 Hitchcock found that in Central District, only 65% of wnter points (85% of which were boreholes) were
functioning, with 19% coipletely abandoned and 16% teiporarily broken down, (Hitchcock (1978), pp.143-75),
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range, but also as a way of redistributing the benefits
to be derived from the livestock industry, as it would
encourage the wealthier stockholders to quit the
overgrazed commons altogether. The TGLP was first
announced in 1975 by the late President Sir Seretse
Khama, who pointed out that the overgrazing problem was
not only causing damage to the fragile ecosystem of the
Kgalagadi, but that it threatened the very fabric of
tribal society:
"What is worse is that it is leading to a
widening gap between the rich and the
poor...this trend is totally against our
national principle of social justice. If
development does not benefit all of Botswana,
it is not the kind of development we want
(Khama 1975).
The TGLP promised on the other hand
"to stop overgrazing and degradation of the
veld; to promote greater equality of incomes in
the rural areas, and to allow growth and
commercialisation of the livestock industry on
a sustained basis" (Chambers & Feldman 1973).
It also promised
"...improved grazing and livestock management,
much more money, better distributed to more
people (RoB, Government Paper No.2, para. 10, p.
11 and Title of Part III, 1975).
The TGLP was thus launched with the avowed aims of
maintaining the carrying capacity of grazing land,
improving herd management techniques, and reducing the
excessive inequality in the distribution of cattle
ownership and income. It established for the first time
an integrated land use plan as a part of an overall
development strategy, and set in motion a whole series of
investigative surveys and legislative actions (Masalila
1983, p.154).
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It was considered that improved range management could
not be introduced on communal lands, and the possibility
for increases in productivity was limited to the freehold
and leasehold ranches. The original plan called for the
demarcation of tribal grazing land into three zones,
namely commercial, communal and reserved areas. One of
the central tenets of the TGLP was that the commerciali-
sation of certain areas of tribal land would foster in
the mind of the individual commercial farmer an
appreciation of the need for conservation and improved
range management, together with an appropriate level of
stock ownership. The farmers would move out of the
communal areas altogether and thereby ease the
overgrazing problem, allowing the remaining smaller herd
owners to increase their own stock. As a result of the
declaration of the TGLP, a nationwide zoning exercise was
conducted with newly appointed District Officers (Lands)
attached to the District Administration carrying out
surveys and drawing up tentative land use plans and maps.
Data was collected primarily on water source distribution
and the nature of the grazing available. It was
recognised that certain safeguards had to be established
when zoning commercial areas.
The District Land Boards were therefore instructed to:
"decide how much land is left for commercial
development after taking into account communal,
reserved, and national needs...it is also
essential that Land Boards should bear the
interests of the poorer people constantly in
mind, especially when considering how much land
should be reserved for future use, when working
out ways to help groups of smaller
stockholders, and in collecting rents to use in
developing the communal areas (RoB, White Paper
1975, sections 11 & 17). (my emphasis)
In the commercially zoned areas, which it was anticipated
would comprise about 10% of the total areas demarcated,
land would be provided for around 700-900 leasehold
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ranches, each of 6400 hectares (64 sq. km . or 25 sq.
miles). Individuals or groups would have exclusive rights
to grazing and water, herd ownership would be controlled
and modern management techniques encouraged. For this to
be effective, commercial farms would need to be fenced -
itself a departure from traditioial tribal tenure which
forbade the erection of fences as land was inviolable and
the common property of the tribe.
That the concept of private control land was still alien
to most Batswana up until as late as 1970 (i.e. three
years before the White Paper of 1973) is shown by the
following extract from a speech made by Quett Masire,
then Vice-President, now President of Botswana:
"we should agree that whilst individual fencing
of grazing is quite indefensible, communal
fencing should not only be permitted but
encouraged. If the people who live in a
particular area are willing to co-operate in
the erection of fences leading to communally
organised grazing control, much larger numbers
of cattle may be safely accommodated within a
given area (Masire 1970, quoted in Hitchcock
1978).
What makes this speech rather remarkable is that
President Masire owns freehold farms himself, including
one of 50,000 hectares (123,550 acres) in the Ghanzi
Farms Block (see Map 1). It appears that until the TGLP
was formally introduced, though it was not acceptable to
fence communal land, owning and using communal land
privatised by the previous colonial administration was.
In the communally zoned areas, individual herd size would
be limited to improve range management and groups of
farmers encouraged to develop water supplies. The rent
collected from the commercial farms would be used to help
develop the communal areas, and was thus seen as a means
of reducing the existing income disparity between the two
groups of stockholders.
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The TGLP guidelines stipulated that certain areas of
communal land be set aside for future use. In these
reserved areas,
"suitably large areas of grazing will be
reserved and guaranteed for future use by those
who only have a few cattle at present." These
reserved areas were to be set aside as a
"safeguard for the poorer members of the
population" (RoB, Government paper no. 2 (1975),
p.6-7). (my emphasis)
In 1978, a meticulously detailed survey was carried out
on the TGLP by Robert Hitchcock, then an official working
in the Remote Area Development Programme of the MLGL. The
survey was based on the Western Sandveld of Central
District, the largest commercially zoned development area
in Botswana. His findings cast considerable doubt both on
the developmental aspect of the Policy and its claim to
be helping the poorer stockholder (Hitchcock 1978,
p.388). Hitchcock's basic criticism of the initial zoning
exercise was that the District planners had neglected to
demarcate the reserved areas, choosing to leave them
"blank" and intended for future demarcation as either
commercial or communal areas. The "safeguards" had thus
been dispensed with. This criticism was justified, when
five years later, the future Permanent Secretary of the
MLGL Ambrose Masilila noted that no land whatsoever had
been zoned as reserved (Masalila 1983, p.155).
Hitchcock showed that it was obvious from an early stage
of the zoning exercise that one of the main assumptions
of the TGLP was incorrect: far from being completely
unused and devoid of water, the proposed commercial areas
of the western sandveld were already occupied and held
many water sources. A later analysis (1981) of the
allocation and leasing situation under the TGLP confirmed
that Hitchcock's earlier findings held true for other
areas of the country: the majority of the areas
demarcated as commercial ranches were already grazed
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communally both by the applicant for the lease and other,
smaller farmers. The areas also contained substantial
numbers of hunter gatherers, mainly Basarwa (Hitchcock
1978, p.6).
Hitchcock's report found that most of the government and
local council boreholes drilled in the 1960s had been
handed over to private individuals. At the time of his
report, less than 5% of the total number of boreholes
were owned by Government or Council (Ibid., p.192). This
is confirmed by the USAID study of 1986 (USAID 1986,
p.107). Writing in 1980, Colcough & McCarthy found the
distribution of boreholes in the Western Sandveld highly
significant. The fact that they are conventionally not
sunk within 8 km of each other, meant that each borehole
effectively controlled over 6Osq. km . of grazing land.
Thus between 1971 and 1974, no more than 500 individuals
acquired de facto grazing rights over nearly a quarter of
the whole of Central District (Ibid., p.117). The TGLP
was serving to provide these farmers with dejure rights
to the grazing land they already had exclusive use of.
Since the Government had no intention of depriving anyone
of his or her borehole, farmers with pre-existing water
sources were deemed to have de jure commercial rights to
their land held de facto already (Masalila 1983, p.155).
Existing land now demarcated as commercial is shown on
Map 2 overleaf. Hitchcock (1978, p.399) found that most
of the water source owners were wealthy with large herds,
and significantly, some held high positions within
Government service. All were non-resident farmers (Ibid.,
p206). This gives some credence to our proposition that
the state is not an impartial arbitrator in the
development process, and to Picard's remarks to the
effect that the State in Botswana functions as the
vanguard of the national bourgeoisie:
"From the results of a study in 1975 of the
attitudes of civil servants toward the proposed
new land policy (TGLP),.it was clear that
BAROLONG FARMS
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bureaucrats understood their socio-economic
status and the extent to which they would or
would not benefit from policy positions"
(Picard 1980, pp.313-356).
The naive assumption that the areas to be zoned
commercial were in fact virgin land and devoid of water
was in itself a serious omission of the TGLP. It was
estimated in 1985 that in Kgatleng District alone,
approximately 20% of the cattle owners had de facto
control of 64% of the total grazing area because they had
sole access to water from boreholes. (NIR, 1985). With
water such a valuable commodity in an arid climate, its
exclusive control by individuals can effectively deprive
others of their means of subsistence. (Sandford 1983,
p.64; Arntzen 1984, pp.38,95-108)
Another criticism mentioned in the 1978 survey concerned
the proposed "developmental" aspects of the TGLP, and
designed specifically to help the poorer farmers. This
stated that the rent from the commercial areas should be
used to help develop the communal areas (RoB, 1973).
However, as the rent was fixed at a sub-economic rate of
P0.04/ha. per annum, or around P256 per ranch (Hubbard
1983; World Bank 1985), and would not be collected for
the first three years of the lease (to allow individuals
to develop their ranches) this would have a negligible
developmental impact on the communal area farmers
(Hitchcock 1978, p.8). In practice, the lease for TGLP
ranches comes very close to being freehold in so far that'
non-payment ofrent is not a condition for cancellation
of the lease.
As Hitchcock points out, most anthropological studies
agree that the Basarwa still maintain clearly defined
territorial rights which are recognised by the various
hunter-gatherer bands (Hitchcock 1978, p.243 & 246), and
that contrary to public opinion in Botswana, mobility is
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not dictated by the movements of game. Groups tend to
stay in limited areas where the various sources necessary
to sustain them can be found (Hitchcock 1978, p. 236).
Ignorance of the hunter-gathering lifestyles of the
Basarwa has led many Government officials to see them as
purely nomadic by nature without the need for established
land rights or usage. The Litigation Consultant for the
Attorney General's Chambers, for example, made the
following statement in a reply in 1978 to a letter of
enquiry from the MLGL (Hitchcock, 1978, p.242):
"The right of the Masarwa to hunt is, of
course, very important and valuable as hunting
is their main source of sustenance.,.without
much clearer information it is impossible to
give a confirmed opinion about the Màsarwa.
Tentatively, however, it appears that the true
nomad Masarwa can have no rights of any kind
except rights to hunting." 4 (my emphasis)
This statement is indicative of the type of treatment the
Basarwa may expect to be given by commercial farmers once
the TGLP is fully implemented. In fact there are very few
"pure" hunter-gatherers left in Botswana, and most
Basarwa have now adopted a semi-sedentary lifestyle in
cattle post areas where they are employed as herdsmen by
the water source owners. A major reason for this
development towards a more sedentary existence has been
the impact of increased stocking rates on wildlife and
wild plant food resources. There appears to be a
correlation between increased stocking rates and a
reduced incidence of hunter-gathering: as perennial grass
species are grazed out by cattle, they tend to be
replaced by annual species as well as by woody shrubs and
trees which displace the herds of gaine.(Hitchcock 1978,
p.269).
14 The ten Masarwa is generally considered derogatory to the Basarva,
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Another factor influencing the availability of game to
traditional hunter-gatherers has been the erection of
cordon fences, particularly since the 1970s, when
Botswana gained preferential access to the EEC market.
Since beef imported into EEC member states must be
certified free from Foot and Mouth disease, the whole of
the country has been divided into stock control zones.
This has had severe effects on the movement of migratory
wildlife, particularly during the drought when animals
will travel many kilometres to waterholes, only to die
a lingering death impaled on the cordon fences (Hitchcock
1978, p.269; Owens 1985; Ross 1987, pp.228-23O).
Hunting and gathering is still carried out by the Basarwa
(and other Batswana) but on a more limited scale, and is
no longer the main source of sustenance. It is combined
with small scale arable farming at the cattle posts using
kraal manure for fertiliser.
Hitchcock found that of these residents in the cattle
post areas, less than 1% own herds of an economically
viable size (i.e. less than twenty head) and 75% do not
hold any livestock whatsoever, a much higher figure than
in the RIDS survey of 1974 (Hitchcock 1978, p.402). He
noted that cattle post owners were reluctant to let their
animals be used for ploughing, and that in two cases
herders had been beaten for doing this (Ibid., p.324).
Basarwa cattle post employees in the Western sandveld
earned on average less than one fifth of urban wage'
labourers (Hitchcock 1978, p.315) and in many cases
payment was irregular, with 23% of those interviewed by
Hitchcock having received no payment at all for six
months (Ibid., p.320). In some cases an existing
symbiotic relationship between cattle post owner and the
Basarwa had degenerated into a master-serf situation and
the residents receive no payment for their labour save
the milk of the cattle they look after. Hitchcock (1978,
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p.318) found two cases where parents had had children
forcibly taken from them by the cattle post owner,
presumably for use as domestic servants,
Virtually all of the cattle post owners interviewed by
Hitchcock said that they wanted to reduce the number of
people on their ranches once they got leasehold rights.
Fewer numbers would be employed and more use will be made
of skilled outside labour (Ibid., p.330 & 376). Many
said they wanted to evict "squatters" off the land.
Others said they wanted to make their employees live
outside the ranches, coming in only for labour:
"Practically none of the water source owners
said they would allow their employees to keep
livestock on the borehole or to grow crops
there. What this means in essence, given the
fact that few plan to do any improvements on
the ranches, is that the primary reason water
source owners want a lease under TGLP is so
that they can force people off the land"
(Hitchcock 1978, p.380).
Thus the TGLP decision to give exclusive access rights to
water sources on the individual ranches appears to have
be at odds with the White Paper statement in 1975 that:
"No commercial lease will be given over any
existing borehole until satisfactory watering
arrangements have been made for owners of all
stock currently using that borehole if any of
them are to be excluded from the commercial
lease (RoB White Paper, 1973, 14, para 42, rule
i).
By 1980, the need for some protection for those
threatened with eviction was recognised. In some cases
there was dezoning of individual ranches from commercial
status where contesting claims to the land made
compensation too thorny an issue. However, in these
cases, opposition usually came from competing stockowners
rather than from the Basarwa. Where compensation was paid
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it was usually in kind (by allocating land elsewhere),
though some payments were made in cash by the Land
Boards. These payments ranged in size between P40 and
P370 for outright dispossession (Picard 1987, p.256).
If we hold as our premise the view that development in
its broadest economic sense should be synonymous with the
elimination of poverty and deprivation, wherever it
exists, and that development efforts should be directed
primarily at the welfare of the poorest sections of
society, then the TGLP has had a negative effect on
development. Instead, it has been a costly experiment in
land planning designed by and on behalf of, the
wealthiest livestock holders in •the country.
The World Bank financed Livestock II Development Project
which established the TGLP cattle ranches on a leasehold
basis, cost some P8 million between 1978 and 1984 (Hoim
& Morgan 1985, p.469), and may be seen as one form of aid
targeted more at the rich than at the poor.
The main aim of the TGLP, which was to move the larger
cattle owners out of the overcrowded communal lands, has
not been met (Hitchcock, p.156). Rather the opposite has
been the case: the larger owners have been given their
own private pieces of communal land, complete with
borehole, whilst the smaller stockholders not having
leasing rights have been effectively displaced by being
denied access to water. These displaced farmers often
have no other recourse than to move back to the already
overgrazed communal areas (Hitchcock 1978, p.9).
The experience over the period since TGLP was first
implemented has shown that the primary problem of
overgrazing and range degradation has not been solved,
either in the communal areas or on the commercial ranches
themselves. No effective stocking limits were ever
introduced for the commercial ranches. Legally the
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ranchers are supposed to limit their herds to 400 cattle
and the government had the right to impound cattle above
this figure. However, this has never been implemented.
Because the TGLP farmer still has formal rights of access
to communal grazing lands, a common strategy has been for
ranch holders to increase their herds and use ranch
grazing only when communal grazing is poor or exhausted,
or conversely, to start using communal areas when their
own overstocked ranches are depleted.
The Permanent Secretary of the MLGL acknowledged in 1987
that this was a problem "as old as the programme itself",
and was doubtful that the target of 1000 ranches would be
realised because there had been a lot of dezoning as
people object to the establishment of ranches.
By May 1987, a total of 337 ranches each of 64sq. km . had
been established, 238 on tribal land and 99 on state
land, of which 89 were situated in Ghanzi (Botswarza Daily
News, May 27, 1987). Those residents still allowed to
remain on TGLP ranches now have no recourse to the tribal
authorities when the owner's cattle damage their crops.
As the land is now officially a grazing area only, no
planting should have been carried out in the first place
(Hitchcock 1978, p.349 & 356). This situation appears at
variance with Botswana's avowed goal of promoting self-
sufficiency in food production.
The communal lands elenent of the TGLP has not been
particularly successful either, as this zone remains
overcrowded and over grazed (as the larger herds which
should have been moved permanently to the commercial
areas are still allowed to graze there). There remains
the need for a greater emphasis on land and water use
planning that takes into consideration the fact that at
least 45% of rural households do not own any cattle, and
that almost two thirds of the total number of traditional
fares, holding nearly half of the traditional farm land,
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have between zero and twenty head of cattle (World Bank,
1985, p.42).
The TGLP is now popularly perceived as benefiting only a
relatively small number of wealthy stockholders who have
been successful in receiving the limited number of leases
(Ibid., p.88). In essence, what the TGLP means for many
present residents of commercial areas is that they could
in all likelihood be forced to leave their present homes
and that they will no longer have access to the ranch
areas for their subsistence and production purposes. Far
from reducing the gap between the rich and the poor in
the rural areas of Botswana, the TGLP has the potential
of increasing that gap and may, Unless careful steps are
taken, result in massive dispossession, increased
dependency, and more widespread poverty.
Central to any development policy is the issue of the
allocation of land and water rights. In Botswana, the
development and utilisation of water resources can not be
divorced from land use and development policies.
The uncontrolled private or public exploitation of water
resources can have disastrous effects on fragile land
resources and inevitably accelerate an unequal
distribution of other resources such as cattle and land
(FAO 1974, p.8). With a fixed resource such as land, one
person can have more only if another has less.
The establishment of private ranches by the enclosure and
fencing of common lands has included the expropriation of
some residents who have previously farmed and grazed the
areas prior to their demarcation as leasehold areas:
"the policy's objective of bringing socio-
economic development in rural areas has not
been realised but has instead brought a form of
dispossession and alienation from the land for
the poorer segments of the rural population
(Molomo 1986).
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Although Hitchcock's warned that "literally thousands of
people face the prospect of dispossession" (Hitchcock
1981), other studies do not see any reason for conflict:
"..many of the cattle poor have fallen out of
the rural economy at the same time as a handful
of the cattle rich have risen out; the rich
escaped the commons altogether, out to the
Kgalagadi sands where only boreholes yield
water. This is why there is so little hostility
between the rural rich and rural poor in
Botswana: the former's wealth is not extracted
from the latter, but rather accumulates
independently through the natural growth of
cattle (Duggan 1983, p.130).
This is a crucial point. The change in the structure of
land tenure represented by the TGLP has not simply left
the poor behind in the development proces8, at a point
where historically, they have always had to survive.
Rather it represents, under the guise of a "rationali-
sation" of the industry, a direct attack on the very
subsistence base of those very marginal groups it was
ostensibly designed to protect. Those ethnic minorities
living in the remote areas now scheduled as commercial
are now faced with the possibility of total dependency on
government welfare (in the shape of food handouts) for
their very survival. Our analysis of the food aid
distribution to these groups in Chapter Five illustrates
how the government has failed to adequately respond to
these needs.
The fact that few cases of outright conflict have been
documented to date does not necessarily mean that none
exists; rather it illustrates that those groups currently
faced with the loss of their subsistence base have little
political representation through which to voice their
opposition. It also shows the essential fragility of the
democratic process for these poor and marginalised
groups. Hitchcock's survey of the commercially zoned
areas of the western sandveld in 1978 showed that a very
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real conflict of interests did in fact exist, but was
rarely brought to the traditional court or kgotla. He found
that in four cases, redress at the kgotla was impossible
for the residents, as the cattle post owner was also the
overseer at the court (Hitchcock 1978, p.368).
If we share with Nieos Poulantzas the view that power can
be defined as "the capacity of a social class to realise
its specific objective interests" (Poulantzas 1973,
Political Power and Social Classes, p. 104), then the following
statement aptly describes the essence and significance of
the TGLP, and the present pattern of economic development
in Botswana:
"We have had enough of "going to the people".
Consultation takes too much time. We should
abandon it. We need to go ahead. All this
discussion and planning is getting in the way
of development. Basarwa, if they are in the way,
should be got out of the way so that we can put
up our fences."5 (my emphasis).
c) Rural Employment, Incomes, and the Impact of Drought.
In the previous two sections of this chapter, we examined
some of the structural characteristics of rural poverty
in Botswana, such as the distribution of productive
assets, and emphasised that a major contributory factor
of rural deprivation was the skewed ownership of
livestock. We noted too the effect of the land tenure
changes on marginal groups such as the Basarwa, and
suggested that poverty has non-economic dimensions too,
including inequalities before the law. In this section we
examine how this unequal access to and control of
productive assets is reflected in existing rural income
and employment levels. We look at the nature and spacial
15 DistrictOfficial at a special LUPAGieeting inSerowe, 26 Jan, 1971 cited in Hitchcock, (1978), Introduction,
poxix.
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distribution of rural poverty, and the cumulative impact
of recurrent drought on livestock and agriculture.
At the time of Independence in 1966, Botswana was among
the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita
annual income of around US$80 (Borton 1984, p.6), and
having virtually no infrastructure or skilled manpower to
aid in its future development. The livelihood of more
than 90% of the population depended on the underdeveloped
rural economy, and a 1967-8 agricultural report found
that some 10% of the population had no visible means of
support whatsoever (RoB, NDP197O-5, 1970, pp.12-13). Since
that time, despite the rapid growth of the economy, the
ownership of livestock has become progressively skewed,
migrant labour opportunities have diminished, traditional
redistributive mechanisms have all but disappeared, and
the rural population has grown considerably.
With the country only recently emerged from a prolonged
and severe drought, there is every reason to believe that
the incidence and severity of rural deprivation has
increased, not diminished, and that a significant
proportion of the rural population are now dependent to
some extent on government assistance.
There are at least two distinct interpretations of
"absolute" poverty. The first is based on a definition of
a nutritional norm, i.e. whether an individual has a
sufficient intake of calories, proteins, and essential
minerals, to maintain health, and excludes such things as
access to public services such as education and health
care (World Bank 1980; Oonunen 1983, p.36). Though this
definition is a very narrow one, relatively high levels
of malnutrition amongst rural children even in non-
drought years, would indicate that a fair proportion of
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households could be accommodated even within this
category.'6
A second and less narrow definition, on which we will
base our own interpretation of absolute poverty, uses the
concept of a Poverty Datum Line (PDL), which indicates
whether an individual has sufficient income to obtain a
minimum "basket" of food, clothing, shelter, education
and health care. This is the method used by the
government of Botswana in its own surveys of rural
poverty. Since 1980 such analysis has included the
concept of an Income Gap Ratio, which measures how far,
on average, the income of those in absolute poverty falls
below the PDL. A ratio of 0.44 for example indicates that
the average income of the group is 44% below PDL.
The latest national survey of rural poverty in Botswana
available in published form is the Rural Income
Distribution Survey (RIDS) conducted in 1974-5. Another
similar study of rural household income is currently
being prepared which will not only provide an updated
estimate of rural incomes and their sources, but also
examine the ways in which levels and sources of incomes
have changed over the last decade. This is likely to be
published some time in 1990.
As a consequence, much of the post-1975 data on incomes
and employment used in this and subsequent sections is
based on local studies and field observations, which are
somewhat limited in value as they can not accommodate
inter-regional differences in both employment
opportunities and other income generating activities.
These inter-regional differences are significant on two
counts: the first is the variation in the resource
endowment between districts, with rainfall higher to the
north and east. Secondly, basic services, communications
16 Malnutrition rates are exaiined in detail in subsequent chapters on the drought relief prograne.
Poverty and Inequality in Rural Botswana 	 151
and formal sector employment opportunities are greater in
the villages of the eastern hardveld and along the line
of rail towns. By contrast, the western and southern
areas of the country in and around the Kgalagadi are
sparsely populated and lack much of the basic
infrastructure needed for employment creation. However,
as personal field observations were carried out in all
regions of the country during the period 1985-7, the
comments mentioned here can be considered indicative of
general trends.
Watanabe & Mueller (1984, p.115) provided a profile of
rural poverty in Botswana by the analysis of RIDS data,
which was based on monthly surveys of 950 randomly
selected households in 20 rural areas. They found a mean
per capita income of $225 with a Gini co-efficient of
0.52%, indicating a high level of income inequality. The
poorest 40% of households received 12% of total rural
income, whilst the richest 20% received 58% of income
(RoB, CSO, 1977, p.84-8). The per capita GNP in 1974 was
$370 (see Table 2.1) which illustrates the danger of
seeing GNP as an adequate indicator of either average
income or overall social welfare.
Five groups of households were formed ranging from those
which had less than 50% of the income required for a
reasonable standard of living to those whose incomes
exceeded this standard by 50%. This classification of
rural households by income relative to basic requirements
was based on the rural PDI developed by the Central
Statistics Office in Gaborone. This PDL estimated the
income requirements of the individual household for food,
clothing , housing and durables, and took into
consideration household size, sex and age composition.
This was then compared with the gross income available to
the individual household (including gifts and transfers)
to obtain a Poverty Income Ratio (PIR) which indicated
the degree to which individual households' income met its
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basic requirements. The results of this analysis are
shown below.
TABLE 2.7: RURAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION SURVEY (1974-75)
Poverty Income Ratio Categories	 S households
1. Less than 50% of income necessary 	 22.2%
to meet Poverty Datum Line
2. Between 50% and 74% of income necessary	 15.5%
to meet Poverty Datum Line
3. Between 75% and 99% of income necessary	 17.2%
to meet Poverty Datum Line
4. Between 100% and 149% of income necessary	 19.6%
to meet Poverty Datum Line
5. Over 150% of income necessary 	 25.5%
to meet Poverty Datum Line
Source:
Based on Watanabe, Barbara & Mueller, Eva, "A Poverty
Profile for Rural Botswana" in World Development: Vol.12,No.12.
February 1984, using RIDS data.
Because of the possibility of some income being under-
reported (estimated by the CSO at around 6%), Watanabe &
Mueller suggested that category 3 comes close to meeting
basic minimum needs, whilst categories 1 and 2 clearly
represent genuine poverty groups. Watanabe & Mueller
concluded from their analysis that the basic problem of
rural poverty in Botswana was the maldistribution of
assets (including human capital) available to the lower
PIR groups. The proportion of households in the lowest
PIR group not owning any cattle was 80% and 18% in the
highest group, while the ownership of small stock was
shown to increase with income status (Watanabe & Mueller
1984, p.118). A similar analysis of RIDS data by Colcough
& Fallon in 1983 showed the extent to which household
incomes were influenced by cattle ownership.
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Cattle provided 13% of the income of the poorest group
yet 40% of that of the richest groups. The difference in
ownership of farm equipment was also very marked between
the PIR groups, as income in excess of subsistence needs
enabled individual households to acquire additional
productive assets such as education, cattle and tractors.
Whilst not having an education did not necessarily
condemn a household to poverty, having a high level of
education greatly enhanced the chances of an adequate
income (Watanabe & Mueller 1984, p.118). This appears to
confirm our earlier suggestion regarding the strong links
between education, public sector employment and ownership
of livestock.
Though the poor in Botswana are not a homogeneous group
of people, there are certain common characteristics which
are mutually self-reinforcing and promote a perpetual
cycle of deprivation. Most studies on rural poverty in
Botswana consider that it is feasible to extend the
definition of the rural poor beyond that of income levels
alone, by looking at the ownership of cattle and herd
size, because of the critical importance of livestock
both as a source of wealth and for arable production.
Cattle ownership and wealth are highly correlated and the
group which owns no cattle generally suffers from
absolute poverty (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.111).
Non-cattle owners tend to have lower arable production
because of reduced access to drought power. The farm
areas ploughed by the poor are lower because of the
difficulty in hiring cattle for timely ploughing, and
thus average crop production is lower. According to one
government survey in 1971-2 (RoB, MoA 1973), only 9% of
non-cattle owners have access to mafisa cattle, and it is
highly likely that this figure has decreased due to the
changing socio-economic rol. of cattle which has
heightened the opportunity cost of using draught oxen.
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Without ownership of cattle they have little access to
rural credit because cattle or other fixed assets are
required for security. For the same reasons they have
generally not benefited from agricultural extension
facilities which have usually been directed towards the
cattle owner and/or producer of an arable surplus.
Amongst the poorer groups, (categories 1 and 2 in Table
2.7) over 43% are female headed households and have to
manage without a permanent source of male labour. They
therefore suffer from absolute shortages of labour at
ploughing time. Poor households are more likely to he
headed by a woman and to have a large number of children
under the age of fifteen. (Watanabe & Mueller 1984,
p.116-118). All non-cattle owners suffer from greater
poverty because cattle are a major source of income, and
are more vulnerable in periods of drought because cattle
and small stock represent a reserve of food and wealth.
Although malnourishment can occur in all socio-economic
groups, there is a small but persistent tendency for
children to be more at risk amongst households with the
fewest cattle (Vierich & Sheppard 1978, p.61).
The Colcough & Fallon study of 1983 indicated that the
proportion of rural households living below the Poverty
Datum Line had risen significantly since the RIDS survey
of 1974. Wage rates in the formal agricultural sector
were low, particularly in the freehold farms of the Tuli
Block and Ghanzi areas. A nutrition survey carried out in
Ghanzi in 1984 indicated that wage rates in agriculture
were between PlO and P30 per month, with a food ration
which varies from nothing (on a farm where the wage rate
was "not fixed") to 60kg. of maize meal per month
(Olofsen 1984).
A close study of the trends in the ownership of cattle
and cultivation of arable farms by Cliffe & Moorsom in
1979 came to the conclusion that a process of
Poverty and Inequality in Rural Botswana	 155
proletarianisation and immiseration was gripping the
countryside. This is a view shared by Dahi & Hjort, whose
study in the same year compared this process in Botswana
with that of Maasailand in Kenya. (Dahi & Hjort 1979,
p.32)
Other studies see that a certain level of inequality may
be a necessary precondition for economic growth and
development, and Hoim & Morgan (1985, p.463) claim that
the government of Botswana is openly committed to
accepting such an approach. In his study of pastoralism
in sub-Saharan Africa, Konczaki argues that the
prevailing pattern of wealth and income distribution in
African societies dependent on animal husbandry is one of
inequality, and that the availability of a marketable
surplus may be related to the degree of inequality in the
distribution of ownership of cattle, given the intensity
of the desire for security provided by livestock
(Konozaki 1978, p.51). In what is essentially a
functionalist argument, Konczaki appears to justify a
certain element of inequality as being necessary for the
production of a surplus. Families with a large number of
animals, he notes, would be more willing to sell their
cattle than smaller herders, and thus implicitly, are
necessary for the process of commercialism, (Ibid.,
p.49). which is seen by some as the universal panacea
for the poor in the developing world.
Konczaki recognises the redistributive mechanisms in
traditional society for eliminating those either too rich
or poor, which historically produced a considerable
degree of homogeneity (Konczacki 1978, p.253). But he
then turns this basically egalitarian process on its head
to justify a growing inequality in more modern times.
Firstly, he says, the elimination of the poorest by the
process of commercialism puts the resources previously
used by their livestock, such as pastures and water, at
the disposal of those who can make "better" use of them.
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Secondly, further impoverishment of the poor creates a
supply of cheap labour for the benefit of those
pastoralists who need it to tend their growing herds.
Intensified commercialisation, by stimulating production
for the market, increases the opportunities for
investment within the pastoral community, which now
retains its wealthiest members instead of eliminating
them (Konczacki, p.53).
The theory espoused by Konczacki can be seen as one more
ideological justification for land tenure changes such as
the TGLP, which he welcomed. However, it does not account
for, but merely recognises, the existence of social
differentiation, and neglects the role of force and
coercion (political and economic) in establishing and
maintaining the existing social structure. Also, the
fencing of TGLP ranches will tend to reduce employment
levels, not increase them, and the benefits of increased
production will accrue to the stockholders, not the
dispossessed.
Though formal rural employment has actually grown since
Independence faster than the labour force and the
proportion of the rural labour force with regular jobs
doubled from 2.5% in 1964 to about 5% in 1975, the
available evidence suggests that this employment has been
largely gained by the members of wealthier households,
those with a greater access to education, and those
living in the larger villages (Colcough & McCarthy
(1980), p.194).
Many of the new jobs have been in Government service in
the larger villages which are the main centres for the
district administration. During the 1980's drought, the
relief programme itself created many new opportunities
for employment at the District level in the newly created
Food Resources Department, and at the District Councils.
However, many of these jobs were given to retired
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government officers who were themselves well established
figures in the livestock industry. Table 2.8 below shows
the structure of formal sector employment by economic
activity, for the period 1975-83.
TABLE 2.8: FORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT BY 8ONOMIC ACTIVITY 1975-83 (THOUSAD8)



























































































































As % of Total Labour Force: 18.1%	 21.7%	 21.4%	 20.7%
Source: World Bank (1985), p.11.
The employment incomes from the poorest groups is largely
from seasonal work in agriculture, and directly related
to rainfall levels and levels of output. In arable
agriculture, employment did show a modest increase up to
1980 where there was normal rainfall levels but far less
than the average increase in the rural labour force (UNDP
et al 1985, p.22). The World Bank estimated in 1985 that
some 110,000 people (26% of the labour force) were
"economically inactive", and this figure no doubt rose as
the drought deepened in intensity after 1985.
In the livestock sector employment opportunities have
largely stagnated. The growth of the national herd since
the late 1960s will have increased employment but this is
likely to have been offset by the concentration in
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livestock ownership and the prevailing economies of scale
of the larger herds.
On the one hand, in the communal grazing areas the range
carrying capacity has almost been reached or exceeded and
on the other hand, commercial ranches now need less
labour after fencing. Boreholes have displaced labour
with capital as there is less need for the cattle to trek
between various water sources. (Peters 1983, p.335).
Evidence from field studies of the TGLP such as that by
Hitchcock (1978) suggest that once a farm is fenced,
herds also require labour of a more specialised kind not
common amongst the rural poor. President Masire's Ghanzi
farm for example, has a British ' manager. He is employed
by South African business interests who have leased the
farm from the President.'7
Although this study is primarily concerned with poverty
amongst the 80% of Botswana's population living in the
rural areas, and deriving an existence from small scale
subsistence farming, or seasonal labouring work, some
interesting comparisons and contrasts may be made here
with urban poverty.
Though job creation in the formal sector in urban areas
has risen since Independence, it has not kept pace with
the rise in the working age population. In 1981 around 9-
10,000 new jobs were created compared with some 17,000
new entrants to the labour market (Salkin 1985). With
rapid urban migration, the proportion of the urban
population in formal sector employment has declined since
the early 1960s, though supported to some extent by an
increase in the proportion of informal sector employment.
This has meant that an income gap between the formal and
informal sectors has developed due to the government's
wage and salary strategy since 1974. Thus income
1? Personal conversation on a field visit to the fan on 23rd. Septesber 198?.
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distribution in the urban areas has probably grown worse,
as minimum wage legislation has not helped the informal
sector workers.
The cluster of characteristics needed for eligibility for
the more skilled or remunerative jobs in the formal
sector themselves tend to be correlated with household
incomes and wealth; thus there is a tendency for the
already wealthy urban households to have the most
remunerative employment. Urban households tend to be
smaller, older, better educated and include more males of
working age than either the rural or national average
(RoB, CSO 1974). An urban study carried out by the CSO
in 1976 found that:
"At least 36% (and possibly up to 47%) of the
total urban population of 90,000 live below the
effective minimum level of subsistence in the
urban areas" (RoB, CSO 1976, p.9).
For data on income distribution in urban areas we have to
return to the RIDS survey of 1974. Here, it was estimated
that the poorest 12% of urban dwellers received only 1.2%
of the total income, with the richest 12% receiving 36%
of the total income (UNICEF 1986, p.39). By comparison
with urban figures, RIDS data for the rural areas found
that 45% of rural households lived below the PITh and that
the richest 10% of households received 42% of the total
income (RoB, CSO 1977, p.84).
However, a comparison between urban and rural poverty is
problematic because of the inadequacy of existing methods
of measurement already mentioned. A PDL for urban
dwellers that included modern housing costs for example
would not be directly comparable with rural areas, where
rondavels are still traditionally built out of mud, trees
and thatching grass, by the household itself, on a plot
allocated by the Land Board at zero cost. A more
meaningful comparison may be achieved by examinin g the
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income structure between rural and pen-urban
populations.'8 Table 2.9 below shows that although median
household incomes in the pen-urban areas were lower than
that in the rural areas, per capita income was slightly
higher due to smaller household size.





Median household income:	 630
	
438
Average family size:	 6.5
	
4.25
Median per capita income: 	 97	 .103
Sources:
RoB, CSO, A Social and Economic Survey in Three Pen—Urban Areas in
Botswana, 1974 and RIDS, 1977.
Also usually more than one member had a job and the
prospects for finding employment were greater than in the
rural areaB. Most important of all was that in the
pen-urban areas, incomes (like the majority of urban
incomes) were "drought proof", as they were not directly
dependent on agriculture. The rural poor, who neither own
nor have access to livestock, are particularly vulnerable
to seasonal scarcities of both jobs and food. Unlike the
urban and pen-urban dwellers, their incomes and
employment are highly dependent on the vagaries of the
weather. But drought does not affect all people equally;
some households are more "drought resistant" than others
and it is the wealthier stockholders (often urban
dwellers themselves) who can therefore take full
18 The pen-urban areas around Gaborone, Francistown, tebatse, and Selebe-Phikwe are typical squatter areas
which have sprung up in recent years with the growth in the towns.
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advantage of falling prices for cattle and wages as the
effects of a prolonged drought are keenly felt.
Several studies (Watanabe & Mueller 1984; Brown 1983)
have noted the particular vulnerability of women in
Botswana to drought and the long term effects of poverty.
They see an improvement in their situation as being
synonymous with development in any real sense of the word
and necessary if the "demographic transition" from high
to low fertility and mortality is to be achieved.
Migrant labour opportunities have weakened tribal and
kinship obligations both in regard to ploughing
activities and the provision of food to needy relatives,
and led to predominantly maternal headed households (FAO
1974, p.9). In the past, widows were normally taken in by
the husband's brother or other kin but this system is now
not generally operative. A National Migration Study in
the early 1980s found that 23% of all households (rural
& urban) were headed by women. (Cliffe et al 1988, p.48)'9
Up to 1950, some 16 to 18% of the entire population in
the south and east of Botswana were absent as migrant
workers. This caused a chronic level of stress on cattle
production relations at home, as all responsibility
shifted to the old and predominantly female headed
households. It also had an adverse effect on arable
agriculture because of the shortage of labour (Massey,
1980, pp.110, 116; FAO 1974). In a study of Maasai
pastoralists in Kenya, Talle argued that the growing'
commercialisation of livestock has reduced womens'
control over food resources and undermined their
traditional role in the household. (Dahl, 1987). It has
probably also been partly responsible for the increase in
unmarried mothers, prostitution, and the spread of
debilitating diseases such as syphilis and tuberculosis
In Africa as a whole, feiale headed households co.prise about 22% of all households (WFP 1985d, p.!).
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(Parson 1984, pp.24-6; FAO 1974, pp.20-21). In the 1940s,
23% of unmarried women of age 15-54 had borne children,
while in 1978 the figure was 54%, and as a consequence
there was an increased reliance on the mother's
grandparents to look after the children. The fathers
however tend to remit more of their earnings to their own
parents than to their wife or girlfriend and children.
Some 42% of malnourished children received no remittances
or other support from their fathers, and female children
run a greater risk of nutritional deficiency. (Cliffe et
al 1988, p.48, 50.)
With labour migration to the mines of South Africa a way
of life for generations, and then urban migration to
towns in Botswana as new job opportunities opened up in
the 1970s, women are now more isolated both economically
and socially. Studies in Shoshong (Central District) in
1972 indicated that 30% of the women over the age of 15
were unmarried mothers, one third of all households were
effectively headed by women, of which three quarters were
by widows or single women, and the other quarter had the
male head absent, usually at the mines (FAO 1972, p.32-3
and Appendix IIB). Thus remittances from relatives remain
very important for this social group.
With regard to the spatial distribution of poverty, it
was seen to be highest among freehold farm employees (66%
below the poverty line) at the time of the 1974-5 RIDS
survey (RoB, CSO, 1977). A 1980 study found that the
proportion of rural households living below the PDL had'
risen since the RIDS survey of 1974. The results of this
study are given in Table 2.10 overleaf.
Several points need to be made here. First, the Barolong
Farms (along the southern border with South Africa) is
one of the few small scale farming areas of the country
where regular crop surpluses can be produced. As a
consequence, households are relatively better off there
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than most rural households (Watanabe & Mueller 1984,
p.118).
By contrast, the table indicates that those employees of
large scale commercial freehold farms have a level of
absolute poverty which appears to have increased.
TABLE 2.10: HDP(EION OF MJRAL }K*JSEW)LDS IN
"ABSOLLTFE" OVER'IY BY AREA.









	 0 • 53
Freehold Farm Fanployees	 72.4%
	
0.33
Source: Colcough & McCarthy, (1980).
Notes: These refugees were mainly fleeing fran the civil ar in
Zimba1e at the time • Since then, the living conditions in the
established camps run by the Lutheran World Federation have been much
improved.
The National Migration Study of 1981 seems to confirm
this:
"...NMS data suggests that many freehold farm
residents are divorced from communal area
economies. As a result, their poverty could be
considered deeper than that of the poorest
communal area residents'" (Wylie 1981, p.39).
There are about 5200 freehold farmworkers whose average
wage levels in 1984 was calculated at P66.10 per month in
cash or P80.39 if payments in kind are taken into
consideration (RoB, Employment Survey 1984).
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My own field observations in 1986, however, revealed
wages of between P33 and P50 per month at Seleka Ranch
for an 11 hour working day. An anthropological study of
the freehold Tuli Block farmers in the same year appears
to confirm these figures for the vast majority of
workers: monthly wage levels of P180 for a
driver/foreman, P80 for a shop assistant, P50 for
domestic servants, and P20 for herders and fence
repairers (Mazonde 1987, p.172.) Both field observations
found that the farm employees were also provided with a
12.5 kg.bag of maize meal per month, but in the case of
one individual at least, drought relief maize meal (25kg.
per month) was being given by the ranch manager as a
supplementary ration. There seems therefore to be some
evidence that donated food aid commodities are being used
to subsidise existing low wage rates, at least for some
categories of freehold farm employees.20
Mazonde also found that on the European owned farms
(unlike the Tswana owned ranches), the workers were not
allowed to drink the milk of the cattle as it would
"reduce the value of the breeding stock". He notes that
the provision of the maize meal instead of an equivalent
value in cash was made because of the farm owners'
concern over the physical strength of their workers,
which "was exploited to the full". (Mazonde 1987, p.174).
These wage levels on the freehold farms fall far below
minimum wage rates in the Government sector. Full time
farm workers are of concern because at their present'
levels of income it is doubtful that they can provide
adequately for their families. At one freehold farm,
Talana Farms, despite "full" employment and zero
destitution, the malnutrition rate amongst pre-school
20 Based on personal field observations in the Tuli Block freehold fans, Bobirwa Sub-District, 14 Septeiber 1986,
The eaployee in question was a health assistant at Seleka Ranch. The exchange rate at that tue was around £1
P3,00.
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children was very high at over 40%. Twenty six children
out of a total of sixty three registered were
underweight 21
Both Seleka Ranch and Talana Farms are border farms owned
by the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), a
Government parastatal company. Despite this, incomes and
living conditions on the farms is not well known.
However, it was reported in the Botswana Daily News in early
1987 that the manager of Talana Farms, a former Rhodesian
Army Scout, had been deported from the country for
allegedly mistreating his employees and for security
violations involving the South African army.
As people's command over productive assets and income
falls, their ability to command food also declines, even
though the amount of food in the region may have only
fallen moderately, or not at all. For example the recent
expansion of cash cropping in the freehold areas of the
Tuli Block has increased the overall aggregate wealth of
the country but at the same time contributed towards a
decline in the entitlement of' the population working on
the farms. The poor therefore become dependent on
government assistance and food handouts because their
sources of income have contracted or disappeared
altogether.
Since 1980 Botswana has been characterised by a series of
droughts of unprecedented duration and severity, the
cumulative effect of which has been to expose the extent,
of poverty already existing in rural areas, and intensify
the degree of deprivation amongst the people. The
vulnerability of the rural economy to drought has led to
declining employment opportunities and incomes, made
manifest by a dramatic fall in cereal production and an
21 Ibid. The wife of the British manager at Seleka Ranch wondered why the Food Resources Departient delivered
drought relief rations to the Talana FarlE an the children re already 'well fed and healthy'.
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increase in cattle mortality, particularly amongst
smaller herds. In periods of drought, opportunities for
employment under the majako system are almost completely
eliminated. As most households participating in majako
are unlikely to own cattle or cultivate land, they are
the hardest hit.
This has led in turn to a corresponding rise in the
proportion of the rural population dependent on food aid
relief of one kind or another, provided through either
multilateral or bilateral aid programmes, or by the
Government's own purchase of food on the world market.
Table 2.11 overleaf examines theimpact of the drought on
livestock slaughter rate, death rate, annual of f take and
calving rate. One of the most damaging results of the
1982-88 drought has been the extent of livestock death.
Dahl & Hjort's study in 1979 showed that livestock owners
with an outside income have a more drought-proof herd,
have a greater "recuperative power" and are therefore
able to recover faster after drought.
Increased involvement in the livestock industry by
commercial farmers using communal land makes the
traditional sector more vulnerable to drought due to
increased competition for scarce grazing, and leads to
growing inequalities in wealth between the traditional
and modern sectors. In this sense, the commercialisation
of the industry is having a definite immiserising effect
on traditional farmers.
Raynaut (1977) notes that one corollary of the growth of
commercial relationships is the breakdown of collective
ties, and an increased vulnerability to the effects of
drought. Sen (1981) similarly attributes the impact of
drought in the Sahel in the early 1970s to "the increased
vulnerability arising from the growing commercialisation
of the (Sahelian) economy".
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RoB, MoA and MFDP, Botsjriculturai Statistics, 1919-81 and Botswana A1!jLulturajCegusL
1982-4. Cited ibis & Norgan (1986), p,465.
Notes:
1) Data added or updated by NFDP but not yet published.
2) Average for all sizes of herds.
Commercial farmers are also better able to gain access to
certain resources (such as credit for water development,
banking or transport) to de-stock animals in the early
part of the drought. Devitt (1977) compared the
strategies in times of drought of three groups in the
Kgalagadi Desert of Botswana and Namibia: Basarwa,
BaKgalagadi pastoralists and white ranchers. He noted the
flexibility and ease with which the white ranchers could
adapt to drought conditions by controlled rotational
grazing and rapid de-stocking to convert livestock into'
cash when drought strikes.
Death rates in cattle herds up to 10 head rose from 30%
in 1982 to 54% in 1983 (RoB, Rural Development Council,
1985 p.4), and in 1984-5, the last year for which data is
available, the mortality rate for herds of less than 10
cattle soared to 86% (IMDC Jan-Feb 1987). The smaller
herd owner sees most of his cattle starve to death during
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the drought, or sells his animals to the larger owners.
In either case, the wealthier owner increases his wealth
and, we would argue, his political power, relative to the
smaller herd owner. It is this relative difference in
economic and political power than maintains an increasing
proportion of the poor in absolute poverty. In this way,
drought itself tends to intensify the maldistribution of
cattle ownership (Thomson 1971, p.124-5).
Sen (1981) notes that it is only in times of crisis such
as drought and famine that the differential power of
groups to exercise prior claims to scarce resources
becomes manifest, the richer more powerful members being
able to acquire or maintain control over the goods
essential to survival. In Africa, as for many other
regions of the developing world, per capita food
production has a particular significance to any
discussion of poverty, but not an absolute one. A fall in
per capita food production per se does not go very far in
explaining poverty, or hunger, or the increased reliance
of a growing section of the community on government
welfare assistance. Indeed, many developed nations are
deficient in cereal grains and are net importers of food,
yet few of their citizens are actually starving.
The problem is that in Africa a decline in food is
closely linked with a decline in entitlements because the
incomes of so many come from growing food, and there is
no counterbalancing rise in the output of industrial
goods. In Botswana, because of the skewed ownership of'
cattle, arable production is inextricably linked to rural
incomes and individual sustenance, even though in good
years cereal production remains largely subsistence in
nature and few households manage to produce a marketable
surplus. In drought years, households have to buy a
larger proportion of their cereal requirements on the
market, (when as net buyers of food, their real
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TABLE 2.12: BASIC INDICATORS RELATED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (ALL CROPS) (1979-198?)











Estiuted val of crops
produced (Pula millions)
Estimated income from crops
per planting household (P.)
70240	 70800 71000	 60900 59180 55800	 N/A	 N/A
65735	 68650 57000	 48200 51220 55300	 N/A	 N/A
54630	 57545 23400	 11230 19040 30050	 N/A	 N/A
83%	 84%	 41%	 23%	 37%	 54%	 N/A	 N/A
46000	 55000 19000	 15800	 8400 20000 22200 21300
287000 290000 204000 229000 203000 211000 243000 310000
205000 210000 69000	 64000 67000 982001 N/A	 N/A
160.27	 189.66	 93.14	 69.00	 41,38	 94.19 '91.36	 68.11
15.25	 19.10	 8.85	 4.47	 2.32	 5.621	 N/A	 N/A
232.00	 278.22 155.26	 92,74	 45.29 101,631 N/A	 N/A
Freehold fart employment	 4300	 4800	 4200	 4500	 5400	 60001 N/A	 N/A
Family labour in agriculture 	 186700 188400 163000 139000 139500 1496001 N/A	 N/A
Labour hired in agriculture 	 60200	 74700 52100	 47550 46650 703001 N/A	 N/A
Total labour engaged	 251200 267900 219300 191050 191550 2259001 N/A 	 N/A
Average annual rainfall (me)	 513	 577	 359	 340	 325	 310	 329	 368
Sources:
a) Household and employment data based on Rural Development Council, National Food Strategy, NFDP, Gaborone 1985.
b) Production and area planted data based on Agricultural Statistics, MoA, 1978-86.
c) Values of crops based on sate source as (a), but using updated data from Agricultural Statistics, MoA, 1978-86.
d) Rainfall based on national average. Data from Dept. of Meteorological Services, Ministry of Works and
Comeunications, 1978-86.
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TABLE 2.13: LIVFS'lDCK AND C})P LOSS DUE TO DITh?F: 1983.
Livestock.
1. Cattle.
Deaths in noxl year (1981)
Deaths in 1983
Cattle lost due to drought
Average value per head
Total income loss:
2. Smalistock (Sheep, goats ,poultry)
	
Total income loss	 P2,000,000




Total production of food
in a normal year (nit)
Total production of food
crops in 1983 (mt)
Decrease in crop production
Average value per metric tonne
Total Loss in income for crops




MFDP, Botswana Agricultural Census, 1983. Cited Hoim & Morgan,
(1986), p.467.
consumption becomes highly sensitive to food prices), or
rely on government handouts of food. Table 2.12 on page
169 above gives the basic indicators for all crops for
the period 1979-1987. The effect of drought on farmers'
expectations of yield, actual production levels and
household income during the drought years of the 1980s is
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very clear. Though the total area actually planted has
been generally well maintained, the low areas actually
harvested illustrate the importance not just of an
adequate rainfall, but of its timeliness (compare
rainfall data for 1983-4 and 1984-5). What the table
indicates more than anything else, however, is the risk
involved in dryland arable agriculture, and how
unfavourably it compares with livestock, given a drought
viable herd size and the prevailing high prices.
An estimate of the financial cost of livestock and crop
losses was made by Hoim and Morgan for 1983, and is shown
in Table 2.13 on page 170 above. These figures represent
a loss of one third of the total income produced from
agriculture in 1983. A 1985 report prepared jointly by
various UN agencies for the Interministerial Drought
Committee (IMDC) of the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning attempted to assess what the
underlying trend in rural incomes would have been if the
drought had not intervened in 1981. Though they admit
their methodology is rather speculative and uses data
from estimated rural incomes in 1981 and 1985 based on
sectoral growth assumptions, their findings in Table 2.14
shown overleaf confirm that the pattern of economic
growth since 1980 would have left the vast majority of
the population with declining incomes even without the
intervention of drought. The analysts are at pains to
point out that this theoretical growth rate of 6% per
annum is almost entirely due to price increases for
livestock and cereals introduced durin g the early 1980s,'
and that it is unlikely that price rises could have been
sustained at the same high level as existed during 1981-3
(UNDP et al 1985, p.19).
Secondly, there is no suggestion in their report that the
number of new jobs available in the rural areas would
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NGT: The following assuiptions were used in .edifying possible rates of drought free moose growth:1) Sectoral
growth assuiptions resain unchanged. Differences in the real value of inco.e arise fros a decline in inflation.
2) Growth in average incoie between 1978 and 1982 in lam Manageient Survey Fans. (MoA, Pars Managesent Survey
Results: 1982 Survey, March 1983.) 3) Average annual increase in crop prices between 1981 and 1984 ma 19.2%. To
this has been added 2% per annus for growth induced by Governient, for exaiple ALOEP. 4) As for (1) for reminder
of table. 5) Inflation assuied to be 9.2% p.a. (CSO, Cost of Living Index, July 1985.)
They conclude:
"the growth rate indicated (in Table 2.14
above), if it is credible at all, would almost
certainly have been confined, at most, to less
than half of the rural population...these
increases would have been offset by an
increasing polarisation between those who owned
cattle in herds of a "viable" size and had
access to land and those who did not. On the
basis of general experience this would suggest
that the incomes of the poorest families would
have declined throughout" (UNDP et al 1985,
p.21).
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Considering the severity and duration of the 1982-88
drought, the situation since the UN report has most
probably grown worse. Drought, then, serves to hasten a
pre-existing process of immiserisation which we consider
has gone hand in hand with the process of
commercialisation in livestock. This background of
social, political and economic change, plus the fact that
participation in both the arable and livestock sub-
sectors is stagnant and that population increase
significantly exceeds rural employment growth, suggest
that
"on average rural incomes are probably
declining in real terms, and those of the
poorest most sharply, irrespective of the
effects of drought (UNDP et al, p.16).
Assessing the extent of poverty in absolute terms remains
problematic, and our intention here has been to indicate
general trends. However, Colcough & McCarthy (1980)
estimated that some 54.5% of people in smaller villages,
and some 46.5% of people in lar ger villages, existed
below the PDL (see Table 2.10). Given the intimate
relationship that exists between the ownership of cattle,
agricultural production and incomes, and the impact of
the 1982-88 drought on mortality rates amongst small
herds, it is highly likely that these estimates have now
been exceeded.
SECTION C
THE 1982-88 DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMME AND
LONGER TERM STRATEGIES FOR HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY
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V
DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS
Drought occurs with alarming regularity in Botswana.
Sandford estimated that a serious drought affecting
grazing conditions could occur in one year in every five
around Gaborone, and in one year every four around
Francistown (Sandford 1979).
Using a method developed by the Australian Meteorological
Bureau, Austin & Macdonald estimated that "major stress"
could be expected in two years out of every ten in
Gaborone, and four years in every ten in Francistown
(Austin & Macdonald 1980). On this basis, it is clear
that drought is a way of life in Botswana, and it is for
this reason in particular that preceding chapters have
stressed the importance of traditional redistributive
mechanisms, and the significance of their decline and
replacement by a impersonal cash nexus. Traditional
responses to drought in the past have included the
storage of surplus grain in good years by the village
Chiefs, and the use of the tribal herds as meat when the
crops failed (Borton 1984, p.18). When climatic changes
caused village streams and wells to dry up, the whole
village would move on to another site,' but the modern
pattern of settlement has now become fixed and reliant on
deep boreholes.
We have also seen in previous sections the importance of
the arable-livestock linkage to the existence of the
1 Earlier this century, Khaia III and the whole of the Bangwato tribe ioved west froi their existing baBe at Old
Palapye to establish a new village at Khaia's cattle post at Serowe. It is now reputed to be the largest
traditional village in sub-Saharan Africa.
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rural economy, and that it was the growing polarity in
the ownership of livestock, to gether with the decay in
its traditional socio-economic role, that had exposed an
increasingly large section of the rural community to
poverty and destitution. As these redistributive
structures have gradually disappeared, along with many of
the other socially cohesive forms of communal activity,
their welfare role has had to be replaced by government
institutions and foreign aid organisations.
In this third section of the study, we shall be examining
the nature of these institutions, which were first
established in Botswana just a few years before
Independence, and since then have evolved through
successive droughts and a long process of co-operation
and collaboration with the various aid agencies. Their
primary role since this period has been the provision of
supplementary rations to food deficit households and
individuals, using donated food from the international
community. In the extensive drought of the early 1960s,
for example, some 25% of the population had received
supplementary rations donated by the World Food
Programme, and after Independence Botswana was to
continue with this form of relief programme in non-
drought years, albeit in a reduced form.
It is therefore somewhat of a misnomer to describe the
current aid programme as simply "drought relief" - rather
it is an ongoing programme that has ran continuously in
one form or another for over 20 years and is simply
thrown into higher gear with the recurrence of the next
drought. However, as much of the primary data used in
this section of the study was collected during a period
of severe drought, we will continue to refer to the
programme as "drought relief".
That the continued existence of a human relief programme
is still considered necessary in Botswana even in non-
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drought years, and despite the rapid growth since
Independence, should therefore be seen as an indication
of a much wider malaise in the economy than can be
explained solely in terms of "drought". A study of the
drought relief programme should therefore be set against
the background of declining rural incomes and employment
levels (relative to the public sector), the emergence of
new class structures and the current changes to the
system of land tenure that the latter has brought about.
Seen in this light, periods of drought serve merely to
highlight the extent of a growing poverty and
deprivation, and accelerate a process of immiserisation
for some marginal groups that has itself becoming
institutionalised. This section attempts to do two
things. First, it examines which elements of the
programme have in fact helped to alleviate rural poverty,
and those that have simply served to provide subsidies
for the wealthier cattle owners. Secondly, it discusses
which elements of the programme, if any, can be expanded
and built upon to effect a transition from "relief" to a
form of "development" that can be enjoyed by all.
a) The Evolution of the Drought Relief Programme.
The prolonged drought which started in 1960 and which
would reduce the national herd by one third over the next
six years (Borton 1984, p.26), signified the country's
first attempt at relief efforts on a large scale. The
Colonial administration's lack of contingency planning'
throughout the years of relatively good harvests during
the 1950s had left it ill-prepared to mount a large scale
response to the drought, and it was not until August 1965
that the relief operation was fully underway. It
consisted of food distribution for specially registered
destitutes and various Food for Work Projects, mainly dam
construction and roadworks. Assistance came from various
sources including WFP, the US and British Governments,
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OXFAM, the World Council of Churches and the Red Cross.
The administration of the relief programme in the field
was carried out by Community Development Staff, operating
within a specially established Relief and Rehabilitation
Unit, and assisted by 17 IVS and Peace Corps volunteers.
This period marked the start of WFP's Project 324 which
was to be later extended and enlarged and today forms the
major component of the food aid programme in Botswana.
Though the relief operation mounted in the 1960s drought
was small and slow to get off the ground, it did provide
some of the basic infrastructure and administrative
skills needed for future droughts. Food storage depots
were constructed in the larger villages, a total of 230
ration distribution points were established throughout
the country, and many of the district officials who were
later to become the country's most senior politicians
received a basic exposure and training in coping with
large scale relief projects. However, as we will see in
subsequent sections, these skills were to be applied more
at the Ministerial level (particularly within the MFDP),
in negotiations with aid donors, rather than in the
practical mechanics of running the drought relief
programme at the District level; this was to have serious
detrimental effects on the overall management and
effectiveness of subsequent drought relief programmes.
In the years between the long drought of the 1960s and
the short but sharp drought of 1979-80, several
structural changes had been made to the administrative'
machinery set up for future relief programmes. During
1973-4 the responsibility for the delivery of food to the
distribution points and project sites was shifted from
the Community Development Department to the newly created
Institutional Food Programme (IFP), located within the
MLGL.
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The MoA set up its own internal working group to
"develop a long-term programme for contingency
planning for dealing with livestock under drought
conditions" (Borton 1984, p.32). (my italics)
A long-term strategy for dealing with human beings under
drought conditions was devised some three years later in
1977 on the recommendation of the Sandford consultancy
which called for the establishment of
"an information system, which gives warning of
incipient droughts, and which triggers off
successive (as the warnings get more intense)
semi-automatic responses to set the machinery
of drought relief in action." (Sandford 1979).
An Interministerial Working Party on Drought was soon
created in the MFDP in response to these recommendations,
with sub-committees in both the MoA and MLGL, thus
setting the basic committee structure for dealing with
drought relief which has lasted until the present day.
However, though a theoretical framework had now been
established for dealing with drought, little had been
done to improve the ability of the government to put this
into practice in the field, as would soon become
painfully obvious.
The failure of the 1978-9 rains caused a sharp drought
with cereal production plummeting to less than 10% of
normal levels (see Table 3.16). Ngamiland in the north
west of the country was particularly hard hit as a foot
and mouth outbreak had effectively cut off the area from
the lucrative EEC market. The emergency relief programme
was set into motion in June 1979 with IFP responsible for
food distribution on a national basis. Within the first
four months it was clear that IFP's performance in this
regard left much to be desired, with cereal distribution
being only about 26% of requirements (Borton 1984, p.35).
This was first attributed to transportation problems by
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IFP until it emerged that IFP had been basing their
distribution on pre-drought beneficiary fi gures rather
than estimated drought requirements prepared by the
Central Statistics Office (Borton 1984, p.36).
Two factors contributed significantly to the poor
performance of IFP during this period. The first was the
structure of the programme at the central government
level. The existence of three separate working groups
from different Ministries, the first drawn from the MoA
and responsible for livestock relief, the second drawn
from the MLGL and having executive power for the human
relief programme, and the third (now the IMDC) an
advisory committee from the MFDP but controlling funding
for the relief programme as a whole, created problems
over the division of responsibility for planning and
implementation of the various relief measures. This
resulted in confusing and often contradictory statements
and directives being sent to the Districts. Most
important of all, the IFP was excluded from most of the
joint meetings and thus forced to play a subsidiary role
where, as the department directly involved in
distributing drought relief food, it should have been
taking most of the initiatives.
The second factor was the institutional changes made to
the Civil Service in 1976-7. At this time the Government
rationalised its procurement, handling and issuing of
supplies and established a centralised Department of
Supplies within the MFDP. A trained cadre of Supplies
Officers was created with its own schemes of service and
training, and IFP staff became part of this new cadre.
What this meant in practice was that the procurement,
storage and distribution of food rations both in drought
and non-drought years became just another Supplies
activity, and its prime importance to human nutrition and
survival became a subsidiary consideration often ignored
during the course of the drought.
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On an operational level, these changes meant that IFP
staff in the Districts who were directly accountable for
distributing the food rations were no longer under the
full control of the IFP Head Office in Gaborone. The
Department of Supplies was now responsible for their
recruitment, transfer and promotion and this was often
carried out without reference to either the wishes of IFP
in Gaborone or to the needs of the programme. It also had
a significant impact on the quality of staff working
within IFP, as the training courses run by the Department
of Supplies were orientated more to correct form filling
and accounting procedures rather than directed towards
the needs of an emergency drought relief situation. These
deficiencies were to remain largely unresolved well into
the 1980s.
At the District level, Drought Committees were formed
with regular meetings attended by Council members and
representatives from all the Government departments
involved in the administration of the relief programme,
and chaired by the District Commissioners.Z They were in
effect sub-committees of the District Development
Committees which had been introduced in 1970. The Drought
Committees had three main functions. First, at the
beginning of the drought Food for Work projects would be
presented and discussed before being sent down to the
MLGL in Gaborone for formal approval and the release of
funds. The second function was to monitor each element of
the drought programme, with each government department
presenting a written progress report to the committee /
which was then discussed before being accepted or
rejected. Thirdly, the Committee would decide on
disbursements needed from the Quick Action Fund, provided
by central government to help break bottlenecks in the
system. The effectiveness of the District Drought
Committees varied considerably between the Districts, and
Z Personal observations as .eiber of Central District Drought Coittee, 1985-1981.
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in all cases was hampered by the lack of accurate and
concise directives from central government.
Following the end of the drought an evaluation of the
programme was commissioned by the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning. In their study, the evaluation team
looked at the management of the programme at the District
level, and particularly at the role performed by the IF?.
The main criticisms of their report concerned the overall
managerial capacity of the Department, its inadequately
trained staff (particularly at the District level), and
its generally poor performance in moving the drought
relief food at the right time and in sufficient
quantities:
"IFP depots in the remoter districts had
particular problems in communicating with their
line of rail depots and even these had problems
communicating with Gaborone. Letters from the
remote districts could take weeks to arrive and
one letter from Ghanzi requesting more supplies
of food urgently, took two months to reach
Lobatse. Telegrams were frequently used but
even these could take several days. Telephoning
was usually unsatisfactory because the person
being called was frequently out of the office,
and no one was delegated to stand in for him.
Urgent requests for additional food supplies to
be sent to the districts were often delayed.
Reporting was slow and erratic, whereas,
because it was a relief programme, it should
have been fast and efficient. Late arrival of
IFP Depot stock reports hindered Government's
ability to monitor the food situation and to
plan the purchase and delivery of future
consignments of food." (Gooch & MacDonald 1981,
p.49).
In their summary of IFP's performance, the authors of the
report concluded:
"Distribution of food between depots and to
final destinations was characterised by
unplanned, uncoordinated and wasteful delivery
systems. As a result people suffered
unnecessarily. Insufficient and at times
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incorrect instructions to staff, inadequate
staff control and discipline, and failure to
respond to the emergency needs of the relief
programme all indicated the critical need to
improve radically the management of the
organisation. That this was not done is, in our
opinion, the greatest single failure of the
1979-80 relief programme" (Gooch & MacDonald
1981, p.70).
Among the many recommendations of the Gooch and Macdonald
report were three that were to reshape the future
strategy of drought planning and implementation in
Botswana at both the centre and the district levels. The
first recommendation concerned the administration of the
drought at the central government level, where it was
felt that the main executive committee should be situated
in the MFDP, where it would receive proper funding and
form an essential element of any future National
Development Plan. Henceforth, drought relief would no
longer be seen simply as a peripheral activity or
temporary emergency programme, but as part and parcel of'
an overall development strategy.
The second was that IFP should be dismantled, and that
responsibility for food distribution at District level
should be transferred to the District Administration. A
small but dynamic unit would be created in the MFDP whose
role in future droughts would be concerned with
procurement of aid commodities and financial assistance
from donors, purchasing on the open market, and shipment
of all food commodities to the railhead storage depots,
from whence it would become the responsibility of the
District Administration. This unit was to emerge as the
Food Resources Department in 1982, but would remain
situated however, within the MLGL.
The third recommendation was that greater emphasis should
be given in future droughts to labour intensive
employment projects. These would replace the prevailing
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system of Food for Work projects (which were seen as
demeaning for the participants and were difficult to
manage logistically) with payments in cash. Less emphasis
would be g iven to free food distribution, which was seen
as likely to be increasingly characterised by dependency
effects, particularly if the drought was a prolonged one.
As the team of consultants' recommendations were still
being debated by Cabinet and before the Ministries
concerned had been informed of the outcome, it had become
clear that the 1981-2 rains had failed over much of the
country, and that therefore Botswana had yet another
drought on its hands.
The drought of 1982-88 was to prove one of unparalleled
duration and severity, and required from the outset a
massive expansion and restructuring of the cuirent relief
programme. The first step was the creation of the Food
Resources Department (FRD) which became the government
body directly responsible for the procurement and
distribution of relief food on a national level, for all
programmes except that of the Remote Area Dwellers'. It
became also the main administrative body for the movement
of relief food in the Districts, though overall
responsibility for food delivery remained with the
District Councils. Commodities destined for distribution
to the RADs programme continued to be purchased and
stored by FRD but the actual distribution to the
settlements was to be carried out by the Remote Area
Dwellers' Officers (RADOs), who formed a separate
Department within the same parent Ministry.
The pattern of drought relief which was established in
the 1979-80 programme was continued and had five main
objectives (RoB, IMDC March 1985).
I.The supplementation of food supplies as a
preventative measure to reduce the incidence of, and
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forestall rises in, malnutrition amongst those groups
considered highly at risk. These comprise the old and
infirm, pre-school children, pregnant and lactating
women, TB patients, destitutes, primary school
children, and those living in remote areas without
access to normal services;
II.The supplementation of rural incomes in order to
compensate in part for production lost due to
drought;
III.The rehabilitation of actually malnourished children
through direct feeding on site at health facilities;
IV.The securing of water for human consumption as and
when required;
V.The alleviation of the effects of drought on
livestock, and the provision of assistance to arable
farmers to increase their ability to regain
productivity during the immediate post-drought
recovery period.
The implementation of the programme had four primary
elements, the first and largest of which was the system
of free food distribution for rural and urban groups
thought to be nutritionally at risk, and to all primary
school children. The second was a much expanded
employment scheme in the rural areas providing short
term income to replace that which had been lost during
the course of the drought. The third element was the
provision of boreholes for the supply of human drinking
water where domestic sources were threatened or had
already dried up. The final element of the drought relief
programme was the introduction of various agricultural
subsidies aimed both at preserving rural incomes and
assets, and at the preparation of arable land ready for
the post-drought recovery period. The first two
The 1982-88 Drought Relief Programme	 185
components are administered by the Department of Food
Resources (MLGL), the third by the Ministry of
Agriculture (mainly the Departments of Field Services and
Animal Health), and the fourth by the Department of Water
Affairs in conjunction with the District Councils, the
latter also having responsibility for the local
coordination of the LBRP.
Expenditures on the individual elements of the drought
relief programme are shown below for the period 1982-3 to
1985-6, and show both the Government's and the donors'
share of expenditure.
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1) Food Supplies are those purchased by FRD to suppleuent donated couodities, usually to cover ati unexpected
shortfall.
2) Includes FBI) recurrent costs,
3) Accelerated Rainfed Agriculture Prograne. See Text.
4) This category covers the building of storage facilities.
Source: IKDC, Kinistry of Finance & Developsent Planning, Kay 1988.
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It is significant, considering the donors' often
expressed concern over the possibility of dependency
effects of free food distribution, that their financial
contribution to LBRP expenditures remained negligible
throughout this period. This situation was to change
somewhat during the 1986-87 programme however, with some
bilateral food donations being "monetised" and used by
the Government to help finance the LBRP. A breakdown of
international aid donations for the 1986-87 year is
provided later in this section.
b) Livestock, Agriculture and Water Projects.
A cattle purchase scheme for the smaller stockholder was
first introduced in 1977, and originally intended to
compensate farmers in Ngamiland for the loss of access to
the Botswana Meat Commission. 3 In 1983 the scheme was
expanded to other parts of the country and took on new
objectives. First, by offering a fixed price for animals
whatever their condition it provided a form of income
support for farmers during the period of drought when
they would otherwise be faced with declining prices, due
to the increased number of animals offered for sale.
Secondly, it provided a way of relieving communal grazing
lands, the carrying capacity of which is seriously
reduced during periods of drought.
The slaughtered cattle are used to provide meat for the
children at primary school. It should be stressed though
that it does not form an integral part of the school
feeding programme, but is essentially a programme of
income support for the smaller herd owners unable to
provide supplementary stock feed for their animals during
the drought, and who are consequently facing the total
Because of the high incidence of Foot and Mouth disease in the District, the SEC had banned all iiports of beef
froi the area thus effectively prohibiting its slaughter at BMC, and liiiting its sale to the douestic .arket.
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loss of their herds. Meat obtained under this scheme was
not made available to children attending health
facilities, even in the same village, as they were
supposed to buy meat from Council funds provided for that
purpose. As we will see in subsequent sections, this
omission led to the development of an anomalous situation
in many villages, whereby the very children most in need
of the extra protein that meat could provide were the
least likely to receive it.
As the project ran in 1986-87, it clearly had short term
benefits to the rangeland, smaller stockholders and to
the quality of diet faced by the primary school children.
However, the programme was more successful in some areas
than in others. In places where rainfall had shown some
improvement, the sale of cattle under this, scheme
practically stopped all together as farmers anticipated
a rapid recovery of grazing. In other areas, farmers
thought that the price offered (P100 from 1985-87) was
too little and hung on to their cattle in the hope that
the drought would break.4
With the closure in 1987 of the Northern abattoir in Maun
(Ngamiland), due apparently to the high prevalence of
diseased animals in the area, it was soon evident that
the number of cattle offered for sale far exceeded the
WFP assisted relief progranes for pastoralists in Turkana District (Kenya) adopted a ore co.prehensive
approach to destocking. When the established Early Warning Systea warned of iipending drought, auctions were
organised by the local authorities to effect a rapid reduction in stock, with pastoralists inforied through Chiefs
of the venues and dates of the auctions. Transactions are coapleted in cask,(WFPIFAO et al, 1988b, p.21) and
livestock owners are paid the current iarket price for their ani.als, •inus a deduction for transport costs to the
nearest aarket. Previously, livestock had been sold on a barter basis, often to So.ali traders who then resold the
anisals through governient auctions or transported thea to uarkets outside the District. It is considered that the
sche.e has had a stabilising effect on the iarket and thus avoided a drastic fall in prices and incoies for the
pastoralists. (WFP/FAO et al, 1988b, p.3l)
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budget allocation for the District under the scheme.
Literally thousands of cattle died where they fell,
finally succumbing through hunger or disease and simply
without the strength to raise themselves onto their feet.
In November of that year in Maun itself, with the
Okavango River still in flow, cattle were seen collapsing
along its banks and into its waters, graphically
illustrating that the major cause of livestock death in
Botswana during drought is not lack of water, but lack
of grazing. In 1987-88, it was estimated that in the Maun
and Lake Ngami areas alone, 17,290 cattle starved to
death (IMDC, Drought Assessment Tour 1988, p.4). The smaller
owners lost their herds simply because they were unable
to buy stockfeed, even when provided by government at
highly subsidised prices.
Stockfeed is usually bought and trucked in from South
Africa and is made available at subsidised prices through
a network of Livestock Advisory Centres (LAC) in the
major villages. Herd owners with sufficient quantities of
available cash usually buy up the stockfeed as soon as it
arrives at the LAC and transport it to their cattle posts
at weekends using their own trucks or those borrowed from
other stock holders. The smaller farmers may travel to
the LAC from more remote villages by donkey cart for
their supply, if they are able to afford it, and have had
sufficient warning that the stockfeed has arrived.
"The current system of subsidising stockfeed
must be considered to have completely failed in
the objective of preventing cattle mortality,
mainly because of the difficulty small farmers
have in obtaining the feed, as well as
reluctance to invest in feed faced with the
very high mortality rates in small herds...the
failure of the current system - by which
farmers have unlimited access to highly
subsidised stockfeed which is nearly all
purchased by large scale operators - is
twofold: not only does it fail to assist the
small herd owners who need it most, but it
encourages overstocking by large owners at a
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time when it is more logical to sell more
cattle in order to allow a recovery of the
veld" (IMDC, Report of the First Drought Assessment
Tour, Jan-Feb. 1987).
Another subsidy which ran concurrently with that of
stockfeed was the cattle vaccination programme, where
free vaccine (particularly against botulism and anthrax)
was made available to all stock holders. Unlike the
Cattle Feed Subsidy, strenuous efforts were made to
ensure that all herd owners, large and small, received
the vaccine services, possibly as it was in the rich
herders' interest that their poor neighbours' cattle
remained free from disease.
Many farmers faced with a succession of drought years are
forced to consume their supply of seeds for the following
planting season (FAO 1974). The Seed Distribution Scheme
was designed to provide free seeds at the beginning of
each season so as to ensure that this deficiency in
indigenous seed stocks did not present itself as a
binding constraint on cereal production once the drought
was over. In the 1987-88 season, over 527,000 packets of
seed were distributed nationally (about 5204 mt.) (IMDC
1988, p.4). To date, most of the country's national seed
stocks have been purchased outside Botswana but it is
envisaged as part of the government's National Food
Strategy that the country should produce its own seeds,
which can therefore be developed and tested under
naturally occurring drought conditions (RoB, Rural
Development Council 1985).
Grants were also made available under drought relief for
farmers who wished to "destump" their fields (i.e. remove
bushes and tree stumps) to facilitate the use of
mechanical planters and potentially increase the
productivity of their holdings. As the process was a
labour intensive one it was envisaged that it would also
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provide some income support for the rural poor and at the
same time prepare fields for the growing season.
It is believed that most farmers hire out at least part
of the work to agricultural labourers, though it is not
clear what proportion of the grant is passed on in this
way. However, one study estimated that the total number
of beneficiaries was three or four times the number of
grants given (UNDP et al 1985, p.74). In the 1986-87
period, some 4947 farmers took part in the scheme at a
total cost of P948,611, making a per capita subsidy of
P191.75, or, assuming that the work was hired out and the
full subsidy passed on as wages, between P63 and P48 per
labourer. In the 1987-88 drought year (April 1987-January
1988), some 5057 farmers participated at a total cost of
P1,347,940, giving a per capita subsidy of P266.55 per
farmer. Again, assuming that the work of each farmer was
completed by 3-4 agricultural labourers, this would have
provided incomes of between P89 and P67, again assuming
that the full value of the grant is passed on by the
farmer. These figures therefore do not represent a very
substantial income when spread over the year.5
Given the critical problem of lack of access to draught
power to ensure timely ploughing, farmers without
adequate means to plough are subsidised by the Government
up to 85% of the cost of hiring draught oxen or
mechanical services, up to a maximum of three hectares.
The project was started in 1983 to assist small farmers
and from its first year of operation the target was to
assist 30% of the arable farming households and 50% in
the second year. However, in 1984 only 11,000 households
were assisted out of a total of over 70,000 eligible
(UNDP et al 1985, p.73). The participation rate rose
dramatically with the good rains of 1987-88 to 26,149
farmers, Even this figure is considerably less than the
Calculated fro. data in INDC (1988), facing page 4.
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number of farmers without access to cattle of their own
or obtainable through the mai'isa system (see Chapter IV)
and varies considerably by region. For example, whilst
there was over 7000 participants in Southern District,
there were only 36 in Ghanzi, and in Kgalagadi District,
only 11 farmers participated (IMDC, 1988, p.4).
A corollary to this is the expenditure pattern on the Row
Planting Subsidy, the application for which only becomes
feasible after the clearance of the individual farmer's
field. In this case Southern District had over 3000
recipients of the subsidy, with Ghanzi and Kgalagadi
having just 1 and 4 respectively (IMDC 1988, p.4).
This subsidy has certainly preserved some farmers' fields
from being completely abandoned during the drought, but
its benefits have not been evenly distributed. In a
drought situation, it is questionable whether the scheme
has contributed significantly to the incomes of the
smaller farmers, as the lack of rainfall after ploughing
largely determines the yield of the crop, and can negate
any benefits of having access to draught power. With the
considerable sums being spent on this subsidy scheme
(over P5 million in 1987-88), it has however served to
increase the incomes of those farmers with several oxen
to hire out under the scheme, and the wealthier
individuals who own tractors. 6 These are the very groups
able to take advantage of low livestock prices during the
drought and buy weakened animals from the smaller farmers
for fattening at their own cattle posts, before selling
through the BMC.
The effectiveness of the various agricultural drought
relief measures is rather difficult to assess, and little
survey work has been carried out to determine the
Over P7OOOO was paid to a Mr. Robert Frans Schroder of Lobatse in 1985 for the hire of his tractors under the
sche.e. He was subsequently charged for obtaining the .oney by deception. (Botawana Daily News, January 22, 198?,
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identity of the main beneficiary groups. The field
clearance scheme has been in effect an extension to the
LBRP programme and will undoubtedly have provided short
term income for a considerable number of otherwise
unemployed people. The Draught Power and Seed Subsidies
have helped remove some of the major input constraints
facing poorer farmers but their real contribution only
manifests itself in a non-drought situation: with poor
rains, they provide neither crops or income, except for
the wealthier farmers with tractors or spare teams of
oxen to hire. Similarly, the Cattle Feed Subsidy and
Cattle Purchase Schemes have been of benefit only to
cattle owners; the former mainly to the larger
stockholders with sources of cash to buy the feed and the
latter for the poorer farmers as a compensatory package
for their animals that would have otherwise simply
starved to death.
The low yields obtained by small farmers even in years of
above average rainfall means that arable agriculture can
be relied upon by most households as only one of several
sources of subsistence. Per capita production of cereals
has never exceeded more than 63kg/head since the mid
1970s and during the 1982-88 drought was below 20kg/head
(RoB, Rural Development Council 1985, p.4). In this sense
most arable agriculture can be seen as a residual
activity. This suggests that drought relief measures
directed solely at dryland crop production of the smaller
farmers may be less effective in producing a regular
income in the longer term than alternative strategies
aimed more at preserving their herds. 7 We will be
returning to this issue in the final section of this
study.
The Water Development Programme served to augment during
periods of drought both the District Councils' and the
I	 reached by a ( uirna to Turkana District in Ienya,(YI'/FAO et at, 19b, p,ll
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Department of Water Affairs' own regular water
development work, and had two components. The Councils
were provided with grants to enable them to provide
emergency supplies of water to smaller villages and
settlements where the existing supplies were in danger of
drying up. This usually took the form of bulk
transportation of water by tractor driven bowser, the
purchase of diesel pumps, tools and spare parts. The
second component of the programme was the provision of
funds to accelerate the implementation of existing
projects run by Water Affairs, and involved the siting of
new boreholes and the construction of water reticulation
systems. The capacity of Water Affairs was greatly
enhanced by the donations of air and rotary drilling rigs
by USAID and SIDA at the beginning of the drought and
worth over P2,000,000, although this increased drilling
capacity was to put a severe strain on the siting teams.
During 1983-84 an average of two out of three of the
boreholes drilled by the Department proved blank (Borton
1984, p.90).
Apart from human water supplies, funds were also made
available to groups of farmers (including syndicates,
management associates and cooperatives) wishing to
improve and develop irrigation systems for agriculture or
livestock. However, the great bulk of funds granted so
far have been used to improve water sources for livestock
(UNDP et al 1985, p.71).
c) The Vulnerable Groups' and Schools Feeding Programmes.
After 1974, a new approach was adopted towards solving
the problems of rural health care provision, which was
later to have a direct influence on the distribution of
relief rations during periods of drought. Using the
substantial mineral revenues which had just began to come
on flow, the government launched its Accelerated Rural
The 1982-88 Drought Relief Programme	 194
Development Programme (ARDP) and started the construction
of health facilities throughout the country, whereas
previously they had existed only in the major villages
(see Table 3.2 below). Between 1973-6 60% of capital
expenditure in the health sector was directed towards
rural health facilities and by 1975 some 80% of the
population lived within 10 miles of a facility (Colcough
& McCarthy 1980, p.223).
TABLE 3.2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH FACILITIPS IN BOTSWANA, 1973-86





































1) Government facilities only.
2) Inch1es about 235 mobile facilities (mobile stops).
Sources:
1) RoB, National Development Plan, 1973-78, Part 1 •, 1973 and CSO
Medical Statistics 1976, Medical Statistics Unit, MoA, 1976.
2) Food Resources Department, Quarterly Progress Report, WFP
progranis, Jan-March 1986.
The main thrust of this new initiative was directed
towards the provision of a basic level of health care for
everybody in the shortest possible time, and was a
radical departure from the previous approach, which was
by its very nature inaccessible to the majority of the
people. The development of rural health centres was to
have an important influence on the structure of
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subsequent drought relief operations, as henceforth the
health facilities were also responsible for the
distribution of relief rations. Drought relief food is
now distributed at the health facilities by the resident
Family Welfare Educator (FWE), who is assisted by a
ration clerk in the larger units. Especially in the
smaller and more remote areas, this system has two
distinct but related advantages as far as the
effectiveness of the drought relief programme is
concerned: first, attendance at the health facility is
greatly improved and pregnant mothers can receive
ante-natal care whilst their other children are receiving
food and being, at the same visit, assessed for their
nutritional status. The dramatic rise in the attendance
of pre-school children at health facilities (from 40,000
in 1980 to over 160,000 by 1986), was probablydue more
than anything else to the fact that food rations were
collected there. The progress of TB patients undergoing
long term medication can also be monitored more
effectively if they can be relied upon to attend the
facility regularly for their food rations. Second, the
link between health and an adequate diet can be developed
conceptually within the village community, and those
children nutritionally at risk can be recognised and
treated at an early stage within the community itself.
The typical village Health Post is usually a one or two
roomed structure manned by the FWE, who is selected in
rural areas by the Village Development Committee (VDC)
and the village community as a whole (in urban areas this
is not always possible and FWEs are rotated). FWEs are
given about twelve weeks training in basic preventive
health care, nutrition and hygiene, and receive only a
modest salary. They are visited regularly by regional
health staff.
Clinics are permanently staffed by trained nurses and
include consultation rooms, a dispensary, and beds for
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the observation of maternity cases. Health Centres offer
more ancillary services than the Clinics, a larger
maternity ward, and a few inpatient beds. Mobile Stops
(included in Table 3.2 in the Health Post category) are
situated in the more remote areas and have no permanent
staff. As their name suggests, they are visited by clinic
staff on a mobile basis, usually once a month, and it is
at this time that food rations are distributed.
Botswana is divided up into Health Regions based more on
population size than geographic area and which therefore
often cut across sub-district boundaries. Each RHT is
headed by a Regional Medical Officer who is a qualified
medical practitioner and is responsible for the
administration of medical care provision within the
Region. A Regional Health Educator and Nutrition Officer
(RHENO), is responsible for the implementation of the
Nutritional Surveillance system in all health facilities,
collects and collates their monthly reports, and then
sends them to the Nutrition Unit in Gaborone. The data is
then analysed by computer at the CSO and the results used
by the EWTC and its parent committee, the IMDC, as a
basis for policy formulation during the drought. The
RHENOs also play an important training role for FWEs at
sub-district workshops and in the field, and in the
organisation of Direct Feeding.
Supplementary food rations have been available in since
Independence to primary school children, pregnant and
lactating mothers, TB outpatients and for medically
selected children under five years of a ge. After 1982,
medical selection of beneficiaries was dropped in drought
afflicted rural areas, and two extra categories of
beneficiary were included: non-school going 6 to 10 year
old children, and "temporary" destitutes, i.e. those who
had been rendered without visible means of support due to
the effects of the drought, but who were expected to
recover those means once the drought had abated. These
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individuals are categorised as "Group B" destitutes to
distinguish them from the "permanent" or "Group A"
destitutes, who have always been eligible for Council
relief funds. This latter group are mainly the old and
infirm without any visible means of support and having no
relatives to support them. They currently receive, in
addition to the normal food rations, a sum of P30.00 per
month which they can spend on essentials at a Council
approved store in the village. Both groups of destitutes
are selected by the VDC, Social Welfare Officer (SWO) and
village extension workers. As the drought deepened in
intensity after 1982, many "temporary" Group B destitutes
were in fact re- classified into Group A "permanent"
status.
Another category of beneficiary - the "Remote Area
Dwellers" (or "RADs" as they are commonly called) - was
created for those populations living outside organised
village settlements, in areas not served by the usual
range of social services such as schools and health
facilities. A "Remote Area Development Programme" (RADP)
was set up as a separate department within the MLGL and
developed primarily to cater for the needs of the
Basarwa, who formed the main ethnic group amongst the
RADs.
Those beneficiaries living in areas classified as urban
(Gaborone, Francistown, Lobatse, Selebe-Phikwe and
Jwaneng), continued to be medically selected and in
addition, received a much smaller ration than those in
the rural areas. No destitutes or six to ten year old
children (not registered at school) were eligible for
rations unless medically selected. This disparity in
ration levels was felt justified by the Nutrition Unit of
the MoA because urban dwellers generally have a much
greater opportunity for obtaining work (at least of a
temporary nature) than their rural counterpart, and
therefore their incomes are likely to compensate for the
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smaller rations. In addition, urban dwellers have access
to a greater range of social services than those normally
available in rural areas, and what work they are able to
obtain is usually "drought-proof". Finally, it was
thought that discriminatory ration levels would help to
slow down the rate of urban migration, already at a high
level. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 on the following pages show the
various ration levels and nutritional requirements for
each beneficiary group, during the drought 1982-88
period.
Starvation in Botswana is seldom a dramatic and acute
phenomenon. It is a cumulative and often insidious
process which can manifest itself in a number of
life-threatening diseases long before it reaches the
terminal stage. It is these diseases, rather 'than the
immediate lack of food, that is usually the actual cause
of death. The group most at risk from these diseases
(which include measles and chicken-pox) are young
children, particularly those under five years of age.
Chronic malnutrition in the very young, even where no
apparent disease is evident, can result in severe
physical and mental retardation which is irreversible,
and it is for this reason that most relief efforts are
directed at children.
The nutritional status of children is not only of
intrinsic importance but also a critical indicator of the
nation's health, as most households with underweight
children also have other family members equally at risk.
Since 1978, statistics on the incidence of malnutrition
prevailing amongst children aged from six months to five
years have been collected through monthly weighing at
health facilities throughout the country, and the sample
size grew to around 120,000 by 1984. For the purpose of
the Nutritional Surveillance programme, malnutrition is
defined in terms of being below 80% of the expected
weight for age according to the Harvard standard, and
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TABLE 3.3 : DAILY RATION LEVELE FOR SCIIOOL, YUU(ERABLE G)UPS, AND 9)TE AREA Dj(RLL(1)
BENEFICIARY	 ICSNI	 YEG.	 DEN	 SORGEIM	 SOEGH1M BEAMS MAIZE SUGAR
GRGUP	 N/KILL	 OIL	 GRAIN	 MEAL	 MEAL
URBAN VULNERABLE GROUPS
(BASIC RATION)	 80	 15	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
RURAL VULNERABLE GROUPS
(BASIC RATION)	 200	 25	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
UNDERWEIGHT CHILDREN
((80% WEIGHT FOR AGE) (2)	200	 25	 -	 -	 -	 40	 -	 -
UNDERWEIGHT CHILDREN
((60% WEIGHT FOR AGE) (3}	-	 60	 80	 -	 -	 -	 -	 50
URBAN Sdllooi.,S 4	- 	 15	 10	 -	 100	 60	 -	 -
RURAL SCHOOL$
	
15	 10	 140	 -	 60	 -	 -
REMOTE AREA DWELLERS(5)
	
30	 -	 -	 -	 117	 417	 -	 -
Notes:
1) Take home rations for Vulnerable Groups' and RADe usually provided on a .onthly basis. Rural schools' rations
during term time provided as cooked meal, with rations for weekends and public holidays provided in dry take hoie
fort.
2) This ration is provided in cooked fort to all malnourished children up to age of five years in addition to the
basic take home ration. Those children under 60% weight for age however, are not supplied with beans.
3) This ration is provided in the fort of a drink called 1Disco Milk' in addition to the basic take ho.e ration
and the extra cooked ration shown in (2) above.
4) Urban schools do not receive rations at weekends and holidays.
5) This works out at I litre of oil, 12.5Kg. maize meal and 3,5kg. of beans monthly.
Source: RoB, Food Resources Department, 1986.
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TABLE 3.4: RATION TYPES AND NUTRITIONAL VAUJB TO VULNERABLE GRGUPS BY CATEGORY (RURAL/URBAN)
BENEFICIARY CATEGORY	 DAILY REQUIREMENT OF 	 VALUE OF THE NUTRIENTS	 PRGPOR?ION OF REQUIREMENT
AND RATION TYPE	 NUTRIENTS (AVERAGE) 	 SUPPLIED IN EACH RATION 	 MET BY EACH RATION (%)
(URBAN OR RURAL) 	 ENERGY	 PRGTEIN	 ENERGY	 PRGTEIN	 ENERGY	 PRGTEDI





(BASIC & COOKED RATIONS)
UNDERWEIGHT (60% W/A(31
















1830	 29	 2987	 108	 163.22%	 372.41%
PREGNANT *)NEN (4)
(BASIC URBAN RATION)	 2500	 54	 437	 16	 17.48%	 29.63%
(BASIC RURAL RATION) 	 2500	 54	 982	 40	 39.28%	 74.07%
LACTATING KOTHERS(5
(BASIC URBAN RATION) 	 2500	 65	 431	 16	 15.89%	 24.62%
(BASIC RURAL RATION) 	 2750	 65	 982	 40	 35.70%	 61.54%
6 TO 10 YEARS NDN-OOL
(RURAL AREAS ONLY)'° 	 2395	 39	 982	 40	 41.00%	 102.56%
TB OUTPATIENYE(7)
(BASIC URBAN RATION)	 3000	 53	 437	 16	 14.51%	 30.19%
(BASIC RURAL RATION) 	 3000	 53	 982	 40	 32.73%	 15.41%
DESTITtTIES A & B
(RURAL AREAS ONLY) (8)	3000	 53	 982	 40	 32.73%	 75.47%
RENDTE AREA DWELLERS (9	3000	 53	 2140	 59	 71.33%	 111.32%
(1) Require.ents for all pre-school children based on an average age of 4-6 years.
(2) This includes both take hoae and cooked rations.
(3) This includes take hose and cooked rations, plus the provision of 'Disco Milk'.
(4) Requiresent based on the last half of pregnancy. Pregnant .others get a ration fro. the day they are
certified pregnant until the day they deliver.
5 Lactating •others receive their ration for 12 ionths fro. delivery,
6 Requiresents based on average of 7-9 and 10-12 year old groups.
(1),(8),(9) All beneficiaries assuied to be adult sales.
Source: Adapted fros the FM) Nutritional Studies, Handbook No.28, FAO, Rose 1974.
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severe malnutrition as being below 60% of the expected
weight for age. This forms the basis of Botswana's
Nutritional Surveillance System and is used as a
reasonable indicator of welfare and of nutritional status
over time. The results are compiled by the Central
Statistics Office (CSO) and used in the Early Warning
System for monitoring the effects of drought conditions.
The Health Status Evaluation Programme of 1984 was based
on the survey used by the National Surveillance System
amongst children of under five years of age, but was
extended in its scope to include adults. Almost 30% of
all people included in the study were moderately
underweight, 10% of the adults suffered from
protein-energy malnutrition and 16.7% were anaemic:
"Overall, intake of staples (cereals) was
considered adequate, although, given the
drought, dependence on the relief programme for
these commodities was high. Intake of protein
food was barely sufficient, and comprised a
limited range of foodstuffs, mainly beans and
meat, with fish and eggs in some places. Young
children in particular tended to lack access to
protein foods. Milk consumption was clearly
inadequate, and again depended considerably on
the inclusion of milk in relief rations.
Finally, intake of' vegetables and fruit was
grossly inadequate, with only about 30% of
people found to be commonly eating vegetables,
and most of which were wild plants. This
finding relates to the fairly high prevalence
of anaemia" (RoB, Rural Development Council,
1985, p.5).
In Botswana, there exists a persistent level of
malnutrition in just over 25% of children under five
years of age, even in non-drought years, implying that a
sizeable proportion of rural households experience
chronic food deficits r!ated to low incomes and lack of
assets. Though the prevalence of malnutrition even in
non-drought years suggests that the problem is
structural, the level of severity is relatively low in
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comparison with other Sub-Saharan countries (RoB, Rural
Development Council 1985, p.6). In the fourth year of
drought (i.e. 1985-86) the Nutritional Surveillance
System recorded about 1000 children registered at health
facilities of less than 60% of their expected weight for
age, and other reports suggested that the total number
did not exceed 2000 nationally, or about 1% of this age
group (RoB, Rural Development Council, 1985, p.6). Figure
3.1 on the previous page shows the average incidence of
malnutrition nationally amongst children under five years
of age over the drought period of 1982-87. It indicates
the percentage of children registered at health facilities
who were below 80% of' the expected weight for their age,
including those under 60% weight for age.
During non-drought periods, the pattern of malnutrition
(here represented notionally on a three-year average of
"normal" years) usually shows a seasonal variation of
about 4%, on average being between 24% (immediately after
harvesting) to 29% in December, after planting but before
the early ripening crops are sown. It is clear from the
graph that the rates of malnutrition amongst the under
fives rose during the period 1982-84 despite the
considerable expansion of the supplementary feeding
programmes, and the seasonal recovery seen in the post-
harvest period (around June-July) in non-drought years is
absent. A significant decline in the incidence of
malnutrition is indicated after 1985, with rates falling
to below non-drought levels throughout the rest of the
period through to the end of 1987. Changes made to the
Nutritional Surveillance system during 1984 has meant
that for year to year comparison purposes, data collected
after 1985 was adjusted by the CSO. The rates of
malnutrition shown in the following graphs were supplied
by the IMDC and reflect these adjustments.
These aggregate figures obscure marked regional
variations in rates of malnutrition. Higher rates were
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observed in the remote areas, small villages, lands areas
and cattle post settlements, and rates appeared to be
higher in some Districts than in others. With the
national rate at 29-31% in 1984, for example, Ghanzi,
Kwaneng, Southern and Kgalagadi Districts had a recorded
incidence of malnutrition of 32-42% for most of the year
(RoB, Rural Development Council, 1985, p.5).
One factor at work here which we have noted in the
General Introduction is the variance in rainfall patterns
and climatic conditions which in the drier zones can
inhibit arable agriculture and limit the type of crops
grown:
"Remote areas of Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, and western
parts of Kwaneng and Southern Districts have
serious problems with the availability of fresh
fruits and vegetables. This situation therefore
raises questions about the mineral and vitamin
adequacy of the diets of children there (IMDC,
Drought Assessment Tour Report, Jan. - Feb. 1987,
p.2).
But citrus fruits and vegetables are grown in Botswana on
a commercial basis, in the Tuli Block along the eastern
border with South Africa, to where most of the produce is
exported. Though these items remain readily available in
the larger villages in the eastern hardveldt, and on a
limited scale in the more remote areas mentioned above,
the cost of transporting them to the latter is high and
they are usually prohibitively expensive for most
households.
This, and the regional differences shown in Figures 3.2
to 3.5 shown on the following pages, reinforce the view
touched upon implicitly in earlier chapters, that the
inadequate nutritional status of many households in
Botswana is more a function of overall income levels than
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In Figure 3.3 for example, Chobe District is seen to have
a consistently high malnutrition rate throughout the
period 1986-87, despite the fact that it is one of the
few areas of large scale commercial farming in the
country and the most ideally suited for growing
cereals under dryland conditions. This phenomenon is
still to be fully investigated, but it appears that a
significant number of households in the area are still
unable to participate in arable agriculture and this may
be due to lack of land, cattle, labour, or a combination
of all three. The fact that the district has by far the
highest yields of sorghum, estimated at six times the
national average in 1987-88, (RoB, IMDC, 1987, p.3), does
not necessarily mean that the grain stays within the
district once harvested.
This applies equally well to the freehold farms around
Ghanzi in the west, shown on the same graph. Whilst the
malnutrition rates in Ghanzi are again seen to be
consistently high over the same period, it remains one of
the best livestock ranching areas in the country with the
President himself owning some 128,000 acres. What the
graphs can not illustrate is malnutrition at the micro
level.
With cereal production relegated to a residual activity
in all but "good" years, and the ownership of cattle now
beyond the reach for an increasing number of households,
it is clear that many have now lost all access to
productive assets save their own wage labour, and this as
we have seen in previous chapters is also no guarantee to
an adequate diet. At Talana Farms, a freehold farm in the
Tuli Block, the rate of malnutrition amongst the under
fives was 40% despite full employment, which is perhaps
indicative of the level of wages paid there.8
8 See previous Section of the study on the spatial distribution of poverty.
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Malnutrition can thus be seen as just one manifestation
of poverty, a lack of access to or ownership of
productive assets and an inability to command a
subsistence wage on the labour market. The policy
implications for this are clear: a strategy aimed at
reducing malnutrition that looks solely at aggregate
production of cereals, at a national or even regional
level, and fails to take into consideration the
individual household's effective demand for those cereals
seems doomed to fail. Yet that seems to have been the
approach taken after the harvest of 1985 which followed
on from good rains over several districts. Certain of
these districts were declared drought recovery zones in
June 1985 and, from then onwards, medical criteria were
applied in the selection of beneficiaries. We will be
investigating the outcome of medical selection on
malnutrition rates, and other anomalies, in subsequent
sections after we have first looked at the supplementary
feeding programmes in more detail. The numbers of
beneficiaries reported to FRD as participating in the
various programmes during the period 1982-88 are given in
Table 3.5 overleaf. The beneficiary figures for 1986
represent about 56% of the total population at that time.
There are a number of points worth mentioning about the
data in this table. The first point is that the overall
number of beneficiaries in the Vulnerable Groups'
programme appears to reach a peak in 1985 and then
decline during 1986 and 1987, and this is contrary to
what would be expected in the fourth and fifth years of
drought. There are at least two possible explanations for
this phenomenon. First, the presence in the programme of
four UNV food management advisors from mid-1985, working
at District level FRD depots and Health Centres, improved
the accuracy of the reporting and food distribution
systems and thus removed the tendency to overestimate
beneficiary levels to secure adequate supplies of food.9
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TABLE 3.5: BENEFICIARIES OF BOTWANA'8 VUIAERABLE GHOUPS', PRIMARY SCHOOL CHIU)EEN, AND
R)TR AREA DWELLERS' PROGRAI%ES: 1982-88










8ev, Malnourished Children (60%
VULNERABLE aous' TOTALE: (4)	236884	 340356 392794	 395019	 354654 373000 119255
PRIMARY SCHOOL CHIIA)REN:
	
190496	 198646 209266	 217790	 236884 249084 261219
RETE AREA DWELLERS':5
	
NIL	 N/A	 20000	 20000	 24349	 29999 38468
GRAIW TOTAL OF BENEFICIARIES:
	
427380	 539002 622060	 632809	 615887 622084 418942
1) In 1982 no distinction was .ade between pregnant woien and lactating iothers. There was also no category of
Destitutes. No data available fro. FRD on the nuiber of ialnourished children or RADs. The Vulnerable Groups'
prograue was expanded in 1982 to include those children between the ages of six and ten and not attending school.
Medical selection was dropped following the declaration of drought.
2) The Pro-school category indicates all children between the age of 4 .onths and 5 years, including .alnourished
and severely .alnourished children.
3) Malnourished and severely .alnourished children are defined as being less than 80% and 60% of their norial
weight for age respectively. See text for details,
4) Most areas of the country were declared drought recovery in 1988 and therefore VG beneficiaries were subject
to aedical selection. In addition, the '6 - 10 year non-school' category largely disappeared, and provision fo'r
Destitute A categories was in iost cases taken over by the local councils. These totals do not include the
.alnourished and severely .alnourished categories which are already accounted for in the Pre-School Totals
category.
5) Data for Re.ote Area Dwellers in 1984 and 1985 are estiaates Ire. FED and Rural Developient Unit, cited in
UNICEFIUNDP/WHO, 1985.
Sources:
1) For period 1982-85, data obtained fro. FED Project 324 II Quarterly Reports to WFP, Oct. to Dec. Reports. Food
Resources Dept., MLCL. Data for 1986 obtained froi FED Monthly Report for Septeiber 1986.
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Second, the fact that certain districts were declared
drought recovery zones in June 1985 meant that
beneficiaries were medically selected and that two
categories (Destitutes and children between the age of
six and ten years not attending school) were excluded
from further rations, may have led to confusion about
which categories of beneficiary should have been re-
registered, when this declaration was officially reversed
the following year.'°
But the most significant feature of the data as presented
here is the amount that is missing up to 1985, which
lends credence to the earlier comment about the UNVs and
their growing contribution, from late 1985 onwards, to
improvements in the reporting system. Up to that time
accurate data on perhaps the - two most vulnerable
beneficiary groups, the severely malnourished and the
RADs, was unavailable.
In the first case, this was due to the fact that the
health facilities never differentiated between children
who were moderately underweight (<80% weight for age) and
those severely underweight (<60% weight for age) in their
requests for food from FRD. As the latter were supposed
to be supplied with special high protein rations by FRD
based on these requests, it is clear that in many
instances the children eligible for these rations never
received them. In the second case, data for the number of
RADs eligible to receive rations was simply never
collected on a regular basis by the Remote Area
Development Officers (RADOs) responsible for this task.
With no data on which to base its supply requirements,
the FRD regularly ran out of those commodities
10 Bobirwa, North-East District, Chobe District and Tutuie were declared recovery zones in June 1985, As we shall
see in the following section, this had profound effects on existing .alnutrition rates in these areas. Most areas
of the country were declared free of drought in 1988 and VG beneficiaries were then subject to .edical selection.
See Table 3.4 for an indication of how beneficiary figures were affected.
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specifically allocated to the RADs. As we shall see in
subsequent sections, when we examine the management of
the individual elements of the programme, administrative
shortcomings such as these were to be a recurring feature
of the food distribution system.
Figures 3.6 to 3.11 shown on the following three pages
give a more detailed picture of the variation in
beneficiary levels using monthly data over the period
1986-88, with a breakdown by FRD region. (Details of
destitutes, RADs and primary school children are shown
later, under their respective sections). It should be
noted that medical selection for all beneficiaries
(except TB outpatients) was introduced from the middle of
1988 onwards, , and that for most' areas this resulted in a
rapid decrease in all categories of beneficiary
registration.
Of particular significance to any meaningful assessment
of the effectiveness of the relief programme are Figures
3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Taking these Figures in order, we can
see that the number of registered TB outpatients has
fallen steadily during the 1986-88 drought period. This
must be due largely to the fact that both medication and
supplementary rations can be dispensed to the TB patient
at the same time by the village FWE. The treatment of TB
within the community by the rural health facilities
during the period of drought appears to have been quite
successful, but it remains to be seen whether the main
underlying causes for the proliferation of the disease in
the first place are being adequately tackled, and whether
many TB patients will in fact regress with the disease
when they are no longer eligible for food rations. Figure
3.9 shows that the number of six to ten year old children
(i.e. of primary school age) not registered at school
throughout the period is still considerable.
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Fig.3.6; VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
PREGNANT WOMEN REGISTERED AT HEALTH
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Fig.3.7: VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
LACTATING MOTHERS REGISTERED AT HEALTH
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Fig.3.8: VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
TB OUTPATIENTS REGISTERED AT HEALTH
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Fig.3.9: VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
CHILDREN SIX TO 10 YEARS REGISTERED AT
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Fici.3.1O: VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
MALNOURISHED CHILDREN REGISTERED AT
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Fig. 3.11: VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN REGISTERED AT
HEALTH FACILITIES BY FRD REGION: 1986-8
Registrations ('OOOs)
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It also shows quite clearly the dramatic fall in the
number of registrations after June 1988, when most areas
were declared recovery zones and this category of
beneficiary became no longer eligible for rations. This
is despite the fact that a UN study in 1985 considered
that:
"...the coverage of children of school age not
going to school is probably a more important
target than school attenders. Although primary
education is free in Botswana, it is still
likely to be the children of the poorer
families who do not go to school. Whether
school feeding programmes should be regarded as
supplements to individual children's diets or
supplements to the child's family, children not
attending school are likely to be the most
vulnerable, and their siblings most at risk"
(UNDP et al 1985, p.63)."
Figure 3.10 shows the number of malnourished children
(i.e. less than 80% weight-for-age, and including those
under 60% weight-for-age) registered at health facilities
and reported to FED over the period 1986-88. It should be
compared with Figures 3.2 to 3.5, which give the
proportion of children under five and malnourished, and
are based on the official IMDC/Regional Health Teams data
for the period 1986-87.
During the course of the 1982-88 drought, it was found by
the UNV advisors seconded to FRD and working in the
field, that the success or failure of the supplementary
feeding programme could be attributed to two main
factors. The first was the management of those elements'
of the programme over which the individual FWE had no
direct control, particularly the regularity of the food
II The proportion of six to ten year old children not registered at prilary school is shown graphically by FRI)
district, in Figures A67-A83 in the Appendix. Clay & Singer (1985) survey of the available literature noted that
several studies indicate that where prilary school attendance is voluntary, children fro. poor households and at
greatest nutritional risk, are least likely to enter forial education. Many evaluators conclude that school ieals
programes have a built-in bias against the poor (p.101),
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supply from the FRD District Depot, and the medical
backup of the Regional Health Team. The second was the
ability and dedication of the individual FWE as she
worked in her own community, and whether she could elicit
support for her efforts from the VDC, social welfare
workers and Village Health Committee. The FWE's most
important preventative role lay in monitoring the
nutritional status of the people living in and around the
village so that sufficient food could be delivered by
FRD. For this to be done effectively, she needed to
assess the number of individuals that required
supplementary food rations.
Up until 1984, little had been done to determine
accurately how many people would take up their ration
entitlements, and therefore how much food would be
required to run the relief programme. In the absence of
clear information from the CSO (who were still processing
the 1981 Census data), on the maximum numbers that could
be expected of the pregnant and lactating women, children
under the age of five, and in the other categories, food
requirement projections were little better than informed
guesses. Since 1982 the number of beneficiaries reported
by the health facilities had continued to rise and this
had resulted in several shortfalls of donated foodstuffs
which were only made good by last minute government
purchases. It was far from clear whether the beneficiary
levels accurately reflected the current need for food
rations, or whether a number of recipients were claiming
more than one ration. The introduction of ration cards,
was aimed primarily at reducing the incidence of double
rationing and keeping it to an absolute minimum. They
were introduced along with a revised "Food Receipt" form
which was an attempt to improve the accounting of the
commodities received by the health facility from the FRD
Depot. This form was designed to function not only as a
receipt for the food received when handed back to the FRD
driver, but to enable the FWE to record the latest
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beneficiary figures on which FRD would base its next
supply.
The Food Receipt form (FR1) provided a simple method of
communicating the latest food supply requirements to FRD,
and replaced the previous aggregate method of monthly
estimates of beneficiaries made by CSO and the Regional
Health Teams. Beneficiary levels could be collated for
all food distribution centres (health facilities, schools
and RADs settlements) to obtain the current District
Depot and Regional food requirements, and this method was
to form the basis of the Department's logistic, planning
and reporting systems after 1985.
However, the ration cards did not serve their intended
purpose when distributed by each health facility, for two
reasons. First, it did not entirely eliminate double
rationing as people registering at more than one health
facility in different villages could obtain several
ration cards. Then, as food was distributed by each
health facility on a different day of the month, several
rations could be collected by visiting each village in
turn. The only way this could have been completely
eliminated was by having rations distributed on the same
day each month but the Government felt that this would
impose too great a restriction on peoples' movements, and
too great a burden on health staff, particularly at the
larger facilities. However, evidence from the field
suggests that the overall incidence of double rationing
was probably quite small.
Secondly, the number of ration cards issued by a
particular health facility did not necessarily correspond
to the number of individuals actually attending to
collect rations. This is because it did not take into
consideration seasonal migration, and only a reasonable
approximation for the aggregate level of demand for
rations on a District or Regional basis. What was of more
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concern to the actual functioning of the programme was
how many beneficiaries were attending for food rations in
each individual health facility at any one time and
hence, how much food was required from FRD. Some FWEs
perceived this problem at an early stage and sought ways
to overcome it. They would for example keep precise
records of the number of beneficiaries currently
registered at their health facility and the monthly
attendance for collecting their rations, striking off the
register those who were no longer eligible, had migrated,
or had otherwise not attended for several months. In the
larger villages with hospital facilities, some FWEs would
even keep separate records of temporary residents
undergoing medical treatment at the Outpatients' Clinic
and collecting their rations there. The number of extra
rations required was then communicated to FRD so that the
Depot could supply an appropriate amount of extra food.
Where such records were kept, the food supplied by FRD
usually proved sufficient and the system worked in a
satisfactory manner.
At other health facilities, no registers were kept of the
number of people attending for rations, or were badly
conceived and took a disproportionate amount of time to
maintain. Building on these examples, suitably designed
registers to enable FWEs to carry out this task
nationally were introduced by the UNV advisors in early
1986 and workshops convened on a District basis to train
them in their use. In this way seasonal migratory
patterns could be accommodated, with beneficiaries being
taken off the register of one facility and entered into
another, with the revised food requirements in both being
reported to FRD.
The need for accurate recording of beneficiaries and the
desirability of registers being introduced as part of the
FWEs' basic training, was never fully appreciated either
by FRD Headquarters or the Nutrition Unit at the MoH,
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despite the fact that such records formed the basis for
all food requirement projections at district, region and
national levels. Consequently, registers were never
officially introduced at the health facilities. As this
meant that many health facilities continued to report
inaccurate beneficiary levels, one consequence was that
some centres ran out of stock too early (thus leaving
some beneficiaries without food), whilst others were
grossly overstocked with food which often became rotten
or infested before it could be distributed.
The basic ration used in the Supplementary Feeding
Programme is collected on a monthly basis from the health
facility and taken home. Although the rations are
targeted towards individuals and not households, one
survey in 1985 found that over 90% of households share at
least some of the food within the family, despite the
fact that about one half of the members would not
normally fall into a "vulnerable group" category (UNDP et
al 1985, p.65). This sharing of rations was found in some
cases to be to the disadvantage of younger children;
however, the same survey noted that it was those
households with the highest dependency on food aid (i.e.
those with the fewest alternative sources of food) that
shared the rations most equitably (Ibid., p.66). Given
these factors, it was decided that to afford sufficient
protection to younger children (particularly if they were
already malnourished), it was necessary to provide a
cooked supplement at the health facility in addition to
the take-home rations.
As a consequence, the Direct Feeding programme was
conceived and designed to provide underweight children
with not only the normal take home ration of Corn Soya
Milk (CSM) and Vegetable Oil, but also with a cooked
ration, together with a portion of beans which were
provided specially for this purpose. This meal was
augmented by other foodstuffs bought from an imprest fund
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supplied to the health facility and usually consisted of
meat, eggs, milk, vegetables, nuts, etc. Severely
underweight children also received a high protein and
high calorie blend of Dried Skimmed Milk (DSM), vegetable
oil and sugar, taken in the form of a drink and called
"Disco Milk".
The main objective behind the provision of a cooked meal
at the health facility was to reduce the high prevailing
incidence of malnutrition, which can be interpreted in
terms of a low weight for age or a low weight for height.
The former method of identification predominates in
Botswana and forms the nucleus of the Nutritional
Surveillance System mainly because it is thought of as
being the easiest to apply.
"The inclusion of height data in nutritional
surveillance was done in the past, but is now
only envisaged in the medium term, or as part
of special focused studies due to time and
practical constraints" (Moremi 1985)
There are other methods: a measurement of less than 13.5
cms at the left middle upper arm in children aged 1 to 5
years indicates a degree of malnutrition.. A measurement
of less than 12.5 cms. indicates that the child is
severely malnourished (Ritchie 1978).
In the health facilities, children are weighed
periodically and their growth trajectory marked on a
chart and compared with a "normal" trajectory. "Weight-,
for-age" measurements indicate body mass in relation to
age, and this can be problematic. A reduction in body
mass can be due to wasting caused by an adequate diet, or
reflect a degree of stunting (a failure to grow in
height), or both. Where the degree of wasting is low when
neasured by the weight for height method, 	 the main
Bstiiated at 7% by RoB, ER, August 1985,
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cause of the apparent malnutrition may be due to stunting
and the child may be following a growth trajectory below
but parallel to the "normal" curve. In cases of stunting,
a initial nutritional "shock" can retard normal growth in
height which is permanent. Even if a normal diet is then
resumed, the child may always be of low weight for age,
although having a perfectly normal weight for height.
This may be a factor that explains the relatively high
incidence of malnutrition recorded even in non-drought
years.
Though it appears that the weight-for-age method be
causing the estimate of malnutrition to be rather on the
high side, there are other factors present and working in
the opposite direction. By far the most crucial of these
is the fact that the whole Surveillance System is based
only on the nutritional status of the children actually
attending the clinic, This explains the rough estimate of
1000-2000 severely malnourished children given in Section
A, and it remains a sobering fact that there might well
be a sizeable number of malnourished and severely
malnourished children over and above this estimate who
are never brought to the health facility, are never
weighed, and therefore never appear on the Nutritional
Surveillance records. For the same reasons, it is this
group that is least likely to be recorded in any
mortality statistics and therefore it remains impossible
to determine how many children actually died during the
1982-88 drought through starvation or nutrition related
disease. The only firm evidence we have of any such
deaths occurred in 1982, not in the rural areas, but in
the semi-squatter areas of Francistown which resulted in
a reappraisal of nutritional standards in an around the
pen-urban areas (Borton 1984, p.60).
Bearing this in mind, there are two main reasons why the
Direct Feeding Programme has failed to significantly
improve the nutritional status of the malnourished
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children even when we limit our definition only to those
underweight children actually attending the health
facility. The first reason is the poor attendance for
Direct Feeding which was perhaps the most discussed and
most misunderstood feature of the whole programme, both
by the donors and the Government. This apparently
irrational behaviour on the part of mothers to bring
their underweight children for a free meal can be partly
explained by the long distances that had to be walked on
a daily basis.
With food provided for the child but not for the mother,
for many it proved too much of a physical effort. Others
who were unable to take the child personally, were
reluctant to • entrust it to older children who might
themselves be weak and anaemic and yet would not be
eligible for cooked rations at the centre. As it was
reasonable to assume in households with one or more
underweight children, that at least some of the other
family members were malnourished or anaemic, providing a
cooked meal to the mother as an "incentive" to bring her
child for direct feeding would have been equivalent to
providing an extra food contribution to the whole
household, surely in itself no bad thing.
A similar view was supported by the UNICEF study of 1985,
which noted
"...there may be an argument for increasing the
"take home" rations for some families, for
example those with malnourished children, in
order to be sure that they receive an adequate
share of food at home" (UNDP et al 1985, p.67).
The advantage of providing an extra cooked ration to the
mother or accompanying older sibling to ensure regular
attendance of the malnourished child, does have
advantages over simply increasing the household's total
take home rations. Regular attendance guarantees that the
The 1982-88 Drought Relief Programme	 225
child receives at least one full meal per day, that its
nutritional recovery can be monitored by the health
staff, and that a whole range of other medical services
such as immunisation, can also be provided. Viewed in
this light, the different ration scales between the
schools and the health facilities for six to ten year old
children seems particularly discriminatory.
Most of the FWEs approached on this subject by the UNVs
agreed that the provision of an extra ration in this way
would have a positive effect on attendance levels, and
particularly so if the meal included meat, as was
provided to primary school children under the Cattle
Purchase Scheme. Imprest funds are provided for the
purchase of foodstuffs at the health facilities to
supplement those provided by FRD, and often include meat,
fresh vegetables, eggs and groundnuts. However, in some
villages fresh butchered meat was simply not available,
or not available in small enough quantities, and the
purchase of tinned meat was not allowed under the
programme • 13
Both these problems are related and could be tackled
simultaneously if provision was made for an extra cooked
ration for such children bringing their younger siblings
for direct feeding. These issues still have to be
addressed and resolved by the Nutrition Unit at the MoH.
The second reason contributing towards the prevailing
high level of malnutrition is that direct feeding is not,
conducted at the mobile stops facilities. Though the
nutritional status of the under-fives is assessed on a
regular basis during visits by health staff, there are no
permanent staff working at these remote areas, and so no
13 No canned foods were allowed to be purchased with iiprest funds. See FRD, Nanual on Huian Relief, 1981.
Botawana exports large quantities of tinned corned beef through the BKC, and also contributes canned .eat to the
World Food Prograne for relief operations in other countries, p.6..
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one can be made officially responsible for either the
storage or distribution of the donated foodstuffs. In
December 1986, some 2646 malnourished children were
reported to be attending mobile stops, of which 204 were
described as "severely malnourished" in the nutritional
surveillance returns. (FRD Regional Monthly Reports, December
1986). Again, this is probably a serious under-estimate
of the real magnitude of malnutrition existing in these
remote areas, as the mothers are less likely to bring
their children for registration if Direct Feeding is not
available.
Hence, an anomalous situation has arisen whereby those
groups with the least access to services of any kind are
denied the last safety net provided by the relief
programme. No estimates exist of the number of children
that are not attending health facilities, and this in
itself is a serious omission of the programme,
Table 3.6 which follows overleaf provides an indication
of the level of non-attendance and illustrates the number
of malnourished children not receiving rations at mobile
stops regionally. The data for all the columns except the
last is drawn from FRi forms submitted to FRD by the
health facilities (the FRi form is a combined food
issue/receipt voucher on which the health facilities also
report their latest beneficiary levels). Data reported to
FRD and shown in the "FRD" column is derived by dividing
the total number of malnourished and severely
malnourished children by the total number of preschool
children registered and is expressed as a percentage.
Data in the "NS" column was obtained from the IMDC and
derived from Nutritional Surveillance Reports, also
submitted by individual health facilities. Unlike the FRD
data, it is shown here only in an aggregate form and not
separated by centre type.
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TABLE 3.6: EATES OF MALEUTEITIOI BY FED_DEPOT/HALTS UCLOS & CINThI TYPE: DEC.1986.
D)T *A	 TYPE	 P2OOL	 6-10 1	 MALMJT.	 3EAL.	 F)___________	 =
MAUI	 HP	 8400	 4752	 548	 106	 7.19%
	4782	 2293	 30	 7	 0.77%
	
TOTALS	 13182	 7045	 578	 113	 5,24%	 9%
TUTMI	 HP	 11289	 5726	 1170	 97	 11.22%
	
2494	 1291	 351	 42	 15,76%
	
TOTALS	 13783	 7017	 1521	 139	 12.04%	 13%
LETLHAIABE	 HP	 3819	 2170	 287	 10	 7.78%
	
169	 137	 0	 0	 0.00%
	
TOTALS	 3988	 2307	 281	 10	 7.45%	 10%
FEAICISTOVE	 HP	 10518	 2909	 1652	 105	 16.70%
	
1142	 644	 221	 2	 19.53%
	
TOTALS	 11660	 3553	 1873	 107	 16.98%	 13%
USAME	 UP	 344	 0	 305	 10	 91.57%
	
22	 0	 15	 0	 68.18%
	
TOTALS	 366	 0	 320	 10	 90.16%	 30%
WBATHE	 HP	 2824	 78	 84	 3	 3.08%	 19%
GAITS!	 UP	 2297	 1156	 216	 51	 11.89%	 25%
IUIUI'TSI	 UP	 1463	 913	 83	 0	 5.61%
	
235	 166	 0	 0	 0.00%
	
TOTALS	 1698	 1079	 83	 0	 4.89%
TSHABOIG	 HP	 2474	 1439	 475	 0	 19.20%
	
UP	 419	 269	 0	 0	 0.00%
	
TOTALS	 6289	 3866	 641	 0	 10.19%	 25%
MASTS	 HP	 20395	 9783	 2005	 223	 10.92%
	
UP	 5510	 3350	 876	 60	 16.99%
	
TOTALS	 25905	 13133	 2881	 283	 12.21%
BOIUDI	 UP	 6146	 4254	 345	 19	 5.92%
	
UP	 45	 45	 6	 1	 15.56%
	
_______________ TOTALS	 6191	 4299	 351	 20	 5.99%	 12%
PALAPYB	 UP	 9732	 6211	 698	 60	 7.79%
	
UP	 701	 947	 lii	 0	 17.40%
	
TOTALS	 10433	 7164	 820	 60	 8,43%
555055	 UP	 6187	 4806	 746	 24	 12.45%
	
UP	 1277	 1255	 19	 1	 6.26%
	
TOTALS	 1464	 6061	 825	 25	 11.39%	 13%
IAIAL&PT.B	 HP	 13643	 1188	 1399	 128	 11.19%
	
UP	 1027	 1036	 0	 0	 0.00%
	
TOTALS	 14670	 8224	 1399	 128	 10.41%	 11%
SELEBE-PIIWE	 UP	 10153	 4212	 638	 154	 7.80%
	
UP	 1370	 792	 130	 4	 9.18%
_______________	 TOTAlS	 11523	 5064	 768	 158	 8.04%	 12%
SKilLS	 HP	 12186	 2125	 959	 14	 7.98%	 10%
UOLEPOLOLI	 UP	 45798	 12243	 1676	 114	 3.91%
	
UP	 13323	 4131	 816	 87	 6.78%
	
TOTAlS	 59121	 16374	 2492	 201	 4.56%	 16%
SUB-TOTAL:	 HP	 167668	 70031	 13286	 1124	 8.59%
SUB-TOTAL:	 UP	 32516	 16356	 2646	 204	 8.76%	 -
CEAJD TOTAL:	 HP/UP	 200184	 86387	 15932	 1328	 8.62%	 15%
Soiree,: FE! Fori. ubiitted by Health Cutrer to FED Dec. 1986; IMDC 1988.
The 1982-88 Drought Relief Programme	 228
Prevailing rates of malnutrition are usually presented by
the MoH on the basis of Health Region, which does not
necessarily correspond with the area served by individual
FRD district or regional depots. In these cases, a direct
comparison between FRD and Nutritional Surveillance data
is problematic. In the table, FRD depots have been
grouped where necessary to accomodate this anomaly. The
data shown in the "NS" column therefore relates to
aggregate rates of malnutrition for all the FRD areas
listed in the block. Beneficiary figures are those
reported to FRD Depots by Health Facilities during
December 1986. No Nutritional Surveillance data was
available from the IMDC for Francistown itself prior to
January 1987. In the table, NS data is shown only for
North-East District, which is served by Francistown FRD
depot. Letlhakane FRD depot corresponds with Boteti
Health Region, whilst Hukuntsi and Tshabong FRD depots
correspond with the Kgalagadi Health Region. Kanye and
Mochudi FRD depots are also grouped to correspond to the
Nutritional Surveillance combined data for Kgatleng and
Southern Health Regions. Palapye and Serowe are also
subsumed under Serowe Health Region in the IMDC data.
Molepolole corresponds with Kweneng Health Region.
In the centre type column, "HP" indicates Hospitals,
Health Centres, Clinics and Health Posts, whilst "MS"
refers to Mobile Stops, i.e. those health facilities not
permanently staffed, and where "direct feeding" is not
carried out. The Malnourished and Severely Malnourished
groups are those children already included in the,
Preschool category but considered to be less than 80% and
60% of their weight-for-age respectively, using
guidelines set down by the MoH. They are shown separately
in the table for the purpose of analysis.
This comparison between the FRD and Nutritional
Surveillance figures indicates a considerable degree of
variance between the two sets of data, despite the fact
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that they are both derived essentially from the same
source (the health facilities). In most cases, data on
levels of malnutrition as reported to FRD are lower than
Nutritional Surveillance data. The most likely
explanation for this is that the health facilities were
asked to provide FRD with two sets of figures: the actual
number of malnourished and severely malnourished children
registered, and the number attending for Direct Feeding
on a regular basis. Most centres provided just the latter
and this would explain the discrepancy between the data
supplled directly to FRD and that supplied to the
Nutritional Surveillance Unit of the MoH. Non-attendance
can be seen to be a serious problem in some regions.
In June 1985, following an adequate harvest in the North
East of the country, North-East and Chobe Districts,
Tutume and Bobirwa sub-districts were declared "Recovery
Zones". Beneficiaries were to be selected on medical
criteria and certain categories would disappear
altogether: destitutes and children aged between six and
ten years were no longer eligible for rations (see
Fig.A75. The assumption made was that supplementary
rations were no longer required for most families as the
harvest in these recovery areas had been good.
In the case of Kasane FRD, health facilities reported
that an average of 90% of their preschool children were
malnourished during December 1986, and yet Nutritional
Surveillance reports to the Regional Health Team for the
same month indicated a rate of 30%. Although at the time'
Kasane was a "drought recovery" zone, the "official" MoH
rate of malnutrition for the District was the highest in
the country. In this case it is perfectly feasible that
health facility staff deliberately overstated the true
rate of malnutrition to FRD in order to obtain more food
rations, in response to a perceived low level of
nutritional status amongst the beneficiaries attending
their health facilities. Figure 3.12 that follows
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overleaf shows malnutrition rates in the recovery areas
after the introduction of medical selection. The effect
was so marked that even the normally quiescent FRD
reported:
"... medical selection for supplementary
feeding had reduced the number of healthy
children being brought to clinics in the
recovery areas since only malnourished children
were eligible for food. The overall number of
beneficiaries dropped from 644,915 in June 1985
to 612,809 in December 1985, whereas the number
of malnourished children in the whole country
increased from 9334 in June to 13851 in Dec.
1985" (FRD Quarterly Report Oct-Dec. 1985, p. 1— 2).
Even as late as April 1987, it appears that the
Government was still using rainfall patterns and size of
harvest as a measure of "drought recovery", again
confusing the issue by equating food availability with
food consumption and entitlement.' 4 Following a lower
rainfall during the 1986-7 sowing season around Chobe,
the Early Warning Technical Committee had reported to the
IMDC that:
"...there is some concern about agricultural
production in the Chobe Enclave. Two weeks ago
the District Agricultural Officer confirmed
that production was expected to be much lower
than the last two years. The EWTC recommends
that special attention should be paid to the
whole of the Chobe District during the Second
Drought Assessment Tour to ensure that its
designation as a District out of drought
remains correct" (EWTC, April 1987).
It appears therefore that the "early warning" of the EWTC
arrived somewhat late, and was based rather on aggregate
production data obtained from the MoA in Gaborone, rather
than actual nutritional status observed in the field.
14 Nalawi, which has one of the inst successful couercial arable far.ing sectors in the region and a rising level
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As most areas of the country were declared drought
recovery zones by mid-1988 and medical selection of all
beneficiaries was introduced, a 	 similar pattern of
malnutrition	 begin to re-emerge for the same reasons.
Though the institutional framework of primary health care
in Botswana is apparently well developed at a District
level, it would appear from this analysis that it suffers
from fundamental and long-standing defects in its
implementation, particularly in relation to the Direct
Feeding Programme. In particular, the reliance on
rainfall data and anticipated levels of agricultural
production as a measure of food security has been shown
to be completely inadequate. Nutritional data for 1989
may reveal this but such an analysis is beyond the scope
of the present study.
Apart from the problem of low attendance at Direct
Feeding (and its distortion of malnutrition rates), there
are other factors involved in explaining the high
prevailing level of malnutrition. The late payment of
imprest funds in some health facilities has also played
an important part. In some Districts, these funds are
disbursed to health posts through the "parent" clinic or
health centre which is then in turn reimbursed by the
Council Treasurer's Department at District Headquarters
on submission of the receipts.
What this meant in practice, however, was that if one
particular health post had not used up all its funds, the
reimbursement for all the health posts served by a
particular clinic was held up. Rulings made by the
District Drought Committees to facilitate the
reimbursement of health posts on an individual basis were
rarely adhered to, and thus those with a large number of
underweight children, and which therefore quickly
exhausted their funds, often went several months before
they were replenished. In those Districts faced with a
The 1982-88 Drought Relief Programme	 233
recalcitrant Treasurer's Department (e.g. Central) this
was a recurrent problem during the period 1985_1987.15
Another recurrent problem of implementation at the
District level concerned the District Health Team itself,
where poor motivation or ignorance of the emergency
nature of the programme led to serious gaps in the
provision of primary health care. In a routine field trip
to Ramogonwane, Kamokwa, and Teleba mobile stops on 14
August 1986, the Depot Manager of FRD Serowe noticed that
the previous food delivery had not been issued to the
beneficiaries. On enquiry to the District Health Team
(whose nursing staff were responsible for issuing the
food on their monthly visits), she received the formal
written reply, reproduced verbatim below:
"As you are aware that your Dept. delivered
food to these feeding points on the 3rd. July
1986, please be informed that according to our
schedule, food was to be rationed on the 21-22
July 1986, but very unfortunately the above
dates were holidays:- 21st. July President's
Day. 22nd:- Public Holiday. Following these
holidays, the schedule remains irreversible and
we had to use the same vehicle to other
outreach stations where it is a'so emphatically
important to ration out food". 6
The beneficiaries at these remote mobile stops therefore
had to wait for the following month's issue of rations
on the 26th. August, and had thus to spend over four
weeks without rations. it is not known whether they had
an alternative source of food. These events cast some,
considerable doubt on the personal commitment of some
Council staff towards the drought relief effort, and the
ability of both the Government and District Drought
Committees to enforce even a semblance of' compliance on
15 Personal observation at District Drought Conittee teetings.
16 Letter froa the Senior Nursing Sister, Serowe, B. G. Motseosi, ref. SP/4/2 to FR!) Depot Manager, Berowe, dated
29 August 1986.
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its own rulings. It is also a reflection of the political
influence of those marginal groups living in the more
remote areas at both District and National levels.'1
The primary schools' feeding programme is the longest
running and probably the most successful of all the
relief programmes in Botswana, and exhibited far fewer
problems when compared with either the Vulnerable Groups'
or Remote Area Dwellers' programmes. This must be due, in
large measure, to the fact that the teaching staff form
together the most educated and most articulate group
within the village community, and are thus able to demand
a far higher level of attention and service, not only
from their own District Education Department, but from
both FRD and village extension teams. However, it must be
pointed out, as before, that a significant proportion of
six to ten year old children do not attend primary
school, for a variety of economic and social reasons.
Figures A67 to A83 in the Appendix provide details of the
proportion of children in this age group actually
attending school, with a breakdown by individual FRD
district for the period September 1983 to December 1988.
It should be noted that data for September 1984 was
unavailable, and that there seems to have been some
under-reporting of the 6-10 year non-school category in
Kanye and Ghanzi during 1983-4 (see Figures A77 and A80).
It can be seen from the Figures that the phasing out of
the 6-10 year non-school beneficiaries nationally in mid-,
1988 has left only a very few children in this category
still registered for medical reasons. Only Tshabong
District experienced a rise in school attendance after
Non-delivery or non-diBtribution of food rations in other villages with greater political representation was
often reported in the national Press or Radio Botswana, or raised in Parlisientary session, before either the
local FED or Health Teaa were even aware of the fact!
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mid-1988 and this rise was slight.(see Figure A78). Some
areas (Tutume, Maun, Gantsi, Sebele, and Mochudi)
actually experienced a slight fall in the number of
school registrations and it is clear that in no District
has the phasing out of food rations for the 6-10 category
been matched by a corresponding increase in the number of
children of that age group registering at school. This
may have important educational policy implications as it
means that a substantial proportion of children in this
age group, during drought or non-drought, are unwilling
or unable to attend school. In Molepolole for example,
this proportion never fell below 30% during the whole of
the period 1983-87 (see Fig.A82). During periods of
drought recovery children falling in the 6-10 year old
category are doubly disadvantaged: they receive neither
a basic education nor the daily meal which is a regular
provision of the school feeding programme. The World Food
Programme now recognises the fact that school meal
programmes may reach neither the most vulnerable age
groups nor the children of the poorest families. (WFP
(1986b), p.18)
The ration levels for primary schools are the same for
both rural and urban areas (see Table 3.2) but the latter
are not provided with take home rations for use during
school holidays or weekends. The nutritional value of the
rations supplied to schools are shown in Table 3.7
overleaf.
Rural schools are provided with sorghum grain which is
then handstamped by local mothers as part of an ongoing
labour based relief project (this will examined in more
detail in the section on LBRP). The bran that is produced
as a result of the process is sold to cattle owners by
the PTA, which raises funds for new school equipment.
Some PTAs that were virtually defunct have been
revitaljsed by having to organise themselves on how to
spend this new form of income. The only exception to this
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is the schools in Ghanzi and Kgalagadi Districts where
handstamping is not traditionally carried out. In these
schools, as in all urban areas, an equivalent quantity of
commercially milled sorghum is supplied direct from the
FRD depot.
TABLE 3.7: RATION TYPES AND NUTRITIONAL VAUJE TO PRIMARY SCHOOL CRIU)REN (RURALI(BAN AREAS)
ARRAANDRATIONTYPB 	 DAILYREQUIRENENTOF	 VAJAJEOFTEENUTRIENTS 	 PROPORTIONOFREQUIRENENT
NUTRIENTS (AVERAGE) 	 SUPPLIED IN EACH RATION	 NET BY EACH RATION (%)
ENERGY	 PROTEIN	 ENERGY	 PROTEIN	 ENERGY	 PROTEIN















HOTES:	 (1) Reqaireaents for all children based on an average of 7-9 and 10-12 year old groups.
(2) No rations during weekends and holidays,
Source: Adapted from the FAG Nutritional Studies, Handbook No.28, FAQ, Rome 1974.
The monthly food requirements and amounts distributed
during the period 1986-88 under the Vulnerable Groups'
and Schools' feeding programmes are shown in Figures A16-
63 in the Appendix, with a breakdown by individual FRD
district.
Whilst the overall success of the programmes in averting
widespread famine has been observed by several studies
(UNDP et al 1985; Hoim & Morgan 1985; Hay 1988), this
section has already noted several anomalies in the
standard of food provision at a micro level. We now turn
to examine the relief programme for destitutes and Remote'
Area Dwellers, who collectively form the most deprived
social group in Botswana and are therefore the most
susceptible to the ravages of drought. As a consequence
they are the group most dependent on the food
distribution carried out under the emergency drought
relief programme.
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d) Destitutes and Remote Area Dwellers.
In rural areas, destitutes are categorised as either
permanent or temporary depending on their age, ability to
work, financial status, and place of residence. In urban
areas, and rural drought recovery zones, only permanent
destitutes registered with the District Council are
recognised; they do not receive a ration but continue to
receive income support from Council funds. The
distinction between permanent and temporary status is an
important one as it determines both the entitlement to
relief rations and other social benefits provided by the
District Council. Permanent (or group A) destitutes are
usually the old and infirm, the disabled, those without
any means of support and lacking any family to offer
shelter and financial support. They collect the same
rations as the other Vulnerable Groups' categories and
are registered with the District Council, from whom they
are eligible to receive some income support and th
provision of clothes, blankets, etc.
Temporary (or group B) destitutes are those able to work
but unable to find any employment during the drought, and
who have lost many alternative sources of income such as
livestock. 18 These destitutes are expected to recover
their lost assets when the drought is over or to be able
to find some sort of agricultural employment with the
onset of good rains.
Destitutes are identif led at the village level by the
Social & Community Development (S&CD) field staff in
18 In Botswana, there is no provision for the rehabilitation of destitutes by restocking their herds or siallstoek
after the drought. In the WFP assisted Turkana Rehabilitation Prograue in northern Kenya, a coiprehensive
restocking programe was launched in 1984, with substantial financial support fro. OTFAM. The scheie involved the
provision of viable herds of siall stock to 500 faailies iade destitute during the 1919-80 drought. Each faiily
was given 70 goats/sheep and an aaount of iaie to cover their food requireient over the year, The cost of buying
the aniials was aet fro. both OXFAN funds and froi the bartering of WFP wheat in return for sheep and goats.
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conjunction with the VDC and Village Health Committee,
often with the full participation of the community itself
through the village kgotla meetings.'9 The names of
individuals considered to be temporarily without means of
adequate support due to the drought are then listed and
given to the FWE at the health facility, who issues a
ration card. These individuals may be re-classified later
as permanent destitutes and registered with the Council
after their case histories have been examined, usually
following on from an interview conducted with a Social
Welfare Officer.
Because the selection of destitutes is conducted in this
way, the rise and fall in the.ir number is a valuable
indicator of how the community itself measures the impact
of drought on rural incomes and employment. For the
government and donors, the number and spatial
distribution of destitutes should, like the level of
malnutrition amongst the under fives, provide essential
information as to the efficacy of the current relief
programme, as it indicates whether rural incomes and
assets, threatened by the drought, are in fact being
preserved. However, there are certain inconsistencies in
the methods employed in recording destitutes which make
the interpretation of trends rather complex. We will be
examining these problems in this section and drawing some
rather tentative conclusions.
The list of beneficiaries shown in Table 3.5 in the
previous section, was drawn from FRD sources and although'
it indicates a rise in the overall number of destitutes
registered and eligible for rations at the health
facilities during 1983-87, there is a surprising decline
in the permanent destitute category in the third quarter
of 1985. This is contrary to what would have been
expected during a prolonged period of drought, when many
19 Personal observation on field trip with 8&CD staff central District.
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destitutes, previously classified as Group B but now
having lost all of their assets, should have been
re-classified in the Group A category.
There are two factors at play that, taken together,
provide a plausible explanation for this phenomenon, both
of which tend to obscure the true level and nature of
destitution. The first lies with the way that the data on
Group A destitutes is collected and recorded by the S&CD
staff. The means test applied to Group B destitutes
applying for Group A status is slow and exhaustive, and
consequently there is a long "waiting list". Data kept
by S&CD staff at the District Council is only
infrequently updated and therefore tends to underestimate
the number of' individuals eligible for Group A status,
i.e. those who will probably remain totally destitute
even after the drought is over.
The second distortion lies in the fact that Table 3.5
draws upon FRD data and reflects not the actual number of
destitutes, but rather the number currently eligible to
receive rations. As we have already noted, destitutes are
no longer eligible to receive rations if they live in a
drought recovery zone and therefore do not appear in FRD
data. Figure 3.13 overleaf shows the effect on the number
of those registered after certain areas were declared
drought recovery zones in June 1985. It groups together
both A and B categories in a more detailed time-series
than that provided by Table 3.5, and shows that the fall
in the number of registered destitutes around this time
was particularly marked in Palapye and Francistown FRD
Regions (the two regions with drought recovery zones).
By March 1986, the total number of registered destitutes
(A and B categories taken together) was rising again, and
this suggests that either those no longer eligible for
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drought recovery zones (in order to obtain rations), or
that there had been an overall rise in Group B
destitution that offset the previous fall in both A and
B categories in the drought recovery areas. It is
possible that both these factors were at work
simultaneously.
From 1986 onwards, a breakdown by Destitute category is
possible and data is shown in Figures 3.14 and 3.15
(shown overleaf) for the period 1986-88. When we
segregate the two categories in this way, it is clear
that S&CD and Health Facility staff experienced some
difficulty in determining whether destitutes should be
classified as category A or B. The peaks for data of
Palapye, Sebele and Lobatse regions shown in Figure 3.14
around January 1987 and January 1988 illustrate the
inconsistencies in recording each category accurately at
village and council level. While a sudden rise in
category A destitutes is plausible (due to a re-
classification from category B), a corresponding fall is
not, as by definition these individuals are permanently
destitute. From early 1988, responsibility for providing
for category A destitutes was shifted to the district
councils in most areas and this is reflected in Figure
3.14. Data for category B (temporary) destitutes shown in
Figure 3.15 appears more consistent up to early 1988,
when medical selection of beneficiaries was introduced.
The point that needs to be stressed here is that little
is known about the destitutes who were de-registered in,
the drought recovery areas during 1985-6 and whether they
were in fact able to recover any of the assets lost
during the drought, or were forced to migrate to other
areas in order to regain their ration entitlement.
Similarly, the number of destitutes appears to be on the
rise again towards the latter part of 1988 and this could
indicate that medical selection was introduced too early.
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Eici.3.14: VULNERABLE GROUPS' PROGRAMME
PERMANENT DESTITUTES REGISTERED AT
FACILiTIES BY FAD REGION: 1986-88
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On the other hand, it may support our previous suggestion
(made in relation to malnutrition rates in drought
recovery areas), that the problem is a more fundamental
one. As we can not rely solely on rainfall data or gross
agricultural output to be realistic indicators of
adequate food entitlement, neither can we rely entirely
on the S&CD departments of the district councils for an
accurate assessment of the true level of destitution. The
experience of the 1986-8 drought suggests that data from
this source may be unreliable and the following examples
illustrate the general administrative weakness of the
relief programme at the District level.
Throughout the period up to October 1986, both categories
of destitute received the same food ration from the
health facility and the Group A received in addition
P10.00 per month from Council funds, to be spent on
essentials at an approved store in the village. This
figure was raised to P30.00 per month in October 1986.
However, implementation of the scheme was poor.
In a tour of the Kwaneng South District in November 1986,
the Minister of Labour and Home Affairs, Mr. Englishman
Kgabo, was shown
"...three Group A destitutes who had not
received their monthly P10.00 rations because
the shop owner had allegedly refused to serve
them due to irregular payments by the Council.
It was also alleged that the destitutes had not
been getting their rations for the past seven
months. On the destitutes who had spent seven
months without rations, Mr. Kgabo said the
problem was caused by negligence on the part of
public officers...government had increased the
Group A ration from P10.00 to P30.00 and
wondered why it appeared people had not been
informed about the change" (Botswana Daily News,
14 November 1986, p.2).
In some districts this problem was still not solved by
late February 1987, due to the fact that the Councils had
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requested insufficient funds from the MLGL to cover the
new amounts required. According to the Minister who had
sent out the circular instructing the Councils to
implement the new scheme, Central District (with the
largest number of destitutes)
"...continued to issue destitutes at their old
rate of P10.00 per month while in the meantime
they prepared supplementary estimates to enable
them to meet the requirement of the circular
(BotswanaDailyNews, 12 June, 1987).
It thus took over four months for the new payments to be
paid in some areas. In July 1987 the Group A destitutes
had their food rations officially cut in half, which made
them even more vulnerable to the consequences of late
payment by the Council.
The term "Remote Area Dwellers", as was noted in the
introductory chapter, is applied to all ethnic groups
settled in areas beyond the reach of services normally
provided by government, particularly education, health
care, and water supplies. Though predominantly composed
of Basarwa and BaKgalagadi peoples, the RADs do not form
one homogeneous group and are of very diverse ethnic
origins. The original inhabitants of the country, most
have became marginalised in and around the Kgalagadi
desert with the steady encroachment of the various Tswana
tribes during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
More recently, the establishment of commercial TGLP
ranches in areas traditionally used for hunting and
gathering, and the erection of wildlife cordon fences (to
meet stringent EEC requirements relating to the control
of foot and mouth disease) have accelerated this process
of marginalisation and eroded the land and resource base
of these groups.
The Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), as we have
mentioned in a previous section, represents an attempt by
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the Government to reach a compromise between treating the
RADs as a separate ethnic group with its own cultural
traditions and its own very specific needs and problems,
and its stated policy to integrate the RADs into the
mainstream of Tswana society:
"The point here is not to make special
provisions to the RADs, but to establish
premises for decision making processes which
compensate for the fact that RADs are
practically without any political
representation in those relevant political
bodies which should ensure an adequate
distribution of government resources, according
to the national development principle of social
equity" (RoB, Guibrandsen et al 1986, p.11).
As with other elements of the drought relief programme,
whether this strategy is successful or not will depend on
the emphasis afforded to it by the Botswana government.
Given that donor support remains at its present high
levels,
"The possibilities of extending national
programmes and to establish projects which are
adequate for the various settlements is
fundamentally a function of the quality and
quantity of extension staff" (Ibid., p.185).
In this section we will be touching on the wider
functions of the Remote Area Development Programme only
indirectly; our main purpose here is to examine the
drought related element of the programme and in
particular, the efficacy of the food distribution system
to this particular minority group.
Few RADs now lead a traditional semi-nomadic life with
hunter-gathering the main form of subsistence. Most now
live in temporary or permanent settlements, or at the
larger cattle posts, where they are employed as herd
boys. Some of these settlements are of considerable age
and were established before the major Tswana villages:
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Ukhwi Settlement in the northern Kgalagadi for example is
over 100 years old, and its existence reinforces the view
expressed by Hitchcock (1978) that the Basarwa have never
been truly nomadic, but have always had established land
bases which were recognised by other groups.
The Ghanzi freehold farms of the Kgalagadi Desert (along
the border with Namibia) present a picture of
proletarianised Basarwa who have been divorced from their
traditional subsistence base for generations. The areas
of Ghanzi District best endowed with water were settled
by Europeans at the beginning of the century and some 200
ranches were established in the 1950s, followed by about
50 more in the 1980 g . An anthropological study of the
Basarwa on the Ghanzi freehold farms is provided by
Guenther (1979). Although his field work was conducted
through the late 1960s up to 1970, the feeling of
alienation and sense of dispossession that he describes
amongst the Basarwa can still be felt in Ghanzi. 2° Early
relationships between the European settlers and the
Basarwa were patrimonial in nature and the settlers were
regarded as a means of protection against the Tswana, who
had often captured the Basarwa as slaves. This has been
documented by early travellers in the region such as
Hepburn (1895), Selous (1893), and Dornan (1917).
(Guenther 1979, p.57)
From the 1950s onwards however, new settlers arrived with
modern farming methods and a preference for Tswana,
rather than Basarwa labour. The Tswana population rose
from just a few hundred in the 1950s to 6000 by 1964, and
many Basarwa lost their jobs. With no access to land of
their own, they had no recourse but to squat illegally on
the farms until moved on. (Guenther 1979, p.108). After
20 Personal observation: whilst driving in Ghanzi town in the evening in April 1987, the vehicle following •ine
had a window siashed by a stone thrown by a group of Basarwa, Our presence there, whether as relief workers or
'governient officials' was greatly resented,
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Independence, conflict became a striking feature of
Ghanzi life, with the Basarwa facing both white economic
domination and Tswana political domination. (Ibid.,
p.125). Guenther vividly describes the alienation and
cultural deprivation of farm Basarwa and their self-
abasement in contacts with the Tswana and European
settlers. They regarded themselves as a "k''amka kwe" -
weak, stupid and inconsequential bushmen (literally,
"mouthiess people") (Ibid.,p.157-8). One reason for the
Basarwa remaining on the farms, despite the lack of
employment, was their dislike and fear of the veld
Basarwa, a feeling nurtured and encouraged by their long
contacts with Europeans. Silberbauer starkly described
the effect of settlement by the Basarwa on the Ghanzi
Farms as:
"firstly, a dislocation and eventual breakdown
of band life and secondly, a complete change of
economic orientation from cooperative and
communalistic to individualistic and
competitive" (Stephen 1982, p.10).
Of those Basarwa still employed on the farms as farm
labourers, Guibrandsen found that their wages remain
extremely low at around P15-20 per month, and that
"there is a tendency among a few of the more
sophisticated ranchers to offer wages of around
P40.00 per month (even though this is
significantly below the poverty datum line).
But these same ranchers consciously intensify
the exploitation of their labour, thus enabling
them • to retain a smaller work force" (RoB,
Gulbrandsen et al 1986, p.119, 132).
As we have already seen on TGLP farms elsewhere in the
country, many ranch oT.rter in Ghanzi are now unwilling to
harbour non-employees on their ranches:
"The severity of the situation on the Ghanzi
farms can be illustrated by many ranchers'
refusal to allow distribution of food relief on
their ranches; they fear that such assistance
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would make it even more difficult to get rid of
those people they do not want on their ranches.
Allegedly, some ranchers collect food relief on
behalf of RADs, allocating it as if it were
monthly food rations" (RoB, Guibrandsen et al
1986, p.119).
The drought relief programme is thus used to subsidise
existing low wage rates, in a similar fashion to what we
have already seen to be the practise on some Tuli Block
freehold farms. On the Ghanzi farms, the incidence of TB
in the Basarwa community is among the highest in Africa
(RoB, Guibrandsen et al 1986, p.126) and the health
workers there are not regular Government staff but farm
employees.
Recent years have seen attempts to settle Basarwa
communities, often in the belief that this would improve
their standard of living. The process of settlement can
be voluntary or enforced, as when groups of Basarwa are
effectively dispossessed by the establishment of TGLP
ranches. 2' Settlement by the Government is always of a
voluntary nature and only encouraged in order to be able
to provide at least a modicum of essential services. It
has, nevertheless, had certain detrimental effects on the
quality of life previously enjoyed by the Basarwa groups.
Two examples serve to illustrate these effects. In 1979
in Ghanzi District, the resettlement of Basarwa from
Settleient of noiadic or seii-no.adic tribes iay be reluctantly acceded to with the destruction of the resource
base and destitution. Aiongst the seii-no.adic pastoralists of Turkana District in Kenya, there is now a settled
population of sole 70,000 people (out of a total of about 232,000 in 1984) the iajority of whoi were pushed into
settle.ents by destitution and the need for food aid. The greatest iigratory ioveients were to those places where
developient and relief activities were iost intense. (WFP/FAO et al, 1988a, pp. 23-24, 21)
22 In the Turkana District of Kenya, the developient of conercial ranching has required that pastoralists and
their herds be ioved off large tracts of land which were then leased or sold to conercial operators. The Laikipia
and Oalana ranches are exaiples of successful coliercial ranches developed in this way, but although this approach
has certain obvious advantages to the central governient and the individual couercial operators, it has brought
little advantage to the pastoralists who have been displaced froi their traditional lands. (WFPIFAO et al, 1988a,
p.49). As with the Basarwa of the Kgalagadi, those groups thus settled generally have a high reliance on food
aid for their sustenance, Of the seii-settled pastoralists, the Ngiyapahuno and Ngilukuiong rely inst heavily on
mime relief foods. Around 45% of their total annual food supply is derived froi relief rations.(WFP/FAO et al,
1988a, p.39)
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commercially owned ranches in the area was made possible
through land allocations from the Land Board in East and
West Hanahai, Tshawe, and Tshibukwane (situated near to
the Namibian border). As some of these settlements grew
to hold around 600-700 people who were attracted by the
availability of fresh water, conflicts over land and
grazing rights began to emerge with neighbouring
communities.
In such disputes, the RADs inevitably are the losers.
Because of their political marginality and traditional
lack of institutionalised leadership, they experience
great difficulty in coordinating the expression of their
joint economic interests. This has become critical in
respect of articulating and defending their limited land
rights, particularly in relation to the establishment of
TGLP ranches. In Ghanzi District, where they form a
significant minority of 40% of the population, they have
no representation on local land boards or on the District
Council (RoB, Gulbrandsen et al, 1986, p.25). Silberbauer
(1981) pointed out that the Basarwa traditionally tended
to gather only fairly near to their villa ge site, which
was almost always located in area of plentiful plant
growth, and they were careful not to strip an area
completely. As plants became depleted through their
gathering activities, animals which graze or browse
became less likely to stay in the area. It thus became
less attractive as a hunting ground, and the Basarwa moved
on, allowing the plant life to recover. The traditional
hunter-gatherer way of life therefore, helped to preserve
the delicate ecological balance of the Kgalagadi.
However, it also
"...required an unrestricted and undisturbed
use of large tracts of country, which is
incompatible with the needs of the pastoralist
and cultivator" (Stephen 1982, p.7).
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It is this fact more than any other, explains the present
marginalisation of the Basarwa groups and the destruction
of their resource base. At Xade in the Central Kgalagadi
Game Reserve (CKGR), the concentration of RADs (about
800) in a relatively small area has eliminated veld foods
in the locality and caused a decline in nutritional
standards compared to more dispersed groups. The Nurse at
Xade reported:
"We are also seeing a number of epidemics in
Xade because of the increased population which
we do not see in other areas, e.g. chicken pox,
severe influenza (affecting half the
population), and conjunctivitis (affecting
almost all children and some adults)" (RoB,
Guibrandsen et al, p.125).
Tuberculosis is now actually on the increase amongst
Basarwa communities (despite falling in all other Tswana
communities - see Table 3.5), and diarrhoea in the
under-fives, due to poor personal hygiene and
malnutrition, is common. (BotswanaDailyNews, 13 February,
1987). With the incidence of TB highest in settlements
where traditional sources of subsistence are decreasing
(RoB, Gulbrandsen et al (1986), p.62), and with more than
one third of all children under the age of five
nutritionally at risk, (i.e. weighing less than 80% of
their expected weight for age) it is clear that the
Basarwa who have recently adopted a sedentary lifestyle in
established settlements are amongst the most vulnerable
of all social groups in Botswana. Despite all the
attendant problems of the settlements, life there is
often preferred by the Basarwa to the alternative of
living in established villages, where the destructive
processes of social and economic subjugation can be
heightened by ethnic discrimination. Enforced settlement
occurs when the Basarwa are affected by commercial
developments such as TGLP. In most cases, no compensation
is offered as only developments made beforehand on such
land has to be compensated for by law. Such developments
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include the erection of a building or the cultivation of
a field, neither of which are usually carried out by
hunter-gatherer groups •23
Government resettlement schemes for dispossessed RADs are
mainly centred around Ghanzi and are run quite
successfully, but for the insufficient amount of land
allocated for the settlements. The cost of water supplies
to the RADs' settlements, particularly in the western
areas, is extremely high, with a only a 25% success rate
for borehole drilling. The cost of a successful borehole
was estimated at P111,000 in 1988 (FRD, May 1988).
The children in the RADs' settlements are lagging behind
in educational opportunities, even though a number of
schools have been built in some Districts. The demand for
a basic education is high and in some settlements
community (i.e. non-government) schools have been opened
through self-help initiatives. The learning abilities of
the Basarwa children are generally thought to be good
(RoB, Guibrandsen et al 1986, p.58), but is not reflected
in their academic achievement. This may in large part be
due to the fact that they are taught in Setswana, a
language that many children are not familiar with.
The scope for most forms of economic activity at these
settlements is very low. However, those settlements
situated near or within Wildlife Management Areas (WMA)
offer the possibility of the development of a range of
game products for which there exists a wide export
market, without the objectives of the WMAs being
compromised. An evaluation of the RADP in 1981 noted that
as many as 70% of the 250,000 large wild herbivores which
die annually in Botswana die a natural death, and it
TGIIP Guidelines, revised 1984, Lands Division MLGL, cited in Gulbrandsen et al (1986), p.6.
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appears therefore that a potential for an expansion of
this resource base exists (Egner 1981). However, these
areas are already being encroached upon by Tswana
livestock owners and this threatens not only the
preservation of wildlife but the traditional source of
the RADs' subsistence base.
One recent study for the RADP and NORAD found that
production of handicrafts also offers a large potential
for overseas trade, but at present neither these nor the
range of game products available have been commercially
developed or adequately researched. Where the Basarwa
continue to practise traditional crafts the prices they
obtain for their products from local entrepreneurs is
very low in comparison with their eventual retail price
(RoB, Gulbrandsen et al 1986, p.32).
Many RADs participate in the seasonal LBRP projects,
which mainly involve the clearing and debushing of roads,
well digging, and the construction of community housing.
This has often been linked with the Government run
community "Self Help Projects." The 10% capital
contribution normally required from the community is
accepted in the form of labour instead of cash. In RADs
settlements near to the border with Namibia (Quangwa and
Xai-Xai settlements in Ngamiland), some Basarwa have been
recruited to work for the South African army as trackers,
and directed against SWAPO insurgents (Stephen 1982).
There has been progress in some settlements towards
providing the RADs with cattle and farming implements.
The cattle scheme introduced included the provision of
two heifers to each individual by the District Council.
When their number has grown to five, the original two
revert to Council and the farmer keeps the other cattle
(RoB, Gulbrandsen et al 1986, p.47). This can be seen in
some ways as a revival of the traditional mafisa system,
but the small number of animals involved hardly make the
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herd drought-proof (see the footnote on page 237 for
details of the similar but more comprehensive schemes in
Turkana).
The Gooch & Macdonald consultancy report on the 1979-81
drought, which focused its attention on the emergency
aspect of the programme, stressed that special food
provision needed to be made for the RADs, who were
generally the first beneficiary group to be affected by
the drought, and the most severely (Borton 1984, p.68).
With the gradual disappearance of game and veld foods as
the drought deepened in intensity, there was an urgent
need to provide the RADs with rations that would meet
their full subsistence requirements, and not just
supplement them.
In the 1970s, hunting and gathering provided some 80% of
Basarwa subsistence needs. By the mid-1980s, many had
become almost totally dependent on drought relief
rations, and in some settlements had given up pursuing
independent economic strategies altogether:
"a considerable proportion of RADs depend upon
such programmes for more than 80% of their
subsistence. Only those groups of RADs whose
hunting and gathering territories are not
encroached upon, and who have access to
drinking water, are generally the ones whose
production ensures that their children obtain
a satisfactory level of nutrition" (RoB,
Gulbrandsen et al 1986, p.1).
This gives the analysis of the effectiveness of the food
distribution programme to the RADs a particular
significance.
Some RADs settlements are in a process of transition to
formal, villages and have been afforded basic social
facilities. Twenty four are presently covered by a health
post, and the provision of food rations therefore falls
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under the Vulnerable Groups' programme, with distribution
carried out by the FRD. However, as the normal clinic
ration is less than the full RADs ration (see Tables 3.2
and 3.3), many in fact opt to seek new locations so that
they can once again obtain the full RADs ration. This has
resulted in the non-utilisation of many of the services
provided, and the non-attendance of RADs at the Health
Posts. In order to overcome this, those RADs settled in
these particular areas are now allowed to receive their
normal ration in addition to that which they receive from
the health facility, though it is far from clear whether
this is carried out in practice. The number and
distribution of Health Posts in RADs' settlements is
shown below in Table 3.8.
TABLE 3.8 : HEALTH CARE FACILITI IN RADs SILE1EIfl'S, 1986.
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Source: RoB, Gulbrandzen et al (1986).
Most settlements are not covered by a permanently staffed
health facility, and are served by mobile clinics visited
by a nurse on a monthly basis. In Ghanzi District for
example, some 50% of the population, most of whom are
RADs, are served in this way (RoB, Guibrandsen et al
1986, p.126). As with those mobile stops falling under
the VG Programme, no direct feeding of underweight
children is carried out at these settlements due to lack
of supervision and accountability of the donated
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foodstuffs. For the RADs as a group therefore, the
monitoring of nutritional status among the population is
less well developed than in the established villages.
It is important that FWEs are familiar with the culture
and social structure of the community in which they work,
and it is for reason that they are generally recruited on
a local basis. In RADs settlements this has been
difficult because few women have had the necessary seven
years of primary education with which to qualify for the
post. Therefore in those cases where a health post
exists, the FWE is recruited from outside the community
and many have had difficulties in winning the confidence
of the RADs. Eventually, it is hoped to have enroled
nurses at all RADs' health posts to deal with the special
needs of the community, and to administer emergency
medical treatment where the remoteness of the area makes
immediate evacuation impossible.
Initially the provision of food rations to the RADs was
met by government purchase and administered on a District
level basis by the Remote Area Development Officers
(RADOs) attached to the District Councils. Later, WFP and
other bilateral food donations were utilised, and
responsibility for the distribution of food rations to
the settlements was moved to the Remote Area Development
Unit created within the MLGL. The procurement and storage
of food rations for the programme remained with the FRD.
The most remarkable feature of the RADs feeding programme
is how little is known about it, thus making it difficult
to assess just how successful it was in meeting its own
stated objectives, which were essentially the same as
those for other vulnerable groups. Two major consultancy
reports by the UN in 1985 and 1986, commissioned by the
Government, between them devote less than a single page
to an assessment of the RADs programme, and this is
perhaps indicative not only of the priority afforded to
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the RADs as perhaps the most vulnerable of all social
groups, but of the poor management of the programme as a
whole. What evidence we can gather suggests that the
programme was run on a very haphazard way, particularly
in the early years of the drought:
"Some RADOs managed to maintain reasonably
regular supplies to a variety of remote
settlements but in many cases supplies were
irregular, their on-site distribution was
poorly supervised, the reporting to Gaborone of
amounts distributed and funds remaining was
poor and the involvement of the Regional Health
Team was minimal...it must be said that in some
cases Council officials cared little about the
plight of the Basarwa" (Borton 1984, p.69).
There are obvious linkages between the reporting and
distribution systems, as food requirement projections for
the settlements were based on the number of beneficiaries
reported on a monthly basis by the RADOs to the FRD
District Depots, in a similar fashion to the Schools' and
Vulnerable Groups' programmes.
From the middle of 1985 onwards, attempts were made both
by FRD and the RADs Unit in Gaborone to ensure that the
RADOs were fully conversant with the need to supply
monthly beneficiary figures (based on their field work)
to FRD, so that the correct amount of food rations could
be ordered and stocked at the District level. What made
this particularly imperative was that the supply of maize
meal which formed the main component of the food ration
of the RADs was only stocked at the District FRD depots
in small amounts, due to its limited shelf life, and had
to be ordered to a strict schedule from just one milling
company in Lobatse called Corn Products Ltd. A large
South African subsidiary, Corn Products held extensive
wholesale interests within Botswana and was virtually the
only company with both the equipment and capacity to mill
maize of the quantities required by the programme. This
in itself was to have wider implications, not only for
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the RADs programme, but for that of the Vulnerable
Groups', as we shall see later in our discussion of the
overall management of the drought relief programme.
As we have seen from Table 3.5, no data on the number of
beneficiaries is available between the onset of the
drought in 1982 and 1984, when all we have is an estimate
of 20,000, repeated again the following year. This was
because most RADOs failed to collect beneficiary levels
and report them to FRD on a regular basis.
This begs the obvious question about whether the amount
of food distributed during this period was adequate to
cover requirements, and the short, answer to this question
is that for most of the period prior to 1986, we simply
do not know. We do however, have data for the amount of
food distributed under the programme from FRD depots
during the period 1986-88, and we can compare this with
the calculated requirements based on beneficiary figures
supplied by the RADOs during the same period. This
analysis is shown in Tables Al to A15 in the Appendix.
In all of these Tables, for those months when the RADOs
did not report the current beneficiary levels of RADs in
their settlements, an estimate has been made based on an
average of those months where figures were available.
Where this had to be done, it is indicated in the
footnotes of each individual Table. As distribution to
the settlements in any one month is based on beneficiary
figures collected during the previous month's delivery,
total calculated requirements are based on beneficiaries
reported during the period December 1985 to November
1988. The actual distribution is for the period January
1986 to December 1988.
We can interpret this data on various levels. First and
foremost, it is clear that an assessment of distributive
performance on an aggregate, national level is hopelessly
inadequate and hides supply deficiencies on an individual
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settlement, District or even Regional level. Secondly,
the apparent gross undersupply in some Regions,
particularly Sebele in 1986 and 1987 and Francistown in
1988, may be due to an overestimation of requirements if
the beneficiary levels were inflated by the RADO. In this
case, the RADO may be supplying food to a greater
proportion of RADs than would be indicated by these
figures. Conversely, the apparent oversupply of some
commodities from Maun Depot (Ngamiland) in 1986 and 1987
and Mahalapye in 1988 may be due to an underestimation of
requirements by the RADO and need not indicate a
particularly good distributive record. In this case, the
RADO may be collecting more food from the Depot than the
calculated requirement would have indicated.
Thirdly, as the three commodities which make up the RADs
ration should be issued and distributed in a fixed
proportion to each other, the varying distributive
performance of each commodity would indicate that stock
levels were not consistent at each Depot. At Tutume Depot
for example, only 31% of the calculated requirements of
beans were collected and distributed by the RADO,
compared with 111% of the oil requirement. Whether this
was due to localised stock shortages and inefficiencies
in the FRD intra-regional distribution system, or to
mismanagement on the part of the individual RADO, or
both, is not immediately clear. We do know however, that
in some sub-districts in 1985, the RADOs did not collect
any beans for the settlements at all because they were
not aware that beans were stocked at FRD for that
purpose; it is not known whether they obtained any from
an alternative source using Council funds.24
Whilst data on monthly stock levels in the individual FRD
depots in 1986 is not available, we do have data for the
period 1987-88 and from this we can determine to a
24 Personal observation of Selebe-Phikwe and Mabalapye FR!) stock analysis ledgers,
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certain extent the possible causes for a poor
distributive performance. Letlhakane FRD depot for
example, which exhibits only a 67.03% distributive
performance for maize-meal, simply didn't provide its
Regional Officer with stock level reports for seven
months out of the year. Consequently the regional depot
in Francistown did not know how much maize meal to
supply. The depot manager at Letihakane apparently failed
to monitor stock availability and requirements for the
RADs and allowed the RADO to collect some 183% of its
vegetable oil requirements in the same year.
Tutume depot also oversupplied the RADO with vegetable
oil by 71%, whilst in the same region Maun depot only
managed to supply 54% of its calculated requirements.
Maun did not distribute any oil whatsoever between August
to December 1987, and the small amount of oil in stock
during that period (around 0.10 mt) was most likely
condemned and unfit for human consumption.
It is difficult after the event to determine exactly
where these problems originated. Oversupply from the
Regional Depot to Letihakane and Tutume may have
encouraged the district depot managers and RADOs in these
two depots to distribute too much oil (if only to clear
their warehouses for other more perishable stock), which
left little stock left for Maun. On the other hand, the
Letihakane and Tutume managers may have requested too
much oil in the first place, which the Regional depot
agreed to supply without first checking actual
requirements based on reported beneficiary figures.
A similar picture emerges in Sebele Region, where only a
52.06% distribution of oil was achieved in Molepolole but
Mochudi distributed 248.73% of its calculated oil
requirements. In this case however, under-distribution in
25 Francistown Region ionthly stock reports 1987,
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the former does not seem to have been caused by over-
distribution in the latter: there appears to have been
an inadequate level of oil stocks in the region.
Kanye depot in Lobatse Region also had a poor record of
distribution for RADs' oil during 1987, with no oil being
distributed during the first three months of the year.
The reasons for this is not clear, as stocks of oil in
the depot were adequate during the period.
What made these supply deficiencies even more acute was
that they were not spread evenly over all the settlements
in a particular district but in some cases concentrated
in certain areas, i.e. a total cessation of distribution
was witnessed in some settlements. Though it is difficult
to quantify exactly how many settlements were affected in
this way, we do know for example that deliveries to
certain RADs settlements in Mahalapye were not made for
as long as three months.
Logistical planning and support from FRD headquarters
remained very poor throughout the period and goes some
way towards explaining the shortage of stock experienced
in some district Depots, particularly those receiving
maize meal direct by rail from Corn Products in Lobatse.
Palapye Region, with three Depots falling into this
category (Serowe, collecting direct from Palapye
railhead, Mahalapye and Selebe-Phikwe), suffered more
than most in this regard. Due to irregular and unplanned
food movements to these depots, Depot Managers had to
continuously transfer maize meal by road to and from
other depots in the Region. It was not uncommon, for
example, for Mahalapye to move maize meal from
Selebe-Phikwe to supply the RADO in its own area, and for
26 Personal observation of Mahalapye FRD stock analysis 'edgers, This is not obvious from Table AG, which shows
a 96.15% distributive performance for the district as a whole over the year, With an emergency food aid prograime,
over-supply during one period does not necessarily compensate for previous under-supply.
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Selebe-Phikwe to move food from Mahalapye in the same
month because of uncoordinated supply and distribution
systems. When the new contract for the supply of maize
meal was signed with Corn Products in April 1987, the
supply to Mahalapye was mistakenly omitted from the
contract and the Depot thus received no direct supply by
rail for nearly six months. 27 As a consequence, many of
the depots' vehicles were employed in transferring maize
meal from other depots instead of delivering food to the
settlements.
Because of the lack of an adequate reporting system
flowing from the districts to the MLGL, and the inability
of the Ministry to account for the donated commodities,
WFP took the unprecedented 'step of unilaterally
withdrawing its support from the RADs programme at the
end of 1986. This decision was communicated to the
Ministry without prior consultation with the FRD staff at
either Regional or District level, or with the UNV
advisors working within the FRD and at that time actually
on the WFP payroll. 28 WFP simply informed the Depot
Managers by telephone that they were to discontinue the
supply of WFP beans to RADs settlements, and this
effectively reduced the size and nutritional value of the
ration available. Though maize meal continued to be
provided by Government funds, and vegetable oil was
supplied through bilateral donations from Sweden, FRD
headquarters had apparently made no provision to find an
alternative source of supply for the beans, which formed
the main protein component of the RADs ration.
It took some two months for FRD to negotiate a temporary
"loan" of beans from WFP to cover the attendant shortfall
until a new bilateral donation from Canada arrived. To
their credit, most Depot Managers followed the initiative
27 Personal counication received frog FRD HQ.
28 The UNVs were originally recruited aiid paid by (JNDP.
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of their UNV advisors and tried to maintain an
uninterrupted supply of WFP beans to the RADs throughout
this critical period. However, distribution of beans over
the year was deleteriously effected in most regions.29
Whatever the root cause for the poor distributive record
of the RADs' programme, the picture that emerges from
1985-87 data is one of confusion and mismanagement, and
a total loss of accountability which generally went
unrecognised at a district and national level. That such
a situation should have been allowed to develop in the
first place is perhaps indicative, not only of the
working relationship between WFP and FRD, but between
these agencies and their field staff. Perhaps more
importantly, it illustrates the'level of commitment and
concern for what is essentially the most crucial element
of the drought relief programme.
With the withdrawal of WFP support for this essential
programme, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
undertook to provide financial support with grants from
the Special Emergency Fund for Drought and Famine. To
improve the reporting system for the OAU, the UNV
advisors were requested to hold national training
workshops for all the RADOs in Gaborone in mid-1987. The
emphasis was laid on the registering of beneficiaries at
the settlements in order to obtain accurate food
requirement projections at the FRD district depots, as
well as milling requirements at Corn Products. The RADOs
were also trained in basic logistics and encouraged to
liaise with FRD staff to ease transport constraints. A'
new and standardised reporting format was introduced
which it was hoped could fulfil a dual purpose. First, it
would present in a concise and coherent form the
29 Stocks of RADs' beans at the end of January 1981 were as follows: Palapye Region: 1.70 it,; Lobatse region
1.85it; Sebele region: 6.81 it; Francistown region: 73 it. This is reflected in the distributive perforiance of
the individual regions, being respectively 54.30%, 66.18%, 70.48%, and 81.45%.
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necessary progress report required by the District
Drought Committees Secondly, it would form the basis of
the periodic reports to the OAU from the MLGL, as it
provided data on beneficiary levels, food distribution
and stock levels.
Data for 1988 shows an overall improvement in
distributive performance for the RADs' programme in
Palapye and Sebele, but a marked deterioration in both
Francistown and Lobatse regions. Again, the cause of this
can not be attributed solely to FRD management
constraints at the district level, but more likely to a
combination of poor control and monitoring by both the
RADOs and FRD. Lack of coordination at FRD headquarters
level (particularly in relation to ensuring regular
supplies from Corn Products Ltd. at .Lobatse) was also an
important contributory factor.
While a more detailed analysis of the data would be of
interest, we will only consider some of the more salient
points here as they relate to particularly poor levels of
distribution or managerial capacity. As an example, we
can note that at the end of March, Letlhakane had 18.30
mt of oil in stock (almost 4 months supply), whilst Maun
had zero stocks. The following month, all of Letlhakane's
stocks were collected by the RADO for distribution,
giving a yearly distributive performance for the depot of
128%. A better strategy would have been for the regional
depot to send more oil to Maun depot instead, which only
managed to distribute 28.74% of its oil requirements.
Letihakane did not distribute any maize meal at all
during the last quarter of 1988, apparently due to low
stocks at Francistown, which is itself a reflection of
either continuing supply problems with Corn Products,
inefficiency at FRD HQ, or both.
In Lobatse region, Kanye and Tshabong depots actually
distributed less RADs' food in 1988 than in 1987 (the
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declaration of drought recovery would not have influenced
this performance as the RADs' rations remained the same).
The poor performance at Kanye has reflected badly on the
region as a whole due to the number of RADs registered in
the area. The main shortfall for the depot was in the
supply of maize meal. Stock levels as indicated on the
monthly regional reports do not indicate any particular
shortfall in supply 30 throughout the year and so it is
likely that responsibility for the poor level of
distribution lies with the RADO concerned.
FRD monthly regional reports indicate that distributions
of beans from Hukuntsi depot were made only in the months
of April, May, August and September - giving a yearly
distributive performance of this commodity of just
10.09%. The problem here in the first half of the year
seems to have been the non-availability of "RADs" beans
in the regional depot at Lobatse (stocks of beans for the
schools programme never fell below 400 mt in the first
quarter of the year. 31 ) The regional stock report for
August 1988 indicates new stocks of RADs beans at the
regional depot of 140.7Omt, yet during that month
Hukuntsi only distributed 0.5 mt. The following month of
September saw only a distribution of 0.4 mt, with zero
distribution after that for the rest of the year. In fact
for some reason, none of the new regional depot stocks of
beans which are reported after August were transferred to
Hukuntsi depot or anywhere else for that matter.32
The IMDC Drought Assessment Tour in early 1988 produced'
a report which marked its first attempt as the main
policy formulating body in the relief programme to
30 Kanye depot is within easy driving distance frois Lobatse and Corn Products Ltd., and so supply to this depot
does not present any logistic probleis,
31 Lobatse PRO regional stock reports 1988,
32 The regional stock reports show the stocks of 140.70 mt lying untouched at the regional depot until the end
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actually quantify the food distributive performance of
the RADs programme. This assessment is shown in Table 3.9
below.




















1)Population refers to the total number of RADs eligible for rations, i.e. the current population in the
settlements. This compares with an average number of 20825 in the period Oct.- Dec.1986, 23,081 in Jan. 1987 and
25,616 in Feb. 1981. (KWTC, 1981)
2)The number of bags required is calculated by multiplying the number of beneficiaries by three to get the
requirement for three months (1 bag per person per month). There appears to be an error in the case of Southern
District which has only been multiplied by two.
3) This is the number of bags delivered during the three ionth period.
4) This refers to the number of bags that should have been delivered, bat were not.
Source: IKDC, Drought Assessment Tour 1988, p.9, drawn from RADO and FED monthly distribution reports.
Once again it is clear that in many cases insufficient
food was distributed, and that in some the necessary
distribution reports expected from the RADOs were not
made available to the IMDC assessment committee. This is
despite the fact that the IMDC admits in the same report
that
"..in the National Drought Package the only
realisable benefit that is truly and fully
accessible to the RADs is the feeding
component" (IMDC, 1988, p.10).
The 1982-88 Drought Relief Programme	 266
It is painfully obvious that even the "feeding component"
of the programme is simply not working for many of the
RADs.
In their report the IMDC identified four main constraints
in the administration of the programme: first, transport
difficulties and vehicle availability; second, the role
of the FRD in procurement and storage; third, the
inadequacy of food storage facilities at the settlements,
and fourth, the milling capacity of Corn Products is
inadequate. It does not however propose any solutions to
these problems, which we will now examine in turn.
Transportation has been a recurring problem throughout
the life of the programme. An undue reliance on the hire
of private vehicles has not worked in the more remote
areas as the contractors are unwilling to risk damage to
their vehicles at existing haulage rates. The four wheel
drive Mercedes trucks provided to District Councils for
food delivery are in many cases insufficient and even
unsuitable in some areas, particularly in the heavy sand
of Southern District, and spares are not available.33
Requests to have them replaced where necessary by larger
Scania six wheel drive vehicles (as used to good effect
by the Department of Water Supplies) were made by the
RADOs themselves at the workshops held in 1987. At
present there seems to be no plans to carry out these
replacements.
The whole transportation of RADs food during the 1982-8
drought was characterised by the absence of an adequate
planning strategy which could in many cases, be
accommodated within existing FRD delivery schedules. In
some remote areas, the delivery of school, health
facility and RADs' food could be accomplished with one
IKDG Drought Assessment Tour, 1988, Main Report, p.9. This is soiewhat surprising as the trucks are
ianufaetured in South Africa.
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single trip, whereas in practice the RADs vehicles often
travelled grossly underloaded, even when allowing for
poor road surfaces. In some Districts, Transport
Coordinators were seconded to FRD in 1982 on the
recommendation of the Gooch & MacDonald report, following
on from the IFP's incapacity to move food in sufficient
quantities during the 1979-81 drought. Mainly retired
government officers, their presence appear to have
greatly improved the distributive performance of the
Department in recent years, and to have been particularly
effective in Palapye Region, where a 97% distribution
rate of RADs' food was achieved (see Table All in the
Appendix).
However, as the Transport Coordinator for Central
District is based in Serowe, where both the District
Council and District RADs' Unit are also based, this
relatively good performance is not entirely unexpected.
Elsewhere in the District, their role in the
distribution of RADs' food remains a passive (and
therefore less effective) one in that they act only on
the requests by the RADOs for Council or privately hired
transport, and facilitate the payment to haulage
contractors.
To move on to the IMDC's second point, it would appear
that in Francistown FRD region, the coordination and
cooperation between the RADO and FRD in the supply of
RADs' food has reached its lowest ebb:
"In some Districts (e.g. North west) the
Department of Food Resources would only haul
food for the RADs from Francistown to Maun,
(and) even though FRD have to proceed to their
sub-depot at Shakawe, the RADs food is not
taken there. It is not even accommodated in FRD
depot stores which are available at Shakawe.
This reflects a bad working relationship
between the Depot Manager and Remote Area
Development Unit" (IMDC 1988, p.9-10).
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The third issue raised by the IMDC concerned the lack of
adequate storage at RADs settlements, is not a new issue,
and apparently was only raised after the unusually heavy
rains and floods during the period November 1987 to
January 1988:
"If storage was available, food could be
supplied in bulk and this may avoid disaster
during flood seasons and transport breakdown"
(IMDC 1988, p.10).
The construction of storage facilities could have been
carried out as part of the LBRP programme at all
established settlements and would have provided much
needed (albeit short term) employment opportunities for
the RADs. It would have also helped ease the transport
constraints mentioned earlier by reducing the number and
frequency of food deliveries required.
The fourth and final point raised by the IMDC concerned
the capacity of Corn Products in Lobatse to deliver maize
meal in sufficient quantities to the railhead depots. The
dependency of Botswana on a South African subsidiary for
a major part of its relief efforts is an issue which we
have already raised before and to which we will be
returning again in later sections.
Here, the concern of the IMDC is perhaps slightly
misdirected, as much of the irregularity of supply is due
not to the company's milling capacity, but to FRD's
inability to provide delivery schedules which match the
individual depots' requirements. Corn Products is a
commercial enterprise and provides all the maize meal in
the country through its wholesale outlets. As such it has
large wholesale warehouses in every major village, and
any interruption in the normal supply to the FRD railhead
depots could be made good by arranging to purchase from
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these outlets. 34 This in fact is common practice when
supplementary rations are provided for LBRP participants
working some distance from their home village.
The monitoring capacity of the programme also changed in
1988. The UNVs for Palapye and Lobatse regions left early
in the year and were not replaced, while the UNVs for
Francistown and Sebele regions were used more for
training of FRD staff in Gaborone. The marked
deterioration in distributive performance in Francistown
and Lobatse - the two largest FRD regions - during 1988
may have had something to do with this change of
strategy. While Palapye region could be managed quite
well from Central District headquarters at Serowe, and
Sebele region direct from Gaborone, both Lobatse and
Francistown regions covered huge and remote areas which
posed greater managerial and logistical constraints. The
role of the UNVs up to the beginning of 1988 had largely
been to monitor the programmes in the field from the
field and to help overcome transport and supply problems.
The Remote Area Dwellers, of whom the Basarwa form the
main group, are the most marginalised and deprived of all
social groups in Botswana. They are a people whose
hunter-gatherer lifestyle is rapidly breaking down, and
are the most severely affected by the growing
commercialisation of livestock. Their very survival as a
separate ethnic group with its own distinct culture and
social norms is intimately bound up with debates about
the nature of agriculture and land use, and particularly
the role of the country in providing beef for the
international market.
"How Botswana as a nation now adjusts to the
interests of hunter-gatherers, pastoralists and
ranchers must deeply affect the kind of state
that this is to become. As one of the few
This strategy was in fact suggested to FRI) HQ on a number of OCCaSiOnS without response.
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parliamentary democracies in Africa, Botswana
is a state that prides itself on its multi-
racial stance and its emphasis on economic
development. The central government has
repeatedly affirmed its commitment to social
justice and democratic participation in the
taking of basic decisions. But it is yet to be
seen whether the pressures toward
commercialisation will overwhelm and radically
change that commitment in practice" (Hitchcock
1982)
If the Government's management of the RADs' feeding
programme is anything to go by, it would appear that this
commitment to social justice is already seriously in
doubt.
e) Enployment Creation and Economic Impact of the LBRP.
The LBRP is arguably the single most important single
component of the current Drought Relief Programme in
terms of addressing the fundamental issues of
unemployment and under employment in the rural areas of
Botswana. It has two main objectives: first, to help
compensate for losses of income suffered during the
drought by providing short term employment, and second,
to simultaneously improve the basic rural infrastructure
in the villages by the implementation of projects chosen
by the communities themselves. LBRP projects can thus be
seen as developmental in nature as they represent an
attempt to satisfy the needs and aspirations of the
entire community that initiate them. This section
provides an analysis of the evolution and socio-economic
impact of the LBRP during the 1982-88 drought. The
feasibility of expanding the LBRP into a fully fledged
public works programme, as part of a longer term
development strategy, will be covered in the final
section of this study.
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The concept of mobilising the village community for joint
enterprises or agricultural effort is not a new one in
Botswana, and in fact formed an essential element of the
traditional rural economy, was based on the exchange of
labour rather than through cash transactions, and, as we
noted in section one of this study, was perhaps the only
guarantee of survival for the tribes in a harsh climate.
However, with the emergence of a cash economy and the
development of a new form of economic individualism,
community effort has had a rapidly declining role to play
in tribal society and is now reduced to a residual
activity in most social groups.
The introduction of a labour intensive public works
programme in the 1960s, and which has continued in
various forms since then, can therefore be seen as the
institutionalisation, by the Government, of what was a
normal communal activity at the village level, but with
one important distinction. Communal effort was no longer
the central core of a self-sustaining tribal economy, but
took the form of a relief programme aimed at the rural
poor, for whom the wider economy offered little
alternative hope of maintaining even basic subsistence
levels.
The programmes established in the 1960s and which ran
during drought years until 1973, used WFP donated food as
the basis of payment to the participants on the projects.
The food donations were in the form of maize meal,
vegetable oil, dried skimmed milk and dried fruit. These
Food for Work (FFW) projects are tabulated in Table 3.10
overleaf, together with data on the number of
participants and expenditures.
The WFP323 project was designed to promote a wide range
of communal activities, and at the same time, control the
tsetse fly in Ngamiland and Chobe Districts. Projects
included the building of pit latrines, classrooms, dams
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and roads, and soil conservation devices. Productivity,
in comparison with what could have been achieved by the
use of more capital intensive methods, was low due to
inadequate supervision and a shortage of equipment (Gooch
& MacDonald 1981, p.7).
TABLE 3.10: ANALYSIS OF FOOD FOR WORK PROJECTS IN BOTSWANA, 1966-1980
Nuiberof	 No. of Nan	 Expenditure
Project No.	 Year	 Participants	 Days Worked	 Food	 Transport	 M.iii. Unspecified
WFP 323	 1966-67	 27500
WFP 564(1)	 1969-71	 12573
WFP 2074Q	 1973-74	 1174
















1) Includes 3600 Angolan refugees,
2) South African Bands (Botswana was still using this currency in 1973-4). Excludes Kgalagadi and Southern
Districts where no inforiation is available.
3) Kgatleng Quick Action Fund.
Source: Gooch & MacDonald (1981), p.5,
Project WFP564 had similar objectives to WFP323 and
included the provision of food to 3600 Angolan refugees
settled in the Etsha area of Ngamiland. Nine thousand
hectares of land were cleared, 500 hectares destumped,
and 6000 hectares cultivated. In thirteen villages,
houses were built by the participants. Productivity was
again low due to the shortage of trained supervisors (one
supervisor to 58 labourers on average).
Project WFP2O74Q was designed to encourage autumn
ploughing, weeding and early planting. This project was
very quickly mobilised but failed to reach. its target of
5000 farmers, as many had lost their draught oxen in the
previous year's drought.
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Project WFP995 had its main emphasis on brick moulding
and site clearance rather than construction. Productivity
was again low, and when WFP food was exhausted it took
two months for Government purchases to arrive. As a
consequence, many workers simply gave up hope of
receiving any back pay, and left the sites (Ibid., p.8).
The small Kgatleng scheme was the only one implemented
during the 1979-80 drought and included improvements to
village kgotlas and the debushing of roads.
The influential Gooch & MacDonald consultancy of 1981
found that the FFW projects were
"sporadic, hastily implemented, and have
usually fallen short of their objectives...
productivity on the schemes has been low. Last
minute planning, the late arrival of equipment,
the inability to recruit and train sufficient
on site supervisors in time and the late
arrival of food were the major factors" (Gooch
& MacDonald 1981, p.9).
Though the secondary objective of creating viable
improvements in the rural infrastructure had not been
fully met, the main objective of providing relief was
generally more successful, particularly in reaching the
poorest sections of the population.
A major FAO survey in 1971-72 estimated that 29,890
individuals had participated in FFW projects up to that
date, and that the participants were predominantly
females, from female-headed households. As we have seen
already in Chapter Four, this group remains the most
vulnerable to the effects of drought, and their
participation in the FFW is significant. Table 3.11
overleaf illustrates the survey's findings. Though
younger males were the most likely to be migrant
labourers and therefore less likely to participate on FFW
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existing customary work roles of the two sexes (FAO 1974,
p.31). Perhaps more important of all was the fact that
female headed households owned on average only one
quarter of the number of cattle owned by male headed
households, and were therefore able to plough less land
(FAO 1974, p.33 and 36).
TABLE 3111: FOOD F(1 WORK PARTICIPANTS BY S & AGE CR*JPS (1971-72)








Source: FAO (1974), p.31.
"Livestock holding, especially cattle, is the
key to wealth, influence and crops production.
The majority of families that had participated
in the food for work scheme held no cattle, and
those that did held fewer than the average of
the population (FAO 1974, p.32).
It appears therefore that the FFW programme was
successful in reaching the poorest households and remains
one of the few drought relief programmes that have
directly benefited the non-owners of cattle more than the
cattle owners (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.l33). Syson,
working in Shoshong village only, confirms this
assessment. She found that 76% of the poorest 24% of the
households had participated in FFW projects, compared
with 42% of the rest (Syson 1972, p.56)
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One of the main terms of reference of the FAO survey was
whether the FFW was having a disincentive effect on
agriculture. From 1970, concern had been expressed in
official circles in Botswana about the apparent decline
in acreage planted under crops over the previous decade:
"The findings of the survey indicated that
participation in food for work projects may
have been associated with a reduced cropping
activity of not more than 2% of the total
households" (FAO 1974, p.38).
Considering the low level of cropping activity of these
households, the overall impact on total production was
probably negligible. As we suggested in noted in Section
B, Chapter II of the present study, the overriding
constraints on the agricultural activity of the
individual household remain the ownership of cattle and
the availability of rain.
By 1979, there were four different kinds of projects
predominantly using labour intensive methods. Not all of
these were intended to function purely as "relief" works,
and to avoid confusion in the description that follows,
their official titles are listed below together with
their Ministerial funding codes as appropriate:
a) Labour Intensive Public Works Schemes (LG38);
b) Self-Help Schemes (LG17);
c) District Road Maintenance Pilot Project (LG34);
d) Drought Relief Schemes (LBRP);
LG38 projects were intended to be more productive than
normal relief works, with the employment of unemployed
labour not the main objective, but the means to an end.
The important distinction between LG38 and LBRP was that
the former would be run in non-drought years when drought
relief was not available, and t he projects had to justify
using labour rather than capital intensive methods on
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economic, and not just social grounds. The latter was
defined more as an emergency programme where productivity
was not the main objective. Payment for both programmes
was in cash, not food, at the rate of P1 per day. Wages
formed about 72% of the total utilised funds, with the
remainder being spent on tools, petrol, and donkey cart
hire. Overheads such as the salaries of supervisors, were
warranted to the recurrent budgets of the participating
District Councils (IMDC 1987, p.4).
The LG38 programme operated under the same operational
constraints that had plagued the FFW projects: lack of
administrative, supervisory and technical capacity at the
District level. This led many projects to be rejected by
the MLGL at the planning stage.
The Self-Help LG17 scheme was directed towards the
stimulation of local initiatives and self-reliance at the
village level. Projects have included the establishment
of communal vegetable gardens, and the construction of
teachers' quarters, pit latrines, storerooms and
community centres. The scheme envisaged that suitable
projects would be identified by the VDC after
consultation with the villagers at the kgotla, and that
everyone would contribute to the cost of their
completion, by donating labour or materials. The rate of
contribution is around 20% of the total cost of each
project. Cash is now gradually replacing labour as the
main village contribution, with many of the poor
unwilling to participate. Gooch & MacDonald (1981, p.14)
found some resentment to the scheme during the 1979-80
drought, which was described to them as "poor people
providing their labour to build infrastructures for the
rich". The District Road Maintenance Pilot Project (LG34)
ran in Central District from 1980 onwards, in
collaboration with ILO, the World Bank and NORAD. It was
hoped to establish in this project the basis for a fully
fledged public works programme (to replace LG38) which
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could be extended to a national level. It was designed to
use labour intensive methods, and yet achieve
productivity levels comparable to, or exceeding, capital
intensive methods.
Road maintenance was chosen as the most appropriate
project type because it as felt that year round access to
villages and land areas was important for long term rural
development and economic growth. Nongazetted (i.e.
unmapped and unsurfaced rural roads) comprise 60% of the
total length of roads in Botswana. These roads are for
the most part dirt tracks, and are the only communication
link between villages, lands and cattlepost areas, where
eighty percent of the people in Botswana live. Keeping
the 11,000km. of rural roads in usable condition is a top
priority of the District Councils.
As some 42% of the rural population lives in Central
District and it has around 40% of the ungazetted roads
(1971 census), it was chosen as the most suitable area
for the pilot scheme,
For the type of rural secondary road in Botswana, labour
intensive techniques were found to be more economical
than capital intensive methods. It was estimated in 1981
that the construction costs of a new tarred road was
P150,000 per km, and that gravelled roads were unlikely
to be below P25,000. The District Roads Maintenance Pilot
Project estimated in the same year that an engineered
earth road costs around P6000 per km using labour
intensive methods (Gooch & MacDonald 1981, p.21). For
example, donkey carts can move 7-8 cu. metres (around 15
tonnes) per day at the cost of P9.60 and beat a tractor
and trailer over short hauls of around 350 metres (Ibid.,
p.28). Capital intensive methods also require the use of
foreign exchange which is spent outside the country
(mainly in South Africa), whilst labour intensive methods
put money into the rural communities.
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Wage rates were fixed at P2.10 per day, which although
low in comparison with the current minimum wage rate in
the government sector of P4.10 per day (Ibid., p.25), was
still substantially higher than that existing in the
traditional agricultural sector (see Chapter Four for
examples of wage levels prevailing in the agricultural
sector)
"Basing the wage rate on prevailing wages and
returns in the traditional agricultural sector
was rejected on the grounds that at these
levels one could not expect high productivity
and the risk of absenteeism would be high"
(Gooch & MacDonald 1981, p.25).
Approximately 1500 man-days were required per km. of road
requiring selective improvement, giving a labour cost of
P3150. The cost of tools, supervision and administration
was estimated at substantially less than P3000 per km.
(Gooch & MacDonald, p.28). Between 1980 and 1986,
however, productivity declined with the number of
man/days required for construction rising from 1994 to
2743 per km. (ILO 1986, p.23). The reason for this
decline was two-fold. First, the qualit r of construction
had been enhanced which required additional work.
Secondly, the elimination of task work had caused a
reduction of output in ditch excavation (from 4.5-5.0 m3
to around 1.5-2.5 m3 per day) (Ibid., p.23). As a
consequence, task work was introduced in 1987.
The positive results achieved by this programme led the
Government to extend it to other Districts for a further
five years, and between 1980 and 1986 the project had
constructed over 770km. of rural roads (of which 86% were
constructed and 14% gravelled). During the same period,
the programme had provided temporary employment to more
than 3800 people (Ibid., p.22). and in 1987 employed some
2000 people for an average 200 days per year (IMDC 1987,
p.2). These figures should be seen in the light of the
fact that the annual increase in the labour force is
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21,000 per annum (ILO 1986, p.1), based on a population
increase of 3.4%, whilst in 1986 it was estimated that
the current level of unemployment and underemployment was
230,000 people, or some 62% of the available workforce
(IMDC 1987, p.1.&4.).
The LBRP projects which ran during 1979-81 had as their
primary objective the provision of relief to those
households affected by drought and the outbreak of foot
and mouth disease, which had effectively prevented them
from selling their livestock to BMC. Wages were fixed at
P1.00 per day, i.e. less than 25% of the Government
minimum wage, as it was argued that this would
automatically ensure that only the neediest were given
jobs and cause the minimum disruption to agriculture.
Most of the projects involved bush-clearing, the
stripping of fields, and stump removal.
The total expenditure for these projects was P734,123 of
which P535,902 (73%) was spent on labour costs. Some
535,902 man/days were expended, with the total number of
participants estimated at 4000, though not all of these
were working for the whole season due to a high labour
turnover. For example, one project had an average
attendance of 100, a maximum attendance of 180, and the
estimated total number of participants at 280 (Gooch &
Macdonald 1981, p.34). There is some evidence to suggest
that the wage rates, although comparable to those
obtained in traditional agriculture, were too low to
expect a level of productivity comparable to more capital
intensive methods. Where food rations were provided to
supplement the wages, a higher level of productivity was
obtained:
"Projects which only provided maize meal for
their workers incurred lower productivity due
to the lack of protein in the diet...improved
productivity was claimed for those projects
with workers in camps, when a regular supply of
meat was provided" (Ibid.', p.36, 38).
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However, even without the provision of food rations, the
wage levels offered compared favourably with those paid
to cattle herders, who are among the lowest paid of all
agricultural workers:
"On one scheme in a remote area, cattle herders
were attracted to the scheme by the regular
P1.00 wage and the cattle owners complained
that the project was diverting their labour"
(Gooch & McDonald 1981, p.42).
In this light, it appears that the argument for basing
LBRP wage rates on those prevailing in agriculture was
essentially a reflection of the vested interests of the
larger cattle owners. In a drought situation, little
arable agriculture is carried out, and with the onset of
rains the LBRP projects are suspended.
The value of the food component supplied to those
participants working in areas remote from their village,
is not known as it was subsumed under the materials
expenditure, and in general, the record keeping by
project administrators was insufficient to allow a
thorough analysis of all the projects (Ibid., p.31). One
lesson learnt from the evolution of the LBRP was the need
for an enhanced level of technical supervision of the
projects. This need was to be met in part during the
subsequent 1982-88 drought by the use of expatriate
technical manpower, made available by the US and Dutch
governments.
Botswana was ill-prepared to launch a substantial
expansion of its LBRP programme in 1982, and the fact
that it did achieve a measure of success in the first
year of its operation was due largely to the efforts of
some key personnel at the District level, particularly
the District Commissioners and Council Secretaries.
Bxap1es of wage levels of herd boys are given in Section B, Chapter It.
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(Borton 1984, p.69). It may also be partly due to the
fact that the Government was now firmly committed to
paying participants in cash rather than in food, which
made the logistics involved in its implementation much
easier and cheaper, as it obviated the need for
additional transport and personnel at District level.36
At the start of the programme the wage levels were
reviewed by the MLGL and Nutrition Unit, and the price of
a "minimum requirements" basket of goods for an average
family was taken as a basis for discussion, As a
consequence, the daily rate was fixed at P1.50, still
substantially below the minimum government rates, but now
no longer simply reflecting ex.sting rates in
agriculture. The key elements of the planning process of
LBRP projects are outlined below:
I.Initial project identification is made by the
villagers themselves, usually at a kgotla meeting
attended by officials from the District Council. The
list of projects submitted by the villages are then
assessed by the District Drought Coordinator and his
Technical Officer (usually an expatriate working on
volunteer terms.) Projects are selected on the basis
of their expected labour component (which should be
around 70% of the total projected cost), and the
expected long term benefits to the village community.
Another consideration was how well the projects
fitted in with those submitted by neighbouring
villages. For example, if several villages submitted
road projects, whether these roads could be linked
together;An estimate of the number of man/days and
materials requir rd is then made (possibly after
visiting the site) and used as the basis of the costs
to be included in the Project Memorandum;
36 We will be exaiining the relative uerits of FFW and cash' pajients later in this section,
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II.The Project Memorandum is then reviewed by the
District Drought Committee before being sent to FED
in Gaborone where the Planning Officer would check
costings and productivity rates. It is then passed to
the Labour Based Appraisal Committee (a sub-committee
of the IMDC) in the MFDP for final approval;
III.On completion the funds required for the projects are
then warranted to FED by the MFDP and then sent to
the District Councils. Payment teams are then
organised to tour the project sites each month to pay
the labourers.
The administration of the LBRP at the District level was
the responsibility of the District Drought Coordinators
working under the authority of the District Commissioner
and Council Secretary and to whom they had to report at
the quarterly Drought Committees. Many of the Drought
Coordinators were retired government officers working on
a contract basis for the period of the drought and with
little experience of managing a programme of this size
and complexity. Several appeared unable to compile and
present coherent progress reports to the Drought
Committees, and one in Central District had his reports
rejected on a regular basis. 37 These administrative
weaknesses were compounded by the failure to establish
standardised purchasing and accounting procedures in the
Districts and sub-districts.
In some cases, when funds were sent to the Districts, the
cheques were paid directly into the Council Treasury
account and this made it impossible to keep track of
expenditures on a sub-district basis. As a consequence,
some sub-districts appeared to be overspent and were told
to stop projects, when in fact the overexpenditure had
occurred in other sub-districts or even in other Council
PerBonal observation at Central District Drought Conittee ieetings, Serowe.
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activities. 38 In other cases, expenditures on materials
for individual projects as recorded by the Drought
Coordinator did not match, and the Committee was unable
to determine which set of figures was correct.
A more serious problem lay in the organisation of the
Council payment teams. With the onset of drought in 1982,
many districts took months to release sufficient staff
and vehicles to ensure that the payment teams actually
visited each project site once a month (Borton 1984,
p.15) and this situation had still not been solved by as
late as 1987.
In Kweneng District in January of that year, the Acting
District Commissioner reported to the Council that
"numerous problems were being encountered in
the implementation of the programme...some
problems were a result of poor methods of
operation, insufficient knowledge of what was
going on about the projects and how to
calculate the wages for workers.. . in some areas
payment was delayed for up to four months.
(Botswana Daily News, January 12, 1987).
Three months later, it was reported that in the same
District, some P143,617 had been expended on unauthorised
projects for which no funds had been allocated, and some
payments had been authorised for projects that did not in
fact exist. (BotswanaDailyNews, April 9, 1987). A similar
situation had occurred in Kweneng in the 1982-83
programme, when projects were started without official
authority being granted. Out of a total expenditure on
the projects in the District of P582,000,
"as much as P250,000 of this could reasonably
be said to have been wasted - all as a result
of the combination of unpreparedness to mount
38 Borton (1984), p.75 and personal observation.
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such a programme and overzealous District
officials" (Borton 1984, p.74).
These shortcomings obviously had a deleterious effect on
the morale of LBRP participants in some areas, and
explains the varying levels of productivity between one
District and another (Ibid., p.75-6).
One important element of the LBRP was the employment of
women in rural areas to mill sorghum for the school
feeding programme using traditional pestles and mortars
(except in Kgalagadi and Ghanzi Districts where the
traditional handstamping of sorghum grain is not carried
out.) In 1983-4 some 4300 part time jobs were created
under this scheme, with the handstampers being paid at the
same rate as the other LBRP workers, and each milling
around 8kg. of sorghum (sufficient for 57 school
children) daily. Because the number of women wanting to
participate in this scheme far exceeded the number of
available places, the labour was rotated and therefore
provided temporary work for between 6000 and 7000 workers
(FRD 1984, p.28). Table 3.12 overleaf . lists the other
types of projects carried out under the LBRP.
An assessment of the contribution of the LBRP programme
to improving the rural infrastructure is fraught with
difficulties and varies with the type of project
completed and the technical quality of the work itself.
The Council Works Departments were very short of officers
in the technical grades, and those they had were more
familiar with the construction techniques of modern style
buildings than, for example, the appropriate thickness of
earth walls for small dams (Borton 1984, p.76). Some dams
were simply washed away with the onset of heavy rains in
November 1987.
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TABLE 3.12: EXPENDITURE ON LABOUR BASED RELIEF PROJECTS, 1985-86 AND 1986-8?.
1985-86 Projects	 1986-81 Projects





































































Notes: Average wage coiponent was 78% of the total cost of the prograue.
Source: ItO (1986), p.26.
The most productive types were probably those which
directly facilitate future production, such as land
improvement projects. They include the marking out of
boundaries, the removal of scrub, stones and land
clearance generally, soil conservation and erosion
control, including the planting of trees or hedgerows and
the terracing of hillsides, afforestation and minor
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irrigation works. Such projects, particularly the
planting of woodlots and erosion control, have great
potential that can only be fully realised in the years to
come.
As the primary objective of the I1BRP was to preserve
rural incomes during the drought, we will base our
assessment of its economic impact on the extent to which
it achieved this goal.
In 185-86 it was estimated that 74,000 people benefited
from the programme and worked for an average of 60 days
each (ILO 1986, p.25). In 1986-8 ,7 42,344 places were
created with approximately 70,000 participants after
rotation (IMDC, 1987). Using the ILO data in Table 3.12
above, which estimates that 78% of total expenditure was
spent on labour costs, the gross wage received per capita
is P71.84 and P88.10 respectively. This is hardly a large
amount over the year, and compares unfavourably with a
figure of P134 for handstampers in 1984 (assuming 7000
participants, and that all the funds of P937,550 were
disbursed) (UNDP et al 1985, p.77).
Though a number of LBRP projects in remote areas also
attracted a food ration supplement of 12.5kg. maize meal
per month (worth about P6.00), most did not, and we can
therefore discount this in our calculations of overall
remuneration levels.
If we now move on to look at the allocation of LBRP funds
to the Districts, we can get an appreciation of the per
capita benefit to the rural population as a whole. The
IMDC has established a funding ceiling for each District
based on primarily on population, but those areas
particularly severely affected attracting a premium
allocation of 20% (UNDP et al 1985, p.77). Table 3.13
overleaf, drawn from FRD data, shows the allocation for
the year 1983-84. It should b,e borne in mind that this
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data represents the funds disbursed to the Districts and
not the actual expenditure on the projects. As some were
never completed due to late submission of the project
memoranda, these figures tend to overestimate the level
of income flow to the rural areas.
TABLE 3 • 13: LBRP DISBUIEN'IS BY DISTRICT JUNE 1983 - MAY 1984.













































Notes: Population calculated by dividing disburseient by per capita allocation as provided by FRD.
Source: FRD, Annual Report, June 1983-May 1984, p.27,
When looked at on a per capita basis, the contribution
that LBRP has made to replacing rural incomes lost
through the drought appears very insubstantial, though a
paper prepared by the Rural Development Unit in 1985
estimated that the programme had replaced 30.5%, 32.9%
and 37.7% of lost income due to the drought during the
years 1983 to 1985 respectively! (RoB, Rural Development
Unit (MFDP) June 1985). However, as these estimates are
based only on LBRP participants, and even then only on
crop losses (not livestock or wage employment), they do
not give a clear indication of how effective the
programme has been in replacing lost incomes in the rural
areas as a whole. In any case, if these figures are
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accurate, then it would appear that many Batswana have
very little cash income even in non-drought years.
Upon closer scrutiny it also emerges that the benefits
derived from the LBRP has varied a great deal between
villages even in the same District and one survey found
that participation rates varied between a high of 72% and
a low of 13%, and household income earned from the LBRP
ranging from P250 to P35 (UNDP et al 1985, p.18).
It is not clear whether the participants on LBRP were
necessarily those who had lost most crop income and were
therefore the most in need. Though the FRD guidelines
instruct the VDCs to focus their recruitment on the
poorer households, 4° this was probably not carried out
uniformly in practice, due to competition for the limited
number of available places. LBRP projects also favour the
labour-rich household at the expense of those with high
dependency ratios, and manual work is of little use to
the old and the sick. We do know however, that the
proportion of female labourers was estimated at 70% and
this rose with the onset of rains as the men left for
ploughing (Borton 1984, p.74). 4' As we have mentioned
before, where these women are the head of their
household, they are often the most vulnerable from a
nutritional standpoint, and therefore most in need of an
additional source of income during the drought.
Though the primary objective of LBRP was to preserve
rural incomes, it was assumed from the outset that the
majority of the targeted population would be the rural
poor, who spent most of their income on food purchases.
Implicit in the strategy therefore was the preservation
of household food security which was threatened by
declining incomes during the drought.
40 FED, Manual on the Human Relief Prograue,(1986), p.10. Participants had tobe 'not lems than 13 years of age.'
41 FFV and Labour Based relief projects elsewhere also attract a large number of female participants, (WFP 1985d},
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It is not at all clear that the Botswana Government's
commitment to paying its future LBRP participants in cash
rather than in kind, (which we suggested earlier was
probably taken initially on logistic grounds) has in fact
achieved this objective. In 1982, the newly- formed FRD
department was ill-prepared to undertake food
distribution to LBRP sites in addition to managing a
vastly expanded programme of its own, and so payment in
cash by touring council officials seemed an attractive
option. But as we have seen in the previous section, the
late payment of LBRP participants in some Districts has
cast considerable doubt on the efficacy- of this strategy.
From a wider perspective, the decision to pay
participants on LBRP projects in food or in cash, or a
mixture of both, is a subject of increasing interest to
the donor community, and in this section we will be
examining some of the arguments in favour of using the
market as the primary distributive mechanism. The
arguments in favour of using cash wages as opposed to
food are quite persuasive:
"First, it preserves the dignity of the
workers. Second, it allows a greater
flexibility of the recipients to use the money
for what they need most. Third, it allows for
the possibility for the recipient households to
actually invest part of this new income in
future productive activities or in the
improvement of their living conditions" (UNDP
et al 1985, p.78).
We will now examine each of these in turn. The first two
points are rather contentious and ignore the fact that
many LBRP participants, particularly in the more remote
areas, have always lived outside or at the margin of the
cash economy, and this does not per se imply a loss of
dignity, which rather occurs through a basic lack of
productive assets and the loss of subsistence which that
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implies. 42 The second point presupposes the existence of
markets and shops at which to spend the wages. Because of
the economic marginalisation of many Batswana in the
remote areas, markets have simply never developed:
"The District Commissioner in Maun has
confirmed that starvation in Beetsha sub-
village, about 450km. to the West, has forced
some people to eat the roots of the "motlopi"
tree. • .because there was no shop from which to
buy food. The nearest shop is at Seronga, some
50km. away and even that facility is too small
to cater for surrounding villages.. .even those
engaged in drought relief programmes have to
eat the motlopi root (Botswana Daily News,
September 7, 1987).
There is also the problem with cash wages that if LBRP
projects are situated in remote areas and isolated from
the national market, the rise in local demand will be
inflationary, and may adversely affect those who were not
able to participate in the LBRP projects. One report in
1985 estimated that the demand for food in rural areas
increased to replace "food income" (i.e. that grown for
own subsistence) by 40% (Eele & Funk 1985). Localised
inflation has already occurred in some of the smaller
villages when the income support for Category A
destitutes was raised to P30 per month. 43 Also, as
commodities in the west of the country are more expensive
than in villages to the east and along the line of rail,
a fixed LBRP wage rate favours the larger villages over
the more remote areas which are already disadvantaged in
the provision of health care and social services. The
wage rate is unlikely to be adjusted to accommodate these
price differentials for administrative reasons (Borton
1984, p.7O).
42 After the 1979-80 drought, sose 80,000 people in Turkana District of Kenya were e.ployed on FFV projects as
part of a WFP relief and rehabilitation prograue. The prograne has been extended until 1993,
Reported at Mahalapye sub-district drought conittee seetings in 1987.
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The third point assumes that sufficient income is left in
the household after expenditure on essentials to be
invested in future productive activities, or used on
improving living conditions. As we have already seen, the
average per capita earnings of LBRP participants is low
by any standards and it is not immediately obvious how
such small amounts could be invested in productive
assets. Such investment as does occur will depend on a
number of factors, including the number of LBRP
participants in each individual household and its
dependency ratio, and how the household perceives its
immediate priorities. These priorities may in certain
circumstances not correspond with the nutritional
requirements of the household, and participation of
mothers in LBRP projects has been mentioned as one reason
for the low attendance in some villages at the Direct
Feeding programme.44
The socio-economic survey carried out by UNDP/UNICEF/WHO
in 1985 found that about 37% of participating households
spent some LBRP income on food but it did not indicate
the proportion of the income spent (UNDP et al 1985,
p.94). We do not know therefore whether the LBRP
programme is having a significant effect on improving or
preserving the nutritional status of the participants and
their children, when compared for example with the
supplementary feeding programme.
The experience of UNICEF in Ethiopia suggests, but does
not confirm, that the nutritional status of children
improves faster if food transfers are made to households
than if they work for cash (Ibid., p.79). If further
research indicates that the same is true for Botswana,
then a return to FFW may be preferable during drought
years when households are unable to produce enough food
for themselves, with a return to cash based LBRP projects
Personal counication froi several FEs in Central District.
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in years of adequate rainfall and improved domestic
production. 45 An alternative strategy would be a mixed
approach where basic food rations are supplemented by an
appropriate cash payment. 46 This in fact is already
implemented at those LBRP projects situated in remote
areas and as we have already seen, enhances productivity
at those sites.
45 This presupposes, of course, that the supply of food conodities is organised effectively. In FFW prograes
in some other countries, this has not always been the case. (Clay & Singer 1985, p.81).
46 This would avoid the problem of recipients having to trade food for other household conodities which they
require.
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VI
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 1982-88 DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMME
In this chapter we first examine the role of the IMDC as
the main planning, funding and coordinating body for drought
within central Government, its working relationship with
the District Drought Committees, and particularly its
primary function of identifying and declaring the onset
of drought through the Early Warning Technical Committee
(EWTC). Second, we assess the administrative capacity and
distributive performance 1 of the Food Resources Department
(FRD), as the main executive body of the drought relief
programme.
a) Planning for Drought: the Role of the IMDC and EWTC.
The IMDC coordinates the activities of the five
departments and ministries dealing with the different
aspects of drought relief measures. The Ministry of
Health, operating through the Regional Health Teams and
village health facilities, is responsible for nutritional
surveillance, assessing how many people are nutritionally
at risk and the quantity and quality of food rations
required. The Department of Meteorology provides weather
surveillance, rainfall patterns and expected crop yields
by region. The Department of Water Affairs drills new
boreholes in areas severely crippled by water shortages.
The Ministry of Agriculture assesses the expected crop
1 In Section (dl of chapter five we analysed the food distributive perforiance of the Reiote Area Dwellers'
prograne, for which FRD's sam responsibility was the sovesent of RADs' food to the district depots and its
8torage. Responsibility for delivery to the settlesents and final distribution re.ained with the RAI)Os and district
councils concerned. In this chapter we consider the distributive perforiance of the Vulnerable Groups' and prisary
school feeding progranes, for which FRD had direct responsibility in supplying the health facilities and schools
throughout the country.
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production using data on the area ploughed and planted by
its extension personnel in the field. It also provides
subsidised livestock feed, free seeds and vaccines, and
a subsidy on draught power. The FRD, operating within the
MLGL, handles the supplementary feeding programme to
primary schools and health facilities, and the
administration of the LBRP projects.
The post of Secretary of the IMDC was transferred in 1983
from the MFDP Planning Officer to the newly created post
of National Food Strategy Coordinator, situated in the
Rural Development Unit of the MFDP. Though the concept of
a national food strategy had first been raised by the
Gooch & MacDonald consultaricy in 1981, the real impetus
had come from a visit by a mission from the African
Development Bank (ADB) in early 1983. The key elements of
the National Food Strategy will be examined in a
subsequent Chapter.
Until 1984, warning of an impending drought was based on
the interpretation of data provided by a variety of
sources:
I.simple rainfall data collected by the Meteorological
Department from around the country which indicated
any substantial deviance from the normal. As we have
noted elsewhere, in Botswana it is the onset of the
first rains in November and December that determines
the timing and extent of ploughing and planting, with
the subsequent rainfall pattern determining the
overall yield. Thus by early February it is possible
to get areasonable idea of the maximum harvest which
can be expected, by looking at the level of rainfall
up to that date;
II.assessments of the crop condition and area planted by
the extension teams of the Ministry of Agriculture;
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III.to a lesser extent, trends in the national
nutritional surveillance data;
IV.qualitative reports from District Officials, such as
the District Commissioner, RADOs and the Regional
Medical Officer.
If meteorological data indicated a substantial departure
from normal rainfall patterns, together with a
corresponding decline in the acreage ploughed or planted,
the IMDC could then anticipate the likely magnitude of
the shortfall in cereal production, and set in motion the
necessary government machinery to implement another
drought relief programme.
In 1984, the Early Warning Technical Committee (EWTC) was
formed as a sub-committee of the IMDC and chaired by the
IMDC Secretary (now the NFS Coordinator). As its name
suggests, its primary role was to produce the earliest
possible estimates of the severity of any impending
drought. It was provided with computer facilities to
ensure the rapid updating and comparisons of data, and to
enable the salient points to be clearly presented, both
to Government and the donor community. Since then its
crop forecasting capacity has been much improved through
the production of moisture satisfaction indices for maize
and sorghum by the Meteorological Department, using a
methodology developed by the FAO (Borton 1984, p.85).
The EWTC makes regular monthly assessments of the effects
of drought conditions and the availability of food
supplies, and produces reports and recommendations for
the IMDC and senior policy makers. Links have been
established between the national early warning system and
the SADCC Regional Early Warning Centre based in
Zimbabwe, which is being developed under the Regional
Food Security Programme. To be effective, an early
warning system of drought and impending famine conditions
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must include the monitoring of all variables which
influence the income of the vulnerable groups, their
ownership of productive assets, their wage and employment
levels, and local prices. All these factors have a direct
bearing on the ability to command access to food, and the
monitoring of aggregate levels of agricultural output or
cereal availability is clearly insufficient.
As we have already seen in previous chapters, some of the
worst rates of malnutrition in Botswana occur in areas
which are themselves the most productive (e.g. the Tuli
Block freehold ranches). We have also seen that relying
on nutritional surveillance data alone can be misleading
as it is based only on actual attendance at health
facilities. The real level of malnutrition is likely to
be highest in those areas where attendance is poor. In
any case, waiting for early warnings in this form is
leaving it too late as the whole point of the relief
programme is to prevent malnutrition occurring in the
first place.
The early warning system in Botswana was successful in
that it offered a faster assessment of the severity of an
impending drought, and the likely shortfall in domestic
cereal production. For planning purposes this was a great
advantage, as it gave both Government and donor agencies
more time to draw up or restructure their contingency
plans. Because it is heavily biased towards using
meteorological data and estimates of agricultural output,
the system is less well equipped to indicate when the
drought is effectively over and the relief programme
should be wound down, or stopped altogether. This was
particularly evident in 1985 when several areas were
declared recovery zones, yet subsequently suffered a
marked increase in the rate of malnutrition after rations
were reduced.Z
2 This was covered in the previous Chapter.
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The IMDC conducts a national assessment tour every year
around January or rebruary to visit the Districts, obtain
an update on the drought situation from the officials
concerned with the programme. It also discusses the
current trend in nutritional status of the under fives
with the RMO and RHENO, collects data on the acreage
ploughed arid planted from the MoA Agricultural
Demonstrators, and assesses the condition of livestock
and grazing. A special drought committee meeting is
usually convened for this purpose.
It is worthwhile pausing at this stage to examine the
structure, function and responsibilities of the District
Drought Committees, as they all have a bearing on the
working relationship with the IMDC and the performance of
the drought programme as a whole. The Committee meetings
are chaired by the District Commissioner and attended by
all senior District and sub-district officers currently
working on drought related activities. These include
representatives from the MoA, S&CD, Water Affairs, FRD,
Council Treasury, CTO, District Health Team, and
Nutrition Unit, as well as a sprinkling of Councillors
and the occasional MP. Councillors and MPs often exert a
powerful political influence on the meetings at the sub-
committee stage by the choice of subjects they bring up
for discussion, and this is then reflected at the main
committee meetings. They are generally drawn from an
elite group, wealthier and better educated than the
general populace and frequently have close kin ties with
the traditional aristocracy of chiefs and headmen. Holm
found that 62% of councillors held more than 25 head of
cattle and 59% claimed paternal kinship ties with the
local chief or headman (Holm 1972). Often the emphasis at
the sub-committee meetings is placed more on livestock
water supplies and the availability of subsidised stock
feed than on the human aspects of the drought relief
programme.
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The effectiveness of the Committees varied widely and
often reflected the abilities and personality of the
individual DC or Council Secretary. In the case of a
strong Chairman (as at Serowe), duties which had been
delegated at a previous meeting were entered in the
minutes as an "action" item and the individual officer
concerned was expected to explain what action be had
taken at the next Committee meeting. At other District
Committees, even at the specially convened IMDC drought
assessment meetings, many senior officers either did not
attend * did not have any information to relate, or failed
to produce satisfactory progress reports. In Central
District, the FRD Regional Officer for Palapye attended
only two meetings between his appointment to the post in
October 1985 and December 1987, and failed to prepare a
report or speak a single word at either.3
The effectiveness of the Drought Committees to monitor
and control the food distribution in the Districts was
complicated by the two-tier level of responsibility for
the administration of the relief programme. In 1982,
following one of Gooch & MacDonald's recommendations, the
responsibility for ensuring that food reached the
individual school, health facility and RADs' settlement
was shifted to the District administration, despite the
fact that it was FRD that was actually moving the food:
"Concerning food movements, the Department's
responsibility ends when the food reaches the
districts. All we retain after that is
accountability, to be able to say to whom the
food was issued within the district, but as far
as making sure that food moves from one point
to another is concerned and especially making
sure that nobody within the district that is
entitled to a ration goes without one, that is
the responsibility of the District Commissioner
and the Council Secretary" (FRD, Annual Report,
June 1983-May 1984).
Personal observation as ieiber of the Drought Conittee.
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Once the food reaches the districts therefore, FRD was
reduced to a role no more than advisory regarding what
should, in fact, have been the very reason for its
existence: food security and food movements within the
country during the period of the drought. In this
surprisingly frank statement by FRD in 1984, the
Department effectively declared that it was no longer
responsible for supervising its own staff in the
Districts and if they did not maintain regular supplies
to the feeding centres then it was a matter not for FRD
but for the District Administration to take action on. As
most of the FRD staff that were working at Regional and
District levels were seconded from the Department of
Supplies, the possibility of effective supervision, or of
disciplining inactive officers at a District level was
practically negligible. This applied also to FRD's own
efforts to discipline its staff, and is, as we shall see
later, one reason why it generally failed to achieve the
sole element of accountability it admitted being
responsible for.
b) Food Procurement, Storage, and Management.
The IFP had, from its inception, been regarded as serving
the interests of WFP, and felt by its parent Ministry to
be more a part of WFP than a government department:
"WFP ordered the food, scheduled the shipments,
and were responsible for food movements to the
railhead depots. They submitted the monthly
reporting format for stocks and deliveries,
reimbursed half of the estimated in-country
distribution costs incurred by IFP and even
assisted IFP to balance the figures for the
Quarterly Progress Reports required by WFP
Rome" (Borton 1984, p.31).
With the onset of drought in 1982, the Food Resources
Department (FRD) was created to replace the IFP and
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became the government body directly responsible for the
procurement and distribution of relief food on a national
level, and for all other administrative and financial
elements of the programme including the LBRP.
From the outset it became obvious that although FRD was
now an autonomous government department within the MLGL
and working independently from the donors, it had
inherited some serious staffing problems at the Head
Office from IFP. The Accounts and Personnel sections in
Gaborone remained virtually unchanged, characterised on
the one hand by a low productivity and morale, and on the
other by a latent tribalism uncommon in Batswana society
and made manifest by the attitude of some senior staff
towards the Director. 4 An ordained Church Minister of
Kalanga origins, the new Director was resented by those
staff who had been retained from IFP, particularly in
later years when he started to devote an increasing
proportion of his time to Church activities, at home and
abroad, which distanced him from the day to day problems
facing the Department in the Regions. Over successive
years this internal strife had a deleterious effect on
staff morale in the Districts, and many experienced and
capable officers directly involved in the food
distribution felt alienated and were often overlooked
when it came to promotion. 5 The combination of all these
factors had a detrimental effect on the capacity of the
whole Department to manage the drought relief programme
efficiently and effectively, and allowed the Head Office
to fail even to be aware of the distributive performance
of its own Depots in the field.
FRD has four main activities, each of which has important
structural linkages with the others, and the failure of
Personal observation.
It was a general feeling aAongst FRD staff in the Districts that promotion was often based on tribalistic
grounds,
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any one has important repercussions on all four. There is
additionally a theoretical division of responsibility for
the implementation of the four activities between FRD
headquarters, the Regional Offices and the District
Depots, but in practice this division has often been
blurred. The first main activity is the procurement of
food commodities for the relief programmes which is
carried out by FRD headquarters in Gaborone, but based on
projected requirements calculated from beneficiary
figures collated by the District Depots. Food
requirements not met from the donor community and
unanticipated shortfalls are made good by government
purchases. Commodities destined for distribution to the
RADs under the RADP continued to be' procured and stored
by FRD, but the actual distribution to the settlements
was carried out by the RADOs, who formed a separate
Department within the same parent Ministry. Food
requirements for this programme were calculated on
beneficiary figures reported by the RADO to the District
Depots. The structure and operation of the RADP, and the
role of FRD within it, has already been examined in the
previous chapter.
The second activity is that of the storage and management
of food commodities for FRD's own distribution to schools
and health facilities, and for the RADOs distribution to
RADs' settlements. This is primarily the function of the
Regional and District FRD staff, but as additional
storage space often has to be hired, and funds for this
purpose have to be approved by FRD in Gaborone, a joint
responsibility for maintaining an adequate storage
capacity has to be assumed.
The third area of activity is the actual distribution of
commodities at a sub-district level, primarily the
responsibility of the individual Depot Manager, but
requiring the logistical backup of the Regional Depot and
the HQ in Gaborone to ensure a regularity of supply.
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Lastly, the reporting system from the District Depot to
the Regional Offices, and from the Regional Office to FRD
HQ, provided the communications link which kept all four
activities in tune with each other. We will now examine
each of these in more detail.
From 1982, and on the operational side of the programme,
the important post of head of procurement and
distribution at FRD HQ was filled by a former Registry
Supervisor in the Office of the President, an experience
that was unlikely to prepare her adequately for the
demanding role that lay ahead. However, we can look at
the procurement exercise from at least two different
perspectives. First there is the routine procurement of
relief food from the international donor community,
usually conducted a year in advance, and greatly
facilitated by the involvement of the IMDC members and
officials of the Ministries involved. The donor agencies
themselves are usually closely involved during the period
of negotiations and on hand at FRD to help calculate
commodity requirements based on aggregate beneficiary
levels at the schools and health facilities and current
ration scales. At this level of operation the procurement
process generally works well. It is during periods not
covered by donor contributions that the administrative
weakness of the existing procurement system becomes
evident.
One such period was in early 1986, when existing stocks
of ICSM (Instant Corn Soya Milk) donated by WFP and used
in the health facilities began to run down. The ICSM is
a high protein blend of corn, soya and milk powder and
forms the most essential element of the Vulnerable
Groups' ration. WFP had notified the Government through
FRD that it did not intend supplying any future shipments
of this commodity due to its high manufacturing cost.
Though USAID had agreed to step in and make further
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donations, the first shipment was not expected for around
six months.
Arrangements had been made with Corn Products 6 at Lobatse
to produce an ICSM substitute to cover this shortfall,
which was essentially a blend of maize meal and dried
skimmed milk, and nutritionally comparable to the
imported commodity. Corn Products was at that time the
only milling company with suitable equipment to do this,
The arrangement involved milling the "maize milk" for FRD
during weekends when the plant was not being used for the
regular milling of maize meal for the Company's own
wholesale and retail trade, and worked well for the first
few months. Corn Products was given a production schedule
to work to based on the requirements of the railhead
depots, and would dispatch the maize milk directly from
its own sidings in Lobatse. However, it became clear that
Corn Products was unable to keep up with the supply
schedule and it became increasingly irregular, with
several depots running out of maize milk altogether. The
procurement officer in FRD HQ was unable to obtain any
guarantee of improvement in the output from Corn Products
and thus the Department was in deep crisis.
The appropriate action for FRD to take would have been to
approach the consortium of donors with a view to
temporarily releasing some sorghum and DSM stocks
normally earmarked for the schools programme. If
necessary this could have been replaced at a later date
either by the Government's own purchases, or by an
adjustment to the donors' intended future donations. An
alternative strategy would have been for the Government
to release some of its own sorghum stocks held by BAMB,
or even part of the Strategic Grain Reserve.
See si.ilar conents on Corn Products and the RADP in the previous Chapter,
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In the event, the senior staff at FRD were reluctant to
approach either the donors or any other Government
departikent for assistance or advice, and no food was
released from any source. As a direct consequence, as
many as half the number of health facilities in some
areas were without food for as long as six weeks, and in
Serowe, destitutes were seen begging for food at the
doors of the FRD depot, which was overflowing with grain
destined for the schools' programme.T
A similar, but less serious crisis occurred the following
year when approximately 1000 mt. of beans in the District
Depots were found to be deteriorating very rapidly. The
beans, a bilateral , donation from Canada and used for all
three feeding programmes, 8 had apparently got wet en route
to Botswana and had started germinating. Samples of the
suspect beans were collected by the UNVs and subsequently
sent for analysis in Johannesburg. Though it was obvious
from the outset that a large proportion of existing
stocks would have to be condemned as unfit for human
consumption, and that there would as a consequence be a
shortfall in supply before the arrival of the next
shipment, FRD took some two months to finalise the
purchase of alternative stocks. By the time these started
arriving by rail from Malawi and South Africa, many
feeding centres had been without beans for a period of
six weeks or more. 9 This must cast some considerable doubt
on the administrative capacity of the senior management
of FRD to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The
widely held belief that FRD was a "dumping ground" for
inefficient personnel from other departments is perhaps
indicative of the priorities of a government more
Personal observation. At this tue there existed a very poor working relationship between the lain donors,
represented by WFP, and the senior staff at FRD.
8 ka.ely, the Vulnerable Groups', Schools and RADs' Feeding PrograHes. Bilateral donors such as Canada and
Sweden continued to support the RADs' Prograirie after VFP had withdrawn.
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interested in the livestock element of the relief
programme.
From August 1982, FRD has had four administrative regions
with offices situated at Francistown, Palapye, Sebele and
Lobatse. These are shown in Table 3.14 below.
TABLE 3 • 14: FRD REGIONAL OFFICES AN!) ThEIR DISTRICT DELYS
Notes:
Those District Depots marked with an asterisk are located on the line
of rail and nonually receive most of their stocks direct, i.e. not
via the Regional Depot.
Source: FRD Gaborone.
The geographical coverage of these FRD Depots is
illustrated on Map 3 which follows on the next page.
The problem of FRD's storage facilities at the onset of
the 1979-80 drought was highlighted by the Gooch &
MacDonald consultancy in 1981, which found that the
capacity of many depots had remained unchanged since the
1960s drought and was completely inadequate. Maun Depot
forexample, had a storage capacity of only SOmt, whilst
the amount of food it was distributing each month was in
excess of 250 mt. This situation had continued throughout
the 1970s because the IFP's infrastructure priorities
were perceived more as a lack of sufficient vehicles and
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maintenance facilities than a shortage of storage space.
Assistance from the UN Capital Development Fund during
this period had therefore concentrated on building up the
vehicle fleet rather than expanding the storage capacity
of the depots.
By 1982, it had been realised that additional storage
capacity was required and a programme of expansion was
put into effect with capital assistance coming from the
UN, USAID and the Lutheran World Federation. However, the
building programme was not completed until early 1987,
and six months later, several still had no water,
electricity or telephone connections. During this period,
additional storage space had to be rented to cope with
the ever increasing amounts of food as the programme
expanded. Some Regional Officers resorted to moving
excessive amounts to their outlying District Depots in an
effort to clear space in their own warehouses:
"During this quarter (January-March 1985), many
losses were experienced from the sub-depots of
Maun, Kasane and Tutume in Francistown Region.
This was as a result of poor management by the
then Regional Officer of Francistown, who was
reported to have hauled larger and larger
amounts of food to the Districts. As a result,
more food was destroyed by rain packed outside
the storerooms. By December 1984, Kasane and
Maun depots were stocked with food to last for
eight to twelve months. More of this stock was
piled outside the storerooms for a longer
period. Some of these commodities were re-
transferred to Tutume depot and got damaged on
transit as it was during the rainy season".
(FRD, Quarterly Progress Report to WFP, Project 324 III,
January-March 1985).
The magnitude of these losses is indicated in Table 3.15
overleaf and applies to WFP commodities only. The data
was extracted from FRD's own quarterly reports to WFP,
but as FRD received bilateral aid donations from USAID,
the EEC, Sweden and other countries during this period,
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TABLE 3,15: ESTINATE3 OF Q)f0DITY LOBSES/WRITE-OFFS AT FED DEPOTS: 1985 (METRIC TONNE3).0
DEPOT MANE	 I(M	 SORCE1I	 KAIZR	 OSM	 MAIZE	 VEG.OIL	 BEANS	 TOTALS
MilL'21
PAIJAPYE REGION:
Palapye	 0,02	 0.75	 5.10	 0.00	 6.26	 13.83	 3.50	 29.46
Serowe	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.78	 0.56	 1.15	 2.49
Mahalapye	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 6.72	 0.00	 1.23	 7.95
Selebe-Phikwe	 0.32	 0.00	 0.00	 0,00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.50	 0.82
Regional Totals:	 0,34	 0.75	 5.10	 0.00	 13.76	 14.39	 6.38	 40.12
FRAWISTOWN REGION:
Francietown	 7.42	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.42
Tiituie	 18.87	 0.00	 0.00	 2.36	 0.00	 0.44	 0.15	 21.82
Letihakane	 17.28	 0.45	 0.00	 0.00	 0,00	 0,00	 0.00	 17.74
Maun	 54.00	 0.68	 0.00	 0.11	 0.00	 0.85	 0.00	 55.65
Kasane	 71.99	 27.58	 0.00	 0.48	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 100,04
Regional Totals:	 169.56	 28.11	 0.00	 2.95	 0.00	 1.29	 0.15	 202.66
LOBATSE REGION:
Lobatse	 14.99	 4.94	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.35	 21.29
Kanye	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Tshabon	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Hukuntsi	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Ghanzi	 1.04	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0,06	 0.00	 1.11
Regional Totals:	 16.03	 4.94	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.06	 1.35	 22.39
SEBELE REGION:
Sebele	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Molepolole	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Mochudi	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Regional Totals:	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
NATIONAL TOTALS:	 185.93	 34.40	 5.10	 2.95	 13.16	 15.74	 1.88	 265.11
Notes:
1 Lesses/write-offs at Palapye, Serowe & Nahalapye are non-WFP coøodities.
2 Maize Milk is a blend of iaize ieai and 10% 05K.
3 In all cases, the Regional depot losses have been subsuied under their local depot losses. No data available
for depots in Sebele Region.
Sources:
NF1' data: FRO Quarterly Progress Reports to NF1', 1985. Other data drawn fros Condeination Certificates kept at
Palapye Region FED depots.
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it does not reflect the true extent of losses during
1985. 10 To account for these other losses not shown in the
reports to WFP, we have included additional data from
Palapye Region only drawn from Condemnation Certificates
kept on file in individual depots. Table 3.16 overleaf
shows losses for 1986, and combines the usual WFP
Quarterly Reports data with that indicated in stock
analysis ledgers from individual district depots. The
high rate of loss at Francistown in 1986 is very marked
and provides a stark contrast to the low rates in its
District Depots which had suffered high losses the
previous year due to gross overstocking. Francistown's
losses can not be attributed solely to lack of storage
capacity which was adequate throughout the year and
additional warehouse space is always available for hire
in this busy town, second in size only to Gaborone
itself. Rather they are attributable to poor stock
management and rotation, and the general failure to
fumigate storerooms after heavy insect infestation
(Chotani 1988). These figures probably underestimate the
actual magnitude of losses. The low incidence of loss at
Lobatse, and the absence of any loss at Sebele Region is
more likely an indication of non-reporting of losses and
write-offs in the depots' monthly reports.
Data for losses in 1987 and 1988 is shown in Table 3.17
which then follows. Unlike the previous two tables, it
indicates losses and write-offs on a regional basis only,
being drawn not from individual district depot reports
but from the monthly reports made by the regional
officers themselves. The data include commodities from
the VG, schools' and RADs' programmes, and from all
donors and government stocks (i.e. not just WFP
commodities).
10 As Clay & Singer (1985) note, 'Developient assistance agencies and N(s are operating under forial accounting
require.ents, which cannot accoiodate visible evidence of iiproper practice s . The saie applies to recipient
governients, also.
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TABLE 3,16: RECORDED COMMODITY LOSSES/WRITE-OFF AT FED DEPOTS, 1986. (METRIC TONNES)1
DEPOT NAME	 ICSM	 S0RGllt	 MAIZ	 DEN	 MAIZE	 VEG.OIL	 BEANS	 TOTALS
MILK2'
PALAPYE REGION:
Palapye	 0.00	 0.10	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.67	 8.05	 9,81
Serowe	 0.02	 0.69	 0.00	 0.50	 0.66	 0.59	 3.60	 6.07
Mahalapye	 0.00	 0,00	 0.00	 0.05	 0.24	 0.31	 9.00	 9.59
Selebe-Pbiki	 20.91	 2.65	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.36	 15.15	 40.07
Regional Totals:	 20.93	 3.44	 0.00	 0.54	 0.90	 3.94	 35.80	 65,55
FRANCISTOWN REGION:
Francistown	 90.70	 193,18	 52.90	 0.00	 0.00'	 0.00	 17.55	 354.33
Tutume	 0,84	 0.00	 0.05	 0.00	 1.29	 0.13	 1.15	 3.46
Letlhakane	 0.82	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 2.61	 0.00	 3.42
Maun	 0,48	 0.10	 1.05	 0.00	 0.00	 0.66	 0.00	 2.29
Kasane	 3.74	 0.00	 0.00	 0.29	 0.00	 0.68	 13.10	 17.81
Regional Totals:	 96.57	 193.28	 54.00	 0.29	 1.29	 4.08	 31.80	 381.31
LOBATSE REGION:
Lobatse	 1.36	 0.00	 0.00	 0.14	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.50
K.anye	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Tshabong	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Hukuntsi	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Ghanzi	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Regional Totals:	 1.36	 0.00	 0.00	 0.14	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.50
SEBELE REGION:
Sebele	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Molepolole	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Mochudi	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Regional Totals:	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
NATIONAL TOTALS: 	 118.87	 196.72	 54.00	 0.96	 2.19	 8.01	 67,60	 448.37
Notes:
1 This data ap1ies to all donated couodities and Governient stock.
2 Maize Milk is a blend of iaize ieal and 10% DEN.
Sources: PRO Stock Analysis Ledgers, 1986 for Palapye & Francistown data. Lobatse and Sebele data froa FED
Quarterly Reports to WFP, 1986.
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TABLE 3.17: RE(X)RDED Cc*fl)DITY LOSSES/WRITE-OFFS BY FRD REGION,
1987-88. (rl'r)
REGION	 ICSM/t1 SORGHUM	 DSM VEG.OIL BEANS	 1UI'AIS
1987
PALAPYE	 5.730	 0.000	 0.000 0.090 123.950 129.770
FRANCISTc*JN 211.500	 16.820	 0.150 48.190 180.000 456.660
LOBATSE	 125.710	 8.880	 0.000 1.277	 19.300 155.167
SEBELE	 158.975	 152.735	 4.045 34.203	 10.950 360.908
IUrALS:	 501.915	 178.435	 4.195 83.760 334.200 1102.505
1988
PALAPYE	 133.990	 17.360	 0.046 0.400	 78.200 229.996
FRANCISTOWN 43.269	 7.700	 0.000 5.653	 35.700	 92.322
LOBATSE	 337.283	 237.280	 4.606 0.400	 51.500 631.069
SEBELE	 74.889	 212.370	 0.000 20.106 103.750 411.115
TorALS:	 589.431	 474.710	 4.652 26.559 269.150 1364.502
Notes:
1) This data applies to all donated coninodities and Government stock.
2) Around 250 nit. of the beans lost in 1987 were part of a bilateral
donation from Canada which had a high moisture content on arrival,
and subsequently started to germinate.
Sources:
FRD Stock Analysis Ledgers and Regional Stock Reports 1987-8.
The losses indicated here should be considered as
conservative estimates, as some depot managers avoided
declaring the full extent of losses until periodic visits
by the Supplies' Department inspector forced them to
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update their stock analysis ledgers. 11 This applies
particularly to Francistown region in 1987.
Losses for 1987 and 1988 are considerably higher than for
1986, even allowing for the fact that around 250 mt. of
the beans written-off in 1987 were in poor condition on
arrival. The high rate of losses for 1988 was due, at
least in part, by the gross overstocking in some depots
which was exacerbated by the lower distribution
requirements after the drought. However, the primary
responsibility for the heavy losses must rest with the
depot managers themselves, and the regional officers who
were their immediate supervisors.' 2 These criticisms could
be levelled at several Depots staffed by Supplies
Department personnel, whose course training content
assumed that all stores are inanimate and durable. As
such, many have received little or no specific training
in food management or storage, and had no experience of
the loading and routing of vehicles, basic personnel
administration or knowledge of the objectives of the
drought relief programme.
In a questionnaire produced as part of a staff training
programme in 1988, it emerged that out of 20 Storekeepers
who responded, 10 had received no formal training of any
sort by the Supplies Department, and an additional 4 had
received training of only four weeks' duration or less
(Chotani 1988, Table 4.6, iii). What makes Francistown's
case in 1986 particularly surprising is that such a
situation was allowed to develop in the presence of a
senior Supplies Officer at the Regional Depot. However,
the poor level of management in the District Depots was
Personal observation in several depots and ftc. correspondence with Supplies' Departient inspectors in Central
District.
12 The UNVa role was not a supervisory but an advisory one, The NLGL and FP were quite clear in this regard,
although the UNV was often looked upon by both parties as responsible for the success or failure of the relief
operation. This was quite an unenviable position to be in.
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not solely attributable to the lack of training:
"Though a handful of Depot Managers and one of
the Regional Officers performed very well, the
others were poorly trained and poorly
motivated. Some were too weak to stand up to
the demands of their drivers. Several had
severe drinking problems. Thus it continued to
appear that the FRD was being used as a
"dumping ground" by the Department of Supplies
for its problem staff. When the additional
depots were created in the first months of the
Programme, none of the new Depot Managers
performed well and two were undoubtedly
alcoholics" (Borton 1984, p.66).
Though this situation improved dramatically after 1985,
training courses first initiated by a FAO Nutritionist in
Gaborone, and from then onwards held on a regular.basis
by the UNVs, showed that few Depot Managers were prepared
to involve themselves in the day to day supervision of
the storage and rotation of stocks, and tended to leave
this to junior office staff and the Storekeepers. Many
were unable to complete the monthly stock reports which
were routinely sent from their depots each month, filled
in by their Storekeepers.13
By 1987, all Depots had been expanded or rebuilt to give
a storage capacity sufficient for two months' supply
(based on the average number of beneficiaries served by
each Depot), though Francistown still relied on rented
warehouse space for about one-half of its capacity. Maun
for example, now boasted a capacity of 800 nit which was
a great improvement over its previous facility.
Though the District Depots were designed to store two
months' supply of each commodity from the Regional Depot,
13 Personal observation. The poor standard of reporting, accounting and auditing of WFP conodities is not liiited
to Botswana alone. In the Turkana Rehabilitation Prograue in Kenya, for exaiple, physical stock levels were
consistently lower than those recorded in the ledgers. The project was criticised in this regard by a teai of
external auditors,(WFPIFAO et al, 1988a, p.69).
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those that were railhead depots and receiving their
stocks direct from ports in South Africa, or by rail from
neighbouring countries,' 4 still had insufficient capacity.
A factor that had been overlooked by the planners was
that these depots often received rail shipments of a
single commodity that were equivalent to four months
supply or more, and that the donated food did not arrive
in convenient instalments of two months' duration. When
two or more different shipments were arriving
simultaneously, it often meant that the warehouse quickly
became full to capacity.
With FRD head office reluctant to commit itself to the
long term hire of additional warehouse space (which it
felt would be hard to justify to the MLGL as its own new
Depots neared completion), it was left to the Depot
Managers to store any further commodities that arrived
outside the warehouse in the compound. However, due to
the fact that FRD HQ had failed to provide adequate
pallets, poles and tarpaulins with which to do this, a
substantial amount of food was damaged by rain or insect
infestation.
Some Depot Managers, in an attempt to ensure that at
least their grain was stored inside the warehouse,
routinely stored shipments of vegetable oil outside in
the compound; where these were in tins rather than
plastic bottles, they soon began to rust and leak. At
Selebe-Phikwe depot in early 1987, some 15000 tins of oil
were affected in this way and had to be transferred to
200 litre drums; approximately 2000 tins (8000 litres)
had to written-off as they had already leaked into the
ground.'5
14 Food was oft8n purchased by both donors and Government from Nalawi and Zimbabwe.
15 Personal observation.
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c) The Distribution of Drought Relief Food.
Despite continuous problems with personnel, the
distributive record of FED during the 1982-88 drought was
a considerable improvement over that of its predecessor,
the IFP. Whilst the IFP had managed a distribution of
17,000 mt. during the thirteen months of the 1979-80
drought, FED had managed in 1982-83 to distribute 27,000
mt., even though the beneficiary groups had been scaled
down (Borton 1984, p.68). As the programme expanded this
was further improved to around 35,000 mt. in 1983-84
(Ibid., p.88), and 39,890 mt. in 1984-85 (UNDP 1985,
p.59). However as we will see later in this section, data
collected from health facilities and FRD depots in 1988
suggest a peak in distributive performance in 1987
followed by quite a marked fall-off in 1988.
An analysis in 1985 of primary health care data collected
between August 1983 and May 1984 revealed that 51.5% of
all children under five years of age in urban areas
received rations of some kind, as did 69.7% of those
living in rural areas, 70% of those living at the
"lands", 73.9% at cattle posts but significantly, only
43.6% of those living on freehold farms (Spaf ford 1985).
The low rate of distribution to freehold farm children,
as we have suggested in previous sections, may be due to
the fact that freehold farm employees responsible for
rations do not order food from FED on a regular basis, or
even that ' FRD foodstuffs may be used to supplement
employees' wages instead of being given to children. In
either case, this finding seems to tie in with the
prevailing high rate of malnutrition that we have already
noted exists on the freehold farms, and appears beyond
the control of the Botswana Government.
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The 1985 survey conducted by UNDP/UNICEF/WHO confirms
that distribution for the VG and schools' programmes on
the whole was "satisfactory". It found that 98% of the
respondent households with children at school reported
receiving take home rations every weekend and holidays,
and 89% of households eligible for health facility
rations reported regular supplies every month (UNDP et al
1985, p.62). But as we have seen with the RADs' programme
in the previous chapter, the aggregate distributive
performance can often hide poor coverage at a District or
even Regional level.
Tables A16 to A30 in the Appendix provide a similar
analysis to that of the RADs' programme, covering the
annual distribution during the period January 1986 to
December 1988. The analysis is by district, region and on
a national basis, with a breakdown by commodity type.
Figures Al to A66 analyse the monthly distributive
performance for the same period, but show aggregate food
requirements and flows for all feeding programmes (i.e.
schools, vulnerable groups' and RADs'). Both Tables and
Figures are based on the same data obtained from FRD
Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly beneficiary reports.
In both cases, food "requirements" (i.e. the quantity of
food needing to be delivered) were calculated on a
monthly basis for each FRD Depot using the preceding
month's reported beneficiary levels, as collected by FRD
on each delivery or from the RADO in the case of RADs'
settlements. Thus the monthly food requirements are based
on beneficiary levels reported from December 1985 to
November 1988 and current ration levels (see Table 3.2).
Tonnages distributed are based on FRD district and
regional stock analysis ledgers and/or monthly reports
for the period January 1986 to December 1988.
The poor performance of FRD in the procuring of
commodities to cover shortfalls in donated food has
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already been mentioned, and the failure of Corn Products
to supply adequate quantities of maize milk during the
early part of the year is clearly seen around March 1986
in the northern regions of Francistown and Palapye.
In 1986, the distributive performance of three Depots
(Kasane, Tutume and Molepolole) was noticeably poorer
than the others. Two Depots out of the three had a poor
performance for both programmes: Tutume Depot for example
distributed only 61.84% of the calculated requirements
for schools and health facilities, and 63.35% for the
RADs' programme, whilst Molepolole distributed 71.73% and
22.60% respectively. These two Depots are among the
largest in the country and it is possible that the
managerial capacity of both the FRD staff and the RADOs
was overstretched. Surprisingly, the small Depot at
Kasane at the northern tip of the country also had a poor
performance during 1986 of 67.65%. The reasons for this
are not immediately obvious: the Depot has a very small
number of beneficiaries, and there are no logistical
constraints in keeping it well stocked.'6 As Kasane Depot
covers Chobe District which was made a drought recovery
zone from June 1985 onwards, it is possible that some
confusion arose as to the correct rations to apply.
Kasane improved somewhat during 1987, but fell again to
below its 1986 distributive performance in 1988.
The conflict that arose between the need to avoid late
deliveries, and at the same time offload new shipments
promptly as and when they arrived (to avoid demurrage
payments) was a regular occurrence at the rail head
depots, and reached a crisis point in Palapye and
Francistown regions during April 1986. As we have seen,
a shortfall of maize milk from Lobatse during the
preceding few months had left many health facilities
16 Kasane is situated on the •ain tarred road northwsrds fro. the regional depot at Francistown, fro. where it
receives all its stocks.
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without food due to the run down of stocks of both ICSM
and maize milk at the Depots. When new shipments of ICSM
finally started arriving in April in quantities well
beyond the of f loading capacity of the FRD Depots, a
difficult decision had to be made. Should the Depots
concentrate on offloading all the railwagons and thus
minimise demurrage charges, or should they devote more of
their time and resources to moving as much of the newly
arrived ICSM to the health facilities, where it was badly
needed? The lack of any directive from FRD HQ allowed the
Regional Officers at Palapye and Francistown to adopt the
conservative, "Supplies' orientated" approach and
offloading continued unabated for a week or more with all
vehicles and personnel tied up in ' this activity. At
Palapye alone, some 600 mt. of ICSM was tallied and
offloaded from the rail wagons onto trucks, transported
to the warehouse, of f loaded again, stacked and recounted,
with no deliveries being made at all during this period.17
By contrast, the FRD Manager at the railhead Depot of
Mahalapye, faced with the prospect of of floading almost
500 mt of ICSM into her own relatively small warehouse,
adopted the novel solution of issuing to the health
facilities direct from the railwagons. She did this by
using FRD, CTO, District Council and privately hired
vehicles, all of which offloaded direct from the
railwagons and were then issued with a dispatch note for
delivery to the village health facilities within the sub-
district. This completely eliminated the need for
offloading and stacking at the warehouse and the
consequent need to reload the vehicles at the time of
delivery. In this way, Mahalapye mana ged to move 265 mt.
of ICSM to its health facilities during the month of
April, compared to only 42 mt. at Palapye, and the
operation was perhaps the nearest the programme ever got
during this period to warranting the description
17 Personal observation and Palapye Stock Analysis registers.
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"emergency drought relief." These efforts, together with
the poor response to the crisis at Palapye and elsewhere,
went unnoticed at FRD HQ which tended to take "action"
over late or non-delivery only if the matter was raised
in Parliament, reported on Radio Botswana, or in the
newspapers 18
In all four FRD regions there was a steady improvement in
distributive performance during 1987 compared with 1986.
As with the analysis of the RADs' programme in the
previous chapter, we have more detailed data on stock
levels and food movements for 1987 and 1988 than for
1986. This provides a clearer insight into why certain
depots performed • less well than others.'9 As with our
previous analysis of the RADs' programme, we will limit
our comments to the more salient points that arise out of
Tables A21 to A30.
By far the worst distribution in 1987 was from Sebele
depot, at an overall level of 62.97%. The region as a
whole seems to have been short of sorghum during the
first four months of the year, and after supplying
Mochudi and Molepolole this left inadequate stocks at the
regional depot for Sebele itself. A similar poor
performance with stocks of CSM is not so easy to explain:
stocks of CSM were adequate for most of the year but
Sebele never distributed it in sufficient quantities. In
December, with 981.40 mt of CSM in stock at the regional
depot (also situated at Sebele), the district depot only
managed a distribution of 20.70 mt.of CSM, compared to a
18 Personal observation,
19 But not a coiplete picture. Stock levels for each conodity are reported at the end of each calendar .onth
by the districts, and are collated in the regional stock reports. However, they do not provide data on food
receipts and transfers the ionth. The development of an iiproved reporting and .onitoring systel is
discussed in soie detail later in this section.
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calculated requirement for the month of 153.90 mt. 2° A
similar picture emerges in the distribution of vegetable
oil from Sebele, which was only 63.22% over the year. In
April only 9.9 mt. of oil was distributed despite stocks
of 60.1 mt. in the district depot at the end of March; in
December only 29 mt. was distributed with existing
stocks of 28.10 mt. at the end of November.
A marked deterioration in FRD distributive performance
occurred during 1988, even though the overall
distributive performance by FRD to the health facilities
and schools remained generally higher than for the RADs
settlements (administered by the RADOs and shown in
Appendix Tables Al to A15). As we have already
postulated, the absence of the four UNVs during 1988 may
have had a bearing on this performance, and the rapid
declaration in 1988 of recovery zones, the medical
selection of beneficiaries and the disappearance of some
categories altogether will have added to the confusion,
However, a direct comparison of the two programmes'
effectiveness (measured purely on the basis of the
percentage of requirements actually supplied) could be
misleading. While requirements for the VG and schools'
programmes decreased during 1988 (because of medical
selection), requirements for the RADs' programme actually
increased due to the rise in the number of recorded
beneficiaries. The fact that the distributive performance
of the two programmes are almost the same (70.69% and
68.50% for the VG/Schools' and RADs' respectively) masks
the much improved tonnage moved by the RADOs during the
Based on the nuiber of reported beneficiaries in Noveiber 1987 as recorded in Sebeles regional report for
that ionth.
21 Stock levels obtained froi Sebele regional reports, The regional depot stocks of oil for the two periods were
236.50 it. and 130,90 it. respectively.
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year. 22 The one major caveat that must be reiterated after
such an interpretation is that starvation occurs at a
micro level and during the same year, for example,
Francistown's distributive performance for the RADs'
programme was only 45.51% compared with the previous year
of 89.46%.
Starting with Palapye region, Mahalapye district depot
appears to have performed particularly badly in 1988,
compared with a particularly good attainment in 1986 and
1987. Distribution of CSM and sorghum (the main
commodities in the VG and Schools' programmes) reached
only 67.29% and 64.81% of their requirements
respectively. Distribution of CSM in July for example
was only 1.20 mt. despite stocks of 934.37 mt. at the end
of June; distribution in August and September was 9.62
mt. and 5.47 mt., with the previous month's stocks
remaining high at 933.16 mt. and 924.45 mt. respectively.
Though monthly requirements during this period were
falling, due to medical selection and the consequent
reduced number of beneficiaries, distribution still fell
significantly below acceptable levels. 23 With sorghum, the
fall-off in performance can be traced to around August
onwards. Distribution of sorghum during August was zero,
even though stocks of 91.50 mt. remained in the warehouse
at the end of July, and the depot received new stocks
during the month which left a closing balance at the end
of August of 368.60 mt. In the following three months
distribution remained well below the calculated
requirements. During this three month period, stocks of
sorghum were 680.15 mt. at the end of September, 639.55
mt. at the end of October, 616.75 mt. at the end of
November, and 618.00 mt. at the end of December. Despite
The gross tonnage iovedin the RABs' prograuein 1988 was 4761,32 it., co.pared with 2838.46 ut in 1986 and
3497.24 at. in 1987.
23 Palaype regional stock reports.
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these stocks, distribution of sorghum in December again
fell to zero.24
Again, the reason for this is not immediately clear. One
contributory factor was that the depot manager at
Mahalapye (who had performed very well in 1986 and 1987)
was transferred to another depot in 1988. She was
replaced by a relatively inexperienced officer from the
Supplies' Department who may have had difficulty managing
a busy rail-head depot even with a greatly reduced
beneficiary load. However, a closer look at the stock
reports for Mahalapye in 1988 suggests that the poor
distribution was more likely due to the gross over-supply
to the depot itself. By the end of March the depot had
stocks of 908 mt., with a total storage capacity of
around 850 mt. Stocks had grown to 1440 mt. by the end of
May, to 1425 mt. by the end of August, to 1753 mt. by the
end of September, to 1959 mt. by the end of October, to
2013 mt. by the end of November, and stood at 1763 mt. at
the end of the year. From August onwards, Mahalapye had
more stocks than the regional and district depots in
Palapye which had a combined storage capacity in excess
of 2000 mt., more staff and more vehicles,25
With all the available vehicles and labour tied up with
of floading at the ralihead, it is not surprising that
deliveries fell behind schedule. The depot manager and
storekeeper will have spent most of their time tallying
the new stock, much of which will have had to be stored
outside the already overcrowded warehouse. This would
have involved ordering extra tarpaulins and pallets from
FRD HQ in Gaborone, a lengthy and often fruitless
procedure. 26
24 Palapye regional sthck reports.
25 Palapye regional reports.
26 Personal observation. Tarpaulins ordered in 198? for the regular FRD fleet of I it, vehicles took two .onths
to arrive and turned out to be for 5 it. trucks.
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What happened in Mahalapye in 1988 therefore was a repeat
performance of the 1986 episode described above, when
most of the distribution in the region was halted due to
the arrival of large stocks of CSM. What made the
situation in 1988 more difficult to cope with was that
beneficiary figures and food requirements were falling,
and it was therefore not feasible to divert excess stocks
directly from the railhead to schools and health
facilities as before.
In Francistown region, distribution to schools in
Francistown itself appears to have been very poor during
1988. Supplies of sorghum were particularly low at 46.48%
despite more than adequate stocks at the regional depot,
and a similar stock position existed for beans and DSM
throughout the year. Distribution of sorghum from Kasane
depot was also low at 46.35%. Distribution was zero in
June despite stocks of 20.95 mt. at the end of May (the
calculated monthly requirement at that time was just
8.955 mt.). Distribution in July was only 1.00 mt., in
August 0.30 mt., in September 6.15 mt., in October 4.55
mt., in November 0.50 mt., and in December fell again to
zero. During the whole of this period stocks of all
commodities were more than adequate to meet requirements.
In Lobatse region, Lobatse district depot appears to have
had a very low distributive performance for all
commodities except CSM, which was high at 91.29%.
Distribution of sorghum was exceptionally poor at only
26.45% and no distribution at all took place during the
months of July, October and December, notwithstanding
adequate stocks throughout the period. Distribution of
beans was also poor by Lobatse. During the year, monthly
distribution to schools was often as low as 0.1
mt.(February, April and October) or even 0.05 mt.
(July), which equates to 1 or 2 bags against a calculated
average monthly requirement of around 6.3 mt.! In the
last quarter of the year, it appears that stocks of beans
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was low throughout the region and distribution in
December was zero.
At Tshabong, distribution of sorghum flour appears to
have proceeded well until the end of June when stocks
were exhausted. In July and August distribution was zero
and the regional stock reports indicate that only 3.5 mt.
was supplied by Lobatse during this two month period
(monthly requirements averaged around 11.4 mt.). In
September, the depot received fresh stocks from Lobatse
regional depot and managed to recover some lost ground by
distributing 20.8 mt., but by the end of November stocks
had again fallen to just 0.5 mt., none of which was
distributed during December. The regional depot was
clearly negligent during the latter half of the year in
not supplying adequate stocks to the depot, and this
resulted in an overall distributive performance for
sorghum of just 46.23%.
Ghanzi depot also had a poor distributive record for
sorghum flour for 1988 at only 39.76%. The supply from
the regional depot up to May was sporadic and unplanned,
and stocks at the end of that month was only 4.3 mt. with
a monthly requirement of around 18 mt. Distribution in
June was only 0.2 mt. or 4 bags, and was zero in October
and December. As with Tshabong the supply from Lobatse
was completely inadequate to meet requirements, and the
regional reports for September and October both indicate
the sorghum stocks at Ghanzi were exhausted. In November,
Lobatse transferred a meagre 10 mt. to the depot despite
the fact that sorghum stocks at the regional depot had
been over 1200 mt. for the previou8 three months.
There were problems with the distribution of sorghum in
Hukuntsi depot too, with no deliveries in February,
November and December. This, together with shortfalls in
distribution in other months, gave a distribution of only
52.21% of requirements. Again, this appears to have been
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at least partly due to insufficient stocks being sent to
the depot, or sent on an unscheduled day of the month
after the depot manager's own planned delivery to the
local schools.27
Sebele region had the worst distributive performance of
all the regions in 1988, as in the previous two years.
With only three depots, it is the smallest region in
terms of area, and presents fewer logistical problems as
two out of the three depots have their own railhead. In
1988 there were no stock shortages in the region serious
enough to cause any major fall in distributive
performance compared with the previous two years. The
regional depot's proximity to Gaborone simplified many of
the administrative barriers which in other more remote
depots had become binding constraints on distributive
performance. More than 57% of the region's food
requirements is accounted for by Molepolole depot, and as
a consequence the distributive performance of the region
taken as a whole depends to a great extent on the
administrative competence of the depot manager there. In
1988, although Molepolole performed better than the other
depots in its region both absolutely and relatively, the
actual amount of food moved was still unacceptably low in
comparison with requirements.
Figures Al to A66 trace how closely distribution matched
actual requirements during the period 1986-1988. The most
outstanding characteristic of drought relief food
movements illustrated by these graphs is the cyclical
nature of the food distribution, even in those Depots
where the aggregate distribution over the year was
Depot ianagers very often planned their deliveries to schools and health facilities separately, This .eant that
deliveries to schools would go ahead using whatever stocks of sorghum, beans, DSK and oil that available at the
scheduled time and shortfall would have to be •ade up the following month, i.e. they were not made up with a
subsequent delivery to the sate village of VG conodities later in the month. This 'separation of the two
programmes, as with the RAJ)s' programmes, was a major logistical constraint that will be discussed later in the
section.
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satisfactory, with a wide variation in the level of
supply seemingly completely uncoordinated with actual
food requirements. This phenomenon can be attributed as
much to the unplanned nature of the established food
procurement and distribution systems as to the competence
of the individual Depot Manager. It is probably most
pronounced in Kasane depot, which had a particularly poor
distributive performance over the three year period.
Although this depot has only one 7 mt. truck, its
distribution requirements are very low and there is a CTO
unit in Kasane that can be called upon for spare vehicles
if required. There is no logical reason why the depot did
not move its relief food in sufficient quantities. The
cyclical nature of actual distribution suggests that on
alternate months the truck must have been standing idle
for most of the time.28
There were however, more fundamental problems associated
with the distribution system throughout the 1982-88
drought. Firstly, though an experienced and capable
Logistics Officer was seconded to FRD HQ from WFP during
1986, 29 his main role lay in procurement, and in
coordinating food movements along the line of rail depots
with both WFP and other bilateral donors. The need for
logistic support and planning outside Gaborone tended to
be overlooked and, as a consequence, the actual business
of transporting food from the Depots to the schools and
health facilities was neglected and never formed an
official part of the training of FRD staff at either
District or Regional levels. One example of this was the
decision, taken quite arbitrarily at FRD HQ in early
1986, to put the schools and health facilities on 45 and
28 Kasane depot distributed less than one truck load of relief food in February, April, June and August of 1986,
April, August and Deceiber of 1987, and August and Deceuber 1988. See Figures AlO, A31 and A53.
29 This expatriate officer's secondient was teruinated by FRD after just one year in Deceuber 1986, and no
replaccient was requested fro. WFP by the Ministry,
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30 days supply cycles respectively. The decision was
taken without prior consideration of whether it would
provide a more efficient and cost effective method of
transporting food than existing schedules, or whether the
new schedules were physically possible given the existing
manpower and vehicle constraints. In fact, at no stage
was it appreciated that few depots, if any, had viable
transport schedules in any case, and most appeared to
move food on an ad hoc basis. This is not to say that
some Depots' transport systems did not function quite
well, but rather that in the absence of any workable
directives from FRD HQ, the performance of each Depot
depended on the personal commitment, ability and
knowledge of the key personnel involved. When these key
personnel were absent, the whole "system" quickly broke
down and the supply fell behind schedule, because the
rest of the office staff did not how to operate it. The
situation was not so far removed from that existing in
the 1979-80 drought, when
"IFP deliveries to health facilities, primary
schools and villages were unplanned,
uncoordinated and very wasteful. No depot had
a planned system of deliveries. Some districts
delivered first to all the health posts, then
to all the primary schools, and finally to
village stores, without attempts to combine
loads (Gooch & MacDonald, 1981, p,l9).
The decision to have a standardised system of 30 and 45
day supply schedules served to endorse the separate
delivery of food commodities of the two programmes, thus
increasing the number of trips required to each village
and raising transportation costs, whereas instead it
should have sought their combination wherever possible.
What was	 really	 required was	 a	 standardised
transportation system which would have the following
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three main objectives:
I.To iron out cyclical fluctuations of supply in each
individual Depot. The situation was that where one
month the transport and manpower were overstretched,
the next month they were under-utilised. This was
particularly important in rail head Depots where new
shipments could arrive, and did, during the very
months when the maximum number of deliveries were due
to be made. In such cases, FRD vehicles were
inevitably tied up with of uloading at the railway
station and deliveries fell behind schedule. A
rational use of FRD vehicles would also allow for the
possibility of pooling vehicles from two or more
depots at peak periods where off loading at railhead
was in progress.3°
II.To base delivery schedules, wherever possible, on the
combined beneficiary loadings of health facilities
and primary schools for each village, rather than on
a potentially wasteful system of an individual
programme supply. The system should take into
consideration basic logistical planning methods by
looking at transport use by geographic area, rather
than centre type, as is presently the case. As the
weight of rations issued to beneficiaries at both
schools and health facilities is the same 31 at
6.75kg. per month, it becomes a relatively simple
matter to treat both centres on an equal basis for
delivery purposes even though the commodities
30 The pooling of vehicles was carried out at Palapye railhead on occasions, albeit in an ad hoc fashion. tf
Serowe's .onthly distribution plan was iade out of phase with Palapye's, this left a pool of available vehicles
for offloading at the railhead when Palapye's own vehicles were distributing to schools and health facilities.
Serowe's vehicles and labourers would travel the 45 km. to Palapye and help ofuload the relief food into the
regional warehouse, returning to Serowe with their last load for their own warehouse.
31 See Table 3.2, The Direct Feeding component can safely be i gnored for weight purposes.
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supplied differ in each case. 32 Supplying both types
of centre at the same time and for the same period
(to minimise the number of trips required) can be
continued even when beneficiary levels fluctuate; in
such cases the supply period is adjusted to maintain
an optimum load on the delivery vehicle.
III.To base actual transport schedules not arbitrarily on
30 or 45 day supply periods, but on the storage
capacity at individual schools and health facilities,
and on the optimum load of the delivery vehicles
used, taking into consideration prevailing road and
weather conditions.
There were other, more mundane features of the FRD food
distribution system that also contributed towards its
habitual inefficiency and inertia. The most significant
of these was the logistical function of the Regional
Depots vis-a-vis their district and sub-district depots.
The original role of the four Regional Depots envisaged
that they would form the administrative centres of the
Department outside Gaborone, and, with their extra
storage capacity, provide a "buffer stock" for the
satellite depots in the Districts. As a consequence, the
Regional Depots were each staffed with senior
administrative officers from the Supplies' Department
cadre.
The Regional Officers were responsible for the timely and
efficient movement of food to all the schools and health
facilities in their Region, and the storage of RADs'
commodities for later collection and distribution by the
RADOs. They were the most senior representatives of the
FRD outside the Head Office and it was intended that they
would play an important role in providing a liaison with
32 This also could apply, in iany cases, to deliveries to RADs' settleaents,
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the District Commissioner, Drought Coordinator, and
District Drought Committee.
In this role they were ill-equipped and badly supported
by FRD HQ, who provided only a typist and typewriter and
little else by the way of office equipment or even
stationery. This was not due to financial constraints,
but rather to short-sightedness at FRD HQ, where the
dominant opinion was that the sole activity of the
Department outside Gaborone lay simply in moving bags of
food from one place to another. 33 Unlike other Government
departments, FRD could boast of only one duplicating and
one photocopying machine in the whole of the country,
(both in the Head Office), which were rarely in working
order. As all seventeen District Depots had to produce
periodic written reports that required a wide circulation
(such as progress reports presented at drought committee
meetings), they had to be typed, stencilled and
photocopied on machines at other Government offices or
schools. This had a significant impact on the morale of
the staff working at the District Depots and their status
in the eyes of other Government departments.
Until the construction of the new warehouses from 1985
onwards, Regional and District stocks were stored
together in Francistown, Palapye, Lobatse and Sebele, but
accounted for separately using different stock analysis
registers. As separate records also needed to be kept for
each donor, it meant that up to 40 different stock
analysis registers could be in use at any one time.
Donations of USA manufactured vegetable oil for example
could arrive as part of the WFP Project 324 programme, or
as part of a bilateral package under USAID auspices. In
both cases the oil arrived in identical packaging but had
WFP provided FRO generous capital grants for office and warehouse equipaent which was never allocated to the
Regions and as a consequence reiained largely underspent.
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to be accounted for separately; at the Regional depots
this required four stock analysis registers for the one
commodity: two for each depot, and in each depot, one for
each donor. As the Regional warehouses were intended to
act as supply depots to the District Depots, and
additionally hold surplus buffer stocks, they were not
supposed to issue food direct to schools and health
facilities, but merely to transfer stocks to the District
Depots.
When Palapye District Depot for example, ran out of ICSM,
a transfer was made from the Regional stocks. Though this
was a transfer on paper only, and the stocks of ICSM were
never moved physically (both Regional and District stocks
were stored together) it did however markedly increase
the amount of paperwork required, and with •that, the
likelihood of accounting errors. These errors were
common, with one or both of the depots usually omitting
to record the transfer in their respective stock analysis
registers and monthly reports.
When the warehouse storage capacity was expanded and it
became possible for the first time to keep Regional and
District stocks physically separate, the same accounting
procedures were maintained, with Regional stocks being
kept purely for transfers to other depots and the
District Depot issuing to the feeding centres. In
practise, however, once the District Depot had exhausted
its old stock following the "First in, first out"
principle of food management, it then had to turn to the
Regional warehouse for its next supply. As there was
little point in physically moving the new stock from the
Regional warehouse to the District warehouse, a paper
transfer was made so that future deliveries to the
feeding centres could be made direct from the Regional
warehouse and drawing from these stocks.
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As the Regional warehouse now contained the oldest stocks
as well as the most recent, issues continued to made
direct from there. With the arrival of new shipments, the
Regional Depot was gradually filled to capacity and the
new stock had to be stored in the District depot, from
where, as it was new stock, it could not be issued! In
some cases, the rotation of stock was neglected and the
staff were unsure about which stacks of food should be
issued first. This must have been a major contributory
factor to food wastage (particular at Francistown) as
old stocks became infested.34
Although the roles of both the Regional and District
depots was now for all practical purposes either reversed
or conjoined, which obviated the need for maintaining
separate stocks and stock analysis registers, the
integration of the Regional and the local District depot
stocks was never discussed or considered by FRD HQ and
continued to cause accounting problems throughout the
duration of the drought. In Palapye, the Regional depot
was still considered to hold the "buffer" stocks for the
District depots even though two had th3ir own railhead
and received their food stocks direct, and on several
occasions had supplied Palapye with food when its own
stocks were low.
The Regional Officers were also responsible for the
timely compilation of monthly reports which collated
beneficiary figures, issues and stock levels submitted by
the District depots. This reporting format was designed
by the UNVs and the WFP Logistics Officer in early 1986
and was intended to form the basis of FRD's own reports
to its parent Ministry and the donors. The Regional
report was an important one in that it calculated the
monthly food requirements for each commodity (i.e. how
much needed to be distributed that month) at each
See Tables 3.15, 3,16 & 3.17.
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District depot in metric tonnes, the total amounts
required for the Region, and the stock availability of
each commodity in months at each depot. By reconciling
all food flows within the Region as well as
inter-regional food transfers, it also provided a check
on the individual monthly reports produced by the
District depots.
Because of the complexity of calculating food
requirements with so many different ration levels, the
Regional Officers were unwilling to attempt the
completion of the report on a regular basis, and left the
task to the UNVs. 35 The Regional Officers also found it
difficult to reconcile the Regional stock movements (both
issues and transfers) particularly if errors had been
introduced via the District depot reports.
In Palapye region, the UNV Regional Advisor designed a
computerised spreadsheet which simplified many of the
problems of completing the monthly regional report, and
at the same time allowed a fairly sophisticated degree of
analysis of the performance of the food distribution
network. The spreadsheet package was used in Palapye
region throughout 1986 and 1987, but not by the Regional
Advisors in other regions because of the lack of
computers. 36 The main features of the package included the
following:
I.The calculation of the total number of beneficiaries
for each category and programme type by each district
depot, with regional totals. All that was required
was that the operator input the number of
beneficiaries for each beneficiary category and
programme, using data which already formed the basis
Personal experience as the IJNV Regional Advisor for Palapye. Ny IJHV colleagues in Francistown, Lobatse and
Sebele had ajijiar experiences.
36 The coiputer used in Palapye Region belonged to the IJNV.
The Management of the 1982-88 Drought	 334
of the district depot reports. The percentage change of
each category of beneficiary from the previous
month's figures is also indicated. This is useful in
assessing trends in levels of malnutrition, primary
school enrolment, and migratory movements.
II.The calculation of food requirements in metric tonnes
by commodity and programme type for each district
depot, with regional totals. This was performed
automatically as the current beneficiaries were
entered into the spreadsheet, using current ration
levels and the specified time period. The current
daily ration levels for each programme (VG, schools'
and RADs'), for each ration type (urban or rural),
and for each beneficiary category (Pregnant Women,
Pre-School, Destitutes, etc.) could be input
separately, expressed in grammes. The spreadsheet
needed the facility of using different ration levels
for each category of beneficiary to accommodate
possible revisions in future drought relief
programmes affecting individual categories or
groups. 37 It was also possible to calculate food
requirements for any given time period in days,
though for the purpose of the regional report a
period of 30 days was the norm, as distribution was
planned on a monthly basis.
III.The calculation of issues (distribution) and stock
levels in metric tonnes. This was another potential
source of error in the stock analysis ledgers, where
commodities were always expressed in units rather
than weight. Some commodities arrived in a variety of
different unit weights, which made calculation in
Revisions to the level of rations applicable to destitutes for exaiple, were in fact iade during 1981.
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metric tonnes difficult. 38 For this part of the
computerised report, the operator simply entered the
total number of units of each weight and type, which
were then converted to metric tonnes, with totals by
commodity type. For the report to accurately reflect
the actual flows of food to and between depots and
from thenceforth to the end distribution points, all
data had to be expressed nett. For example, if one
hundred 50 kg. bags of sorghum (5 mt.) were delivered
to a particular school but 20 similar bags were
returned to the depot rotten or infested, the nett
delivery was entered as 80 bags, or 4 mt.
IV.Calculation of nett receipts at the regional and
district depots in metric tonnes, using the same
method of data entry as for issues and stock levels.
This was another important part of the spreadsheet
which was not actually reflected in the manual
version of the regional report. It was useful to know
the nett receipts of relief commodities arriving at
each depot to able to assess the stock availability
in any given month. 39 If for example Mahalapye
requires an average of 50 mt. of maize-meal per month
for the RADs' programme, and the delivery schedule
from Corn Products in Lobatse is meeting these
requirements in full, this does not necessarily mean
that Mahalapye has enough maize-meal stocks for the
RADs'. If Serowe and Selebe-Phikwe delivery schedules
for the same commodity are not being met in full,
they will naturally arrange to take some of
Mahalapye's stocks. Thus the nett receipts (i.e.
receipts minus transfers) needs to be monitored to
38 Vegetable oil for exuple arrived at various times in 1,82kg., 2,27kg., 3.5kg., 3.6kg.,3.lkg.,4,5kg,, and
9.2kg. unit weights. It was not unusual for depots to have most, if not all, of these commodities in stock at
any one time. A separate stock analysis ledger was kept for each item.
This was particularly true of railhead depots, which received stock for their own use but also for transfer
to other depots by road.
The Management of the 1982-88 Drought	 336
ensure that food flows to individual depots are
sufficient. Over the year, this data is particularly
useful in assessing whether regional depots are
supplying adequate stocks to their satellite depots
in the districts. It is, of course, also equally
useful in determining whether FRD HQ and the various
donors scheduling of food shipments to the regional
and other railhead depots is on time and in the
correct amounts. The regional nett receipts matrix on
the computer spreadsheet also helped in tracing
errors, losses and omissions from the individual
district depots.40
V.Calculation of the distributive performance for the
month (based on the previous month's reported
beneficiary figures) of each commodity by comparing
the calculated requirements with quantities actually
distributed. This analysis covered each district
depot and the region as a whole. The stock
availability of each commodity expressed in months
was also indicated for each depot and the region.
By the inclusion of data on food requirements and stock
availability, the report facilitated the procurement,
allocation and distribution of food shipments to the
railhead depots. As the report format also calculated the
food requirements, the possibility existed to extend the
analysis from a regional to a national basis. It was
possible for example to conduct a "What if?" analysis
with the spreadsheet by adjusting individual ration
levels and extending the requirement period on the sheet
to 365 days. This could provide the various Ministries
40 For exaiple, let us consider a siiple transfer of 300 bags (15 it,) of beans fro. Nahalapye to 3erowe. In the
regional matrix this would be shown as a negative receipt for Kahalapye and a positive receipt for Serowe, and the
regional nett receipt of beans would balance out to zero. If however, Serowe had failed to enter its receipt in
its stock analysis ledger, the matrix would show a zero entry for Serowe and a corresponding negative figure in
the regional receipts. This would indicate a nett flow out of the region or loss, and point to the likelihood of
an error or omission that could then be rectified.
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and donor agencies involved with annual projections of
food requirements based on the revised ration levels.4'
Unfortunately, FRD HQ was never to exploit this tool of
analysis, despite the availability of funding for
computers for the regional offices from WFP. 42 Unlike
other departments even within the same parent Ministry,
FRD's lack of familiarity with computers led to an active
distrust of such innovations. It is also true to say
that, having suffered much criticism in the past, it was
now reluctant to embark upon any new policy which may
have led to a more open analysis of its operations and
performance. As a consequence, FRD was therefore unable
to assess, in a quantifiable fashion, whether the
individual district depots were achieving an adequate
level of distribution, or indeed, whether their
respective regional depots were supplying them enough
stocks to meet their requirements.
Another significant innovation in the reporting and
monitoring system at the Depots was the introduction of
a register for food deliveries to individual schools and
health facilities, together with the collection of food
by the RADOs. Though food movements of each commodity was
already recorded on a daily basis in the stock analysis
ledgers, the register provided for data organised by end
distribution point.
Such a register existed in a variety of formats in most
depots but it was not until late 1987 that any serious
41 For exanpie, increasing the daily 03K ration froa log, to 12g. in the schools, and reducing the daily vegetable
oil ration from 25g. to 20g. at health facilities would affect the tonnages required of these two commodities over
the coming year. The spreadsheet could provide this data instantly, based on current beneficiary levels, for each
district depot, each region, and nationally, In a siiilar fashion, beneficiary levels could be adjusted either
separately or simultaneously to meet anticipated levels in the coming year to project new food requirements, given
that the ration levels would stay the same.
Personal communication from WFP' s Chief of Operations. WFP' a policy towards capital grants for warehouse and
office equipment was that it would respond only to official requests for such equipment from the Department or
Ministry concerned, i.e. it did not initiate purchases based on its own perceived requirements for the programme.
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consideration was given to its introduction on a national
basis in a standardised format. That such a register was
necessary and desirable was shown by the fact that many
depot managers did not know, on a daily basis, what
deliveries had been made and, more importantly, which
still needed to be made. Because of poor motivation and
lack of training, or managerial incapacity, they were
therefore at a loss as to how to go about planning a
viable and cost effective transport schedule for their
depots.
The format of' the register or "Summary Book" (as it
became known) was simple: it summarised the information
shown on the "Food Receipt" (FR1) form used at the time
of delivery with a separate page for each individual
health facility, school or RADs' settlement. The Food
Receipt form was in two parts: the first was completed by
FRD and detailed the quantity of food being delivered
(based on the latest reported beneficiary figures), the
date of the delivery and the supply period; the second
part of the form was filled in at the feeding centre and
gave the current beneficiary levels by category and was
used as the basis for the next delivery of food. The
Summary Book listed all the information on the Food
Receipt in tabular format and was updated on a daily
basis when the Food Receipts were brought back to the
depot by the drivers.
Used over a period of time, the Summary Book had several
advantages:
I.It provided up to date information in a concise
format to all the depot staff about which feeding
centres or RADs settlements were due for their next
delivery, and thus helped to formalise a transport
schedule which could be applied by any member of the
staff if either the depot Manager or Storekeeper were
absent;
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II.By comparing delivery dates and supply periods (i.e.
the period over which the food was supposed to last,
and by implication, the latest date by which the next
delivery had to be made), late deliveries could be
identified and an assessment made of the depot's
overall distributive performance;
III.As beneficiary figures and quantities of food
supplied were both tabulated on the same line of the
double page entry, checks could be made to ensure
that food requirements were being calculated
correctly;
IV.Beneficiary data could be compared for each category
over time to assess demographic and nutritional
trends or simply as a rough check on whether the
stated levels were realistic.
The Summary Book was therefore a useful managerial tool
and could have been consulted by IMDC and FRD HQ staff
during their periodic field trips to assess the
distributive performance of the District depots, and
whether the RADOs were collecting and delivering food on
a regular basis. It had still, however, not been formally
accepted by FRD HQ by the end of the drought in 1988 and
with the exception of Palapye Region its use had been
sporadic. It is likely therefore that the current
distributive performance of the FRD Depots, and their
delivery to individual feeding points, remain largely
unmonitored and unrecorded, with the attendant risk of
hardship that non-delivery entails.
d) The Effectiveness of the 1986 Programme.
To what extent have the main objectives of the drought
relief programme, introduced in Chapter Five, been met?
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We will now review each of them in turn, and present an
assessment of the programme in these terms:
Objective 1: The supplementation of food supplies as a
preventative measure to reduce the incidence of, and
forestall rises in, malnutrition amongst those groups
considered highly at risk. These comprise the old and
infirm, pre- school children, pregnant and lactating
women, TB patients, destitutes, primary school children,
and those living in remote areas without access th
nonnal services.
Despite the fact that the aggregate performance of the
food distribution system improved considerably over the
duration of the drought, the implementation of the
programme in some geographical areas and amongst certain
ethnic groups remained very poor. Though an assessment of
the human impact of a failure in the food distribution
system must remain subjective, it is reasonable to assume
that the inability of FRD to deliver food rations on time
and in sufficient quantities must have caused severe
economic and nutritional distress in certain remote areas
and social groups. The fact that this distress remains
largely undocumented does not rule out the possibility
that it has resulted in a significant increase in the
mortality rate amongst some sections of the rural poor,
with the cause of death attributable not to acute
starvation, but to chronic malnutrition and consequently
a reduced resistance to disease.
Though a recent report prepared for the FAO stated that
Botswana had less malnutrition than any other drought
affected country in Southern Africa (Mason, Haaga & Test
1984), the evidence we have already presented in this
Chapter suggests that this statement is rather
optimistic, and that there may well be a significant
level of malnutrition in the more remote rural areas that
simply does not appear in the national nutritional
surveillance system, or in any other official statistics.
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The significance of FRD's poor distributive record in
certain rural areas and particularly in the RADs'
programme obviously depends on the contribution that
supplementary rations make to the overall food supply. In
1985, supplementary feeding appeared to be providing on
average between 19% (large villages), and 32% (other
rural areas) of the rural food supply (Eele & Funk 1985).
These figures represent the contribution that rations
made to the food supply of average households; the
contribution made to the poorest households must have
been considerably higher and in both cases will have
increased after 1985 with the cumulative effects of the
drought and the progressive loss of productive assets.
The contribution made by the RADs' ration to household
food supply is very much higher because of the lack of
any alternative means of subsistence. (RoB, Gulbrandsen
et al, 1986, p.1). This makes the poor distributive
record of the RADs' settlements (an analysis of which is
given in Tables Al to A15 in the Appendix) highly
significant and certainly a cause for serious concern.
Given then the importance of the FRD food distribution
system to all beneficiary groups living at, near or below
subsistence levels even in non-drought years, it is
therefore surprising that no efforts were made during the
drought by either FRD or the IMDC to assess distributive
performance in the District depots. This is despite the
assurance in 1985 by the Rural Development Unit of the
MLGL that
"In view of the importance of Early Warning
Indicators for decision making, further efforts
have been made to improve the quality and
coverage of the relevant information systems.
Changes have been introduced to the methods of
data collection in Nutritional Surveillance
aimed at reducing errors, standardising
reporting and improving the presentation of
results. Additional information linking the prevalence of
malnutrition with the incidence of receipt of supplementary
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rations is to be collected." (RoB, Rural Development
Council 1985 p.11). (my italics)
The monitoring of food distribution by FRD does not seem
to have been carried out, except perhaps at the roughest
aggregate level, whereas to have any relevance at all it
should have been carried out at a District and village
level. Here, the FRD Summary Books kept at the District
depots could have been used to determine the continuity
of supply even to individual feeding centres.
The poor calibre of FRD staff has proved to be a
perennial problem and perhaps the greatest constraint on
the effectiveness of the food distribution system. This
is likely to continue until senior FRD personnel and IMDC
begin to formulate management strategies that begin
firstly, to ensure that depot managers are adequately
trained and motivated to carry out the tasks they have
been employed to do; secondly, to measure the quality of
their work by routinely monitoring the distributive
performance of the depots; and thirdly, to provide an
adequate level of logistical backup to the depots in
terms of sufficient quantities of food, storage capacity,
manpower and vehicles.
Objective 2: The supplementation of rural incomes in
order to compensate in part for prodxtion lost due to
drought;
The Labour Based Relief Projects injected relatively
large sums of money into the rural economy in the form of
cash wages, but the per capita income derived from the
LBRP was low by any standards, varied considerably
between different areas, and wages were often delayed by
the poor management of the District Council payment
teams. It is also not known whether participants in the
LBRP were necessarily the poorest groups in the rural
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areas; 43 the number of registered destitutes who
participated for example, was never recorded.
The projects suffered from low productivity and in many
instances the long term economic benefits for the rural
infrastructure remain doubtful. Perhaps the most
significant impact on rural incomes came from the Hand
Stamping Programme, with per capita income levels
considerably higher than those achieved in other LBRP
projects.
Objective 3: The rehabilitation of actually malnourished
children through direct feeding on site at health
facilities;
The attendance of mothers with underweight children at
health facilities for Direct Feeding remained poor in
many areas due to a variety of administrative and
bureaucratic factors. Foremost amongst these are the
failure of some District Councils to reimburse imprest
funds promptly, and the decision by the Nutrition Unit in
Gaborone not to extend the Cattle Purchase Scheme to
health facilities in a similar fashion to primary
schools. The weakness of the Direct Feeding programme
overall, and its virtual absence at mobile health
facilities in those areas likely to be most at risk
during a prolonged drought, has meant that many
malnourished children have had to rely on take home
rations alone. While these are designed to be
supplementary in nature, they are, as we have already
noted, often shared with other members of the family.
Objective 4: The securing of water for htunan consumption
as and when required;
A 1985 survey found that of 146 respondent households who professed no source of inco.e, 104 said that they
had no LBRP incoie either, and of the 136 who owned no cattle only 40 said they had participated in LBRP, UNOP et
al, (1985), p.104,
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A significant effort was made during the drought to
ensure the maintenance of water supplies to urban and
rural communities, and drilling capacity appeared to be
adequate, with no lack of donor support in terms of the
provision of equipment and technical training. As the
provision of emergency water supplies concerns all
sections of the village community equally (because,
unlike food, the water supply is shared), and the sinking
of boreholes a discrete activity, this element of the
drought programme could be closely monitored at the
District level. Villages needing improvements to their
existing water supply, or completely new boreholes could
be itemised at District Drought Committee meetings, and
their progress discussed.
Objective 5: The alleviation of the effects of drought
on livestock, and the provision of assistance to arable
farmers to increase their ability to regain
productivity during the imediate post-drought recovery
period.
Major parts of the drought relief programme have been
aimed at preserving livestock (and thus the income of
those rural households holding cattle) through a series
of subsidies, and for the preparation of arable land
through subsidies on seeds and draught power. The former
has benefited only the declining proportion of rural
households still holding cattle which has tended to
further polarise the ownership of livestock, while the
value of preparing arable land for cultivation has had a
negligible effect on income for the majority of farmers
due to the prevailing drought conditions.
At the same time however, these elements of the programme
have reinforced income disparities in the rural areas as
the greatest benefit has accrued to those farmers hiring
out ploughing teams or tractors. This income has often
been reinvested in livestock as smaller farmers have been
forced to sell off their weakened cattle at low prices
The Management of the 1982-88 Drought	 345
due to the effects of the drought.
The prevalence of substantial undernourishment, even in
non-drought years, suggests that rural poverty in
Botswana is a problem that is structural in nature and
related to each individual household's level of income.
As we have stressed throughout the preceding chapters of
the study, household income is closely related to its
ownership of productive assets, particularly of cattle.
It is exacerbated during periods of drought, and only
prevented from developing into a full scale famine by the
existence of a relief programme that functions
satisfactorily, at least on an aggregate level. At the
micro level however, in the remote areas and for certain
ethnic groups, the available evidence suggests that the
programme is far from satisfactory, and should give grave
cause for concern amongst Botswana's political leaders.
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VII
LONGER TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR BOTSWANA
Chapters IV, V and VI of this study have examined the
immediate life-threatening problems of poverty and
deprivation in rural Botswana and the efforts of the
1982-88 relief programme in tackling the effects of
drought which, we argued, exacerbated existing structural
inequalities and deprivation in rural society rather than
provided a causal explanation for them. Now we must look
beyond the immediate attempts at the amelioration of
poverty and hunger, and consider the longer term
development strategies focused at the causes of rural
poverty currently being pursued by the Government of
Botswana. In these current strategies, as in those of the
past, international aid of one kind or another will
continue to play a primary role. This chapter traces the
evolution of aid to Botswana since Independence, the role
of food aid in the country's 1982-88 drought relief
programme, and the current role it is playing in the
immediate post-drought period. In the light of renewed
academic interest •in food aid policy, we also examine the
main issues relating to the fungibility of aid, the
possibility of agricultural disincentives, and the
targeting of national food security programmes. We then
analyse some of the more salient features of the National
Food Strategy (NFS), currently being pursued by the
Government of Botswana (RoB, Rural Development Council,
1985). The objective of the NFS is to
"achieve a situation where a minimum acceptable
diet is available to all Batswana" (GOB, RDC
1985)
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and is ostensibly aimed at achieving a greater degree of
food self-sufficiency. The first element of this strategy
is the immediate post-drought recovery programme put into
effect in early 1988 and projected to last until 1990.
The second element of the NFS is longer-term, and focuses
on the need to improve rural incomes through the
development of arable agriculture and livestock, and
establish a strategic grain reserve that would lessen
dependency on emergency food aid during periods of
drought. Though not made explicit in the published
version of the NFS report in 1985, any future development
strategy will also have to address the problem of rural
unemployment, which needs to be seen not as part of a
relief project during periods of •drought (as is the case
at present), but as an ongoing programme.' To this end,
we provide a brief assessment of the viability of
expanding the current LBRP into a fully-fledged public
works programme using the guidelines recently prepared by
the ILO, and designed to provide a lasting solution to
the problems of increasing poverty, deprivation and
misery in rural Botswana.
a) The Role and Contribution of Aid to Botswana.
Until 1972-3, financial aid provided a crucial supplement
to the government's budgetary resources, with typically
50% of public expenditure financed by aid sources up to
that date. With the mineral revenues coming on flow
during the middle of the decade the nature of aid shifted
from recurrent-budget financing to capital-project aid,
and by 1976-7 the proportion of recurrent expenditure
still being met by aid had been reduced to around 25%
(Colcough & McCarthy, p.99). This was seen by the
1 Given the objectives of the NFS, it is surprising that the report of 1985 (RoB, Rural Developuent Council 1985)
provides only a single paragraph relating to the "saintenance of rural incoues", which it proposes can be achieved
by Nteuporary euploy.ent opportunities" in the LBRP projects where crop production fails during drought,
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Botswana government as an important step towards eventual
economic "independence and self-determination, as
Britain had previously provided some 80% of recurrent
expenditures in the early post-colonial period (Colcough
& McCarthy (1980), p.99)
Since 1970 Botswana has also received a substantial
amount of aid for development purposes from a variety of
sources. From the mid-1970s onwards the USA, Canada and
the World Bank have emerged as the major providers of
project loans, with Sweden the main bilateral donor of
programme aid and aimed primarily at the education and
water sectors (Ibid., p.103). Between 1972-1975, the
country's net development aid receipts per capita from
all sources were about twenty times the average for all
Commonwealth countries and, amongst mainland African
states, only the Congo and Gabon received more official
aid per capita over the same period (UN Statistical
Yearbook, 1977, p.823). Some years later, in 1979,
official development assistance was equivalent to US$116
per capita, compared to an average of US$17 for Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. Only Liberia received more aid
on a per capita basis. Moreover, the grant element of the
aid donated was high and formed 12% of government revenue
in 1980-81 (Borton 1984, p.1).
However, for the rural population of Botswana, it is
probably the aid that has arrived in the form of food
that has had the most significant impact on levels of
nutrition and standards of living. Between 1962 and 1975
Botswana received more food aid per capita than any other
country (FAO 1974; Stevens 1978). A comparison with Niger
illustrates that Botswana enjoys considerable pre-
ferential treatment. Niger, with a per capita GNP of $336
received 25.4kg of food aid in 1985, whilst Botswana with
a per capita GNP of $902 received around 42kg in the same
year (Hoim and Morgan 1985, p.418).
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The reasons for this large and sustained flow of aid to
the country since Independence are various. Britain
obviously had a moral responsibility to support the
recurrent expenditures in the immediate post-
Independence period in recognition of its earlier
neglect; however, since the meeting of recurrent
expenditures implied a continuing level of commitment,
the 0DM was no doubt satisfied of the country's ultimate
economic and financial viability.
Botswana's position as one of the few multi-party
democracies in Africa, and the fact that it remains a
"front-line" state, has also influenced many donor
governments and agencies that have taken a particularly
strong stance against apartheid. Support for Botswana has
often been seen as part of an overall strategy for
peaceful change in Southern Africa. However, it must be
added that some of the largest donors (including the UK
and the USA) are heavy investors in South Africa and so
their generosity is not entirely altruistic: aid can also
serve to assuage public criticism of the Government's
role in supporting apartheid at home. 2 The fact that
Botswana has a flourishing private sector and open
commitment to the market economy must have also played a
part in its ability to attract funds from the
international community.
These arguments only go so far and do not fully explain
why, for example, Botswana receives more per capita aid
than other front-line states. Colcough and McCarthy
considered the reasons "relate more to the efficiency,
planning capacity, ability to spend and negotiating
skills of the Botswana administration, than to political,
regional or economic factors" (Colcough & McCarthy 1980,
p.105).
2 Soie writers note a geopolitical distribution of food aid that strongly reflects foreign policy and eiport
proiotion objectives often unrelated to developient conceris or needs. (Clay & Singer 1985, p.22).
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Our analysis of the drought relief in Chapter Six would
suggest otherwise, at least at a micro level. There have
been significant deficiencies in the implementation of
the programme which have affected the more remote and
marginalised groups and therefore those most dependent on
the success of the relief programme.
Aid can contribute to the relief of poverty in several
ways. Perhaps the most visible and immediate impact comes
in the shape of famine relief and Food for Work
programmes, but other types of aid can play a role in
stimulating growth, either directly, or by the provision
of basic services such as education, sanitation and
health care.
There are a number of theoretical arguments 3 both for and
against aid to developing countries that need to be
discussed here in relation to Botswana's own pattern of
economic development. The first we will consider is the
allocative one which argues that imperfections in capital
markets often results in inadequate private investment in
the economies of poor developing countries because of
uncertainties over the yield on capital, and that
economic growth is therefore inhibited. Financial aid
can help overcome these imperfections by channelling
capital to these countries. Mosley argues that this form
of aid has, on an aggregate level, no demonstrable effect
on economic growth as measured by GNP, and no significant
effect on private sector investment in developing
countries either way (Mosley 1987, pp.137, 140, Mosley &
Hudson 1987 p.31). Botswana, however, is an exception.
The country's privileged access to the lucrative EEC
market for its beef exports under the Lome Convention,
(even in comparison with other ACP states) may be seen as
See Clay & Singer's 1985 survey of the literature for a iore general discussion of aid as a developient
resource.
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a form of financial aid, and has increased private
investment in the livestock industry and resulted in
economic growth (Ibid.,p.234). The wider policy
implications and trends of the EEC development programme
are mainly determined by the Lome III agreement (Singer
(1987), p.69), 4 aimed at the integration of food aid with
the development process and in conjunction with the
elaboration of food strategies within the low income food
deficit countries. What this has meant for Botswana as an
ACP country, as we have seen and discussed in earlier
chapters, is that access to lucrative markets in the EEC
has made the livestock industry the primary depository of
private investment in the country. Whilst overcoming the
basic constraint of lack of investment, this form of aid
has helped create a growing polarisation in the ownership
of cattle and other productive assets, and has
consequently failed, despite its good intentions, in
addressing the problems of rural deprivation. It is
possible to argue that this form of aid has stimulated a
pattern of growth that has increased the extent and
degree of poverty for a substantial proportion of the
population. Even food aid itself can widen wealth and
income inequalities, 6 as a recent WFP report noted:
"Food aid projects have frequently paid
insufficient attention to the prevailing system
of ownership and other relations of production
in project areas. This neglect has frequently
allowed the benefits of projects to accrue to
local elites, thus further exacerbating the
maldistribution of income". (WFP 1985e, p.15)
The only way this can be avoided in the future is by
greater input being made at the planning stage by UN
Lo.e Ill was signed in 1984 and like its predecessors, is a trade, aid and cooperation agreeient involving free
access to the EEC of the sixty-six AC? ie.ber states' industrial goods and lost agricultural products.
Several FFW projects carried out in Bangladesh in 1915-76 under WFPIUSAID auspices could be criticised in this
vein, Excavation of silted village water tanks by FFW labour often provided a ready iade source of inco.e for their
owners, who could then restrict or forbid their use by other villagers (personal observation).
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agencies and NGOs, with personnel fully aware of the
power structures existing at both village and national
levels.
The procurement of food aid from developing countries for
use on aid programmes in others can be seen as one
particularly effective form of South-South trade; when
procurement is done on a regional level it can also be
seen as a form of regional stabilisation. Such triangular
food aid transactions are now being increasingly used by
WFP. Between 1981-83, some 406,372 metric tonnes of maize
was bought from Zimbabwe for use in neighbouring
countries (Singer 1987, p.130). Without these purchases,
storage and disposal problems in Zimbabwe may have had a
negative effect on future production. In Botswana,
sorghum and beans were bought from Zimbabwe and Malawi
respectively in 1986. It is difficult to compare the cost
effectiveness of local purchases in developing countries
with imports from normal channels (i.e. developed
countries). Bulk shipments are often imported ready
bagged, whereas local purchases are usually bagged
locally and are of a different variety. For example,
there is a preference in Africa for white maize rather
than yellow, and white sorghum (dura) rather than the
American red variety, which is normally used in the USA
as animal feed. Often these indigenous varieties are much
preferred to those imported from the USA and Canada.6
Therefore a comparison on the purchase price alone is
less meaningful. However, a comparison of shipments with
potential internationally tendered alternative "actions"
lets us establish "Import Parity Prices" or IPPs. The
shipment of 10,600 mt. of white maize from Zimbabwe to
Botswana in 1986 at $117.30/mt. plus the low transport
costs at $7.00 per tonne, compared favourably with the
estimated alternative IPP cost of $160 from the USA. (WFP
6 RoB, Food Resources Departient, 1986 and personal observation, See also IF? (1985b) which supports this view.
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1987c, pp.19-20 & Table 14). The purchase of 2556 mt. of
beans from Malawi in 1986 for Botswana also proved very
cost effective, with the total cost of consignments
ranging from $252 to $367 per mt., compared with
estimated alternative IPP costs of $585 to $730/mt.
respectively. (WFP (1987c), p.20 & Table 14). Malawi
beans were also considered more palatable than North
American varieties (personal observation). Similarly,
the overland shipments from Kenya to Sudan during 1986
also appeared cost-effective given the high cost and
difficulties of moving grain overland from Port Sudan.
(WFP (1987c), p.20).7
The most popular case for aid however is the moral one,
whereby a transfer of resources from the wealthier
developed countries to the impoverished and least
developed nations will help improve the living conditions
of the very poor and hungry. The redistributive case for
aid has been criticised by opinion at both ends of the
political spectrum. Bauer argued that aid reduces the
recipient government's own development efforts, impedes
a "natural" division of labour, and distorts markets by
encouraging a "non-viable self-sufficiency" (Clay &
Singer 1985, Mosley 1987, p.13). The financial and
project aid provided to Botswana for the development of
its mineral extraction industries would seem to
contradict this view, as the country now has an output of
diamonds greater than that of South Africa and Namibia
combined.8
Criticism from the Left that aid supports the power of
regimes expropriating the poor has more credence, but has
to be qualified (Hayter & Watson 1935, Chapter 10). Food
This was not the case however in food aove.ents carried out by WFP during the first phase of 'Operation Lifeline
Sudan' in 1989-90, Inefficiencies in tendering procedures, logistics, and finance, together with the use of hired
(rather than contract) transport fleets made the operation very costly and hard to ionitor. (personal observation)
8 See Chapter III.
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aid, it is argued, can be used to protect the recipient
government front political overthrow. An adequate supply
of food in the country is often a necessity for political
survival, and it is possible that many recipient
countries see aid flows as the only way of stabilising an
otherwise untenable situation (Hathaway 1981).
On another level, certain structural reforms may be
necessary in an aid recipient country in order to remedy
food shortages or an inequitable access to food. Foreign
aid may allow the recipient government to postpone these
essential reforms if it is reluctant to antagonise
privileged groups on whom it relies for political
support. Scott (1980) mentions the Bangladesh military as
one group that falls into this category. In a similar
vein, aid may help to perpetuate an inherent urban bias
in developing countries by allowing for a reduction in
taxes, and the creation of subsidies on food and energy
(Lipton 1977; Bates 1981, 1983). Aid to rural areas can
act as a compensation for collective deprivations with
highly visible selective benefits such as health posts,
and water schemes - a palliative to the poor which does
nothing to change the basic injustice of vastly unequal
access to employment, incomes and productive assets.
(Mosley 1987, p.94). Much of Botswana's rural development
"push" during the mid-1970s, I would argue, can be seen
in this light.
The tendency in the past for financial aid to be given
for projects rather than programmes served to reinforce
this urban bias. With the possibility of conflict between
donor administrative and technical staff towards quick
disbursing projects (particularly those using exports
from the donor country) on the one hand, and more
technically competent rural development projects on the
other, a large proportion of financial aid was spent on
capital imports in support of projects in urban areas.
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The absorbative capacity of some LDCs remains so poor
that there is a tendency now for more programme aid, i.e.
aid not tied to specific projects but simply to expand
the recipient country's capacity to import goods and
services for developmental purposes as it requires. In
Botswana, there is a blurring of the previous distinction
between project, programme and emergency food aid, with
programme aid now given on a multi-year basis.
Whatever the motivations behind current aid donations to
Botswana, and requests for such aid from the government,
it is clear that drought is a recurring phenomenon and
its effect on food production will necessitate aid of one
form or another for the foreseeable future. As in the
past, this aid is most likely to be in the form of food.
We will therefore now examine the contribution of food
aid to Botswana in recent years, and its relative merits
and demerits.
Food aid may be seen as an international resource
transfer to the recipient country, as support for balance
of payments problems, as a budgetary resource for
existing government expenditure, or as a direct income
transfer to selected beneficiaries within the country. In
Botswana food has been used not just for drought relief
but for ecological recovery or disaster prevention, such
as planting trees, erosion control, and the construction
of dams, through the current LBRP programme. Public works
programmes, where food is provided in part or in whole
payment for the project workers, is perhaps the most
important use of food aid. It offers both the challenge
and the opportunity of improving nutrition and creating
long term employment, providing supplementary income and
creating and maintaining the rural infrastructure vital
for development, such as feeder roads, irrigation schemes
and erosion control.
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If food aid supports programmes normally paid for by
the recipient government (e.g. school meals), then it can
be said to provide budget support. In Botswana, food aid
has been used in this way and has made a valuable
contribution to the provision of school meals since
Independence. Food aid can also function as a form of
budget support by its role in import substitution, in so
far as it replaces foreign exchange expenditure that
would have had to be spent on commercial food imports.
Like balance of payments support, it offers the
opportunity for development, not a guarantee. It brings
the possibility of supporting higher producer prices, the
undertaking of agricultural investment and the provision
of extension services.
Food aid can often produce considerable net savings of
foreign exchange, particularly if delivered c.i.f. as
there are substantial savings on transport costs for the
recipient government when compared to commercial imports.
WFP has a standing arrangement to pay 50% of the internal
transport costs for the least developed countries (Singer
1987, p.145), and Botswana also receives this substantial
benefit.
Most food aid is supplied in bulk to government stocks or
reserves, and then usually sold to recipients or
distributed through national relief schemes and termed
"programme" aid. Concessional sales to governments
constitutes some 80% of all food aid, with the remainder
distributed direct to the beneficiaries as project aid
through agencies (Singer 1987, p.91). Food aid is
potentially more efficient than financial aid in that it
cuts out the financial element of a transaction which
mainly involves the purchase of food anyway.
In Botswana, as in other regions of Sub-Saharan Africa
and elsewhere in the developing world, malnutrition and
the lack of resistance to disease due to prolonged
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periods of undernourishment during childhood, are
endemic. The continuing debt crisis affecting many
developing countries, and the consequent structural
adjustment policies under the pressure of IMF
conditionality is thus having a disproportionately heavy
impact on the nutritional status and overall living
standards of children and other vulnerable groups, by
placing restrictions on government spending. A report
prepared for UNICEF by Jolly & Cornie (1984), provides
evidence for this and a series of country studies.
World Bank programme loans from 1980 onwards also aimed
at structural adjustment of the economy and were
conditional on the implementation of "supply side" or
incentive boosting measures of policy, often accompanied
by some privatisation of industry. As malnutrition during
early childhood can lead to a lowered mental and physical
capability which is irreversible, food aid targeted to
these groups is vital, and it is precisely in these areas
of human need that food aid can provide a significant and
long term remedial role. Thus food aid can be used to
offset some ' of the less desirable effects of conditional
financial aid.
When channelled through primary schools and village
health centres, as in Botswana, its developmental impact
can be reinforced by widening the access to education and
primary health care, thus greatly enhancing the quality
of human capital, which can be seen as a nation's
greatest asset. 9 It is perhaps significant that of the ten
countries undergoing structural adjustment in the 1980s
studied by UNICEF,'° Botswana was among those judged to
Provided of course it is seen as part of a iuch wider prograiie of social and political change. As we have
already noted a substantial proportion of prilary school aged children do not attend school.
10 UNICEF found evidence that the lipact of adjustaent policies on developing countries (for exaiple, arising
fro. INF conditionality) on the welfare of children and other vulnerable groups has been disproportionately heavy,
and has resulted in a deterioration of their nutritional and overall living standards. (Jolly & Cornie 1984).
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have most successfully protected the nutritional status
of the poor, and did so by expanding existing feeding
and income supplementing programmes and introducing new
ones. It was also able to emerge from the balance of
payments squeeze most rapidly and was, with Zimbabwe,
able at the same time to attract substantial aid towards
its social programmes (Hubbard 1988).
Food aid can aim to achieve its objective of alleviating
hunger and suffering amongst the rural poor by direct
supply or by other, indirect, means. The most direct
method, and one which remains the dominant mode in
Botswana, is the provision of food rations to those
vulnerable groups who are, for one reason or another,
unable to provide themselves an adequate level of
nutrition. Direct movements of food are highly "visible"
and therefore misappropriation is arguably less likely to
occur." Distribution of food aid in this way can have an
immediate impact on nutritional status which, because the
food is issued and administered through government
institutions, can be monitored on a regular basis by
health staff, teachers, the responsible ministry in the
recipient government, and by the donor community. The
great strength of this type of distribution is that the
results can be seen and assessed in the light of the
programme's own stated objectives. Less visible methods
of distributing food aid do not have this advantage
because it is impossible to adequately monitor, on a
continuous basis, the nutritional status of every
individual household.
However, direct food aid to vulnerable groups needs to be
seen only as part f an overall system of rural
development which looks at the problem of household food
security in its entirety. A report commissioned by WFP
found that supplementary feeding programmes on their own
rn border areas, this iight not always be the case.
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could have only limited impact on the chronic problem of
childhood malnutrition:
"There seems to be little consistent evidence
that supplementary feeding programmes have an
unequivocally beneficial effect on childhood
nutritional status, if this is held to be an
appropriate indicator of the preservation of
future potential function." (WFP (1986b), p.16)
Where measurable improvements have been noted
consistently, supplementary food has been supplied
together with health inputs, and the projects have been
well monitored. Part of the problem appears to be that
take-home rations are shared amongst the family, and that
therefore it is the household's food security that has to
be considered.'2
The local purchase of food (where available) for
distribution to vulnerable groups can have the additional
advantage of stimulating production and raising the
incomes of farmers. In Botswana, this is usually not
possible during periods of drought when production falls
well below subsistence levels for the majority of
subsistence farmers, but during periods of adequate
rainfall, BAMB buys up available surpluses of sorghum
which are used as relief food during periods of drought.
In Botswana, a Cattle Purchase Scheme is also in
operation for providing meat for primary schools during
the drought, but is unlikely to be of direct benefit to
the very poor, who neither own cattle nor send their
children to school.'3
Indirect movements of food to the hungry may be handled
through the market mechanism, with cash supplements paid
to beneficiary groups and spent on food from local
This problei has only been partly solved in Botswana by the introduction of direct feeding' for ialnourished
children at health centres.
13 See Chapter Iv.
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traders. In some cases an input of cash may increase
effective demand and stop food being moved to other
areas. 14 By providing demand for trade and transport, cash
relief	 give a dynamic stimulus to the rural economy.
This method is currently used in Botswana, on a limited
scale only, as a form of social security for those
classified as "permanent" destitutes. The success of such
a scheme (as opposed to direct food movements) depends on
a number of factors. First, there needs to be a trader
network in existence in the more remote areas that are
often the first to suffer in periods of drought. The
Basarwa, for example, are usually the first group to be
affected by a failure of the rains and their needs can
reach a critical point at a very early stage. In western
areas of Botswana, because of its very small population
density widespread poverty and lack of effective demand,
this trader network does not exist in a viable form. As
on the eastern freehold farm blocks, where basic
foodstuffs are available for purchase, the cost is often
higher than in urban areas because of the difficulty of
transport and the monopoly position enjoyed by the
traders. 15 Secondly, and related to the first point, there
is a real danger that supplementary payments in cash,
once fixed, may diminish in value to their recipients due
to localised inflationary pressures. When, in 1986,
"permanent" destitutes received an increase in their cash
supplement from P10.00 per month to P30.00, and a
corresponding reduction in their food ration entitlement,
localised inflationary pressures reduced the value of
this supplement. 16 Thirdly, payments in cash assume that
beneficiaries will buy nourishing food for themselves and
their children, and thus help to break the cycle of
14 This occurred in Wollo province, in the 1913 Ethiopian faiine. 8ee Sen (1981).
Such a situation coiplicates still further the problei of establishing a Poverty Oatui Line for the reiote
areas.
16 See Chapter III.
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chronic malnourishment that characterises the nutritional
status of many of the under-fives in the rural areas.
Field experience in Botswana suggests that this is not
always the case.'7
The present LBRP programme, now with payment in cash
rather than in food, is another way of channelling food
to the hungry, though as only the able bodied are able to
participate, its benefits often do not reach the old and
the infirm, the very young, and those simply too weak to
work through hunger and ill-health. Tables 3.18 and 3.19
shown on the following pages show the contribution of
food aid to cereal availability in Botswana during the
period 1979-80 to 1986-87, and the composition of food
aid by commodity type during the period 1980-87
respectively. Table 3.18 illustrates a number of
important points. Firstly, the variation in domestic
cereal production between "normal" years and periods of
drought, the actual number of drought years during the
decade, and consequently the proportion of total food
requirements needing to be imported is indicative of the
state of dryland arable agriculture in Botswana.
This has important policy implications for the NFS which
is based firmly on the concept of expanding rural
employment by developing agriculture. Secondly, the
proportion of food aid to total supply appears to have
increased as the severity of the drought deepened in the
mid-1980s, as one would expect it to. Thirdly, the level
of commercial imports rose sharply in response to the
drought from a low of 70,175 mt in the non-drought year
1980-1 to a peak of 149,322 mt in 1982- 3, thereafter
falling slightly, but not to the same extent as the rise
in food aid.
17 Personal observation.
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TABLE 3,18 : CEREAL PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, AID IMPORTS AND AVAILABILITY (1978-1987)
1979-80	 1980-1	 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4	 1984-5	 1985-6	 1986_7(1)






40300	 48860	 15500	 12980	 6030	 16600	 19100	 18000
	
95326	 70175	 106106 149322	 145823	 140975	 N/A	 N/A
	
13962	 9248	 4914	 24278	 25639	 46225	 29861	 38360
	
560	 729	 549	 815	 1314	 9880	 N/A	 N/A
	
108728	 78694	 110471 172785	 170148	 177320	 N/A	 N/A
Total Cereal availability 	 149028 127554	 125971 185765 176118 193920	 N/A	 N/A





Cereal food aid as a per-
centage of total supply
Beneficiary nuibers in '(0
and schools' prograues31
164.49	 135.56	 129.07 183.56 167.95	 178.24	 N/A	 N/A
15.41	 9.83	 5.03	 23.99	 24.44	 42.49	 26.47	 32.81
9.40%	 7.25%	 3.90% 13.07% 14.55% 23.84%	 N/A	 N/A
359000 360000	 421000 538000 600000 622060 632809 615887
Cereal food aid per
beneficiary (kg.)
	
38.89	 25.69	 11.51	 45.13	 42.73	 14.31	 47.19	 62.28
Notes:
1) These figures indicate only the aiount of cereals available for the relief prograue, not the actual alounts
distributed. See Tables in the Appendix.
2) De facto population extrapolated fro. 1981 census using iediui variant (C8O).
3) Data for 1979-80 to 1983-4 fro. Rural Developient Council, National Food Strategy, KFDP, Gaborone 1985. Data
for 1984-5 to 1985-6 froa FRO, Project 324 Quarterly Reports to N??, Oct.-Dec. for each year. Data for 1986-7
obtained fro. FED Regional Monthly Report for Septesber 1986.
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TABLE 3.19 : COMPOSITION OF FOOD AID BY COMMODITY TYPE (1980-1987) METRIC TONNES

























14951	 10496	 12646	 28389	 34558	 55790	 39223	 54126	 33350
















































































































































































1) Donations given for the Strategic Grain Reserve in 1987 and not necessarily for direct distribution as part of
the feeding programes.
2) Part of this donation (15000.t) is for uonetisation and will then be used to support LBRP.
3) Does not include 3000it of Maize shown in Table 3,18 and intended for the Strategic Grain Reserve.
Source:
1) Data for 1979-80 to 1985-86 froi World Food Prograaae, Botswana, 29 April 1987. Data for 1986-87 fro. IMDC May
1988. Years shown as seasons to correspond with other tables.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the rise in food
aid does not seem to have occurred until one year after
the rise in commercial imports, suggesting a lack of
donor response to the drought. This in fact was not the
case. According to Borton, who worked at the MLGL and
Food Resources Department between 1980 and 1983,
shipments of WFP programme aid due to last until the end
of 1982 were called forward to meet the additional
requirements of the 1979-80 relief programme, and
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therefore were simply not available during the latter
part of 1982:
"Incredibly, IFP officials were apparently
unaware of how early the Project 324 supplies
would become exhausted" (Borton 1984, p.52).
The government had failed to request replacement stocks
from the donor community in time and was therefore
obliged to meet this shortfall from commercial purchases
until such time as WFP could arrange new shipments.
The level of commercial imports remained at a high level
after this date to meet the needs of the vastly expanded
Vulnerable Groups' Programme. Of significance here is the
growth in the amount of maize being donated as food aid.
Though maize is grown in Botswana, the staple cereal is
sorghum, which is a more drought resistant crop. This may
bring about a change in taste preferences and can lead to
future foreign exchange expenditures on imports long
after the initial aid has been phased out. Table 3.20
shown overleaf gives the origin and monetary value of
drought related foreign aid to Botswana during 1986-7,
and is included to indicate both the multiplicity of
donors and the extent of aid to Botswana.
It is clear from these tables that food aid has been
providing a substantial proportion of the country's
cereal requirements in recent years, and that the
Strategic Grain Reserve is now emerging as a high
priority of both the government and the donors. We will
be examining the importance of the SGR later in this
chapter when we discuss the National Food Strategy.
On a national basis, the form in which aid is donated and
the way it is utilised by the recipient government, has
a direct bearing on how effective it is in alleviating
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TABLE 3.20: ORIGIN AND VALUE OF DIJGHT RELATED FOREIGN AID 1D
BOTSWANA 1986-87







Water Tanks for Schools
Water Buckets for Rural Schools
Free Seeds Scheme
Upgrading of FRD Depots
IUFAL VALUE OF FOOD DONATIONS:
ESTIMATED CX)ST OF SHII1ENT:


















































































ESTIMATED 'lUFAL VALUE OF DWXJGHT
RELATED AID FRCtI DONORS 1986-87:
	
P.127,851,220
1) Prices based onWFP, Project Botswana 324 (EXP.4}, WFP/CFA 18 : 23/13-A(ODE) Add.2. March 1987. Exchange
Rate: US$:P2.00,
2 Strategic Grain Reserve.
3 Sold by Governient and the revenue used aninly for LBRP.
4 Organisation for African Unity. Grant provided by the Special Eaergency Fund for Drought and
Faaine in Africa.
5 & 6) Prices based on WFP March 1987.
7 Lutheran World Federation. Also includes the provision of a water bowser for Ngaailand district
Council.
8 United Nations Developient Programe,
9 United Nations Office of Riergency Operations for Africa,
1 IMDC, Nay 1988.
2 VP?, Project Botswana 324 (EIP,4), WFPICFA: 23/13-A (ODE) Add.2. March 1981.
18 CPA: Couittee on Food Aid Policies and Progranes (the governing body of VP?)
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We have seen from the previous section that in Botswana
a significant amount of food aid reaching the country is
not destined for direct distribution to vulnerable
groups, but as part of the SGR, or for monetisation by
the government to help finance other parts of the relief
programme. Whether these counterpart funds generated by
the monetisation of food aid supplements or replaces what
would have been spent on the other parts of the
programme, is an important issue not just to Botswana.
Recipient governments can allocate resources made
available to it by the donors between developmental and
non-developmental purposes. This is due to the fungible
nature of aid, a feature which can hasten or hinder the
process of rural development, often depending on the
donor's political influence with the host government.
The growing interest in the monetisation of food aid has
focused on the role it can play in financing recurrent
expenditures incurred by- the recipient government in the
administration of its existing "direct" feeding
programmes.'9 Aid programmes can increase recurrent costs
considerably for the recipient government, by requiring
more staff, more transport, more storage and more
training. Many projects fail because the recipient
government is unable to purchase spare parts or maintain
adequate staffing levels. The WFP General Regulations
stipulate that all expenses connected with project
implementation are to be born by the recipient countries,
either from their own budgets or from external sources.
WFP is able to provide some equipment for project
implementation but the present level of contributions for
non-food items is totally inadequate: in 1986 for
19 The extension of the WFP Kenya 2669 prograne through 1989-93 for Turkana District envisages the monetisation
of WFP wheat for rapid destocking in the face of impending drought, With this revolving fund, local authorities
would be allowed to purchase up to 25,000 small stock in the early rounds of the destocking operation, the start
of which would be declared by the Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit.
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example, food commitments stood at $629 million, against
non-food resources of only $10.9 million. (WFP 1987a,
p. 1 6- 1 7 )
In Botswana, monetisation has helped to tackle the
growing problem of funding maintenance and recurrent
expenditures. These costs include such items as spare
parts for government vehicle fleets, transport and
handling costs, and warehouse construction. Funds
generated for through the sale of food aid commodities is
usually conditional on proceeds being used for
development purposes (as counterpart funds), for example
on roads, storage, distribution and marketing.
WFP has allowed the sale of foodgrain in Ethiopia and
Bangladesh to defray the transport and handling costs of
their food aid. A WFP report (WFP/CFA 16/4 Add.1) on the
Bangladesh experience with food aid programmes and
policies noted that a major constraint to the utilisation
of foreign aid for development was the inabaility of the
government to provide counterpart funds. (WFP 1987a, p.3)
Some 8% of the Bangladesh Government revenue has been
generated in this way in recent years (Singer 1987,
p.92). In Indonesia in 1984, an evaluation of a PL480
USAID Food For Work project recommended that 10% of
project commodities be monetised to meet other programme
costs (Bryson et al, 1984).
In Kenya, the WFP assisted Turkana Rehabilitation
Programme had a system of exchanging relief food grain
for cattle and small stock at "fair rates of exchange".
This, it is claimed, achieves two major objectives:
firstly, it preserves existing prices for animals during
the onset of drought e:'cl. therefore pastoralists' incomes,
and secondly, it accelerates the offtake of animals
20 One reason why international donors are becoiing increasingly reluctant to coiiit cash funds for WFP elergency
prograaes and projects is because of VFP's poor record in effectively .onitoring and accounting for food move.ents
and cash disburseients. (personal comAunication froi FP staff in Roie IIQ).
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during drought, when the slaughter of animals and the
sun-drying of meat (biltong) can maintain village stocks,
or be used for school feeding programmes. (WFP (1986c),
p.17-18.
The fungibility of food aid extends both to funds
released for budget support and for balance of payments
support, and both are difficult to tie down or monitor.
The extent to which this is possible often depends on the
proportion of the development budget financed by aid,
with "switching" not possible if the whole of the budget
is financed by aid (Mosley 1987). As with other forms of
aid, some critics suggest that foreign exchange saved or
generated by the food aid simply allows governments to
avoid or delay politically unpalatable policy decisions
relating to more realistic agricultural policies,
exchange rates and economic policies.21
In recent years, donors have been pressing for dialogue
and agreement on food aid to be conditional on economic
reforms, sometimes as part of a national food strategy.
Theoretically, the major donors can exert some
considerable influence on the recipient governments to
bring about land reform and efforts to introduce social
change. On a practical level, however, the power of
donors over recipient governments has often been
exaggerated in the past and there is little evidence to
suggest that aid is an effective instrument for changing
domestic policies (Mosley 1987, p.39). In Botswana, as we
have already suggested with regard to the World Bank
support of the TGLP, aid can in fact reinforce them.
Though the multiplicity of donors can cause a high
administrative burden on the recipient government, it is
usually preferred to having to deal with a single donor,
because of the possibility of increased political
21 Pya, F., Speech to Royal Coiiionwealth Society on Britain's Contribution to Developient, London 1983, Cited
Singer (198?}, p.42.
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leverage that the latter would entail (Ibid., p.106.). In
Botswana in 1986-87, WFP found it very difficult to
establish proper accounting procedures for its aid
channelled through FRD, because of the plethora of other
donors such as USAID seeking to increase their own
proportion of donated food. 22 This allowed a poor level of
food management to persist. When WFP withdrew its support
from the RADs programme for example, (due to the lack of
an adequate reporting system), the OAU stepped in with
financial support and the poor distributive record of the
programme was allowed to continue.
There is a need for an analysis of the effectiveness of
food aid programmes at both macro and micro levels. The
planners of food aid programmes tend to base their
analysis of nutritional needs, programme performance and
aid effectiveness on macro-economic aggregates and not in
terms of regions or socio-economic groups, their
knowledge of which is often too superficial or
fragmentary. Yet hunger and starvation takes place at the
household level, and any analysis should be able to
determine, say, whether enough food was distributed at a
district or village level. In Botswana, as we saw in the
previous chapter, this was not always the case, and
therefore this study has attempted to describe the
function of the aid programme at a macro level and assess
its effectiveness at a micro level.
Maxwell (1986) stressed that food aid should aim to be a
resource for growth, and have incentive effects on
agricultural production and economic growth. The current
LBRP programme in Botswana would fall into this category
as it focuses on the improvement of the rural
infrastructure and the preparation of arable land. The
aid to Botswana's livestock industry under Lome III would
22 Personal couunication hoi WFP staff in Gaborone,
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also be included, as it has been instrumental in
stimulating economic growth and domestic investment.
Mosley (1987, p.175-8) described the effectiveness of aid
in terms of linkages. For Mosley, aid has a positive
effect for the poor if it gives them greater control over
productive assets such as land and water, which Lome III
does not; it has zero effect if it is comprised of
consumption goods such as free food distribution to
Vulnerable Groups, as no linkages are created; and
finally it has a negative effect if it stimulates a form
of capital intensive production, i.e. tractors can remove
linkages between the poor and productive assets such as
the land and increase, rather than decrease, existing
levels of deprivation.
The targeting of beneficiaries has become of particular
interest in recent years to the growing body of food
policy analysts. 23 The essence of the food policy analysis
is that expensive blanket coverage of beneficiaries
through food subsidies (such as rations distributed under
the Vulnerable Group Programme in Botswana, which is in
fact not means-tested but open to all women and children)
is inherently inefficient, and should be replaced by a
more targeted system of subsidies to the poor. This
should theoretically allow for a greater subsidy to be
applied where it is needed most.
The analysts' case is at first sight a compelling one
when applied to a situation such as in Botswana. With
equal food aid subsidies being applied indiscriminately,
the income gap between the wealthy and the poor sections
of the community will tend to increase, with the poor
spending the income saved on the food ration by buying
more food, and the wealthy, having already achieved an
23 See World Bank, Poverty and ilunger: Isaues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries, 1986 and a
critique of it by ilubbard (1988),
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adequate diet, able to invest their savings. In practise
however, the argument for the increased targeting of
beneficiaries remains unproven, as the procedure is
fraught with difficulties. In Botswana, for example,
definitions of rural poverty are extremely contentious.
Though throughout this study we have used the ownership
of cattle as a proxy of wealth, reaching a cut-off point
above which a cattle owner becomes ineligible to receive
a food ration is administratively complex and probably
politically unacceptable in Botswana. At a Drought
Committee meeting at Letihakane (near the diamond mining
town of Orapa) in 1987, it was proposed that the
permanent destitute category of beneficiary should be
defined as someone having 40 head of cattle or less.
This would have meant that around 90% of the population
would have been registered destitutes!24
One basic criticism of the food policy analysts' case is
that a significant amount of blanket aid subsidies end up
effectively targeted at the wealthier sections of the
population. Others are deliberately targeted at groups
which do not include the very poor. Mosley argues that
most official aid is not very effective in reaching the
very poorest groups in the recipient country. A staff
report on the World Bank financed "Second Urban Housing
Project" in Botswana admitted that the bottom decile of
the population had no access even to the cheapest
conceivable form of Bank financed housing (World Bank
1975, p.41). The poor continue to live in shanties in the
pen-urban areas. Morris & Gwyer assert that "experience
suggests that official aid can rarely reach the poorest
of the poor", and the World Bank claimed that "it has
24 Personal observation at Drought CoMlittee, See Tables 2.4, 2.5 & 2.6 for details of cattle ownership.
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proved extremely difficult to benefit the very poorest
groups who lack productive assets.tt
By contrast, programmes directly distributing food aid
through health facilities and primary schools offer the
opportunity, when adequately monitored, of reachin g the
very poorest sections of the community. Botswana, with
its well developed rural health infrastructure, should
have achieved far greater progress in eliminating
malnutrition than it in fact has. Its failure to do so,
despite high levels of per capita food aid over a long
period and general lack of financial constraints, is
indicative of the low priority given to the programme in
terms of skilled manpower allocation when compared to
other sectors such as livestock.
Concern over possible agricultural disincentive and
commercial market displacement effects goes back to the
early days of food aid, 26 and a recent WFP policy study
has revived academic interest in the subject (Maxwell
1984). It has in the past been useful to distinguish
between price and policy disincentives; a price
disincentive occurs when the supply of food aid adds to
the total supply and cause the free market price to fall,
whilst a policy disincentive occurs when subsidised food
imports such as aid allow a government to neglect or
postpone policies which would stimulate agriculture
(Maxwell 1986, p.19).
25 Morris, J., & Gwyer, 0,, 'UK Experience with Identifying and Iapleienting Poverty-Related Aid Projects', in
Developient Policy Review, vol. 1, (1983), PP,147-162. World Bank, India: First Calcutta Urban Developient Project:
Project Perforiance Audit Report, Operations Evaluation Dept., Report No. 4023, 1982,
26 See Schultz, T. W,, "Value of US Fan Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries', in Journal of Fan Rconoiics,
vol.42, no.5, 1960, Pp,109-130. More recent reviews of the literature are given in Maxwell, S., and Singer, H.,
"Food Aid to Developing Countries: A Survey', in World Developient, vol.7, 1979, pp,225-47 and Clay, E.J. and
Singer, H.L, Food Aid and Developient: the lapact and Effectiveness of Bilateral PIA8O Title I Type Assistance,
IDE Sussex, 1982; and "Food Aid and Developuent: Issues and Evidence', WFP Occasional Papers, No.3, 1985.
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Botswana provides a useful area of study in this regard
because as we noted in the introduction to this chapter,
in the decade up to 1975 per capita aid from WFP to
Botswana had been higher than to any other country. WFP
food aid to Botswana started in the drought of 1965 and
has provided supplementary rations for primary school
children and Vulnerable Groups ever since. Up to 1974
Food For Work projects also operated in every year a
partial crop failure occurred, and concern over possible
disincentive effects on FFW on agriculture led to the
commission of the 1974 FAO survey. The findings of the
1974 FAO survey was that at the micro level in which it
operated, FFW had a negligible disincentive effect on
households' participation in agriculture and that the
overwhelming constraint to arable production was
rainfall, the availability of draught power and labour
(FAO 1974).
In more recent times, WFP has found little evidence of
localised disincentive effects in major FFW programmes in
Ethiopia and Bangladesh (WFP/CFA (1983). A UN mission to
the WFP assisted Turkana Rehabilitation Programme (Kenya)
in 1988 found that the FFW programmes were reaching the
very poor who were less likely to purchase food or resell
it on the local markets. The possibility of a price
disincentive was therefore not an issue. (WFP/FAO et al,
1988b, p.134). Similarly, FFW in Kenya did not divert
labour away from agricultural work as it tended to
attract the under-employed and destitute. This was seen
to stimulate farm production and income by passing on
simple irrigation techniques such as bund construction
which led to higher yields. This has increased the
opportunity cost of working on FFW projects rather on
farms. (WFP/FAO et al, 1988b, p.l3'l).
The established view in the literature is that food aid
has the capacity to cause disincentive effects but these
can be and often are avoided by government policy
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(Maxwell 1986, p.22). There is a possibility that aid
imports, like any other commercial import, can be a
disincentive to local production by reducing producer
prices. But as many of the rural poor in many developing
countries do not have sufficient purchasing power anyway,
they lack the effective demand to have any significant
effect on local prices. With cereal production in
Botswana almost totally subsistence in nature it will not
be affected by any possible impact on local prices from
food aid imports, and as it acts as a substitute for
commercial imports which would have been imported anyway,
there is no disincentive effect on agricultural prices.
Commercial displacement and disincentive effects are
therefore to some extent mutuall r exclusive.27
Sen makes a case for imports of relief food even when
there is enough food domestically, as it can help
increase overall supply and bring down the price, which
might be kept artificially high through hoarding (Sen
1981). In Sudan for example in recent years, a surplus
was maintained in some regions of the country whilst the
population in the south and west were literally dying
from starvation. In any case, the recipient government
does not need to let producer prices fall. Marketing
boards, such as BAMB in Botswana, can operate to
establish minimum prices and any budget deficit that
arises can be made up through monetisation of a certain
proportion of the aid itself. It is conceivable that
lower producer prices, where they do occur, can lead to
an increased output in some cases, to make up for the
fall in revenue, and that therefore production will not
fall with price. In this case, farmers may produce a
bigger surplus but with reduced profit margins (Sen
1981).
27 Clay & Singer (1985) note that in any case there can be a counteracting effect on producers' incoes of
encouraged growth in consuiption of basic foodstuffs from lower prices.
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In their survey for WFP on food aid issues and policies,
Clay and Singer (1985, pp.41-42) conclude that
ttthe debate on the past macro-economic and
agricultural impact of food aid remains
inconclusive... (however) massive disincentive
effects do not seem to have occurred."
Econometric models that have measured the possible
disincentive effects of food aid have found them to be
negligible, (Bezuneh & Deaton 1981) whilst Hall (1980,
pp.19-28) found that long-run multipliers are positive,
so that food aid can actually leads to increased
production.
Another related issue in any food policy analysis is that
of dependency. We have already suggested in previous
chapters that the mode of incorporation of Botswana's
economy into the wider international economy,
particularly in terms of exports, imports and investment,
conditions and constrains many of its internal economic
and political developments. In the context of aid, it is
as a signatory to the Lome III agreement, that has locked
Botswana into a pattern of economic growth that is
threatening the very subsistence base of a substantial
proportion of its citizens.
We have already seen in early sections of this chapter
that the fungibility of food aid carries with it a risk
for the recipient government to neglect or postpone
essential policy reforms, and possibly leave the hunger
and welfare of its population to the international donor
community. It can become dependent on aid for its
political survival. There are however, varying levels of
dependency other than that normally associated with the
national economy. It is feasible that people can become
dependent on food aid on an individual basis, to the
extent that it is preferred to work of any work. This
sort of dependency on food aid appears to have occurred
Longer Term Development Strategies for Botswana 376
amongst some Basarwa groups (UNDP et al 1985, p.113), but
we would argue that this is more an indication of the
poor rates of existing pay and conditions in the more
remote areas, or simply the possibility of negative
returns to effort in arable agriculture in all but
exceptional years.
In general, communities and households which become
dependent on external assistance in Botswana do so
reluctantly because they see no other way of surviving.
The LBRP projects in Botswana, for example are always
oversubscribed (Ibid.). With the monetary value of the
supplementary food rations distributed through health
facilities in 1985 about P4.73 per month, that of the
primary school rations (assuming 30% was taken home and
eaten by the household) about P1.30 per month, and
government minimum wage rates at around P7.30 per day, it
is hard to envisage people becoming "dependent" on these
rations (UNDP et al 1985, p.113). The fact that most
Basarwa groups now rely on food aid for some 80% of their
food needs (RoB, Guibrandsen et al 1986, p.1), suggests
that the Government and food policy analysts should
devote more of their time and efforts to ensuring they
actually receive it, rather than speculating over the
possibility of any psychological dependency.
With the onset of heavy rains in Botswana during
November-December 1987, the longest and most severe
drought in living memory, with average rainfall some 26%
below the long term mean, came to an end (RoB, Project
Memorandum: WFP BOT/324/IV, p.2). The fourth extension to
the long-running WFP Project 324 in Botswana is
essentially a drought recovery programme and envisaged to
commence in 1988 and run through to 1990. As a drought
recovery programme, it assumes a vulnerable group base
level of 150,000 throughout the duration of the
programme, and a primary school enrolment of 260,000
children rising by 15,000 increments to 290,000 in 1990
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(WFP/CFA: 23/13-A (ODE) Add.2, 19 March 1987, p.3). Reduced
non-drought rations for vulnerable groups are applied
which are of less nutritional value to those in use
during the 1982-88 drought relief programme, and are made
up of different ingredients. Table 3.21 overleaf shows
the structure and projected total costs of the three
yearprogramme as prepared by WFP. The most notable
feature ofthe table is that the high-protein CSM usually
provided under the programme will no longer be supplied;
instead the government is to provide maize meal itself
which will be blended locally with vitamin enriched DSM,
as has been the practice in the past when a shortfall of
CSM has occurred. What this means in fact is that while
WFP accepts responsibility for the implementation of the
schools' programme, that of the vulnerable groups will
now be assumed by the government. It is indicative of the
level of cooperation that existed between WFP and the
Government during the period of preparation for this
Project Memorandum that the government was unaware that
it would have to assume this responsibility, despite the
fact that WFP acts as coordinator of all food aid
shipments to the country. (WFP/CFA, 1987 23/13-A (ODE)
Add.2, p.8).
In a letter to WFP from the Permanent Secretary of MFDP,
the Government expressed some concern that
"WFP has unilaterally decided to make provision
for the primary school feeding component of
theProject and directed the Botswana Government
to assume responsibility for the Vulnerable
Groups. This is clearly not in line with the
discussions between WFP and Government during
the 1983 evaluation of this Project, during
which Government reiterated its determination
to take over the primary school programme"
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TABLE 3,21: PROJECFED CX)STS OF WFP IOJEC'F 324 (IV) 1988-1990





1UAL COST '10 WFP:
2. GoVERNMENT (X)STS:
a) Administrative & Related Costs:
b) Food Supplies and processing
c) Transport Costs (50% of ITSH)
1UAL COST ID GOVERNMENT:
UFAL COST OF THE HOJEF: 37437835
Notes:
1) Fifty percent of ITSH costs are paid for by WFP.
2) Includes cost of procurement of maizemeal for vulnerable group
feeding and local purchases of meat and vegetables.
3) Fifty percent of ITSH costs of WFP coninodities to be met by the
Government and full costs of government purchased food.
Source: WFP/CFA:23/13-A (ODE) Add.2, 19 March 1987, p.8.
This, the Ministry pointed out, would have "adverse
consequences in the (budgetary) provisions made in NDP
VI." (Ibid., p.2). As budgetary provision had been made
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for the eventual take over of the schools' programme
however, perhaps the more important point raised with WFP
by the Ministry was the proposed use of maize milk
instead of CSM (see Table 3.19 footnote) which was "not
agreed to by Government" (Ibid., p.2). Apart from the
fact that local bagging of maize milk in unlined cloth
sacks results in a reduced shelf life and consequent
heavy loss from insect infestation, the whole episode
typifies the lack of cooperation between the two parties
throughout the period of the 1982-88 drought.
b) The National Food Strategy.
The central objectives of the National Food Strategy are,
at a national level, the reduction of the country's
present dependence on external food supplies, and at a
household level, the reduction of the dependence of
individual families on government support to make up food
and income deficits (RoB, Rural Development Council 1985,
Intro., p.1). The NFS identifies several key areas of
activity to achieve these objectives (Ibid., p.8-9):
I.the need to enhance the performance of the drought
early warning system by improving data collection on
the rural economy;
II.the need to increase food and cereal production and
to reduce fluctuations in production caused by
drought, by developing a viable strategy for
agriculture;
III.the need to secure the country's basic seed
requirements, and improve the range and quality of
available varieties in the long term;
IV.the need to strengthen nutritional surveillance
systems and drought relief food programmes;
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V.the need to improve the planning and implementation
of drought relief programmes to render them more
effective during future droughts;
VI.the need for an appropriate range of post-drought
recovery measures to assist farmers regain their
productive assets lost during the drought; to ensure
the maintenance of rural incomes at acceptable
levels, and to provide for the rehabilitation of
those who have become totally destitute.
Most of these key areas to be addressed in the NFS are
interrelated, and also include important areas of
activity not d{rectly measurable by criteria applied to
National Planning; in particular, the various types of
institution building implied by the need to strengthen
the monitoring systems of drought, the enhancement of
implementation capacity at both national and regional
levels, the raising of levels of contingency planning and
the interpretation of research (Ibid., p.1).
With the exception of key areas (d) and (e) above, which
refer to the structure of the country's response to
drought, and the need to improve the present level of
training and management of the relief programme at the
District level, we will now examine each of these key
areas in turn. The management and effectiveness of the
relief programme has already been covered in Chapter VI.
Contingency planning for drought requires a system of
data collection and analysis of food production, use and
availability on a continuous basis. The Applied Research
Unit of the MLGL has already implemented a number of
studies relevant to the NFS including an assessment of
village based institutions and cooperatives, and a survey
of the potential for commercial arable farming in Chobe
District; the National Institute for Research (NIR) has
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also been instrumental in the coordination of communal
area research work and the problems of traditional
dryland agriculture. However, the most important surveys
conducted in recent years on food use and availability
have been the Continuous Household Integrated Programme
of Surveys, or CHIPS (sic) run by the Central Statistics
Office. The 1985-86 CHIPS survey was comprised of an
Income and Expenditure survey over a one year period, and
based on aggregate monthly data from 200 households per
month.
This survey, which has not yet been published, will be
directly comparable with the 1974 RIDS survey, data from
which we have used freely in the 'present study, and will
thus indicate recent trends in rural incomes, employment
and livestock ownership.
At the level of national planning and monitoring, a Food
Accounting Matrix for Botswana, originally devised by the
Oxford Food Studies Group, now contains comparative data
on food flows through the economy for 1984 and 1981. The
matrix will be used as a background to decision making
and monitoring both in the short and long term.
The Drought Early Warning Technical Committee was
established by the IMDC and makes regular monthly
assessments of drought conditions and food availability.
It also reviews nutritional surveillance data gathered by
the Central Statistics Office, the Agricultural
Statistics Unit of the MoA, the Meteorological
Department, BAMB and the Food Resources Department. These
contributions facilitate the regular monitoring of
current trends in nutritional status, livestock and
grazing conditions, crop planting, rainfall and food
stocks around the country.
Major improvements have also been made to the collection
of agrometeorological data since 1983, with the
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assistance of UNDP and the WMO. This data has assisted in
the more accurate forecasting of yields of maize and
sorghum during the growing season from an analysis of
rainfall, crop water requirements and evaporation levels
(RoB, Rural Development Council, 1985, p.11).
From the foregoing it is clear that the Drought Early
Warning System is heavily concentrated on the "supply"
side: the main indicators of household stress that it
uses are based on food availability. Though the CHIPS
surveys do look at retail prices on a continuous basis,
its coverage is only 200 households per month, and the
monitoring local market prices is not in itself a
sufficient indicator of an impending fall in purchasing
power. On a micro level, lack of income and effective
demand may not result in a price rise, or may even cause
a price fall. It is envisaged that Botswana's early
warning system will increase its links with the SADCC
Regional Early Warning System based in Zimbabwe, which is
being developed under the Regional Food Security
Programme.
There are about 80,000 holdings in Botswana that grow
crops under traditional dryland conditions. Of these,
about 60,000 (70,000 in years of above average rainfall)
are subsistence in nature (i.e. do not produce a
marketable surplus), some 15,000 are medium scale farms
owned by farmers with 40 head of cattle or above (but not
necessarily with greater yields than the subsistence
farmers), and about 150 are larger scale commercial farms
with substantial investment in water management,
infrastructure and equipment. This latter group is mainly
situated in Chobe District.
On the trend, but with very wide year-to-year variation,
total crop production is about 49,500 mt, of which some
35% is marketed, nearly all of which is produced in the
commercial farms (UNDP et al 1985, pp.133-4; RoB, Rural
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Development Council 1985, p.12). Current cereal demand is
around 185,000 mt so national self-sufficiency averages
only around 25%.
The NDP VI gives considerable attention to traditional
dryland agriculture and the National Food Strategy is
directed towards all farming groups. On the one hand,
there is a drive towards an improved level of food self-
sufficiency and on the other, an attempt to increase both
output and income at the subsistence farm level. The
centrepiece of these efforts has been the Arable Lands
Development Programme (ALDEP), which encourages a "model"
farmer approach to development by providing a package of
financial help and advice for farm implements, draught
power and infrastructure. The inadequacy of draught power
for non-cattle owners was identified as long ago as 1974
(FAO 1974). and it has been noted several times in this
study that it remains a major constraint for poor
households engaging in arable agriculture.
The pilot phase of the ALDEP project began in 1979 based
on research results from two area level projects, and was
introduced nationally in 1981-2. The emphasis of ALDEP is
put on improving marketing techniques and input supply,
as well as the production and distribution of basic seed
varieties. In the initial years of the programme, finance
was provided by loans from the National Development Bank
(in order to overcome the commercial banks' usual
insistence on collateral), and government subsidies.
Later funding came from the ADB and IFAD. As most farmers
were unable to manage their loan repayments due to the
effects of drought, in 1983 the Government intervened to
change the system so that farmers only had to pay a
contribution of 15% of the total cost of each package.
Table 3.22 overleaf shows the number of packages issued
during the period 1979-81 to October 1984. The increase
in the number of farmers taking advantage of the ALDEP
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package rose after the Government's decision to fund most
of the costs, and the continuing popularity of the ALDEP
programme during 1984-5, despite the drought, caused some
degree of optimism that increases in productivity and
TABLE 3.22: FARM PACKAGES DISBURSED UNDER ALDEP (1979/8 i-oc'r • 84)































Notes:	 1) Pilot Phase.
2) To October 1983.
3) "Downpayment only" phase of the scheme (see text).
Source: RoB, Rural DevelopMent Council, (1985), p.13.
output could be expected with the onset of adequate rains
(RoB, MoA 1985). By January 1987 the total disbursement
of packages under the scheme had only reached 12,000.
Figures of this magnitude will not have made much impact
on the country's 80,000 rural households.. The provision
of draught power was inhibited by the lack of animals up
to October 1984 because of high mortality rates in
livestock (RoB, Rural Development Council, 1985, p.13),
and the drought situation after that date up to the end
of 1987 will have undoubtedly made the situation
considerably worse. During the latter part of the drought
the coverage of agricultural demonstrators and extension
workers, already stretched by 1985 due to the fragmented
nature of the lands areas and transport constraints ( RoB,
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Rural Development Council, 1985, p.14), 28 will probably
have limited the full benefits of the scheme to the
larger farmers living near the larger villages. The
Ministry of Agriculture admitted as much when it stated
in January 1987 that only 10% of packages disbursed had
gone to those farmers not owning cattle (RoB, MoA, 1987
Agrinews, p.4).
The ALDEP scheme has links with the SADCC regional
programmes for the development of improved drought
resistant varieties which will have a significant impact
on yields if successful.
Despite the relative popularity of ALDEP, no extension
scheme aimed at improving the supply of inputs to dryland
agriculture will be able to overcome the lack of
rainfall. For this reason it is unlikely that dryland
agriculture will either significantly increase employment
or improve incomes except in years of exceptional
rainfall. Even here, incomes will depend on floor prices
paid by BAMB, which are in turn related to those
prevailing in South Africa (see later section on BAMB and
the SGR in this chapter).
For medium scale farmers involved in commercial dryland
farming and not eligible for assistance under the
Financial Assistance Policy (see below), a special
assistance package was put together by the MoA to
complement existing Credit Guarantee Schemes and lending
by the NDB and commercial banks. The Accelerated Rainfed
Arable Programme (ARAP) introduced in late 1985 was
designed to offer subsidies and incentives to the owner
of medium sized holdings who might otherwise opt during
28 was reported by the MoA in 1981 that one farser in Kwaneng District had actually harnessed hi.self to his
plough because he had no draught anisals of his own and had not been inforied of the facilities available under
ALDEP. NoA, (1987) Agrinews, p.14.
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periods of drought for the generally less risky operation
of keeping livestock.
For large scale farmers involved in commercial dryland
farming, the Pandamatenga region of Chobe District, (an
area of higher and more reliable rainfall pattern that
the rest of the country), was the subject of a land use
planning operation in 1984 and subsequently, allocations
were made of farms of around 500 hectares in size on a
first come, first served basis (RoB, Rural Development
Council 1985, p.16). As large scale commercialised
operations of this type require substantial on-farm
infrastructure to be viable, this scheme is of interest
only to those with sufficient capital, and therefore will
make little impact on existing levels of rural poverty.
As we saw in Section B of the study, the level of
malnutrition in the Chobe District was one of the highest
in the country in 1985-86.
The opportunity exists for small scale non-commercial
molapoZ9 farming in the Okavango Delta region, typically
carried out on small plots of 1 - 3 hectares and involves
a minimal level of rudimentary flood control measures
such as earthen bunds. About three to four hundred
households participate in this type of agriculture, which
has been hindered in the past by choked river channels
and tsetse fly. Once these channels are cleared however,
up to 3000 hectares of molapo could become available in
the Maun-Shorobe area of Ngamiland alone, sufficient for
up to 500 households (RoB, Rural Development Council
1985, p.21). An additional 5-800 hectares have been
identified in the Western Okavango as being also suitable
for flood recession agriculture, and suitable for between
150 and 200 households (Ibid., p.21).
Farming based on flood recession plains,
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Recognising the shortage of draught power in the area,
the Molapo Development Project (MDP) has established a
service centre which, as well as supplying inputs and
equipment, provides tractor hiring services for ploughing
and seedbed preparation. This form of improvement has the
potential to raise yields from present levels of about
1.2 mt to around 2.5 mt per hectare (RoB, Rural
Development Council 1985, p.21), but the number of
households that will benefit from the scheme is small.
The total area of land suitable for irrigated agriculture
in Botswana is estimated to be around 90,000 hectares,
but only a fraction of this fi gure (about 10,000
hectares) would be available in the foreseeable future,
due mainly to the high cost of storing water in rivers by
means of dams and weirs. Boreholes in Botswana are
generally low yielding, due to the fact that groundwater
usually occurs in small faults and fissures rather than
in large aquifers. Therefore they are expensive, (in some
areas of the Kgalagadi it is impossible to predict the
likelihood of finding water without actually drilling the
borehole) and their use for irrigation except in known
areas of sufficient groundwater is unlikely.
Existing dams in Gaborone, Francistown and Lobatse are
already fully utilised for the burgeoning urban
populations in these centres as well as for industrial
purposes, and their use for irrigation is not feasible.
In 1985-86 the height of the walls of the dam in Gaborone
was increased to increase the catchment area as the
previous capacity was insufficient for the population
during an extended drought; in 1986-87 the dam serving
the Orapa diamond mine dried up completely and a pipeline
had to be constructed from the large Shashe Dam near
Franc istown.
By 1971, about 2500 hectares were irrigated in the
freehold commercial farms of the Tuli Block, both from
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boreholes and from the usually perennial Limpopo River
which forms the border with South Africa, with whom any
agreement for expansion in irrigation must be made
(Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.238). However, cereal crops
are grown in the Tuli Block only on a very limited scale,
because of the greater returns from cash crops such as
citrus fruit, cotton and vegetables (most of which are
sold in South Africa), and of course cattle, which are
more profitable because of Botswana's access to the EEC
markets.
By 1986, the Botswana Development Corporation, a wholly
government owned company, managed two large farms in the
region and the area under irrigation could be expanded.
In 1985, in the whole of the Tuli Block area, foodgrain
crops were confined to an area of only 140 hectares, and
any significant expansion in cereal production in this
area would only come if the Government raised its
producer prices for cereal grains (van Vuuren 1983,
p.86), which would raise them above South Africa floor
prices with the attendant risk of smuggling so near the
border.
Botswana does have a major water resource in Ngamiland,
where 11-12,000 million cubic metres of water discharge
into the Okavango Swamp annually from Angola
(Matihabaphiri, NIR 1983, p.7). (The annual consumption
of groundwater in Botswana was estimated in 1977 as 30
million cubic metres) (MFDP, NDP 1976-81, p.'). However,
the ebb and flow of the floods make all year round
extraction at certain points unreliable and flow control
will be necessary before large scale irrigation is
possible, particularly at the southern end of the Delta.
In the Western Chobe (Chobe Enclave), water supplies are
assured in most years, and surpluses were produced by
traditional farmers in recent years, by the practise of
shifting cultivation on between 3,000-10,000 hectares.
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Due to possibility of the high costs involved in flood
protection,
"this area is seen as potentially suitable
mainly for a small number of large scale
private investors, although efforts will
continue to assist the existing agricultural
activities of the small local population" (RoB,
Rural Development Council 1985, p.18).
The main vehicles for the promotion of private commercial
investment in irrigated agriculture are the provision of
financial assistance (including crop pricing incentives),
the improvement of infrastructural conditions, and
lastly, the availability of research information and
extension services. The Financial Assistance Policy (FAP)
was initiated in 1982 and was intended to benefit new or
expanding enterprises both in agricultural and
manufacturing sectors. Requests for assistance are
appraised for economic viability and management capacity,
with a premium given for activities likely to create
employment. Between 1982 and 1984 nine irrigation
projects were approved under the scheme on commercial
farms in the Tuli Block and in the Maun (Ngamiland) area,
with a projected total investment over the five years of
support estimated at around P750,000 (RoB, Rural
Development Council 1985, p.18).
In each of the areas of substantial irrigation potential,
the marketing infrastructure will have to be improved to
stimulate and support increased investment and
production. Feasibility and design studies are underway
for the upgrading of the Maun-Shorobe road, for the
improvement of a major route linking the Tuli Block with
the railway network (probably at Palapye) and also the
provision of a tarmac surface for the Maun-Nata road,
which will complete the all-weather road link with
Francistown (Ibid., p.19).
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Estimated yields from irrigated crops in Botswana are 4-6
mt per hectare for sorghum and 5-7 mt for maize (Wiles
1983, P. 18), compared with 200-300kg./hectare for
dryland crops. The envisaged role and contribution of
these commercial developments, which are likely to absorb
substantial amounts of public money, to solving the
problems of rural poverty and unemployment are not
immediately obvious.
Production of seed was negligible during the early 1980s
and in 1984-5 some 94% of requirements were imported from
neighbouring countries, to be distributed as part of the
drought relief programme, through cooperatives, and
through BAMB outlets (RoB, Rural Development Council,
1985, p.15). This dependency on outside sources for basic
seed stocks is an untenable situation and is being
addressed by the Seed Multiplication Unit of the
Department of Agricultural Research at Sebele (near
Gaborone). This unit undertakes breeding, screening and
testing of varieties and will ensure the preservation of
valuable indigenous germplasm which is well suited to
local conditions. Although improved seed varieties may
increase the potential yield of cereal crops, its use is
likely to be restricted to areas of above average
rainfall, which are currently dominated by commercial
farms (e.g. in Pandamatenga). Their value to the smaller
dryland farmer, under the existing structure of land
tenure remains doubtful. In a 'good" year perhaps about
a half of farming households produce enough for their own
consumption. In a bad year, the situation is much worse
(Colcough & McCarthy, 1980, p.131). In exceptional years
however, rainfall is sufficient for near self-sufficiency
in grain production.
However, until 1974, Botswana had no organised marketing
channels for agricultural products, and private traders
fulfilled this role with very little regard to the
economic interests of producers or consumers (RoB, Rural
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Development Council 1985, p.22). The Botswana
Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) was established in
that year to act as a buyer of last resort, to retain the
domestic production of cereal grains within the country,
and to provide an infrastructure for the supply of
agricultural inputs.
It took several years, however, for BAMB to function in
the way it was intended. In 1975, rains were very good
but crop production was down by nearly half. Many
households did not plant at all, or planted smaller areas
because they were still carrying surpluses from the
previous year (Colcough & McCarthy, p.132). In the South
East of the country, farmers without storage facilities
were forced to sell to local dealers who would pay below
the South African floor price for the year, despite the
fact that the grain was usually being sold to the South
African Maize Board. As most households in Botswana buy
more grain than they produce themselves, they would often
later be forced to buy imported grain back from the
trader for a much higher price. (Lever 1970, p.13).3°
Since 1980, BAMB has also been the instrument of crop
pricing policy for the Government. It has provided a
guaranteed market for all crops at prices which are
announced annually before the start of the planting
season, and it therefore acts as the main vehicle of the
Government's pricing policy for agricultural products.
BAMB has fourteen depots for the purchase and selling of
grain, and the supply of inputs such as seeds, fertiliser
and animal foodstuffs, and the government intends to
extend the current network of agricultural supply and
marketing facilities to reach the remoter areas of the
country. It has a number of agencies (mainly
cooperatives) buying grain on its behalf, and others
30 HoA reports confiri that in 1967 that sorghui producers were receiving about P1? per •etric tonne coipared
with the South African floor price for that year of P31 pe tonne.
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provide seed through the Agricultural Extension services
in areas where no commercial outlets exist. BAMB's
storage capacity was 55,000 mt in 1985 but during the NDP
VI period it hopes to build some twenty-six 200mt "lockup
stores" in more remote lands areas for the sale of pre-
season inputs as well as grain purchases during the
harvest season.
On average, for cereals and pulses, BAMB purchases
accounted for almost 24% of total produce between 1978/9
and 1983/4; the higher the level of production, the
greater the proportion of produce acquired by BAMB. Some
49% of pulses and 44% of maize production was bought, but
only about 16% of the sorghum, which reflects the fact
that most sorghum production is of a subsistence nature
(Colcough & McCarthy 1980, p.23).
The base price for food grains in Botswana is determined
by the landed cost of imported grains from South Africa
plus the transport costs to the zone of production,
leading to maximum differentials of around 40%. Using
this pricing policy, BAMB has retained since 1979
producer prices some 16 - 55% higher than those in South
Africa for sorghum, and some 8 - 20% higher for maize
(RoB, Rural Development Council 1985, p.23). Average
rates of producer price increase between 1978 and 1985
have been about 26% per annum for sorghum and 21% for
maize, considerably above the general rate of inflation
(Ibid., p.24), which nevertheless is of doubtful benefit
to the smaller farmers who have no surplus to sell.
However, as BAMB bases its own producer prices on those
prevailing in South Africa, which have generally been
lower than the landed costs of grain imports from other
world markets, such a pricing policy may have a relative
disadvantage for the crop sector. This situation is also
aggravated by the existing bias in factor and product
pricing in other economic activities, particularly in
livestock farming (World Bank 1985, p.50).
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The expected developments in commercial cereal
production, as envisaged by the NFS, will take many years
to have any significant impact on Botswana's current
cereal deficit. In the meantime there are two main
options for Botswana to follow if the country is to
retain its capacity to feed its citizens. The first
option is the maintenance of adequate foreign currency
reserves to be able to pay for commercial imports of
cereals as and when required; the second is the
maintenance of a Strategic Grain Reserve, the basic
purpose of which would be to provide a safeguard against
food shortage in times of drought or other emergencies.
Botswana has opted for the latter strategy, and a SGR was
established in 1980 with a donation from WFP of 6000 mt
of sorghum. 3' Other than the immediate need for reserve
stocks for the drought relief operation, the aim of the
reserve was for
"...stabilising	 prices	 and	 supporting
Government plans for increased agricultural
production,	 thereby	 reducing	 Botswana's
dependence on food imports." (WFP 1985b, p.13)
The overall value of the WFP project is difficult to
assess given that no stocks were used for price
stabilisation, and consumer acceptance of the imported
sorghum was low. 32 Although the reserve did meet some of
its immediate objectives in being used for drought
relief,
"The effects and measures of project impact
were not explicitly defined in the plan of
operations and, apart from process information
contained in progress reports and annual
audits, no arrangements were made to generate
and store data on which to base their objective
measurement." (WFP 1985b, p.15).
31 See WFP (1985b) for a description and evaluation of the WFP assisted 9ergency food reserve projects in
Botswana, Tanaania, Mauritania, Niger and Mali.
32 WFP (1985b, p.l4}
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Since then the SGR has grown steadily from either aid
donations or from commercial purchases by the government,
reaching 23948 mt (mainly sorghum and maize) by April
1987, and is likely to have exceeded 30,000 mt by the end
of that year (EWTC 1987). With storage costs estimated at
P27 per metric tonne per annum (RoB, Rural Development
Council 1985, p.42), a SGR of this size would cost some
P890,000 per year. Such a strategy, as opposed to
reliance on commercial imports, came under criticism in
1986 from the World Bank. (World Bank 1986, pp.44-45),
though it is arguable that having a SGR will reduce the
cost of commercial imports, as it allows the country to
have greater freedom in when and from whom it buys them.
Aid donations are obviously the most preferable from a
financial point of view, but as we have seen in previous
chapters, they have to be planned for months ahead and
often do not arrive exactly when required.33
In the NFS, cereal demand is expected to grow at a rate
of 4.5% per annum, based on a population growth rate of
3.3% and per capita demand of 4.5%, giving a national
demand of 356,000 mt by the year 2000 (RoB, Rural
Development Council 1985, pp.46-7). The attainable level
of cereal self-sufficiency is thought to be 78% by that
year, giving a figure for domestic production of 240,000
mt. (Ibid., pp.46-7). These estimates were thought to be
overly optimistic by the UNDP/UNICEF/WHO consultancy
report of 1985: assuming the normal intervention of
drought and its effect on dryland farming, a growth rate
for that sector of 2.5% per annum is more reasonable,
which gives a growth rate of 32.9% per annum for the
commercial sector, which is unrealistic (UNDP et al 1985,
pp.133-4). Even if this rapid expansion in the commercial
sector was feasible, its capital intensive nature would
Borton (1984), especially regarding donations in the early 1980s froi the EEC. For a general discussion of
national food security stocks, see Clay & Singer (1985).
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have little impact on rural employment and income levels,
and leave the situation of the rural poor virtually
unchanged: reliant now on government handouts of
domestically produced grain instead of that presently
donated by the international aid community.
c) The Strategy for Post-Drought Recovery.
In this section we look at the spirit of the strategy as
stated in the National Food Strategy document in 1985
and the reality of its implementation as envisaged by the
declaration of the end of drought in 1988. The National
Food Strategy aims to "promote the better use of
available foodstuffs and access to food in the rural
areas" (RoB, Rural Development Council 1985, p.2). In
addition to programmes designed to stimulate and
diversify production, social welfare programmes will
remain in place:
"Existing relief and recovery programmes,
including supplementary feeding, direct feeding
of malnourished children and increasing rural
incomes through public works will make a
significant contribution to the improvement of
nutritional status, both in drought and post-
drought recovery periods.., together with the
hoped for achievement of broad based increases
in agricultural productivity, these measures...
will ensure the availability of at least a
minimum acceptable diet for all Batswana,
leading to the eradication of hunger and undernutrition,
and related disease conditions, especially among young
children" (RoB, Rural Development Council 1985,
p.3).	 (my italics)
This is an ambitious and highly commendable goal, but
probably an unrealistic one, given the methods to be used
in achieving it. In preceding chapters we have already
noted that the contribution of the existing LBRP to rural
incomes is low and does not necessarily benefit the old
and the infirm, and in this chapter we saw that the
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outlook for traditional dryland agriculture was bleak. In
our analysis of the 1982-88 drought relief programme we
saw too that those people most at risk nutritionally (the
Remote Area Dwellers and other marginalised groups) are
the very groups that suffered most from the poor
management of the programme and that even when they were
eligible for full rations they often did not receive food
on a regular basis.
In view of the severity and duration of the 1982-88
drought, a Post-Drought Recovery Programme (PDRP) was
formulated as part of the NFS and was seen as a
complement to the ongoing development activities as
outlined in the NDP VI (RoB, Rural Development Council
1985, p.37), and declared operational by Presidential
declaration in April 1988. The focus of the PDRP as set
out in the NFS was on
"providing a short term stimulus to production
and incomes, with the aim of seeing them return
at least to pre-drought levels. . .and continuing
to assist those who are still suffering the
effects of drought after its ending" (RoB,
Rural Development Council 1985, p.37).
This was seen as involving a scaled-down version of some
of the more effective measures undertaken during the
drought. In particular, it would mean that supplementary
rations under the Vulnerable Groups programme would be
more efficiently "targeted" to those nutritionally "at
risk" by introducing medical selection. We have already
discussed the weakness of this approach in the previous
chapter: in Botswana it is difficult to apply because of
political considerations and even where it is applied
successfully, can result in a cyclical pattern of chronic
malnutrition as the individual is constantly "switched"
on and off rations. Apart from medical selection,
"The ration levels for the post-drought
recovery period have also to be considered, and
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it is expected that these will be reduced from
Drought Relief levels only after substantial
and widespread improvement in nutritional
status has been indicated by the Nutritional
Surveillance System" (RoB, Rural Development
Council 1985, p.38). (my emphasis)
As part of the drought recovery programme, and probably
partly in response to donor encouragement to "target"
supplementary feeding more effectively and to those most
in need, ration levels were reduced for most vulnerable
groups with immediate effect after the declaration by the
President of the official end of drought in April 1988,
with medical selection applied across the board (Masire
1982 p.3).
In essence therefore, a certain level of malnutrition is
now a prerequisite for an individual to qualify for any
rations at all. "Permanent" or Group A destitutes are now
totally reliant on their cash supplements of P30.00 and
face the possibility of the erosion of its purchasing
power due to localised inflation, or as we noted in
Section B of the study have to wait several months before
they receive payment from the local District Council.
"Temporary" or Group B destitutes now receive the reduced
rations for a further six months only, after which time
they stop altogether.
The RADs will continue to receive unchanged rations for
a further year, (i.e. until April 1989) and the food is
now to be delivered by FRD instead of by the RADOs using
Council or privately hired trucks; this may make a
significant impact on the distributive performance of the
programme, provided it is closely monitored. Such
monitoring is unlikely to happen at the FRD on a District
or Regional level, and it remains to be seen whether the
Ministry concerned can elicit this sort of response from
FED in Gaborone.
Longer Term Development Strategies for Botswana 398
Considering the rather specific effect of the drought on
small herds, and their significance, both as a source of
income during periods of crop failure, and as a form of
draught power, the drought recovery plans for this sector
form an important element of the PDRP. However, there is
no mention of provision in the 1988 declaration of
drought recovery of a viable scheme for the smaller stock
holders, whose herds have been most decimated by the last
six years of drought, and still less of those who have
neither access to, nor ownership of cattle of their own.
For the larger stockowners, however, there is a
substantial "package" in the drought recovery programme.
Grants for syndicates or small herd owners to equip or
reticulate boreholes have been raised from P13,000 to
P20,000 and the limit of their cattle holding has been
raised from 40 cattle to 60 cattle each in order to allow
more livestock owners to participate in •the scheme
(Masire 1988, p.2). In addition, individual owners of
larger herds in certain areas will also be able to apply
for grants for drilling new boreholes. Such people will
be expected to contribute 40% of the cost of drillin g if
they own herds of between 61 and 200 cattle, and 60% of
the cost if their herds are between 200 and 500 head
(Masire 1988, p.2). The cost of drilling and equipping a
borehole was estimated as P50,000 in early 1988.
A Groundwater Survey is to be carried out in the TGLP
commercial areas in order to assist ranchers find water
for their cattle. This will enable cattle owners to
distribute cattle more widely over the range, and
"allow for more effective destocking measures
to be instituted when next we face drought
conditions, and thus allow us to use the range
better and protect it better than we have been
able to do up to now. This is going to continue
4 personal comwuication froi LBRP Advisor, PRO, Gaborone,
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to be an area where we have to take care to
protect our resources for the benefit of our
children and our children's children." (Masire
1988, p.2)
The Government also promised to provide assistance for
the farmers who had taken out loans from the National
Development Bank, the Botswana Cooperative Bank or
commercial banks, and whose ability to repay "was
seriously hampered by the drought." The main elements of
the loan assistance scheme offered to write-off seasonal
input loans taken out between 1981-2 and 1986-7 for all
farmers in areas declared drought stricken; for the same
period, to write-off all interest payable on all loans
for tractors, implements, small stock (not pigs or
chickens), and water development, and to reschedule
payment of the outstanding balances (Masire 1988, p.2).
According to the President's declaration,
"These write-offs are to be subsidised to an
overall limit of P100,000 per farmer, and the
assistance will be provided to both those who
have paid off their loans and those who are
still in arrears." (Ibid., p.3).
It is estimated that the drought recovery programme will
cost P109 million in 1988-9. The largest component is
water (which includes the subsidy for 300 private
boreholes and water reticulation, as well as 400 other
village boreholes) at P32.5 million, followed by the
assistance to farmers to repay their outstanding loans
(P24 million) The LBRP and food provision come a rather
poor third and fourth at P18.7 million and P15.8 million
respectively, with the remaining balance going to seed,
draught power and field clearance subsidies (Ibid., p.4).
The Post-Drought Recovery Programme in reality bears
little resemblance to the policy objectives set out in
This was probably intended to be understood in a literal sense.
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the NFS of 1985. It exhibits a marked bias towards the
larger livestock holder, and is further evidence of our
earlier contention that the State functions as the
vanguard of the national bourgeoisie. We have argued
throughout this study that the current development
strategy for livestock, based on a greater exclusivity of
control over grazing and water, is enhancing rural
poverty rather than alleviating it. The further
development of fenced TGLP ranches will decrease
employment opportunities, and the employment effect at
the Lobatse abattoir will be negligible as the plant is
highly capital intensive. Any plans for livestock
development, unless linked with a restocking of those
herds lost during the drought and an improved system of
range management, would have little impact on the very
poor and destitute. We will be returning to the issue of
livestock development in the concluding chapter, when we
consider the viability of small scale pastoralism, and
how it might play a key role in a development strategy
aimed more directly at the rural poor.
d) The ILO Labour Intensive Works Programme.
The National Food Strategy report of 1985 saw the LBRP as
a drought relief activity and it does not figure large in
the PDRP. Apart from the hand-stamping element of the
programme, which remains a permanent feature, "the size
of the LBRP will depend on the indications of the extent
of recovery actually achieved" (RoB, Rural Development
Council 1985, p.38). The NFS therefore, as originally
formulated in the 1985 report, sees the recovery of rural
incomes, employment and assets mainly in terms of
increasing agricultural output, despite the known effects
of drought.
There is, however, no clear cut way of relating "the
extent of recovery", i.e. rainfall levels and crop
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production, directly to the present income and welfare of
former LBRP participants, who are as we have seen,
usually without cattle and very often unable to
participate in agriculture. With the labour force growing
at a rate of 21,000 per annum, (ILO 1987, p.1), and with
declining employment opportunities in the South African
mines, this group of the rural unemployed may represent
the tip of a very large iceberg.
Because of the regularity of drought occurrence, relief
efforts at the village and community levels must be
integrated into the overall rural development strategy,
with LBRP as a strategy for district initiative and as an
instrument for reducing unemployment. During periods of
post-drought recovery - and they are, after all, only
brief respites - the opportunity should be taken to
expanding the LBRP and directing it towards the creation
of work that has the potential to be self-sustaining. At
the household level, there is a need for families to gain
access to sources of income and employment which are more
secure, more remunerative and more plentiful than before,
if a significant improvement in nutritional standards is
to be achieved without a continuous reliance on a
programme of food aid. Without this, a national self-
sufficiency in food will be ineffective in removing the
dual problems of poverty and malnutrition. To this end,
an ILO consultancy was engaged by the Government in early
1987 to look into ways in which the successful Labour
Intensive Road Improvement and Maintenance Programme (LG-
34) could be built upon, not only to provide an expansion
of employment opportunities, but also to transform the
present LBRP programme into a more efficient and cost-
effective exercise. The LG34 programme, which ran as a
ILO/NORAD pilot scheme in Central District from 1980
onwards, used labour intensive techniques yet was found
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to be more cost-effective than other, more capital
intensive technologies •36
In 1985-6, the level of productivity of LG-34 Road
Projects was found to be higher than that of the LBRP
drought projects in 1985-6. The LG-34 labourers were paid
P3.60 per man/day and work eight hours per day, during
which time their excavation productivity can reach 4 - 5
of earth. The LBRP workers on the other hand, are paid
P2.25 for a six hour day, in which their output is "very
low or even insignificant." The hourly wage differential
is quite small but the levels of productivity are very
different (ILO 1987, p.28). The growth and development of
the LG-34 ILO/NORAD programme is' illustrated in Table
3.23 beio:

























Source: 1W (1987), p.23.
Even with the expansion of the programme envisaged in
1987-88, the programiu- remains small in comparison with
the LBRP drought relief programme, and was providing
employment for a total of only 1973 workers by the end of
December 1986 (ILO 1987, p.23). With about 74,000 places
36 See Chapter VI,
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available on the LBRP for approximately 60 days of the
year, (rotated amongst a total of some 80,000
participants) this provided about 4,440,000 man/days work
in 1985-6 (Ibid., p.25).
In the draft terms of reference for the consultancy, the
MFDP noted that there was "some 62% (230,000 people) of
the potential workforce estimated to be unemployed or
underemployed", and that the consultancy report "shall
outline institutional changes necessary to achieve a
level of employment of at least 10,000 people for 200
days a year" and also indicate changes necessary to
greatly increase this employment target on a temporary
basis when Botswana went into its next drought cycle
(RoB, MFDP 1987 LG-38, p.4-6).
The ILO consultancy recommended a public works programme
that would replace the old LG-38 programme, which had
productivity, rather than employment creation, as its
main objective. 37 The new programme aims to reconcile both
objectives, The pilot scheme drawn up by the ILO
consultancy is intended to run for two years in selected
districts; it is therefore not a national strategy at
this stage, but the intention of the Government is to
extend it to all districts in time. The number of
man/days estimated for in the two year scheme is
2,223,000 and the labour cost is estimated at P9,703,000.
With labour costs representing at least 60% of the total,
the financial cost of the whole pilot programme is
estimated at P16,172,000 over two years, or a similar
figure to LBRP costs per annum based on expenditure
during 1986-7 (ILO 1987, pp.3-4). Projects for the pilot
scheme are to be chosen on the same basis as LBRP
projects have been in the past, by the community
themselves. The Village Development Committees are
responsible for drawing up plans and priorities for the
31 See Chapter VI.
Longer Term Development Strategies for Botswana 404
community which are then approved first by the District
Development Committees before being sent down to the MLGL
for final approval and funding. This is not an automatic
process, and consideration is given to the suitability of
the project in terms of employment creation without
detriment to overall cost and quality, and whether the
project will be to the advantage of the poorest. (ILO
1987, p.40).38
The ILO consultancy identifies four main areas of
activity for the proposed scheme: construction projects,
dams, agricultural projects (including irrigation), and
environmental projects. The main element in the
construction area will continue to be the building and
maintenance of all-weather roads, as under the previous
LG-38 programme. The relatively large size of the country
and the limited number of existing roads is seen as a
major constraint on production and development, and the
NDP VI has the expansion of the road network as a primary
goal of its development strategy. In this regard, the
pilot scheme plans to absorb 3300 labourers during the
course of the pilot programme, each of whom will work 300
days, which gives a total of some 990,000 man/days. The
programme sees a construction progress of about 150km per
year, and NORAD has agreed to fund this element until
1991 (ILO 1987, p.50).
The flat topography of Botswana allows a large proportion
of roads to be built to a single standard, and over most
of the country the material available for formation of'
the road surface compacts sufficiently well for the
amount of traffic likely to use rural roads. Road
activities include clearance (debushing/destumping),
excavation, gravelling, drainage, the construction of
culverts and low classification bridges, and general
maintenance. Most of these works can be carried out by
38 Whether this consideration is aade very often in practice is debatable,
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unskilled, labour intensive methods, with only culverts
and bridges requiring building materials, light equipment
and skilled workers. The pilot programme also envisages
the maintenance of around 200km per year of roads
previously constructed under the old LG-38 programme.
Though house construction in Botswana using modern
materials is fairly capital intensive (75% of the total
cost) (ILO 1987, p.34), labour intensive techniques can
be applied to brick and block making. Hand moulds are
obviously the most labour intensive, but even machine
moulded bricks have a 50% labour element in their use
(Ibid., p.35).
Dam construction would, at first sight, appear to be the
most useful labour based activity to undertake in
Botswana. However, the relatively flat topography of the
country makes the selection of suitable sites problematic
and it is likely that some dams hurriedly constructed
under the LBRP programme in recent years were wrongly
sited, or so badly constructed that they were washed away
with the onset of heavy rains. 39 Earth dams can be
constructed using labour intensive methods for excavation
and filling, and donkey transport for moving earth over
short hauls. A mechanical roller is still required for
compaction of the earth, but in this way, dams of up to
4 metres in height can be constructed satisfactorily (ILO
1987, p.32). For large dams, the need to get the work
completed before the arrival of the next rains and the
difficulty in managing a large number of workers on the
site, may introduce a time factor into the process and
force the adoption of less labour-intensive methods.
Percolation dams can also be constructed in addition to
the more common earthen type, which are designed to
maintain the maximum amount of water on the surface. By
Personal observation, As sose eipheral rivers do not flow for years on end during periods of drought, it is
not surprising that the technicians involved were unable to anticipate the force of run-off during the heavy rains
that occurred for exaaple in Noveisber-Deceiber 1987.
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contrast, the percolation type is constructed across a
seasonal or empheral river and designed to allow water to
be held long enough to percolate the surface and recharge
the irrigation wells further downstream. Percolation in
this way can increase well irrigation in isolated patches
of land where surface water would not be economically
feasible (Ibid., p.42).
Agricultural projects also figure largely in the ILO
pilot programme. These include small irrigation schemes
(often in conjunction with dams), the digging of wells
for human and livestock use, and the development of
communal gardens. In Botswana, water supply projects
executed by labour intensive methods are uncommon, due to
the fact that the underground water level is very deep
(100 metres-F) except in certain areas such as Ngamiland,
where the massive Okavango River soaks into the desert
sand, and the eastern part of the country, which also has
a shallow water table of less than 35 metres in some
areas (ILO 1987, p.42).
The most likely type of water project to be carried out
under the pilot programme therefore is the enlargement of
pans. Pans are naturally formed depressions in a
relatively flat terrain and are found all over Botswana.
They collect water run-off from the surrounding area and
may vary in size from between one-quarter up to 24
hectares. The huge Makgadikgadi Pans north of the Orapa
diamond mines are the ancient flood plains of the
Okavango River. Because pans are shallow and have large
surface and bottom areas, water losses due to seepage and
evaporation are very high, and the pans usually dry up
within a few weeks on the end of the rains. The
continuous cycle of water collection and evaporation may
create a large salt build-up in the bottom layers of the
pans which causes any water collecting there to become
saline.
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Labour-intensive projects can help reduce this
evaporation and salinity by several methods. First, by
excavating the lowest part of the pan, the water holding
capacity is increased and the area/volume ratio is
thereby reduced; secondly, seepage can be reduced by
lining the bottom and sides of the excavated pan with an
impervious layer of compacted clay. This method would
also reduce salinity. The inflow of silt into the pan
with flood water can also be reduced by the construction
of a earthen bund or embankment, with "check weirs" at
the main inflow points (points where some form of gully
formation or channelling is visible). By reducing the
velocity of the rain water as it flows into the pan,
suspended particles are deposited ' in the gullies, which
are excavated at regular intervals (ILO 1987, p.44).
Hand-dug wells, where feasible, can be lined by concrete
rings lowered in to the well as the work proceeds. A pump
is used to facilitate excavation as the depth of the well
enters the water table. The well is covered by a
reinforced concrete platform on which a handpump is
mounted. This type of construction uses about a 40%
labour element; if stone is available locally the wall of
the well can be lined by masonry which will enhance the
labour component of the project (Ibid., p.46). Communal
gardens are only feasible where the topographical
situation allows for a supply of water above the level of
the garden, such as a dam.
In Botswana, environmental projects such as erosion
control and afforestation are only recently being taken
seriously. 40 Even as late as 1987, no courses on
afforestation and related research were being offered by
the Agricultural College and Research Centre, and instead
40 Afforestation progra3lles have been a feature of Kenya's Turkana Rehabilitatation Prograaae since 1984 and have
been carried out under Food for Work, Such prograines are particular useful to desert areas subject to soil
erosion. Tree planting helps soil stabilisation and moisture retention, produces huius and shading.
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the emphasis was on zoology and livestock (ILO 1987,
p.34). Afforestation projects could help preserve the
ecology and environment by stabilising slopes, regulating
water run-off and reducing the loss of top soil caused by
erosion. The only constraint on this type of project is
the need for water during the first two or three years
after the planting of the tree seedlings. The most
appropriate seedlings will be those that can tolerate a
degree of salinity in the water supply, and of course are
drought resistant to match the aridity of the
environment.
There is no mention in either the Draft Terms of
Reference for the ILO consultancy, or the ILO proposal
itself, of the envisaged role of food aid in the future
employment planning programme. The provision of food
rations still carries with it the connotation of drought
relief, whereas properly used as part payment of wages,
it could help finance a more rapid expansion of the
programme, and at the same time have a significant impact
on the nutritional status of the participants.
Palliative feeding programmes, however essential, are not
enough and food aid must lend itself to a range of other
actions relating to agricultural production, income
generation and improvements to the rural infrastructure.
We saw in a previous chapter on the LBRP that labour
intensive projects such as Food for Work schemes do
indeed benefit the very poorest of rural families, and
especially the women of female headed households. 41 As a
substantial proportion of the labourers in this programme
41 Figures froi a field sa]ple of 68 WFP assisted projects aiied at the developient and rehabilitation of land
indicate that one third of FF labour is fetale and in soie the proportion is tuch higher. In another saiple of
26 WFP assisted projects that include the developaent of econotic and social infrastructure, 20% of FFW labour is
fesale. (WFP 1985d, p.v). A study of fetale FFW labour in Bangladesh in 197? revealed that 47% are theaselves heads
of households and another 10% cote frot households headed by a wolan. In Tanzania, 60% of road construction
labourers working on WFP projects in a refugee settleient are feisale, and in Lesotho WFP assisted projects 90% of
FFW labour is feisale (in Lesotho wosen fort 72% of the dotestic labour force and 60% of household heads), (VFP
1985d, p.12-13.)
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are likely to be women in this situation, the provision
of food as a supplement or part replacement of wages in
cash would be the most direct way of targeting food aid
where it is needed most. Many aid programmes in the past
have seen women and development as separate issues and as
a result their main involvement has been a passive one
(their inclusion in vulnerable group feeding programmes
for example) rather than directed at increasing their
productive capacity. Their vital role in production both
in pastoralism and cultivation is often subsumed under
the activities of men. The ability of women to
participate in rural development projects however remains
limited by competing demands on time and labour in the
household and in production.
A breakdown of the pilot programme's main activities,
labour requirements and costings is provided overleaf in
Table 3.24. The programme was designed by ILO to meet
the specifications as outlined in the terms of reference
from the MFDP. The ILO programme represents a serious
effort to break away from food handouts with the
attendant risk of dependency that such projects carry
when run for an extended period. It offers a way of
improving the rural infrastructure with projects of a
high technical standard chosen by the community
themselves and at the same time increase incomes and
employment levels where they are needed most.
The one important proviso that has to be mentioned is
that the programme is designed to provide employment for
only an estimated 4500 people over the two year period it
will run, and not all these jobs will be self-sustaining.
As we have already mentioned, this represents less than
one quarter of the annual increase in the labour force.42
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TABLE 3,24: STRUCTURE, LABOUR REQUIREMENTS & STS OF 1W LABOUR-INTENSIVE DRKS P)GRAMME (1987)
Project Type	 Man/Days	 No. of Units	 TOTAL MAN/DAYS REQUIRED 	 Ratio of Skilled
Per Unit	 Required	 Unskilled	 Gangers	 Skilled	 to Unskilled
DAM PROJECTS:
Earth	 9000



























: ILO (1987), pp.55-58.
50	 450000	 15000	 11250
10	 12000	 400	 1200
5	 225000	 1500	 5630
5	 18000	 600	 1800























































300ki	 840000	 28000	 21000	 1:40
400ki	 50000	 1667	 1250	 1:40
lOOki	 5000	 161	 120	 1:40
2000	 60000	 2000	 6000	 1:10
	
955000	 31834	 28370
2091250 + 69709 + 62160 : 2223119
	
4.00	 8.50	 12.00
8365000 + 592526 + 745920 : P9703446
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Though financial support for the main Roads project has
been pledged until 1991, other donors have not shown the
same interest in programmes of this sort in the past, as
they are difficult to monitor and evaluate. 43 Therefore
it is not certain at this moment in time whether the
Government has the capacity and financial resources (or
indeed, the political will) to mount this programme on a
sufficiently large scale to have any significant impact
on rural poverty, without either resorting to payment of
wages partly in donated food, or else in the extensive
monetisation of food aid, which is likely to continue in
this form for some years to come.
ee Table 3.19 for the structure and intended use of donor aid in 1986-1,
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GENERAL CONCLUS IONS
In this study I have attempted to show that poverty and
rural deprivation in Botswana are due more to unequal
access to productive assets, employment opportunities and
incomes, rather than to a harsh climate and recurrent
drought. I have ar gued that the network of economic and
political structures that was developed during the
Protectorate led to the formation of new class structures
based not as in the past, on tribal allegiance, but on an
impersonal cash nexus. This was a major factor
responsible for , the gradual erosion of traditional
redistributive mechanisms, which had ensured that
although life in tribal society may have been always at
or near subsistence level, poverty, drought and hardship
were features that united people rather than divided
them. From henceforth, the relationship between
individuals and groups would increasingly be mediated
through the market, and in the future it would be the
market, rather than the tribe, that determined the
pattern of production and distribution amongst the
people.
In Section B we saw that the spectacular growth of the
mineral extraction industry, from the 1970s onwards,
greatly increased the levels of government revenue,
public sector employment and salaries. Civil Service
income now forms the major source of domestic investment
in the livestock industry, further exacerbating an
already skewed pattern of ownership. I developed this
theme further by highlighting the role of the State in
the commercialisation of the livestock industry after
Independence, and emphasised its close relationship with
the national bourgeoisie. The accession to political
power of the larger Batswana breeding interests not only
established the pattern of economic development in the
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post-Independence period, but the direction that land use
planning and tenure would take.
The contradiction between the private ownership of
livestock and the traditional system of communal land
tenure is now being "resolved" by the privatisation of
large tracts of land and water resources, often for the
exclusive use of the policy legislators themselves. Far
from helping to solve the problems of rural poverty and
range degradation, the TGLP has in fact exacerbated both
by effectively legalising the forced dispossession of'
marginal groups, and by allowing stock densities to
increase, not only on the TGLP ranches, but also in the
very communal areas the policy was supposed to relieve.
Looking at the structure of rural poverty, its spatial
distribution, and trends in rural incomes and employment,
I argued that it was the distribution of productive
assets, particularly in livestock, and an increasingly
exclusive control over grazing and water resources, that
provided the main causal explanation for this phenomenon.
We noted that the Government's own wage and income
policies tended to reinforce these existing inequalities.
Its failure to set minimum wage levels in agriculture had
allowed rural income levels to stagnate, while those of
the public sector had continued to rise.
Drought has an important impact on rural incomes and
employment but does not by itself explain the growing
divergence in the ownership of wealth and assets. Rather
it is the effects of drought acting upon and within a
class divided, market-orientated society that tends to
increase the extent and severity of poverty, whilst at
the same time increasing the wealth of others. To support
this point, we noted that mortality rates amongst smaller
traditional herds during periods of drought were
significantly higher than amongst the larger commercial
herds, and that the wealthier owners often benefited from
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the effects of drought by having access to a reserve of
emaciated animals.
In Section C we examined the structure of the 1982-88
drought relief programme, and noted that a major part of
the relief effort was directed towards the larger farmer
and livestock owner, and therefore had little impact on
rural poverty. The poor nutritional status found in many
rural areas appears to be structural in nature as it
persists even in non-drought years. The persistent high
rates of malnutrition in Chobe District, which enjoys
greater rainfall levels than the rest of Botswana and is
therefore the centre of commercial rainfed agriculture in
the country, emphasises the need to look not just at
overall levels of output, but the entitlement of the poor
to command that output.
The management of the 1982-88 human drought relief
programme leaves much to be desired, and the government
appears to place less emphasis on its efficient
administration than it does on the various projects and
subsidies available for the livestock industry. This is
illustrated by the low priority given to the selection
and training of managers for the Food Resources
Department and the consequent poor distributive
performance of many District Depots. This disappointing
performance went largely unrecognised by the Government
or was simply ignored, except in a few individual cases
where prior publicity had rendered its remedy politically
expedient. This low level of managerial competence was
also found at the district level in the LBRP element of
the relief programme which depended heavily on expatriate
technicians for even its routine administrative and
accounting functions.
Though the level of contingency planning and aid
procurement at a ministerial level was found to be highly
developed, this degree of competence (also largely
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supplied by expatriates) seems to have been focused more
at eliciting further aid donations than directly at the
welfare of the intended recipients. The failure to
monitor the working of the programme at a micro level in
the field severely reduced its effectiveness, and at
various times left many villages and settlements without
a supply of rations for weeks on end. In many areas,
distribution bore little resemblance to actual needs, due
to the near total absence of any logistical planning even
of a rudimentary nature. The hardship and suffering this
caused must have been immense. This was particularly
evident in the relief programme for the Remote Area
Dwellers, perhaps the most vulnerable of all social
groups in Botswana. In our District-based study of relief
food distribution to the RADs by RADOs working with the
District Councils, we showed that in many areas it was
extremely inefficient, despite the absence of financial
and transport constraints. The fact that this problem
only started to be recognised and monitored in late 1987
was indicative not only of the lack of political power of
these ethnic minorities, but also of the present
government's level of political commitment to social
justice and the alleviation of rural poverty.
What future is there for the rural poor of Botswana? This
thesis has tried to argue implicitly that the present
market orientated approach to development is socially
divisive and likely to enhance, not diminish, rural
poverty and deprivation. The privatisation of the commons
has not brought about a renewed sense of responsibility
in regard to grazing and stocking levels; it has
increased unemployment levels rather than reduced them;
and it has not proved more productive than communally
held land. While substantial mining revenues have been
channelled through the medium of civil service salaries
into private livestock development, the problem of
declining rural incomes has been left to the
international donor community.
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However, the belief that the market mechanism can reverse
this downward trend is still unshaken, or at least
acquiesced to, even by the major aid donors. James
Ingram, the executive director of WFP, has stated:
"While the global economic outlook is
unpredictable, the overwhelming economic power
of the capitalist industrialised countries in
relation to the Third World, and the
diminishing relevance of other factors, has
become crystal clear. Solutions to the economic
problems of developing countries will have to
be found within the framework of imperfectly
functioning markets operating more or less in
accordance with the laws of classical
economics." (WFP 1987b, p.4).
Botswana's National Food Strategy (RoB, Rural Development
Council 1985) follows this line precisely. It
demonstrates a marked bias towards the larger commercial
farmer and assumes that increasing the aggregate levels
of crop production and establishing a crop pricing policy
will be the main instruments for increasing rural
incomes. The NFS remains essentially a market strategy
which aims to eliminate poverty and redistribute income
through adjustments and manipulations to the pricing
mechanism. It chooses to ignore the argument that it was
the market that brought about the growing divergence in
incomes in the first place, and that further reliance on
this strategy may well increase existing disparities in
wealth and control of productive assets.
The immediate plans for post-drought recovery illustrate
this point: a whole new range of subsidies has been
formulated for the larger livestock owners. The present
pattern of development in TGLP is to continue, with newly
demarcated ranches now eligible for financial support in
borehole construction, and bank debts incurred during the
drought written-off wholesale. The strategy for the poor
however, seems to be to reduce the food rations they came
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to rely on during the drought - without first evaluating
whether they have any recourse to any other form of
income or employment. The assumption appears to be that
with the return of adequate rains, everyone will now be
able to grow enough food for their subsistence needs. We
have shown that this is not the case because a
substantial proportion of households still do not have
access to draught animals, have insufficient land, or
land of poor quality. Female headed households remain
particularly vulnerable in this regard. For many marginal
groups, the means of subsistence have disappeared
altogether under the recent land tenure changes.
Perhaps the most promising development to emerge during
the 1982-88 drought for the rural poor was that of the
Labour Based Relief Programme. Though the LBRP had a
relatively small impact on rural incomes and
unemployment, compared to the much greater coverage of
the supplementary feeding programme, it marked a point of
transition between a purely "relief" type programme and
a fully-fledged public works programme. It also offers a
greater productive role for rural women than the present
Vulnerable Groups' feeding programme. Its great potential
lies in the fact that LBRP projects are locally selected
by the people themselves, and based on their own
perceived needs and requirements. The constraints we
noted included a lack of donor support for the programme
and the inadequacy of the technical supervision, but
these may be overcome in the future. The ILO evaluation
study (ILO 1987) on the feasibility of a greatly expanded
Labour Intensive Works Programme offers a way forward,
but if such a scheme is to be embarked upon in a viable
form and size, it certainly needs to be more closely
associated with the present food aid programmes. As
donated food is likely to be the most common form of
foreign aid available in the future, the LIWP could use
food as part payment of wages in the programme, or
monetise a proportion of the donation.
General Conclusions	 418
In the absence of any alternative avenues of employment,
pastoralism seems to possess the greatest development
potential in Botswana. The country's international
comparative advantage in beef production, and the
economic viability of pastoralism when combined with an
arid climate and small population, mean that livestock
will probably continue to be the least expensive way of
raising a surplus from agriculture, and would require a
fraction of the capital investment needed for irrigated
arable agriculture. The government of Botswana and the
larger stockholders have long realised this, and have not
been slow to reap the commercial benefits that access to
the lucrative EEC markets has bestowed.
Development however, is more than the production of an
economic surplus. It is equally important not only how
this surplus is generated, but to whom it will accrue.
For Botswana, any real development strategy aimed at the
eradication of rural poverty must surely address three
interrelated problems: the management and control of
productive assets such as grazing and water, household
income, and land tenure. The TGLP strategy that currently
forms the basis of livestock development has failed on
all three counts. The challenge is to sustain and enhance
the conditions of smaliholder production, and a necessary
precondition for this is the development of a land tenure
policy which widens stock ownership and protects the
right of access to grazing land, whilst at the same time
instilling a greater measure of control over range
managemerit.(RoB, MoA,1981); Sandford (1983). The
establishment of communal tenure systems that accommodate
growth, conservation and equity objectives presents a
formidable challenge, but one that surely must be met if
the country is to avoid a chronic dependence on food aid
in the future.
As we saw in the chapter on the TGLP, the communal
ownership and grazing of land has long been considered by
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classical economists as being inherently destructive of
the resource base, and in Botswana this argument has
provided the ideological justification for the enclosure
of the commons and the granting of exclusive rights to
grazing and water. We also noted however that empirical
studies of pastoralist societies (Oxby 1975; Sandford
1983; USAID 1986; Livingstone 1986) have challenged the
"Tragedy of the Commons" theory and provided evidence of
successful range management not only in Botswana but
elsewhere in Africa.
Even within an increasingly class-divided and competitive
society, smallholders continue to share a range of common
interests such, as the maintenance of productive grazing
resources, the production and maintenance of drift
fences, dams and water projects, and therefore communal
tenure need not conflict with range protection and other
ecological considerations. Communal land tenure allows
for a greater flexibility in herd movement in response to
fluctuating rainfall patterns, and has been the chosen
strategy during drought for generations. Sandford (1983,
p.104) notes that scientific research on range
degradation has often being well-intentioned but
misguided. While the range scientists emphasise the
productivity effects of grazing rotation on plant growth,
research trials have largely failed to find any
significant improvement on livestock production using
this method over traditional, free range grazing. This is
partly explained by the inherent complexity of
traditional pastoralism: different species, age groups,
and the sex of livestock have varying nutritional
requirements and this necessitates a free movement over
the range, (e.g. for the use of "salty licks" of mineral
deposits). Such a system is incompatible with the private
control of grazing using fenced ranches.
Unlike in many other African countries, cultivation does
not compete with pastoralism in Botswana: rather the two
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complement each other (manure helps to fertilise the
lands and crop residues provide forage for the cattle).
The long established links between arable agriculture and
livestock 1 mean that a wider ownership of livestock than
exists at present is more likely to enhance range
protection and arable production than decrease it,
provided grazing loads are spread during periods of
abundant rainfall in order to maximise the revegetation
of specific deteriorated areas. Where pastoralists have
milk as their main diet as in Botswana, variations in
yield are an immediate indication of the nutritional
status of the herd and the need to move on to better
grazing. This is in itself a form of rotation. (Sandford
1983, p.103-4)
Perhaps the most practical way of ensuring a more even
distribution of stock in order to avoid overgrazing is in
the siting and sizing of water sources. These should have
a manual delivery proportioned to range conditions and
where appropriate, facilitating migratory movement. '(Oxby
1975, p.6; Sandford 1983; Livingstone 1986, p.l?).
Sandford notes the possibility of making surface water
supplies self-regulating. If their volume and depth are
deliberately kept low, the water supply will be exhausted
before the surrounding pastures are over grazed. This
system was applied in Southern Ethiopia and N.E. Kenya in
the second half of the 1970 g . (Sandford 1983, p.TO).
A wider distribution of smaller water sources also tends
to increase productivity in terms of milk yield and'
liveweight gain per head, because the cattle need to
spend less time and energy walking to the water point,
which in drought years may be anything up to 40 Km. from
the grazing area. Sandford estimates that in Africa up to
1 Sisilar links exist in iany arid and seii-arid regions of Africa where pastoralis. is the dominant form of
production. One of the proposals put forward by the UN mission to Turkana District (Kenya) in 1988 was that crop
patterns should bediversified and that agriculture should be integrated with livestock production,(WFP/FAOet al,
1988a, p.81)
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30% of the average daily distance walked by cattle is
spent specifically in obtaining water. Reducing this
distance by about 30% (by increasing the number of water
sources) could lead to a doubling of the balance of
energy available for useful production of meat, milk and
fibre. (Sandford 1983, pp.73-77.
Provided then that a communal mode of pastoralism is
ecologically sound, what form of social organisation
might it take if it is to provide a means of subsistence
for the rural poor? Without attempting to be
prescriptive, the most appropriate form of social
organisation is likely to be one that provides a level of
continuity with the previous system, while dispensing
with those elements which are no longer desirable or
tenable.
For there to exist a wider ownership of livestock than at
present, the carrying capacity of the range would impose
a limit to the size of herd individually owned which
would be less than the drought viable size (i.e. it is
not possible to provide every individual with a drought
viable herd). This suggests that a pooling of resources
such as breeding bulls, draft oxen, and equipment would
not only be a desirable, but a necessary feature of any
such strategy. Livestock management groups could be based
on the smaller village, the ward, or at a. size where
there starts to be economies of scale in the provision of
water supplies, breeding stock, machinery or managerial
capacity. The Maasai of Northern Tanzania are one such
example of group cooperation in the provision of water
supplies and dip tanks. (Sandford 1983, p.139)
Participatory forms of self-management could be
established through the election of "rotating" committees
whose duties would include the allocation of grazing
areas and stock level quotas, water source operation and
the maintenance of pumps and supplies. The committees
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could also become involved in the provision and
management of other pastoral services such as animal
health and husbandry services, and the bulk purchases of
materials. The Tribal Land Boards could assist in this
task and settle local disputes on stocking levels and
water source use, instead of performing their present
role as the policy instrument of the larger stockholders.
(Sandford 1983, p.233; personal communication from the
District Officer (Lands), Serowe). With effective
management there is every reason to believe that
pastoralism will continue to be even more remunerative
than in the past. National cereal shortages could for
example be met by beef exports to Europe and the United
States, where cattle are raised on grains instead of
forage. Botswana enjoys considerable privileges in having
access to lucrative overseas markets for its beef, and
closer economic ties with SADCC member states could open
up further markets. The main point however is that even
without access to these overseas markets, a wider
ownership or control of livestock would provide the poor
with at least a means of subsistence. It would also
reforge the dynamic link that exists between livestock
ownership and arable production, by providing draught
power.
Establishing such a system of communal tenure and group
management of the range and water supplies, if possible
at all, will not be an easy task. In a highly stratified
society, any egalitarian objective which might seek to
reduce the wealth and power of an existing or emerging'
elite is bound to meet with resistance: in the USSR it
took a bloody struggle in the pastoral areas to bring
about a redistribution of livestock from the old elite.
(Sandford 1983, p.133). The Village Area Development
Programme hoped to form 40 group ranches in Western
Botswana during the 1970s over a period of in five years,
but in fact not one was established. (Odell & Odell 1980,
p.240). Amongst the Maasai of Kenya, group ranches have
General Conclusions	 423
also encountered serious problems. Although each member
of the group ranch was allocated a basic quota of
livestock, the ranch management committee was dominated
by the richer members, and no steps were taken either to
reduce their own holdings or bring up those of the poor
up to the basic minimum. (Helland 1980, p.192).
The benefits of livestock ownership are enjoyed at
present by a small elite, whose private interests do not
coincide with the wider interests of the people and the
nation. Their economic power and political supremacy have
yet to be challenged. This makes it unlikely that a wider
ownership of livestock will be encouraged, and even less
likely that any legally binding ceilings on stock levels
will be introduced. 2 Poverty is not just an economic, but
a political phenomenon, shaping the perceptions and
consciousness of the poor and their relationship with the
larger herdowners. Its existence has a definite function
in a class divided society, one of which is to preserve
a pool of cheap labour in the rural areas (hence the
opposition from some larger farmers to the wage rates
paid under the LBRP).
Without a reversal of the growing polarisation in the
ownership of livestock, the extent and severity of rural
poverty will only be stemmed by ever increasing amounts
of food aid. The government's present development
strategy seems to accept this, and in some ways its
present development strategy reflects and relies on it.
In the short to medium term, the purely financial costs of
such a policy is likely to be relatively low in national
2 The monetisation of a proportion of future food aid during subsequent droughts could be used for the restocking
of destitutes' herds (as undertaken in the Turkana Rehabilitation Programme in Kenya) and a iore equitable access
to overseas markets through the BMC, This would not only provide additional incoie to the very poorest groups but
also timely draught power for agricultural activity during periods of adequate rainfall, However, given the present
political power of the larger herders, the limited carrying capacity of the range, and the fact that access to
overseas markets is granted on a quota basis, such a strategy would probably never be possible without a radical
restructuring of society. Any initiative for such a change would certainly not come from the present political
elite .
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terms: even with almost total reliance on foreign sources
of cereals at the height of the 1980s drought, cereal
imports cost less than 10% of total imports or export
revenues. Full scale public works programmes, reaching
almost half of all rural households, cost in 1985 just
over 1% of the total Government budget (RoB, Rural
Development Council 1985, p.29). With mineral revenues
and foreign food aid still flowing, Botswana's elite will
probably not be faced with any critical policy decisions
for some years to come. The social costs to the rural poor
however, in terms of human development, deprivation and
malnutrition are likely to be much higher, if the
management of the 1982-88 relief programme proves to be
typical of future operations. The pattern of Botswana's
economic development since Independence has left a
growing proportion of its citizens dependent on public
welfare programmes for their survival, and has failed to
adequately address the substantive issues of equity and
social justice.
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NOTES ON TABLES IN THE APPENDIX
The tables in this Appendix present the distributive
performance of the Vulnerable Groups, Primary Schools and
Remote Area Dwellers' programmes during the period 1986-
88. Distribution to the RADs settlements was carried out
by Remote Area Development Officers using RADP, Council
and privately hired vehicles. Food for the RADs was
stored in FRD depots prior to collection by the RADO.
Distribution to both schools and health facilities was
carried out direct by the various FRD depots, which are
grouped by administrative region.
The food requirements figures used in all tables are only
based indirectly on nutritional needs. They have been
calculated by multiplying the number of registered
beneficiaries served by each FRD depot by the ration for
each category of beneficiary for each month during the
period January 1986 to December 1988. The ration levels
are shown in Table 3.3 in the main body of the text, and
their nutritional values in Table 3.4. As distribution in
any one month is based on the beneficiary data collected
from individual centres dujing the previous month, actual
requirements are based on data collected during the period
December 1985 to November 1988. Net distribution therefore
is based on food movements to the centres during the
period January 1986 to December 1988, minus any food
returned to the depots due to spoilage or overstocking at
the feeding centres.
In all cases, distribution was based on individual stock
analysis ledgers in the individual depots, or on monthly
stock reports as submitted to FRD in Gaborone by the
individual district depots concerned.
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TABLE Al: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RE1YE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING	 At1E IN PALAPYE FRD REGION: 1986
CXfl'X)DITIES IN 	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 IUFAIS
MEFRIC 1tNPS	 BEANS M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEPOT
PALAPYE DEPOT:
	
No PADs served by this Depot.
SEEE DELUF:
Calculated requirements: 	 100.40 358.63	 25.82	 484.85
Net distribution:	 70.10	 338.12	 24.76	 432.98
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 69.82% 94.28%	 95.89%	 89.30%
MAHALAPYE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 40.17	 143.27	 10.32	 193.76
Net distribution:	 33.50	 174.31	 15.00	 222.81
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 83.40% 121.67% 145.35% 114.99%
511_RRE-WIKWE DErYr:
Calculated requirements: 	 66.02 235.75	 16.96	 318.73
Net distribution:	 54.05 175.39	 13.10	 242.54
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 81.87% 74.40%	 77.24%	 76.10%
'1U2AL FOOD REJIRFNENTS:
	
206.59 737.65	 53.1	 997.34
'lUFAL NE'F DISTRIBUTION:
	




76.31% 93.24%	 99.55%	 90.07%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD by RADOs
arid current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986. Distribution
calculated from FRD Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly Stock Reports
of Palapye Region FR]) District Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986.
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TABLE A2: DISTRIB1fIVE PERFORMANCE OF RE74JrE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING rCGRArt1E IN FRANCISTOWN FRD REGION: 1986
0(Lfl)DITIES IN 	 RADS'	 RAIDS'	 RAIDS'	 1UAL$







No RADs served by this Depot.
	
51.82	 185.14	 13.35	 250.31
	
16.31	 127.41	 14.84	 158.56
	
31.47%	 68.82%	 111.16%	 63.35%
LELHAKANE DEP(YF:
Calculated requirements:	 76.19 272.04	 19.58	 367.81
Net distribution:	 41.25 240.78	 15.20	 297.23
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 54.14% 88.51%	 77.63%	 80.81%
MAUN DEP(Yr:
Calculated requirements:	 31.42 112.16	 8.08	 151.66
Net distribution:	 57.75	 189.00	 12.04	 258.79
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 183.80% 168.51% 149.01% 170.64%
KASANE DEIUr:
	
No RADs served by this Depot.
TOTAL FOOD REJIR1ENTS:	 159.43 569.34	 41.01	 769.78
1UAL NET DISTRI&TrION:
	




72.33% 97.87% 102.61%	 92.83%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD by RADOs and current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov.
1986, Distribution calculated froi FED Stock Analysis Ledgers and ionthly Stock Reports of Francistown Region FRI)
District Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986. January1986 report not available for Tutuise Depot. Distribution for this ionth
based on an average of Feb. - Dec. 1986. Soae beneficiary data iissing for Tutuie. Beneficiaries estiaated based
on average of reporting ]onths.
	55.97	 199.88	 14.39	 270.24
	
50.35	 126.13	 8.87	 185.34
89.96% 63.10%	 61.64%	 68.59%
	
31.33	 111.90	 8.10	 151.33
	
28.10	 103.98	 8.27	 140.35




















104.72% 59.04%	 94.78%	 70.40%
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TABLE A3: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFOH1ANCE OF RFM)TE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING XRAtt4E IN LOBATSE FRD REGION: 1986
X*fl)DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 'iXYrAlS
ME'rRIC IDNNES	 BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FC* DELUr






























	 97.88% 65.49%	 86.01%	 73.29%
Source:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRO and
current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986. Distribution calculated
from FR1) Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly Stock Reports of Lobatse
Region FRD District Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986. December 1985 Report
not available and beneficiary figures assumed to be same as reported
in January 1986. Tshabong Depot beneficiary figures not reported
January and February and so estimated based on average of reporting
months.
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TABLE A4: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RYFE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING F XRA1T1E IN SEBELE FRD REGION: 1986
(XflI3DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 'lUI'AIS
MErRIC TONNES	 BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEP(Y
SEBELE DERYr:	 No RADs served by this Depot.
!IL1EFOLOLE DERYr:
Calculated requirements: 	 147.47 526.75	 37.93	 712.15
Net distribution:	 58.20	 91.89	 10.83	 160.92
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 39.47% 17.44%	 28.55%	 22.60%
M3CHUDI DERIr:
Calculated requirements: 	 13.22	 47.18	 3.39	 63.79
Net distribution:	 5.70	 28.06	 0.36	 34.12
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 43.12% 59.47%	 10.62%	 53.49%
IUFAL FOOD REJIRNENTS:
	
160.69 573.93	 41.32	 775.94
IUFAL NFF DISTRIBUTION:
	




39.77% 20.90%	 27.08%	 25.14%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and
current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986. Distribution calculated
from FED Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly Stock Reports of Sebele
Region FR]) District Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986. December 1985 Report
not available and beneficiary figures assumed to be same as reported
in January 1986. No beneficiaries reported in February 1986 and
assumed to be the same as January.
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TABLLE A5: NATIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RFI4CIrE AREA








RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 REGIONAL
BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL IUFALS
	206.59	 737.65	 53.10	 997.34
	
157.65	 687.82	 52.86	 898.33
76.31% 93.24%	 99.55%	 90.07%
FRANCIST€MN REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 159.43 569.34	 41.01	 769.78
Net thstribution:.	 115.31 557.19	 42.08	 714.58
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 72.33% 97.87% 102.61%	 92.83%
L.OBATSE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 291.18 1039.93	 74.91 1406.02
Net distribution:	 285.01 681.07	 64.43	 1030.51
Distribution as percentage











160.69	 573.93	 41.32	 775.94
	
63.90	 119.95	 11.19	 195.04
39.77% 20.90%	 27.08%	 25.14%
817.89 2920.85	 210.34	 3949.08
621.87 2046.03 	 170.56	 2838.46
76.03% 70.05%	 81.09%	 71.88%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and
current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986. Distribution calculated
from Stock Analysis Ledgers arid monthly Stock Reports of FRD District
Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986.
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TABLE A6: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RFflYFE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING PROGRAIT4E IN PALAPYE FRD REGION: 1987
OCH4DDITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 IUrALS
METRIC TONNES	 BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEF(IF
PALAPYE DERYF:
	
No RADs served by this Depot.
SE1WE DErcYr:
Calculated requirements:	 120.81 431.48 31.76	 584.04
Net distribution:	 83.40	 321.30 23.49	 428.19
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 69.03% '74.46% 73.96%	 73.32%
MAHALAPYE DEr3cfr:
Calculated requirements:	 56.18 200.65 14.77 	 271.60
Net distribution:	 33.80 192.92 14.04 	 240.76
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 60.16% 96.15% 95.06%	 88.65%
SELEBE-Wfl(WE DEIYr:
Calculated requirements:	 112.62 402.23 29.60	 544.45
Net distribution: 	 40.05 265.97 25.27 	 331.29
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 35.56% 66.12% 85.37%	 60.85%
'lUFAL FOOD REJIRENTS:
	
289.62 1034.35 76.13 	 1400.10
'lUFAL NFF DISTRIBUTION:
	




54.30% 75.43% 82.49%	 71.44%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FR]) by RADOs
and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987. Distribution
calculated from monthly FR]) Regional Stock Reports of Palapye Region,
Jan. 1987 - Dec. 1987.
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TABLE A7: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFO1MANCE OF RErVFE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING PRfJGRA1tyIE IN FRANCIS1DWN FED REGION: 1987
CC*It43DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 PADS'	 IUFAIS
METRIC 1DNNES	 BEANS M/MEAL VEG.OIL Ft DER)T
FRANCIS'lDWN DER:Yr:	 No RADs served by this Depot.
TU'IlJME DERYr:
Calculated requirements: 	 63.88	 228.14	 16.79	 308.81
Net distribution:	 55.30	 205.60	 29.10	 290.00
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 86.57%	 90.12% 173.31%	 77.99%
LETLHAKANE DErYr:
Calculated requirements: 	 98.53	 351.90	 25.90	 476.33
Net distribution:	 61.25	 235.87	 47.46	 344.58
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 62.16%	 67.03% 183.25%	 72.34%
MAUN DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 44.16	 157.72	 11.61	 213.11
Net distribution:	 51.70	 200.66	 6.48	 258.84
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 117.07% 127.22%	 55.82%	 121.24%
KASANE DEPOT: 	 No RADs served by this Depot.
IXYFAL FOOD RFJIRE7'1ENTS: 	206.57	 737.76	 54.30	 998.64
'lUFAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 168.25	 642.13	 83.04	 893.42
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF 'lUrAL RFJIRF1ENTS: 	 81.45%	 87.04% 152.93%	 89.46%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD by RADOs
and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987. Distribution
calculated from monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Francistown
Region, Jan. - Dec. 1987.
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TABLE A8: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFOPIANCE OF RFMYE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING PROGRA!11E IN LOBATSE FED REGION: 1987
(XHIDDITIES IN 	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 'IUrAIS
MEflIC TONNES	 BEANS M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEP(YF
LOBATSE DERIr:	 No RADs served by this Depot.
KANYE DEPcIF:
Calculated requirements: 	 52.87	 188.84	 13.90	 255.61
Net distribution:	 31.10	 142.26	 6.27	 179.62
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 58.82%	 75.33% 45.08%	 70.27%
TSHABONG DE1JF:
Calculated requirements: 	 30.17	 107.76	 7.93	 145.87
Net distribution:	 28.11	 88.73	 6.40	 123.24
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 93.17%	 82.33% 80.67%	 84.48%
HUKUNTSI DEFOT:
Calculated requirements:	 39.62	 141.51	 10.42	 191.55
Net distribution:	 19.65	 103.31	 7.69	 130.66
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 49.59%	 73.01% 73.85%	 68.21%
GHANZI DEIYr:
Calculated requirements:	 153.17	 547.04	 40.26	 740.47
Net distribution:	 103.70	 447.10	 44.26	 595.05
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 67.70%	 81.73% 109.92%	 80.36%
TYFAL FOOD RBUIRE7,1ENTS:	 275.84	 985.15	 72.51	 1333.50
1UAL NF DISTRIBUTION:
	




66.18%	 79.32% 89.11%	 77.13%
Sources:
1) No data for December 1987. Requirements based on beneficiary
levels reported to FRD and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Oct.
1987. Distribution calculated from monthly FED Regional Stock Reports
of Lobatse Region, Jan. - Nov. 1987.
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TABLE A9: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RFYE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING P JGRArTIE IN SEBELE FRD REGION: 1987
ct*tYJDITIES IN
	
PADS'	 PADS'	 PADS'	 UA1S
METRIC 'lDNNFS
	
BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEPOT
SEBELE DEPCIF:
	





























TYFAL FOOD RJIR4ENTS:	 228.28	 815.29	 60.00	 1103.57








1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and
current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987. Distribution calculated
from monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Sebele Region, Jan. - Dec.
1987.
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TABLE A10: NATIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RIMYI'E AREA
DWELLERS' FEEDING rJGRAIt1E IN B(YI'SWANA: 1987
OCM4DDITIES IN
	
PADS'	 PADS'	 PADS'	 REGIONAL
METRIC TONNES
	
BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL 'lUFAIS
PALAPYE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 289.62 1034.35	 76.13 1400.10
Net distribution:	 157.25	 780.19	 62.80	 1000.23
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 54.30%	 75.43% 82.49%	 71.44%
FRANCISTOWN REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 206.57	 737.76	 54.30	 998.64
Net distribution:	 168.25	 642.13	 83.04	 893.42
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 81.45%	 87.04% 152.93%	 89.46%
LOBATSE REGION:
Calculated requirements:	 275.84	 985.15	 72.51 1333.50
Net distribution:	 182.56	 781.39	 64.61	 1028.57
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 66.18%	 79.32% 89.11%	 77.13%
SEBELE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 228.28	 815.29	 60.00 1103.57
Net distribution:	 160.90	 376.00	 38.12	 575.02
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 70.48%	 46.12% 63.53%	 52.11%
IUFAL FOOD RFXUIRF7,1ENTS:
	
1000.31 3572.55 262.94 4835.81
T(YFAL NFF DISTRIBUTION:
	




66.88%	 72.21% 94.53%	 72.32%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and
current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987. Distribution calculated
from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports of FED Regions, Jan. - Dec.
1987.
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TABLE All: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RFTYI(JTE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING P UW.T1E IN PALAPYE FRD REGION: 1988
(XWDITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 'lUTALS
METRIC TONNES	 BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEIYT
PALAPYE DEYr:
	
No RADs served by this Depot.
SEROWE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 131.58 469.94	 34.59	 636.11
Net distribution:	 106.50 413.20	 29.89	 549.59
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 80.94% 87.93% 86.42%	 86.40%
MAHALAPYE DEPcIr:
Calculated requirements:	 89.40	 319.30	 23.50	 432.20
Net distribution:	 90.25	 454.94	 37.23	 582.42
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 100.95% 142.48% 158.42% 	 134.48%
SRI RRE-PHIKWE DERYr:
Calculated requirements:	 134.10	 478.92	 35.25	 648.27
Net distribution:	 107.89	 382.46	 47.05	 537.40
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 80.46%	 79.86% 133.48%	 82.90%
'IOTAL FOOD REJIRF1ENTS:	 355.09 1268.16	 93.34	 1716.58
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 304.64 1250.60 114.17	 1669.41
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REJIRF1ENTS:	 85.79%	 98.62% 122.32%	 97.25%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD by RADOs
and current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988. Distribution
calculated from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports of Palapye Region,
Jan. 1988 - Dec. 1988.
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TABLE Al2: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFMANCE OF RE4YE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING P1JGRAISI1E IN FRANCISWWN FRD REGION: 1988
CCM4)DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 IurAls
METRIC LNES	 BEANS M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEPOT
FEANCISIOWN DE1Yr:
	










































No RADs served by this Depot.
TcYFAL FOOD REJIRF1ENTS:	 462.34 1651.21 121.53	 2235.08
IUTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:
	




49.81% 41.55% 83.09%	 45.51%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD by RADOs
and current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988. Distribution
calculated from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports of Francistown
Region, Jan. - Dec. 1988.
No RADs served by this Depot.
462.34 1651.21	 121.53	 2235.08
230.30 686.00	 100.98	 1017.28
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TABLE Al2: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RFMYFE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING P JGRAt,1E IN FRANCIS'lDWN FR]) REGION: 1988
(Xfl4)DITIES IN
	
RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 1UrAIS
METRIC TONNES
	
BEANS	 H/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DELYI
FRANCIS'lDWN DEPOT:
	
No RADs served by this Depot.
IIYI1JME DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 132.25 472.34	 34.76	 639.36
Net distrthution:	 97.16 302.54	 25.10	 424.80
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 73.46% 64.05% 72.20%	 66.44%
LETLHAKANE DEIYr:
Calculated requirements: 	 193.23 690.10	 50.79	 934.12
Net distribution:	 72.92	 196.07	 65.54	 334.53
Distribution as percentage




















49.81% 41.55% 83.09% 	 45.51%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FR]) by RADOs
and current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988. Distribution
calculated from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports of Francistown
Region, Jan. - Dec. 1988.
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TABLE A13: DISTRIB!YIVE PERFORMANCE OF RF7IYrE AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING PIJ(IW+1E IN LOBATSE FED REGION: 1988
CCtfl)DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 1UrAlS
METRIC 'lDNNES	 BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DEP(Y
LOBATSE DEFCIr:
	
No RADs served by this Depot.
KANYE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 98.55	 351.97	 25.91	 476.43
Net distribution:	 34.85	 133.15	 9.96	 177.96
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 35.36%	 37.83% 38.46%	 37.35%
TSHABONG DEPYr:
Calculated requirements: 	 36.20	 129.30	 9.52	 175.02
Net thstribution:	 15.35	 72.26	 7.90	 95.51
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 42.40%	 55.89% 83.01%	 54.57%
HUKUNI DEpclr:
Calculated requirements: 	 54.98	 196.36	 14.45	 265.80
Net distribution:	 5.55	 137.75	 12.09	 155.39
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 10.09%	 70.15% 83.65%	 58.46%
GHANZI DEIUr:
Calculated requirements: 	 194.40	 694.30	 51.10	 939.80
Net distribution:	 124.00	 521.84	 48.27	 694.11
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 63.78%	 75.16% 94.47%	 73.86%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS:	 384.14	 1371.94 100.97 1857.05




46.79%	 63.05% 77.47%	 60.47%
Sources:
1) No data for December 1987. Requirements based on beneficiary
levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Jan. 1988 - Nov.
1988. Distribution calculated from FED monthly Regional Stock Reports
of Lobatse Region, Feb. - Dec. 1988.
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TABLE A14: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RE7Y1'E AREA DWELLERS'
FEEDING PROGRM4IE IN SEBELE FRD REGION: 1988
(XXfl)DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 'lUPAIS
METRIC IDNNES	 BEANS	 M/MEAL VEG.OIL FOR DELUr
SEBELE DEIOT:
	









































1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FR]) and
current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988. Distribution calculated
from monthly FR]) Regional Stock Reports of Sebele Region, Jan. - Dec.
1988.
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TABLE A15: NATIONAL DISThIB1JIVE PERFORMANCE OF REMYFE AREA
DWELLERS' FEEDING XRMT4E IN B(YrSWANA: 1988
CC13DITIES IN	 RADS'	 RADS'	 RADS'	 REGIONAL
MEflIC 'lDNNFS	 BEANS M/MEAL VEG.OIL 1UA1S
PALAPYE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 335.09	 1268.16	 93.34 1716.58
Net distribution:	 304.64	 1250.60	 114.17	 1669.41
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 85.79%	 98.62% 122.32%	 97.25%
FRANCISIOWN REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 462.34 1651.21 121.53 2235.08
Net distribution:	 230.30	 686.00	 100.98 1017.28
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 49.81%	 41.55% 83.09%	 45.51%
LOBATSE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 384.14 1371.94 100.97 1857.05
Net distribution:	 179.75	 864.99	 78.23	 1122.97
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 46.79%	 63.05% 77.47%	 65.59%
SEBELE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 236.27	 843.81	 62.10 1142.18
Net distribution:	 155.30	 739.20	 57.16	 951.66
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 65.73%	 87.60% 92.04%	 83.32%
TYAL FOOD REJIRE1ENTS:
	
1437.84 5135.12 377.94 6950.90
'lUFAL NF DISTRIaTrION:
	




60.51%	 68.95% 92.75%	 68.50%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and
current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988 • Distribution calculated
from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports of FED Regions, Jan. - Dec.
1988.
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TABLE A16: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PALAPYB REGION FED: 1986 (SC1100LS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
OOffMODITIES IN	 ICEM	 SORGHUM	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
PALAPYR DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 1827.30	 118,77	 52,48	 317.75	 306.30	 3222.60
Net distribution:	 1461.53	 669.03	 55.74	 289.85	 251.53	 2721.68
Distribution as percentage



















1643.19	 589.00	 43.15	 260.13	 269.33	 2804.80
	
1448.73	 566.21	 37.00	 251.05	 236.43	 2539.42
	
88.17%	 96.13%	 85.75%	 96.51%	 87.18%	 90.54%
	
2240.33	 942.33	 10.53	 421.96	 383.41	 4058.56
	
1925.20	 910.09	 59.89	 319.95	 337.38	 3612.51
	
85.93%	 96.58%	 84.91%	 90.04%	 87.99%	 89.01%
	








88.30%	 85.66%	 93.21%	 85.45%	 90.41%
	
87.57%
1117.11	 2978.83	 226.39	 1348.66	 1222.56	 12893.55




85.39%	 92.98%	 92.22%	 90.38%	 87.01%	 81.94%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986.
Distribution calculated from FED Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly FED Stock Reports of Palapye Region, Jan. -
Dec. 1986.
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TABLE All: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF FRANCISTOWN REGION FRD:1986 (SCHOOLS & hEALTH FACILITIES)
COMMODITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGHUM	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VRG.OIL	 TOTALS
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
FRANCISTOWN DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 1113,22	 127.81	 62.14	 361.06	 235.66	 2499.95
Net distribution:	 1206.43	 653.04	 41.91	 289.55	 199.11	 2396,64
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 108.37%	 89.72%	 71.10%	 80.19%	 84.75%	 95.87%
TUTUME DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 2011.43	 1018.42	 79.95	 480.71	 369.15	 4019.66
Net distribution:	 1195.37	 706.36	 53.12	 322.86	 208.04	 2485.75
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 59.43%	 65.50%	 66.44%	 67.16%	 56.36%	 61.84%
LETUIAXANE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 680 .66	 306.23	 21.95	 134.63	 117.94	 1261.41
Net distribution:
Distribution as percentage	 898.48	 206.69	 16.90	 81.30	 118.74	 1322.11
of total requirements: 	 132.00%	 67.50%	 76.99%	 60.39%	 100.68%	 104.81%
MAUW DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 2455.71	 771.61	 56.49	 337.25	 390.61	 4011.73
Net distribution:	 1981.23	 705.46	 36.28	 305.80	 314.53	 3343.30
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 80.68%	 91.43%	 64.22%	 90.67%	 80.51%	 83.34%
KASANE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 63.18	 101.53	 7.38	 41.78	 18.89	 238.76
Net distribution:	 50.83	 62.65	 5.66	 29.80	 12.57	 161.51
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 80.45%	 61.11%	 76.69%	 62.37%	 66.54%	 67.65%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS:	 6324.20	 2985.66	 221.91	 1361.43	 1132.31	 12031.50
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 5332.34	 2334.20	 159.81	 1029.31	 853.59	 9709.30
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS:	 84.32%	 78.18%	 70.15%	 75.61%	 75.38%	 80.70%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986.
Distribution calculated from FBI) Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly Stock Reports of Francisthwn Region FBI)
District Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986. January 1986 report nc available for Tutuie Depot. Distribution for this
month based on an average of Feb. - Dec. 1986.
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TABLE AiB: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF LOBATSE REGION FED: 1986 (SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
()MHODITIES IN	 ICEM	 SORGHUM	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
LOBATSE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 273.71	 142.08	 14,40	 86.75	 57.23	 574.17
Net distribution:	 266.97	 60.39	 9.15	 46.25	 51.90	 434.66
Distribution as percentage
of total requirement:	 97.54%	 42.50%	 63.54%	 53,31%	 90.69%	 75.70%
KANTE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 4517.60	 1678.39	 130.96	 760.40	 752.86	 7840.21
Net distribution:	 3898.29	 1563.59	 122.57	 572.48	 653.21	 6810.14
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 86.29%	 93.16%	 93.59%	 75.29%	 86.76%	 86.86%
TSHABONG DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 551.11	 159.70	 16.76	 103.23	 93.51	 924.91
Net distribution:	 549.90	 159.45	 17.06	 91.40	 92.46	 916.27
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 99.67%	 99.84%	 101.79%	 94.35%	 98.88%	 99.07%
HUKUNTSI DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 321.52	 92.24	 9.33	 58.47	 54.84	 542.40
Net distribution:	 304.11	 88.70	 9.71	 53.90	 48.60	 505.02
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 92.85%	 96.16%	 104.01%	 92.18%	 88.62%	 93.11%
GIIANZI DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 553.86	 148.86	 15.81	 93.38	 92.25	 904.16
Net distribution:	 440.14	 133.75	 14.36	 76.90	 76.48	 741.63
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 79.47%	 89.85%	 90.83%	 82.35%	 82.91%	 82.02%
TOTAL, FOOD REQUIREMENTS: 	 6224.40	 2221.27	 187.26	 1102.23	 1050.69	 10785.85
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 5459.41	 2005.88	 172.85	 846.93	 922.65	 9407.72
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS:	 87.71%	 90.30%	 92.30%	 76.84%	 87.81%	 87.22%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED, Dec.1985 - Nov.1986. Distribution calculated from FED
Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly Stock Reports of District Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986. In the area served by
Lobatse Depot, 20% of beneficiaries assumed to be on urban rations. Reports not available for Dec. 1985.
Beneficiaries and requirements for this month based on Jan. 1986 beneficiaries.
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TABLE A19: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF SEBELE REGION PRO: 1986 (SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
COI)DITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGHUM	 D.S.K.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS



















1661.79	 720,47	 63.54	 386.34	 323.62	 3155.76
	
1417.41	 618.44	 70.66	 326.85	 252.38	 2685.74
	
85.29%	 85.84%	 111.21%	 84.60%	 17.99%	 85,11%
	
3805.50	 1577.44	 117.27	 716.53	 648.15	 6864.89
	
2546.37	 1212.67	 104.16	 610.75	 450.09	 4924.04
	
66.91%	 76.88%	 88.82%	 85.24%	 69.44%	 71.73%
	
987.21	 601.24	 43.19	 262.33	 187.99	 2081.96
	
821.04	 579.23	 43.50	 243.45	 139.84	 1827.06
	
83.17%	 96.34%	 100.72%	 92.80%	 74.39%	 87.76%
6454,50	 2899.15	 224.00	 1365.20	 1159.76	 12102.61




74.13%	 83.14%	 97.46%	 86.51%	 72.63%	 77.97%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986.
Distribution calculated from FED Stock Analysis Ledgers and monthly Stock Reports of Sebele Region FED District
Depots, Jan. - Dec. 1986. In the area served by Sebele Depot, 40% of beneficiaries assumed to be on urban rations.
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TABLE AlO: NATIONAL DISTRIBI7IVE PERFORMANCE OF FED: 1986 	 (SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
COMMODITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGffl!(	 D.S.K.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
PALAPYE REGION:
Calculated requirements:	 7117.11	 2978,83	 226.39	 1348.66	 1222.56	 12893.55
Net distribution:	 6077.23	 2769.57	 208.77	 1218.90	 1063.74	 11338.22
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 85.39%	 92.98%	 92.22%	 90.38%	 81.01%	 87.94%
FRANCISTOWN REGION:
Calculated requirements:	 6324.20	 2985.66	 227,91	 1361.43	 1132.31	 12031.51
Net distribution:	 5332.34	 2334.20	 159.87	 1029.31	 853.59	 9109.31
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 84.32%	 78.18%	 70.15%	 75.61%	 75.38%	 80.70%
WBATSE REGION:
Calculated requirements:	 6224.40	 2221.27	 181.26	 1102.23	 1050.69	 10785.85
Net distribution:	 5459.41	 2005.88	 112.85	 846.93	 922.65	 9407.72
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 87.71%	 90.30%	 92.30%	 76.84%	 87.81%	 87.22%
SEBELE REGION:
Calculated requirements:	 6454.50	 2899.15	 224.00	 1365.2u	 1159.76	 12102.61
Net distribution:	 4784.82	 2410.34	 218.32	 1181.05	 842.31	 9436.84
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 74.13%	 83.14%	 97.46%	 86.51%	 72.63%	 77.97%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS: 	 26120.21	 11084.91	 865.56	 5177.52	 4565.32	 47813.52
TOTAL NET DISTRIBINION: 	 21653.80	 9519.99	 759.81	 4276.19	 3682.29	 39892.08
DISTRIB7FION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS:	 82.90%	 85.88%	 87.78%	 82.59%	 80.66%	 83.43%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1985 - Nov. 1986.
















91.58%	 119.07%	 76.06%	 67.36%
	
89.33%




TABLE A21: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PALAPYE REGION FED: 1987 (SCHOOLs REALTII FACILITIES)
(MMODITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORG1II	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTAIB















































2173.10	 991.72	 14.16	 441.76	 380.39	 4061.13
	
1985.39	 1074.46	 67.52	 380.60	 326.24	 3834.21
	
91.36%	 108.34%	 91.05%	 86.16%	 85.77%	 94.41%
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:
	










1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987.
Distribution calculated from monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Palapye Region, Jan-Dec.1981.
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TABLE A22: DISTRIBI1!IVE PERFORMANCE OF FRANGISTOWN REGION FRD:1987 (SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
)I(W)DITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGHII(	 D.S.N.	 BEANS	 VEG,OIL	 TOTAlS
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
FRANCISTOWN DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 1620.92	 932.46	 69,09	 422.54	 306.02	 3351.03
Net distribution:	 1687.43	 594.03	 41.39	 302.50	 254.07	 2819.42
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 104.10%	 63.71%	 59.91%	 71.59%	 83,02%	 85.93%
'11)TE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 2511.27	 1146.82	 85.35	 514.43	 439.36	 4697.23
Net distribution:	 1900.84	 951.02	 69.45	 421.80	 271.34	 3614.45
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 75.69%	 82.93%	 81.1%	 81.99%	 61.76%	 76.95%
LETLRAKANE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 152.33	 331.51	 24.25	 146.91	 129.99	 1385.00
Net distribution:	 790.82	 371.30	 25.56	 155.20	 148.12	 1491.00
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 105.12%	 105.39%	 112.00%	 105.64%	 113.95%	 107.65%
MAUN DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 2161.34	 907.00	 68.06	 398.62	 370.55	 3911.57
Net distribution:	 1140.15	 773.74	 45.44	 352.40	 205.30	 3117.03
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 80.29%	 85.31%	 66.76%	 88.40%	 55.40%	 79.69%
KABANE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 58.76	 103.38	 7.55	 48.88	 18.54	 237.11
Net distribution:	 57.97	 58.98	 6.10	 31.70	 22.42	 111.17
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 98.66%	 57.05%	 80.80%	 64.85%	 120.90%	 74.12%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS: 	 7110.62	 3421.17	 251.30	 1531.39	 1264.47	 13581.94
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION: 	 6177.21	 2749.07	 187.94	 1263.60	 901.25	 11279.07
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS:	 86.87%	 80.35%	 73.90%	 82.51%	 71.28%	 83.04%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987.
Distribution calculated from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports of Francistown Region, Jan. - Dec. 1987.
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TABLh A23: DISTRIBtT1IVE PERFORNANCE OF LOBAT'SE REGION FRD: 1981 (SCll(L3 & REALTII FACILITIES)
COMMODITIES IN 	 ICSM	 SORUIIIM	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTAI$
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
LOBATSE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 289.75	 148.49	 10.79	 64,79	 52.27	 566.10
Net distribution:	 364,34	 61.70	 8.70	 43.30	 44.93	 522.97
Distribution as percentage
of total requirement:	 125.74%	 41.55%	 80.58%	 66.83%	 85.96%	 92.38%
KANTE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 3737.98	 1591.32	 120.62	 715.04	 642.96	 6807.93
Net distributiofl:	 3089.54	 1636.11	 107.99	 187.85	 530.51	 5851.99
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 82.65%	 102.81%	 89.53%	 68.23%	 82.51%	 85.96%
TSIIABONG DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 482.04	 208.93	 15.05	 94.74	 82.73	 883.49
Net distribution:	 478.30	 163.12	 16.96	 81.00	 80.06	 819.43
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 99.22%	 78.08%	 112.66%	 85.50%	 96.76%	 92.75%
BUKUNTSI DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 299.09	 123,65	 8.94	 55.11	 50.72	 537.50
Net distribution:	 283.64	 96.10	 10.07	 53.55	 47.90	 491.26
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 94.83%	 17.72%	 112.61%	 97.16%	 94.45%	 91.40%
IANZI DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 457.47	 181.39	 13.93	 82.46	 77.67	 818.92
Net distribution:	 453.35	 143.55	 15.06	 61.15	 66.47	 739.58
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 99.10%	 76.60%	 108.16%	 74.16%	 85.58%	 90.31%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS:	 5266.33	 2259.78	 169.33	 1012.14	 906.35	 9613.94
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 4669.18	 2100.58	 158.77	 726.85	 769.86	 8425.24
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS:	 88.66%	 92.96%	 93.16%	 11.81%	 84.94%	 87.64%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED, Dec.1986 - Nov.1987. Distribution calculated from
monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Lobatse Region, Jan. - Dec. 1987.
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TABLE A24: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF SEBELE REGION FED: 1987 (SCHOOLS HEALTH FACILITIES)
COMMODITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGH1(	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS



















1782.50	 910.51	 61.89	 398.63	 322.51
	
1112.50	 518.20	 44.87	 313.15	 203,90
	
62.41%	 56.91%	 66.09%	 78.56%	 63.22%
	
4318.71	 1675.01	 127.94	 162.89	 725.53
	
3971.20	 1590.10	 119.90	 709.87	 495.50
	
91.95%	 94.93%	 93.71%	 93.05%	 68.30%
	
987.09	 610.62	 43,89	 265.84	 189.01
	
811.75	 575.56	 42.06	 263.65	 136.84
	
82.24%	 94.26%	 95.84%	 99.18%	 72.40%
7088.30	 3196.14	 239.72	 1427.35	 1237.05



















1) Requireaents based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987,
Distribution calculated fro ionthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Sebele Region FIll) District Depots, Jan. - Dec.
1981.
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	TABLE A25: NATIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF FED: 1987 	 (SCHOOLE & HEALTH FACILITIES)
(X)MMODITIES IN	 ICEM	 SORGHll	 O.E.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS
METRIC TUNERS	 FOR DEPOT
PALAPYR REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 7218,54	 3185.15	 236.00	 1414.48	 1252.54	 13306.71
Net distribution:	 6679.87	 3183.12	 245.26	 1235.00	 1019,21	 12362.45
Distribution as percentage
of total requireients:	 92.54%	 99.94%	 103.92%	 87.31%	 81.37%	 92.90%
FEANCISTOWN REGION:
Calculated requireients:	 7110.62	 3421.17	 254.30	 1531.39	 1264.47	 13581.94
Net distribution:	 6177.21	 2749.07	 187.94	 1263.60	 901.25	 11279.07
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 86.87%	 80.35%	 73.90%	 82.51%	 71.28%	 83.04%
WBATSE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 5266.33	 2259.78	 169.33	 1012.14	 906.35	 9613.94
Net distribution:	 4669.18	 2100.58	 158.77	 126.85	 769.86	 8425.24
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 88.66%	 92.96%	 93.76%	 71.81%	 84.94%	 87.64%
SEBELE REGION:
Calculated requirements: 	 7088.30	 3196.14	 239.72	 1427.35	 1237.05	 13188.55
Net distribution:	 5895.45	 2683.86	 206.83	 1286.67	 836.24	 10909.05
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 83.17%	 83.97%	 86.28%	 90.14%	 67.60%	 82.72%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS:	 26683.79	 12062.24	 899.35	 5385.36	 4660.41	 49691.15
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 23421.71	 10716.63	 198.80	 4512.12	 3526.56	 42975.82
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS: 	 87.18%	 88.84%	 88.82%	 83.79%	 75.61%	 86.49%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1986 - Nov. 1987.
2) Distribution calculated from .onthly FED Regional Stock Reports of the FED Regions, Jan. - Dec. 1987.
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TABLE A16: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PALAPYE REGION FRD: 1988 (SCBOOL & HEALTH FACILITIES)
COI1HODITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGHUM	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VRG.OIL	 TOTALS














































































3841.36	 2105.20	 144.85	 990.15	 1059.69
	
8141.25
14.62%	 67.01%	 63.01%	 72.08%	 107.56%	 75.02%
Source:
1) Requireients based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988.
Distribution calculated froi aonthly FRO Regional Stock Reports of Palapye Region FRD District Depots, Jan. - Dec.
1988.
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TABLE AZ?: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF FEANCISTOWN REGION FRD:1988 (SCROOLE & HEALTH FACILITIES)
CO$O)DITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGHI!(	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTAlS
METRIC TONNES 	 FOR DEPOT
FRANCISTOWN DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 1336.36	 1011,66	 75.63	 454.13	 278.28	 3162.07
Net distribution:	 1027.50	 473.02	 3886	 238.48	 176.70	 1954.56
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 76.89%	 46.48%	 51,38%	 52.51%	 63.50%	 61.81%
TIJfl6E DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 1894.41	 1155.48	 85.36	 515.10	 362.72	 4013.07
Net distribution:	 1311.57	 770.40	 53.80	 313.76	 236.29	 2685.82
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 69.23%	 66.67%	 63.03%	 60.91%	 65.14%	 66.93%
LETISAXANE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 775.46	 343.48	 24.99	 153.00	 134.01	 1430.99
Net distribution:	 650.07	 225.65	 18,23	 181.35	 126.57	 1201.87
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 83.83%	 65.70%	 72.95%	 118.53%	 94.40%	 83,99%
NAUN DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 2273.83	 907.44	 66.47	 397.59	 382.69	 4028.02
Net distribution:	 1840.53	 1009.71	 40.97	 248.94	 277.45	 3417.60
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements: 	 80.94%	 111.27%	 61.64%	 62.61%	 72.50%	 84.85%
WE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 68.02	 106.59	 7.78	 50.13	 20.05	 252,57
Net distribution:	 71.78	 49.40	 5.25	 26.18	 15.54	 168.15
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 105.52%	 46.35%	 67.49%	 52.22%	 77.52%	 66.57%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS:	 6348.08	 3530.65	 260.22	 1569.95	 1177.82	 12886.73
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 4901.45	 2528.18	 151.11	 1008.71	 832.55	 9428.00
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS: 	 77.21%	 71.61%	 60.37%	 64.25%	 70.69%	 73.16%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988.
Distribution calculated from monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Francistown Region, Jan. - Dec. 1988.
Appendix 463
TABLE A18: DIS'1'RIBYFIVE PERFORMANCE OF LOBATSE REGION FED: 1988 (SCHOOLE & HEALTH FACILITI)
)f1W)DITIES IN	 ICSN	 SORGHI!(	 D.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS
HETRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
LOBATSE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 191.24	 151,27	 11.54	 68.86	 41.73	 416.64
Net distribution:	 180.05	 41.60	 8.03	 33.35	 23.32	 286.35
Distribution as percentage
of total requirement:	 91.29%	 26.45%	 69.64%	 48.43%	 55.87%	 60.08%
KANYE DFPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 1780.42	 1685.19	 122.07	 139.12	 404.38	 4731.18
Net distribution:	 1324.16	 1014.46	 66.03	 423.41	 302.75	 3130.81
Distribution as percentage
of total requireients:	 74.31%	 60.20%	 54.09%	 57.29%	 14.81%	 66.17%
TSRABONG DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 295.20	 213.16	 16.53	 96.65	 60.71	 682.25
Net distribution:	 261.90	 98.55	 11,23	 61.03	 43.40	 482.12
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 90.15%	 46.23%	 67.94%	 63.15%	 71.49%	 10.67%
HIJKUNTSI DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 253.96	 132.45	 9.85	 60.34	 46.23	 502.83
Net distribution:	 197.44	 69.15	 7.23	 43.30	 32.58	 349.69
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 77.74%	 52.21%	 73.34%	 71,76%	 70.48%	 69.54%
I DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 351.81	 195,19	 14.33	 86.52	 65.18	 713,02
Net distribution:	 305.31	 77.60	 7.98	 58.35	 57.78	 506.82
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 86,78%	 39.76%	 55.69%	 67.44%	 88.35%	 71.08%
TOTAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS: 	 2878.63	 2383.25	 174.31	 1051.50	 618.23	 7105.92
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION: 	 2274.81	 1301.36	 100.50	 619.44	 459.63	 4755.79
DISTRIBUTION A9 PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS:	 79.03%	 54.60%	 57.65%	 58.91%	 74.35%	 66.93%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED, Dec.1987 - Nov.1988. Distribution calculated from
monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Lobatse Region, Jan. - Dec. 1988.
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TABLE A29: DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF SEBELE REGION FED: 1988 (SCHLE & REALTH FACILITIES)
COMW)DITIES IN	 ICSM	 SORGH1I1	 D.S.N.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTM$
METRIC TONNES	 FOR DEPOT
SEBELE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements:	 1008,59	 979.12	 70.54	 423.65	 231,43	 2713.34
Net distribution:	 618.00	 561.70	 52.80	 273.80	 154.52	 1660.82
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 61.27%	 57.37%	 74.85%	 64.63%	 66.77%	 61.21%
LEPOLOLE DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 2655.32	 1750.68	 132.17,	 789.21	 524.83	 5852.24
Net distribution:	 1767.70	 1286.50	 15.70	 654.90	 290.80	 4075.60
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 66,57%	 73.49%	 57.28%	 82.98%	 55.41%	 69,64%
XHUDI DEPOT:
Calculated requirements: 	 557.54	 621.95	 45.36	 269.09	 137.03	 1630.96
Net distribution:	 309.30	 325.00	 50.90	 189.30	 14.60	 949.10
Distribution as percentage
of total requirements:	 55.48%	 52.25%	 112.22%	 70.35%	 54.44%	 58.19%
TOTAL FOOHEQUIREMENTS:	 4221.45	 3351.15	 248.01	 1481.98	 893.29	 10196.53
TOTAL NET DISTRIBUTION:	 2695.00	 2113.20	 179.40	 1118.00	 519.92	 6685.52
DISTRIBUTION AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL REQUIRENENTS: 	 63.84%	 64.84%	 72.32%	 75.44%	 58.20%	 65.57%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FED and current ration levels, Dec. 1981 - Nov. 1988.
Distribution calculated from monthly FED Regional Stock Reports of Sebele Region, Jan. - Dec. 1988.
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	TABLE A30: NATIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE OF FRD: 1988	 (SCIIOOLS & HEALTS FACILITIES)
())I1MODITIES IN 	 ICSK	 SORGRI!f	 0.S.M.	 BEANS	 VEG.OIL	 TOTALS
























5147.66	 3115.71	 229.88	 1373.62	 985.21	 10852.09
	
3841.36	 2105.20	 144.85	 990.15	 1059.69	 8141.25
	
74.62%	 67.57%	 63,01%	 72.08%	 107.56%	 15.02%
	
6348.08	 3530.65	 260.22	 1569.95	 1177.82	 12886.73
	
4901.45	 2528.18	 157.11	 1008.71	 832.55	 9428.00
	
77.21%	 71.61%	 60.37%	 64.25%	 70.69%	 13.16%
	
































OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS: 	 73.14%	 65.49%	 63.77%	 68.22%	 78.15%	 70.69%
Sources:
1) Requirements based on beneficiary levels reported to FRD and current ration levels, Dec. 1987 - Nov. 1988.
Distribution calculated from monthly FRD Regional Stock Reports FRD Regions, Jan. - Dec. 1988.
N/ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q88 84.84%
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flg.A3:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND 8CHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes	 1986
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Fig.A5:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1986
AlIENAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q88: 88.00% 	 PALAPYE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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Fig.A6:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS)
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Fig.A7:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RAD8. 8CHOOLB & HEALTH FACILITIE8)
Metric Tonnes	 1986
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Fig.A8:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
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FiciA11;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1986
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988. 81.43%	 FRANCISTOWN FAD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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Fia.A13:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1986
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q88: 88.28%	 F	 KANYE FRD
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Eig.A14:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
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Fia.A15:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonne8	 1986
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988; 87.22%	 [ HUKUNTSI FRD
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Fig.A16:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
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Eig.A17:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRiBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
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Fig.A18:BOTSWANA: FOOD AII1DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
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Fig.A19:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRiBUTION
IFRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1986
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Fig.A20;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
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JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 86
Months of the Year
[_ii Food ReqUirement	 Food DistribUtion
































Fici.A21:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
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Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Bourc. PRO Stock Anil yill L.da.r..i9e6
Fiçi.A22:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance

















AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1B88: 8068% 	
[	 BOTSWANA	
IBASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	 NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 86
Months of the Year
LFood Requirement	 Food Distributioni





Fiçi.A23: BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND 8CHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes
500 ii
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q87 Q4.28%











JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
	
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourci FRO Stock Anat yali L.da.r.. 1957
Fig.A24: BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RAD8. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
A/ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q88: 88.64%	 SEROWE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
I	 DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution













Fig.A25:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance

















AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1887 88.05%	 MAHALAPYE FRD1
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Lii Food Requirement 	 Food Distributio
5ourc.i FRDtock Anil y.Ia L,d p .r. 1987
Fig.A26;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RAD8. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1986 85.04%	
'SELEBE-PHIKWE FRD1
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
itiiiiiititt
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution









Fig.A27;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance














/ERA3E DISTRIBUTION IN 1987: 90.88% 	 PALAPYE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENErICIAAY LEVELS 	
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Lii Food Requirement 	 Food Distribution
Sourc.a FRD Stock Ansivil. L.d p .r.. 1S7
Fig.A28:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1087: 86.03% 	 RANCISTOWN FRU.4
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
I	 DISTRICT DEPOT
0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution












Fig.A29:BOTSWANA: FOOD AiD DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
700
650 AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1987; fl'9	 TUTUME FRD













JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution 1
Sourc.j FRD Stock An.l y.l. L.d p .ri, 1087
Fig.A30:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. 8CHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnea	 1987
400 (I
A/ERASE DISTRIBUTION IN 1987; 98.82%
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Months of the Year
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&ourc.t PRO Stock An.IviIi L,d p .rs. 108!
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Fig.A31:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonne8	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988. 81.84% 	 MAUN FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement 	 Food Distribution
Sourc.i FRD Stock Anulvit. L.da.ri. 1987
Fici.A32:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
















AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988: 74.12%
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JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Bourc. FRO Stock An.t y.I. L.da.r.. 1987
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Fki.A33:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1887: 83.48%	 FRANCISTOVN FRD1
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Bourc.z FRD stock Mulvil. L.daarl. ill
Fig.A34:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1086: 92.38%	 LOBATSE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution


























Fig,A35:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric TonneB	 1 987
IERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN i g eo os.aoz	
L 
KANYE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
ayr'
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
[ood_Requirement	 Food Distribution
8ourc.z FRD Stock Anil yili L.dp ,r.. 1987
Eig.A36:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS &. HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnee	 1987
AVERACE DISTRIBuTION IN 1B87; p1.68%	 TSHABONG FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
[	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution




























Fia.A37:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
A'ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1987. 85.30%	 HUKUNTSI FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
S purcui FRD Stock Anhl yils L.da.r.. 1987
Fia.A38:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1987: 85.59%	 GHANZI FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution




























Fig.A39:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. 8CHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1987
1400	 A/ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q67: 86.30%
1200 
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S purc p i FRD Stock Anilvit. Lidauri. 1987
Fig.A40:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS)
Metric Tonnea	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988: 82.97% 	 SEBELE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution













Fig.A41: BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric TonneB	 1987
/ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1987: 88.77% 	 MOLEPOLOLE FRD1
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement 	 Food Distribution
Sourc. FRO Stock Anht yil. Lidasri. 1967
Eig.A42;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRiBUTiON
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonne8	 1987
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1987; 88.89% 	 MOCHUDI FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
L DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution































Fig.A43:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)











AVERAGE OISTRIBIJTION IN 1886. 80.36% 	
[_
SEBELE FRD	 1
BASED ON RECORDED BEN5FICIARV LEVELS	
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourc.i PRO Stock Anil yil. Ladder.. 1BT
Fig.A44:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance

















/ERAOE DISTRIBUTION IN Q88. 85.23%	 BOTSWANA	 IBASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	 ATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 87
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
5ourc. PRO Stock Analvill L.daara. 1957
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AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN i g aB; 73.70%













Fig.A45: BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTiON
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance




- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
[od Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourca Ff0 Stack An g Lyil, L.dolri. 1958
Fig.A46: BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q88; 76.83% 	 SEROWE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS
[_DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
[ood Requirement	 Food Distribution













Fig.A47:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DiSTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnea	 1988
A'ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1388: 77.43% 	 I MAHALAPYE FRD1
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	 L DISTRICT DEPOTn
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourc.: FRD Stock Analvita Lsd p .ri. 1988
Fig.A48:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnee	 1988
A/ERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1Q88: 83.31% 	 SELEBE-PHIKWE FRD1
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution






























AIERAOE DISTRIBUTION IN 1088: 7800%














Fig .A49;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourca FRD Stock An.IviI. L.do.rI. iSS
Fig.A50:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIE8 AND SCHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
A/ERAGE DIsTRIBuTIoN IN 188: 81.81% 	 RANCISTOWN FRE
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
I	 DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
[_	
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution













Eig,A51:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RAp S. 8CHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
'dEBASE DISTRIBUTION IN 1088: 88.88%	
[	
TUTUME FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Bourc.t FAD Block Ansl y.I p L.da.r,. 198
Fig.A52:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRiBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
















A/ERAI3E DISTRIBUTION IN 1988 84 98%
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Fig.A53:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RApS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIE3)
Metric Tonnes	 1 988
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988; 78.38%
BD O4 RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	 L MAUN FRDDISTRICT DEPOT
- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement 	 Food Distribution
Sourc. FRD Stock An.l ysI. L.d p .ru . 1959
Fig.A54;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance


















AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 19e6; 6.57%
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Fic.A55:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
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Months of the Year
Food Requirement 	 Food Distribution
8ourc.i FAD 8tock Anil ysi. L.da.ri. 1903
Fia.A56;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
80 (1
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988: 80.08%
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Fia.A57:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FIRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACIUTIES)
Me trio Tonnes	 1988
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1888: 	 KANYE FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS	
DISTRICT DEPOT
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JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
[od Requirement	 Food Distributioni
Sourcsi FRD Stock Analvil. L.da,r.. 1988
Fig.A58:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metrio Tonnes	 1988
/VERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1888: 67.38% 	 TSHABONG FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food DistributloJ


























AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988; 65,71%




Fig.A59:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance















JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourcsi FRO 8toc Ani?viIu L.da.rs
Fig.A60;BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RApS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
4VERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988; 72.86%	 GHANZI FRD
BASED ON RECORDED BENEFICIARY LEVELS 	
DISTRICT DEPOT
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution














Fig.A61:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
















JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourc.! FRD Stock kn.l yiIa L.dp.ri. 1985
Fig.A62:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(HEALTH FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
.EIERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988 8659%	 LOBATSE FRD





II AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1986; 61.21%
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Months of the Year
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Appendix 497
Fici.A63: BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FAD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988: 71.48% 	 1MOLEPOLOLE FRD1
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Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribut1J
Sourcrn FAD Stock An.l yuI. L.dolr.. 1955
Fig.A64:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTQN
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance













AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988; 80.34%
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Fkj.A65:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILiTIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988






JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
88
Months of the Year
L.I Food Requirement	 Food Distribution
Sourcez FRD Stock Anhl yal. L.da,ra. 1983
Fig.A66:BOTSWANA: FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION
FRD Monthly Distributive Performance
(RADS. SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES)
Metric Tonnes	 1988
AVERAOE DISTRIBUTION IN 1988: 70.57% 	
r	
BOTSWANA
BASED ON RECORDED BENEPICIARY LEVELS 	
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
I	 88
Months of the Year
Food Requirement	 Food Distribution





























PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88




























83 I 84	 I 85	 I 86	 87	 88	 I
Quarter/Year
REGISTERED	 NON-8CHOOL ---% NON-SCHOOL1
8ourcrn FRD. Osboran. iQ8-i8.
Fig.A68: SEROWE FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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REGISTERED	 NON-8CHOOL	 % NON-8CHOOL














PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88































83 I 84	 85	 I 86	 87	 88
Quarter/Year
LREQISTERED	 NON-SCHOOL —a— % NON8CHOJ
Source FAD. Guboror. 18S-198&
Fici.A70: SELBE —PHIKWE FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 198388
ChIldren 6-10 years ('0008) 	 Percentage Non-School
SOMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSD
183 I 84	 I 85	 I 86	 87	 I 88
Quarter/Year
REQI8TERED	 NON-8CHOOLS ---% NON-SCHOOL



























PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 198388


























183	 84	 I 85	 I 86	 I 87	 88	 I
Quarter! Year
\1 REGISTERED	 NON-8CHOOL ——% NON-SCHOOL
Sourcap FRD. G.barp n. 193-1V8.
Fig.A72: TUTUME FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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Quarter/Year
EREGI8TERED	 NON-SCHOOL --% NON..SCHOOLJ














PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
Children 6-10 years ('000s) 	 Percentage Non-School
Quarter! Year
[iREGI8ThRED	 NON-8CHOOL	 —% NON-SCHOOL
Sourc. FAD. Giboron. 131V
Fia.A74: MAUN FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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Quarter/Year
\REGISTERED	 NON-SCHOOL —--% NON-8CHOj























































PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
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Quarter! Year
REGISTERED	 NON-SCHOOL	 % NON-SCHOOL
Sourc. FRD. Gaboron. 1963-1988.
Fig.A76: LOBATSE FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
SDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSD
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PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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Quarter/Year
REGISTERED	 NON-SCHOOL -- % NON-SCHOOL
SOUrCIL FAD. Guboroni 188-1986.
Fig.A78: TSHABONG FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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Percentage Non-SchoolChildren 6-10 years
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Fig .A79; HUKUNTS! FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 198388
SDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSD
183	 84	 85	 I 86	 87	 I 88	 I
Quarter/Year
\REGI8TERED	 NON-SCHOOL ——% NON-8CHOOL
8ourc. Ff0. Gibaron. 1983-19p5.
Fig.A80; GANTSI FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
SDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSD
83 I 84	 85	 I 86	 87	 88	 I
Quarter/Year
[REGISTERED	 NON-SCHOOL --% NON-SCHOOL
Bourc.c Ff0. Gaboron. 1983-igaL
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Fici.A81: SEBELE FAD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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Quarter/Year
REOI8TERED	 NON-8CHOOL -- % NON-SCHOOL
8ourc. FRO. Gsboron. 1gB3-168.
Fig.A82; MOLEPOLOLE FRD
PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
Children 6-10 years ('OOOs)	 Percentage Non-School
SDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSDMJSD
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Quarter! Year
REGI8TERED	 NQN-8CHOOL ---% NON-SCHOOL






















PROPORTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN REGISTERED AT SCHOOL: 1983-88
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